VZCZCXRO0590
OO RUEHQU
DE RUEHPU #0595/01 0931412
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031412Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2714
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0999
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0846
RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC 0436
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0871

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 000595 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR 
S/CRS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR 
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PKAO MARR ASEC HA
SUBJECT: USAID-MINUSTAH PARTNERSHIP ADVANCES PEACE IN 
HAITI'S SLUMS 
 
REF: A. 05 PAUP 2493 
     ¶B. 05 PAUP 2239 
 
¶1. This message is sensitive but unclassified: please protect 
accordingly. 
 
¶2. (U) Summary.  This message summarizes the Haiti Transition 
Initiative (HTI), the USAID sponsored program to reduce 
violence and restore stability in Port au Prince's most 
volatile slums.  USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives 
(OTI) implements HTI through the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM).  HTI has achieved initial success in 
several areas, and the program should serve as one possible 
model for a refocused and expanded effort to combat gangs and 
improve living conditions throughout the sprawling Cite 
Soleil slum, which has become the epi-center of gang activity 
that destabilizes the entire capital.  HTI directly addresses 
the goal of reducing gang violence, which was identified as 
one of two critical measures to promote Haiti's transition to 
democracy.  Moreover,  President-elect Preval has identified 
improvement of conditions and the establishment of order in 
Cite Soleil as one of his most pressing priorities.  The 
long-term solution to criminality in Cite Soleil is robust 
and community-based law-enforcement that goes well beyond 
military patrols and checkpoints.  Nevertheless, the 
practices that HTI employed in Bel Air in developing 
community trust and support would apply in Cite Soleil.  End 
Summary. 
 
HTI Funds Programs in Bel Air 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (U)  Post reprogrammed USD 3 million in FY 05 Economic 
Support Funds and added USD 2.5 of supplemental funding to 
fund HTI community programs.  Post had originally allocated 
the ESF for  violence reduction programs run by MINUSTAH's 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) program, 
but shifted strategy when it became clear that the DDR 
program was ineffective.  The program took hold in May 2005 
when HTI, at the suggestion of community leaders in Bel Air, 
reconstructed a public performance center that had been 
burned to the ground after a dispute between pro-Lavalas 
supporters and the HNP.  The reconstruction of this public 
performance center built confidence between community leaders 
and HTI program managers.  The community leaders developed 
additional proposals for HTI funded programs, including the 
renovation of roads and "Play for Peace" summer youth 
activities. 
 
Gang-Related Killings Outrage Community Leaders 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Twice thoughout the summer, gang members targeted 
"Play for Peace" activities.  Community leaders were outraged 
and responded by giving HTI the names and locations of the 
gang members responsible for the killings.  HTI approached 
the Brazilian MINUSTAH CIVPOL commander for the neighborhood 
with the information.  At first, he hestitated to intervene 
questioning that the allegations that the gang members werer 
targeting the summer camp activities.  UN headquarters in New 
York applied pressure to MINUSTAH to provide security for the 
programs.  The Brazilian's were receptive to advice from 
headquarters; it was at this point that 'the carrot started 
speaking to the stick' according to HTI program assistant 
Stephanie Broughton. 
 
Enter MINUSTAH 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  For each target neighborhood, HTI gave MINUSTAH 
maps and briefing papers describing the program, the type and 
location of projects, current security issues within the 
community, and opportunities for collaboration  They used 
this information to provide a strong security presence in 
these areas, but continued to focus on providing a security 
presence near HTI-funded programs and projects.  Not only did 
MINUSTAH now have the intelligence it previously lacked, but 
also MINUSTAH had confidence and support of the communities 
 
PORT AU PR 00000595  002 OF 002 
 
 
they were supposed to protect. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) As the program progressed, Brazilian MINUSTAH 
forces set up a new base in the Fort National community of 
Bel Air.  HTI followed and started working with community 
leaders to rebuild roads, create sidewalks, and repair canals 
while MINUSTAH established regular patrols.  MINUSTAH forces 
living in the neighborhood also suggested projects. 
Community leaders and HTI program implementers noticed a 
change in the Fort National neighborhood: gang-members were 
losing power and were unable to intimidate the communities as 
employment became available, structural improvements became 
evident, and a security presence became strong.  According to 
HTI, "People were working, MINUSTAH was patrolling, and gangs 
could no longer intimidate the population." 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Emboldened by the sight of MINUSTAH security 
forces, more communities in Bel Air requested HTI funded 
programs and a stronger security presence.  In Autumn 2005, 
community leaders from Ti Cheri, a Bel Air community 
bordering Fort National, asked Fort National residents how 
they too could have the HTI/MINUSTAH support for their 
community.  Fort National community leaders introduced 
leaders from Ti Cheri to HTI and HTI started on similar 
programs in the new neighborhood. 
 
¶8.  (U) At this point, HTI declared its Bel Air program a 
success.  One neighborhood after another had requested an 
HTI-MINUSTAH presence.  Areas off limits even to MINUSTAH 
forces six months prior, were accessible.  In response to the 
disappearance of the gangs, community leaders from a Bel Air 
neighborhood called Gwo Woche (which means big rock in Creole 
and was named after a large rock where gang members would 
hold voodoo ceremonies before they would commit crimes) 
requested that HTI fund a basketball court to be built on top 
of the place where the rock stood. 
 
Bel Air Residents Declare Peace 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (U) Bel Air residents requested a holiday soccer 
tournament in December 2005.  HTI agreed and suggested the 
usual Play for Peace games.  Bel Air community leaders 
disagreed with the name.  "No," they told HTI, "we already 
have peace; let's call this the Tournament for 
Reconciliation."  The community asked Brazilian MINUSTAH 
forces to play in an exposition match. 
 
Next Step: Cite Soleil 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (SBU) HTI already implements projects in Cite Soleil yet 
suffers from a lack of cooperation with MINUSTAH.  According 
to Broughton, "The Brazilians in Bel Air have been wonderful, 
but the Jordanians in Cite Soleil are not supportive of our 
proposed cooperation."  HTI anticipates a rotation of 
MINUSTAH forces and hopes that it will bring further 
opportunity for cooperation.  For the time being, HTI and the 
Brazilian MINUSTAH contingent have started projects along the 
road between Bel Air and Cite Soleil, which is also the line 
between Brazilian and Jordanian control.  The plan is to 
achieve the same domino effect that traversed Bel Air by 
showing community leaders on one side of the street success 
on the other side of the street. 
 
Comment 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11. (U)  The main lesson learned from Bel Air is that the 
involvement and desire of the community is the most important 
factor in the three part equation.  The other two parts of 
the equation are programs, that bring jobs and structural 
improvements to the community, and security, which reassures 
the community that it will not come under attack by those 
'spoilers' who want to maintain chaos. 
SANDERSON