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DE RUEHFR #2252/01 0961015
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O 061015Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6020
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 002252 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR RU BE MO
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED DISCUSSES NATO AND FORMER SOVIET SPACE 
ISSUES WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CRAIG STAPLETON, FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On March 31, A/S Fried met with French MFA 
officials to discuss NATO partnerships, Georgia, Ukraine, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Belarus, Russia and Darfur.  Fried pressed 
French officials to remain open to offering Georgia a NATO 
Membership Action Plan, and noted that French and U.S. 
analyses regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine and Belarus were 
very similar, with both sides agreeing on the opportunity to 
pursue a solution on Nagorno-Karabakh.  The atmosphere was 
positive.  The French side enthusiastically took the 
opportunity to compare analyses, which largely tracked with 
those of the USG, with two major exceptions: Russia and NATO. 
 Regarding Russia, Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye 
cautioned against "returning to Cold War blocs," code for 
policies in the former Soviet space that might offend Russia, 
particularly on Georgia.  In an extended discussion of NATO 
partnerships, French officials laid down clear reservations 
about a broader, "global" role for NATO in conjunction with 
other democracies.  They presented a constricted view of 
NATO's continuing role in Darfur, and stated that France 
would not be able to make a national contribution.  Finally, 
EU member states, according to the French, favor an EU-wide 
approach to energy security.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) A/S Fried, Pol M/C and Poloff met first with 
A/S-equivalent for Strategic Affairs Philippe Carre, followed 
by a separate meeting with A/S-equivalent for Russia, the 
former Soviet space and the Balkans Jean-Francois Terral.  In 
a third, and last, meeting, A/S  Fried, the Ambassador, POL 
M/C, Deputy Polcouns and Poloff met with Political Director 
Stanislas de Laboulaye, Carre, Terral, Minsk Group co-chair 
Ambassador Fassier, and EU CFSP Unit Head Vincent Falconi. 
 
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NATO 
---- 
 
¶3. (C) Much of the discussion centered on partnerships, which 
was prompted by the March 31 tabling at NATO of the U.S.-UK 
food-for-thought paper on Global Partnership.  Carre 
emphasized a distinction between members and non-members, and 
between "within the family" discussions in the NAC and 
arrangements for dialogue and cooperation with partners, 
including new high-end partners.  He agreed that NATO must 
first discuss strategic challenges and appropriate responses 
"en famille."  Partners come in at the implementation stage, 
with those who have something to contribute joining 
discussions of appropriate taskings and arrangements. 
 
¶4. (C) NATO is cohesive, Carre contended, because it is built 
on a shared history around Article 5.  If non-NATO members 
are given the privileges afforded to NATO members, he argued, 
the alliance would be "watered down," and if membership were 
extended to non-traditional countries, the bond shared among 
members would become "looser."  Carre repeatedly warned of 
using NATO in such a way as to move it from a military 
alliance dealing with common threats to a Western alliance 
projecting into non-Western cultures.  He argued that NATO 
must avoid feeding the counter-productive perception held by 
some that it is a "military part of the American bloc," 
particularly as China rises to the "number two position" in 
global power.  Fried countered that the partnership 
initiative did not blur the distinction between partners and 
members.  Chinese misinterpretations could be avoided though 
dialogue and outreach, and an offer of partnership to India, 
a non-Western democracy, would address some of Carre's "West 
versus the Rest" objection.  He cited Carre's example of 
Chinese misgivings potentially necessitating the 
establishment of a channel of communication between China and 
NATO. 
 
¶5. (C) Fried replied that NATO benefited from the input of 
partners like Afghanistan but also from the input of high-end 
security providers such as Australia, Japan and South Korea. 
NATO, he said, only stood to gain by advancing its 
cooperation with partners.  Carre agreed that NATO should be 
able, in addressing a problem, to reach out to and work with, 
any country that is prepared and able to help.  He also 
affirmed that there needs to be a place to discuss potential 
operations.  However, he explained, the GoF did not want to 
see NATO become "a permanent grouping of like-minded 
democracies," and he saw no place in NATO for non-members to 
determine future missions or discuss "global common 
challenges" in general (Strategic Dialogue).  Carre mentioned 
the Contributors Committee as a forum that already exists for 
partners to coordinate, but admitted that NATO could use 
another forum for potential contributors to interface with 
NATO when they are considering joining a NATO operation. 
Fried said that NATO operations often take place under 
 
PARIS 00002252  002 OF 004 
 
 
circumstances that require NATO to look beyond the tactical 
and even strategic goals of the mission itself.  For example, 
he said, the ISAF mission in Afghanistan opened wider 
questions about the role of Pakistan and other bordering 
nations.  NATO partners who are engaged in Afghanistan, he 
argued, should have a say in answering these relevant 
questions.  Carre accepted the point, but stressed that such 
consultation be operation-specific. 
 
¶6. (C) Turning to upcoming NATO meetings, Carre called for 
differential treatment in terms of expectations for the Sofia 
ministerial and the Riga summit.  He asked that the U.S. not 
trumpet in Sofia elements that it would like to see announced 
eventually in Riga.  Carre conceded that broad objectives 
would undoubtedly be addressed in Sofia and that language 
such as "provide security wherever needed" or "the need to 
cooperate" would be mentioned, but he stressed that they 
should not be broadcast as defining statements lest they 
precipitate division. 
 
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DARFUR 
------ 
 
¶7. (C) Citing President Chirac's previous discussion with 
President Bush, Carre said France supported the AU and the 
UN, and that some NATO assistance was acceptable.  However, 
this should be limited to support, i.e., no troops on the 
ground or raising the flag, no role in an operational sense, 
or simply to "score points."  Fried said that NATO was being 
asked to do more because of the needs on the ground. 
Effectiveness is the key.  Carre responded that France would 
be unable to assist, given its other commitments, e.g., in 
the DRC.  Fried cautioned that it would be important for 
France to make some contribution, if only to avoid the 
perception of another Iraq.  Carre averred that while France 
would not make a contribution, it would also not seek to keep 
French officials from participating in a NATO operation: 
"This is not Iraq."  Carre said NATO contributions were not 
of much value unless the U.S. was involved.  He noted that 
when the AU was supported by NATO, the U.S. provided 
transport under a NATO label.  He said a NATO role was an 
"abstraction" because, other than planning, it consisted of 
national contributions. 
 
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GEORGIA 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Fried said it was important to see Georgia as it was, 
with good and bad, and not simply to accept Russia's 
simplistically negative view.  Terral agreed and said France 
rejects Russian "propaganda."  Indeed, they are well aware of 
Russia's bad behavior in this region.  Terral said he noticed 
the positive effect of U.S. guidance on Georgian President 
Saakashvili, but noted that every time Saakashvili makes a 
mistake, Russia takes advantage of it.  France is focused on 
reversing Russia's roll-back strategy, which seeks to 
maintain and strengthen Moscow's grip on its neighbors. 
Terral said he didn,t understand why Georgia wasn,t moving 
faster on implementation of the military bases agreement. 
 
¶9. (C) Fried outlined reasons why Georgia could be a good 
candidate for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), notably 
the support for NATO membership among the Georgian 
population, as opposed to the more divided Ukrainian 
population.  Terral, Carre and Laboulaye stressed Russian 
opposition, with Laboulaye underscoring France's desire not 
to return to the Soviet-era 'bloc' mentality.  Carre said 
France viewed giving a MAP to Georgia as similar to EU 
accession negotiations, i.e., an inevitable road to 
membership.  Fried disagreed: membership was conditional on 
performance and MAP was expressed as a statement of hopes, 
not inevitability.  He added that MAP would make Georgia a 
stabilizer in the region and argued that Russian objections 
were manageable, just as they had been for the Baltic states 
and Central Europe. 
 
¶10. (C) Falconi reviewed the EU action plan toward Georgia 
and focused on the EU's demand for progress on frozen 
conflicts in addition to progress in implementing reforms. 
Fried agreed that reform was important, as was constructive 
Georgian behavior with respect to the regional conflicts, but 
added that Georgia should not be held responsible for Russian 
obstructionism, e.g., on Abkhazia, as this gave too much 
leverage to Russia.  He argued that Georgia needs incentives, 
not just U.S. pressure, which the MAP process could provide. 
 
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UKRAINE 
 
PARIS 00002252  003 OF 004 
 
 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Fried noted public U.S. statements that the 
international community will work with whatever government 
emerges from the Ukrainian elections, while privately 
encouraging the divided Orange coalition to re-unite.  Terral 
agreed with this approach and said that former PM Tymoshenko 
and President Yushchenko should join together.  He noted, 
however, that personality differences may make it impossible 
for them to do so. 
 
¶12. (C) Terral emphasized that businessman and Regions leader 
Rinat Akhmetov appears to be moving into the forefront of 
Regions leadership at the expense of former PM Yanukovych. 
Saying he bears watching, Terral described Akhmetov as smart, 
pragmatic, and not exclusively Moscow-oriented.  Terral 
thought an Akhmetov-led Regions party could eventually evolve 
in the right direction.  Fried agreed, but emphasized that 
Akhmetov's evolution was still a work in progress, and an 
Orange coalition was the best short-term answer for Ukraine. 
Terral reiterated it was important for the West to open a 
dialogue with the Regions party.  Fried agreed. 
 
------- 
BELARUS 
------- 
 
¶13. (C) Terral said there is a new dynamic in Belarus; for 
the first time, the opposition is credible and united.  He 
stressed the need to promote and help opposition leader 
Alexander Milinkevich in a subtle way, so as to make sure he 
is not expelled or imprisoned.  Milinkevich, said Terral, had 
the right approach; he wanted to become a viable candidate 
for the next elections, not last week's.  Terral said it was 
possible, perhaps, to encourage Moscow to think favorably of 
Milinkevich, given that he is pragmatic and not anti-Russian. 
 France supports inviting him to meet with the EU, OSCE and 
even NATO, but would be against his visiting capitals such as 
Prague, Vilnius and Warsaw, because this would make him 
appear as a pro-West puppet, and therefore diminish his 
credibility with Moscow. 
 
¶14. (C) Fried agreed with Terral's points, but noted that 
Russia should not be given the right to determine what 
countries Milinkevich should visit, and which he should not. 
Fried also raised the situation of students involved in the 
recent demonstrations in Minsk and now in danger of expulsion 
from their schools.  The EU and the U.S. should think 
creatively about how to help these students, said Fried, to 
show that the West has not forgotten them. 
 
---------------- 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
---------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Fried argued that the possibility of progress toward 
a settlement, thought to be dead in the water at Rambouillet, 
has been resuscitated.  Laboulaye asked if Russia could be 
trusted to play a positive role.  Fried said he thought 
Russia was in a constructive mode on Nagorno-Karabakh, if 
only to keep the U.S. from moving unilaterally.  Minsk 
co-chair Amb. Fassier wondered whether Azerbaijani President 
Aliyev was ready to deal, given his public hard-line and 
references to a military option.  He also questioned whether 
Armenian President Kocharian was more concerned about 
succession and whether Russian participation in a PKF would 
be more like Abkhazia or SFOR.  Fried agreed that there were 
many uncertainties in the process, but concluded that there 
was nonetheless a chance of success.  After some reflection, 
Laboulaye agreed it was worth another try.  Fassier expressed 
hope for an agreement on principles by the St. Petersburg 
summit and noted that the issue would be discussed during an 
upcoming April 19 meeting in Russia.  Carre suggested 
postponing discussions on a PKF, given that the OSCE's HLPG 
was not ready.  He suggested another body would need to do 
planning unless a "real" HLPG were created. 
 
------ 
RUSSIA 
------ 
 
¶16. (C) Laboulaye noted that Russia was "in the background" 
of many of the issues discussed, and had furthermore been the 
subject of much discussion during the previous day's meeting 
between President Chirac and the Secretary.  Laboualye agreed 
with Fried that Russia cannot be allowed to determine our 
policy toward countries in the region.  In his longest 
intervention, he underscored, however, that there was also 
another logic of relations with Russia, especially for 
Europeans.  A good relationship with Russia was central to 
 
PARIS 00002252  004 OF 004 
 
 
French thinking, and France wants to avoid the (re)creation 
of blocs.  French thinking on MAP, Georgia and Ukraine should 
be seen in this light.  Fried replied that good relations 
with Russia are an important goal worth pursuing, even in the 
face of current difficulties, but it would be a mistake to 
cater to Russia's irrational emotions.   Georgia should be 
allowed to make its own case, and not have it defined by 
Russia. 
 
¶17. (C) Regarding energy security, Falconi said that national 
policies on energy were beginning to evolve in an EU 
direction as a result of Russia's pressure on Ukraine. 
Laboulaye underscored the harm Russia had done to its 
international credibility as an energy supplier because of 
its recent heavy-handedness in dealing with Ukraine and 
Moldova.  Fried said the U.S. was prepared to discuss energy 
issues with the EU and/or individual member states as 
appropriate, but needs advice on who will be the appropriate 
interlocutor.  In addition, Fried warned that Russian 
domination of Georgia could have a potentially negative 
impact on European and U.S. energy security. 
 
¶18. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this message. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton