VZCZCXRO6515
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHSM #0527/01 1081332
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181332Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0093
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEADRO/HQ ICE DRO WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000527 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NB, EB, AND DS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016 
TAGS: PREL EAIR MARR PGOV PINR SW
SUBJECT: SWEDEN:  THE NEW POST "CIA PLANES" REALITY -- 
POLITICIZING A DEPORTATION FLIGHT CLEARANCE 
 
REF: HQ ICE DRO WASHINGTON DC DTG 281545Z MAR 06 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Stephen V. Noble, reason 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1.  (c) What could have been a routine diplomatic flight 
clearance for a 4/4 Department of Homeland Security 
deportation "ICE" flight to land briefly and refuel in Sweden 
enroute to final destinations in the Middle East developed 
into an urgent situation when late in the game Swedish 
authorities began questioning the procedures for and the 
substance of the flight.  The Government of Sweden concern 
appears to have grown out of reports of "CIA Planes" landing 
at European airports.  The GoS has signaled that a higher 
level of scrutiny and more specific requirements will be 
applied for the clearance of certain categories of state 
aircraft -- including any future ICE charter flights -- and 
that these flights will not be deemed to be covered by a 
bilateral blanket clearance.  Any future ICE clearance 
requests should include the same categories of information 
demanded by the GoS for this flight (see below), and this 
should be provided at least 20 days before the flight.  End 
Summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
¶2.  (c) Polcouns was summoned to the MFA 3/30 by Americas 
Department senior adviser Olof Hultgren, who said that the 
MFA had been made aware of a USG-chartered flight scheduled 
to stop at Arlanda airport late 4/4 for refueling.  Hultgren 
asked us to confirm the nature of the flight (deportations to 
third countries beyond Sweden), and informed us that the GoS 
viewed this flight as a state aircraft.  The charter company, 
ATA, reportedly had filed a routine flight plan, which Sweden 
viewed as not appropriate or adequate in this case,  Hultgren 
said that according to the requirements for clearance of 
state aircraft flights in Sweden, "Block 18" of the flight 
plan was to be filled in.  Hultgren referred to the blanket 
authorization agreement for state aircraft and provided a 
copy of it, indicating this would provide a basis for a state 
aircraft clearance.  (DAO note:  In hindsight, it appears 
that the MFA officer was not familiar with the proper use of 
blanket clearances, nor the specific requirements that our 
blanket clearances were authorized for.)  Hultgren said 
Sweden's MOD had told the MFA that they were surprised to 
learn that a February charter ICE flight also had not been 
submitted as a state aircraft, and that this did not meet the 
requirements of the MOD and the GoS.  He said the 
then-pending 4/4 flight must meet the state aircraft 
requirements as indicated.  We replied that we would pass the 
request to Washington. 
 
¶3.  (c) After 3/31 consultations with the Department (EB, PM, 
L), Econcouns was informed by L that the chartered flight met 
the definition of "state aircraft."  Econcouns provided the 
Department the number listed in the blanket authorization for 
state aircraft.  Late in the evening of 4/3, MOD Lt. General 
Johnsson advised the DATT that the blanket authorization 
would not be valid for this flight.  On 4/4, the day the 
flight departed, Econoff was advised by the MFA that we would 
need to apply to the MOD for a specific clearance for this 
flight.  He said it was considered a state aircraft, but was 
not covered by the blanket agreement.   Neither the MFA nor 
Sweden's Civil Aviation Authority could help; the matter was 
under the control of the Swedish defense authorities. 
 
¶4.  (c) When DAO submitted a request for a specific 
diplomatic flight clearance for this flight, MOD required 
answers to the following questions: 
 
a.  Which American agency is doing the transporting? 
b.  What categories of persons are being transported? 
c.  Are they being transported willingly or with force? 
d.  Is there a reason for Swedish authorities to help with 
security? 
e.  Are there going to be local authorities at their final 
destinations? 
 
After answers to these questions were provided, supplemental 
questions were posed: 
 
a.  For which specific types of illegal activities are they 
being deported? 
b.  How are the passengers restrained while onboard? 
c.  To which local authorities will they be turned over at 
their destinations? 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000527  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶5.  (c) The questions appear to be directed at finding out 
whether this flight was for renditions or prisoner transfers 
connected with the war on terror -- a sensitivity Hultgren 
mentioned to us explicitly.  The press did not report on this 
flight, but picked up on the February flight, which was 
correctly reported as being a deportation flight.  Any 
subsequent flights should anticipate the same questions, and 
be prepared to provide answers at least 20 days ahead of the 
flight.  What is not yet clear is whether the new 
requirements are simply an indication of a government 
sensitive to the renditions/prisoner transfer issue in the 
run-up to general elections in September, or if Sweden wants 
to make the clearance process so difficult that we will seek 
other refueling venues.  What is clear is that if we wish to 
continue using Sweden as a refueling point, we will have to 
become accustomed to these and perhaps more questions. 
NOBLE