Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06SUVA133, FIJI MILITARY'S INTENTIONS: A WORRYING UPDATE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SUVA133.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SUVA133 2006-04-03 02:32 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Suva
VZCZCXRO9893
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHSV #0133/01 0930232
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 030232Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SUVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3002
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1178
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0071
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 0798
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0974
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SUVA 000133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2031 
TAGS: PINS PGOV MARR PREL FJ
SUBJECT: FIJI MILITARY'S INTENTIONS: A WORRYING UPDATE 
 
REF: A. SUVA 64 
 
     B. SUVA 72 
     C. SUVA 92 
     D. SUVA 98 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Larry Dinger.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (S)  The secret report of a late-February conversation 
between Fiji Police Commissioner Hughes (protect) and 
Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) Commander Bainimarama 
is worrisome reading, with Bainimarama signaling he is 
willing to remove Prime Minister Qarase and place himself in 
power if the PM and his party win reelection in May and 
continue their present course.  Hughes noted (as we have) 
that the Commander's views in a conversation often vary from 
benign to a sense that military intervention is nearly 
inevitable.  Hughes concludes that Bainimarama is distorting 
and exaggerating the Fiji situation in describing what he 
sees as a duty to the nation that transcends democratic 
principles and processes.  Hughes reportedly warned the 
Commander that he is contemplating "treason," which would 
bring him into conflict with the police, the courts and the 
international community.  Bainimarama dismissed such "by the 
book" concerns as not applying to the Fiji context.  He added 
that he does not care about a possible loss of aid from 
Australia, the United States and New Zealand.  Hughes sees a 
"strong possibility" of a coup, if Qarase wins and doesn't 
alter course. 
 
2. (C)  In other developments, Bainimarama led 200-400 armed 
troops in a "parade" through Suva on the day Fiji's 
Parliament went into pre-election dissolution.  Our 
conversations with RFMF senior officers lately leave the 
impression the Commander has the support of his troops.  In 
conversations with Bainimarama, the Embassy and senior 
visitors have made clear U.S. views of the proper 
civil-military relationship and have signaled the sort of 
negative consequences that would follow a coup.  It is 
possible the RFMF's recent statements are bluff, intended to 
influence voters against Qarase and his party in the 
elections; but even that would be disturbing.  We will 
continue efforts to convince military leaders to act in 
appropriately democratic fashion.  Commander Bainimarama's 
Iraq-planning visit to Washington in late April will be 
another opportunity to reiterate USG views.  End Summary. 
 
Fiji's fractured civil-military relations 
----------------------------------------- 
3. (C) We have received several indications in recent weeks 
that the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) is seriously 
contemplating a coup if the current Qarase government is 
reelected and doesn't change course.  Reftels lay out the 
fractured relationship between RFMF Commander Bainimarama and 
Prime Minister Qarase's government and indications that the 
RFMF might seek to remove the government if it continues to 
act contrary to the RFMF's view of the national interest. 
Bainimarama drew two lines in the sand in February: if Fiji's 
Great Council of Chiefs selections in early March of Fiji's 
new President and Vice President were tainted by the 2000 
coup (in the end the GCC reselected the incumbents, fine with 
the RFMF) or if constitutionally required elections in 2006 
are flawed.  Bainimarama has since qualified the elections 
issue, saying the RFMF believes the elections will inevitably 
be manipulated by the Qarase government and will not be free 
and fair; however, the new government may be given a chance 
to perform appropriately: to set aside flawed reconciliation 
and fishing-rights bills; to turn away from 
"racist/nationalist" politics. 
 
Added evidence of RFMF "coup" contemplation 
------------------------------------------- 
4. (S)  We received on March 30 a copy of a "secret" memo 
Fiji Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes (protect) wrote after 
meeting with Commander Bainimarama on February 27. 
Admittedly the memo is a month old, but Hughes told an 
interlocutor on March 30 he considers it still accurate. 
(Hughes, an Australian Federal Police officer on secondment 
to Fiji, is home on holiday for two weeks, so we cannot 
follow up at the moment.  We have known him to be a solid, 
professional policeman with excellent judgment.)  In recent 
months, relations between Hughes and Bainimarama, which 
appeared relatively close seven months ago, have clearly 
become strained.  The Feb. 27 meeting did not help matters. 
Hughes portrayed an erratic Bainimarama surrounded by a 
compliant officers corps that is feeding the Commander's 
 
SUVA 00000133  002 OF 003 
 
 
sense of righteous grievance against the Qarase government. 
 
5. (S)  Hughes attempted unsuccessfully to allay 
Bainimarama's concern that the police were gearing up to 
confront the army.  The conversation then broadened to the 
RFMF's Pakistan-like "doctrine of necessity," put forth as 
justification for potential military action against the 
government (ref A).  Bainimarama railed against the "evil, 
corrupt, cannibalistic" Qarase government and expressed 
regret for putting Qarase in power during the events of 2000. 
 He said he should have retained power himself, for 5, 10, 
even 40 years.  Now, if he must remove the distasteful Qarase 
government, he would not appoint an interim government but 
would rule by himself.  Bainimarama discussed three possible 
flashpoints.  First was the March president and vice 
president selection process (now OBE).  Second would be 
re-election of the Qarase government.  Bainimarama said he 
"would not tolerate regression back to ethno-nationalism." 
Third, if the Indo-Fijian-dominated Labor Party wins the 
election and civil disorder results, the military would step 
in to restore order (seemingly to buttress the government, 
not to remove it). 
 
"Coup as catastrophe" argument falls on deaf ears 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
6. (S)  Bainimarama rejected Hughes view that a military 
government would be catastrophic for Fiji, suggesting that 
unnamed Indo-Fijian businessmen had told him Fiji could 
bounce back from another coup in 18 months.  Bainimarama 
added that he does not care about international reaction, 
including the possible loss of aid money from Australia, the 
United States and New Zealand. 
 
"Don't worry" v. "the stick" 
---------------------------- 
7. (S)  Hughes noted (as we have) inconsistencies in 
Bainimarama's logic.  He swung between saying "Don't worry, 
there won't be a military intervention" to implying a near 
inevitability of intervention no matter what happens at the 
polls.  Hughes reported he told Bainimarama that removing the 
government "would amount to treason."  The police, the 
courts, and others would be compelled in turn to take action 
against him.  Bainimarama dismissed this as "doing it by the 
book," which would not work under the circumstances.  Hughes 
suggested Bainimarama should educate rather than threaten. 
The Commander said education wouldn't work.  The Fijian 
people "only respond to the stick from us."  When Hughes 
raised practical issues for his police under a coup scenario, 
including for personal-protection officers who might be 
caught in the middle, Bainimarama responded: "as long as they 
didn't get in the way, they would be all right."  The Hughes 
memo notes that the police would be powerless to prevent a 
takeover. 
 
Lines have been drawn 
--------------------- 
8. (S)  In conclusion, Hughes painted a bleak situation in 
which "the lines have been drawn."  Hughes alleged the 
Commander is "distorting and exaggerating" the situation in 
Fiji to suit his own agenda.  He sees a duty to protect the 
nation in a role that "transcends democratic principles and 
processes."  He professes not to want to intervene 
militarily, but unless the government and Great Council obey 
his demands, he will take over.  He will not listen to 
contrary views and is underestimating or ignoring the 
repercussions of a coup.  Hughes concludes that Bainimarama 
is prepared for a military takeover, and there is a strong 
possibility this will occur if Qarase is returned to power in 
May and pursues policies that offend the Commander's sense of 
what is right.  Hughes ends by judging that the RFMF is not 
as strong nor as well-led as in 1987 (Fiji's first coups). 
In any coup attempt, factions would occur.  Hughes predicts 
any military government would be inherently unstable, which 
would lead to bloodshed and, inevitably, to that government's 
downfall. 
 
Recent events: an RFMF march in the streets 
------------------------------------------- 
9. (U) In March, Bainimarama and his spokesmen injected 
themselves frequently into Fiji's political debate.  On March 
27, the day Parliament was dissolved to make way for the 
elections (May 6-13), the commander led some 200-400 
(estimates vary) of his troops in a military "parade" across 
the capital city, passing by the Parliament compound.  The 
soldiers and their leader dressed in camouflage and carried 
weapons.  Bainimarama told the media the soldiers were doing 
"what soldiers should be doing - taking long walks, but this 
 
SUVA 00000133  003 OF 003 
 
 
is a public display of reassurance to the public." 
 
RFMF inner circle: support for the Commander 
-------------------------------------------- 
10. (C) At a recent social event hosted by the Embassy DATT, 
the Ambassador talked at length with several of Commander 
Bainimarama's inner circle, stressing the importance of the 
military taking its appropriate place subordinate to the 
elected civilian leadership in a democracy.  A few months 
ago, similar conversations with RFMF officers brought 
reasonably comforting responses: that the RFMF fully 
understood the lessons from 1987 and 2000: coups are a 
disaster for Fiji, and the nation "can not go down that road 
again."  Now the responses are unsettling: that the Qarase 
government and its corrupt, racist policies are a disaster; 
the RFMF has a duty to protect Fiji's best interests; the 
Commander has the support of his troops; the RFMF does not 
want to act but will do so if necessary. 
 
Comments 
-------- 
11. (S) The Ambassador, the DATT, and senior-level visitors 
like PACOM Commander Fallon, CENTCOM Commander Abizaid, and 
MFO Director General Larocco have good relations with 
Commander Bainimarama.  All have used interactions with the 
Commander in recent months to emphasize the U.S. view of 
civil-military relations.  Bainimarama is certainly giving 
the impression that, despite such advice, he is prepared to 
remove the Qarase government, if that government is reelected 
in May and if it then does not immediately change course to 
policies that meet RFMF approval.  The realities that such a 
course would contribute to Fiji's "coup culture," would have 
severe economic consequences, especially for Fiji tourism, 
and would result in ruptured military relations, including 
cancellation of the U.S. Army Pacific PAMS conference which 
is now scheduled for Fiji in September, appear not to be 
major factors in Bainimarama's calculations.  Such factors 
also do not seem to sway the senior officers we have been 
talking to lately. 
 
12. (S) It is conceivable that the rhetoric is just bluff, 
intended to influence the voting public to reject Qarase and 
his cohort in the elections.  Bainimarama has backed away 
from extreme statements before, suggesting he had been 
misunderstood.  Bainimarama and some of his senior officers 
have repeatedly tried to reassure us, saying "you don't need 
to worry."  Still, Commissioner Hughes is clearly worried 
that the threats are not bluff.  We worry, too.  We worry 
that the threats may be real, and we worry that, in any case, 
such threats will warp Fiji's electoral environment to the 
detriment of a free and fair election.  We will continue to 
utilize opportunities to try to convince RFMF leaders to play 
their proper, limited role in Fiji's governance.  Commander 
Bainimarama is planning to attend an Iraq planning conference 
in Washington later this month.  That will be another 
opportunity for the USG to reiterate its views. 
DINGER