Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06MOSUL39, NINEWA RULE OF LAW ISSUES PART I: NINEWA CRIMINAL JUSTICE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MOSUL39.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSUL39 2006-04-01 12:22 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL REO Mosul
VZCZCXRO9496
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMOS #0039/01 0911222
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011222Z APR 06
FM REO MOSUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0457
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0051
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0034
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0038
RUEHMOS/REO MOSUL 0476
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSUL 000039 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
JUSTICE FOR: CARL ALEXANDRE AND KATHLEEN OCONNOR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/1/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR KCRM
SUBJECT: NINEWA RULE OF LAW ISSUES PART I: NINEWA CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COMMITTEE OFF TO POSITIVE START (CORRECTED COPY) 
 
REF: MOSUL 37; A) MOSUL 17; B) MOSUL 16 
 
MOSUL 00000039  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron  Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial 
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
 
 
[CORRECTED COPY -- SUBJECT LINE] 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) In recent months we have heard criticism of the Iraqi 
criminal justice system in Ninewa.  Even officers at the 
Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC) say they are "tired" 
of seeing terrorists released by "cowardly judges" or "corrupt" 
military and police officials.  Corruption and cowardice aside, 
problems now tend to be centered on poor communication and 
coordination among the Iraqi judiciary and the security forces. 
The impetus for the Ninewa Criminal Justice Committee (NCJC) is 
to serve as an effort to acknowledge these problems and work 
towards solutions collectively to improve the criminal justice 
system in the province.  The first meeting, held in late March, 
exceeded expectations by both the parties involved as well as 
PRT and MNF-N officials observing.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) PRT Rule of Law Coordinator and PolOff met with 
Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) BG Wathiq Al Qudir, Ninewa 
Chief Judge Faisal Sadeeq Hadeed, Investigative Judge Amer 
Rasheed Hammedi and Iraqi Army (IA) 2nd Division Commander MG 
Jamaal, and MNF-N at One West Iraqi Police (IP) headquarters in 
Mosul on March 25. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
DIAGNOSIS OF A PROBLEM: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (C) The public is frustrated with the effectiveness of the 
criminal justice system in Ninewa.  During a conversation with 
two colonels from the Provincial Joint Coordination Center 
(PJCC) on March 24, Col Ismael Hussein Khader told PolOff he and 
his colleagues at the PJCC had been working hard over the past 
three years -- at risk to their own personal safety -- to make 
Iraq safer.  However, he claimed, they felt their work was 
negated when "well-known terrorists" were released from prison. 
He and Col Khaled Suleiyman believed these events damaged the 
public's faith in government institutions.  Khader believed 
there had to be some sort of collusion between terrorists and 
judges, and members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).  Even 
Coalition Forces (CF) were complicit since they were not doing 
enough to keep the bad guys behind bars, he said.  "The 
terrorists have the streets," he exclaimed.  He and Suleiyman 
asked for USG assistance to rid local government and security 
forces of corruption and help restore the public's faith in the 
government.  "We think America could do something to leave a 
good impression," they said. 
 
------------------------------ 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (C) Over several meetings with IA, IP, and judicial 
officials similar complaints arose: there was little or no 
communication, and a great deal of distrust, among institutions. 
 Chief of Police Al Qudir told PRT officials on several 
occasions he recognized the need to increase the public's trust 
of the police.  Since there had been corrupt officers in the 
past, he admitted, it caused a large rift with constituents. 
Such problems were complicating the force's ability to improve 
since they were not receiving information tips, for example, 
from concerned citizens about terrorist activities in their 
neighborhoods.  More importantly, was that the public thought 
the IP was complicit with the release of terrorists from prison. 
 This made him angry and fostered his own distrust of Ninewa's 
judges with prosecuting cases (ref a).  Chief Judge Hadeed and 
Investigative Judge Hammedi saw the problem from another angle. 
While the IP and IA commanders could "go public" and "blame" the 
judiciary for releasing terrorists (ref b), judges were 
forbidden to defend themselves in the press.  Even more 
frustrating, according to Hadeed, was that the "truth" was not 
getting out: although some judges were corrupt, most were 
working hard to hear terrorist cases with missing evidence, 
 
MOSUL 00000039  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
crimes scenes not protected, and ISF investigators not allowed 
to testify by their commanders.  "The system cannot continue 
that way it's going," said Hadeed.  "We have to do something to 
figure this out with the army and police."  Here was where the 
PRT's Rule of Law unit stepped in. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
THE RESULT: NINEWA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) The first meeting of the Ninewa Criminal Justice 
Committee served as a chance for the PCOP, IA, and judiciary to 
begin honest dialogue and work on issues to improve coordination 
on criminal investigations and evidence collection.  Chief Judge 
Hadeed began the meeting by spelling out the local judiciary's 
frustration with IP and IA investigative information.  He 
chalked up the problem to poor communication and a lack of 
education by ISF investigators on criminal case reporting 
procedures.  "There was no contact" with ISF on cases and 
therefore they could not be tried.  With Ministry of Interior 
commandos, for example, the judiciary had "very little contact." 
 ISF was acting like they were above the law, he said.  Even CF 
was guilty since they did not know Iraqi law, claimed Hadeed. 
One of the biggest problems was when ISF were transferring 
suspects to CF custody.  "Judges should be involved and given 
all documents," he said.  Admitting the judiciary was also to 
blame Hadeed said some judges were "being lazy," for not quickly 
moving through cases.  But most upsetting, said Hadeed, was when 
the IA would not allow their agents to testify. 
 
6.  (C) Chief of Police Al Qudir said the IP was upset as well. 
There were cases where they caught insurgents "red-handed" in 
the act of committing a crime, but that the case was later 
thrown out because the IP did not follow procedures.  He said 
this problem was more pronounced with CF, but that the IP was 
cooperating better with CF, and CF was now waiting until the IP 
finished their investigation before taking custody of the 
suspect.  Al Qudir also claimed that witnesses and informants 
were sometimes difficult to track down. 
 
7.  (C)    Iraq Army (IA) 2nd Division MG Jamaal began by 
launching into his frustrations with the judiciary.  He claimed 
if there was no law then only chaos would exist, and as a result 
all sides would have to work together.  He believed terrorists 
were benefiting since judges were not standing firm against 
them.  He blamed lawyers for exploiting the system for personal 
gain.  More importantly, however, Jamaal expressed his strong 
commitment to uphold the law, claiming he was doing everything 
he could to enforce it.  Jamaal did not understand why his 
investigators' testimony was needed if the IA caught terrorists 
in the act of committing a crime or having given a documented 
confession.  His conclusion was that it was the fault of the 
court system that terrorists were released. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
SOLUTION: BETTER COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
8.  (C) Jamaal's solution?  Judges had to be firmer and not 
allow lawyers to push them around.  He said the work of the IA 
was becoming increasingly more difficult because most terrorists 
knew they would only have to stay in prison for three to four 
months before being released.  He accused judges of buying off 
on terrorists that pleaded they were coerced into confessing 
under duress.  Using a battlefield analogy, Hadeed reminded Gen 
Jamaal that there were two types of leaders: those on the 
battlefield, and those planning the war from behind a desk. 
Comparing himself to the desk officer, Hadeed claimed the law 
did not allow him much flexibility.  Like Jamaal, too, he was a 
soldier who was limited by the rules of engagement.  Accusations 
that the judges were folding under pressure from terrorists had 
been mitigated, he said.  They now conducted terrorist 
investigations with panels so that any decisions would not 
single out a particular judge.  He said that if a panel had 
received a threat the case would not be prosecuted locally, but 
shifted to the Higher Juridical Council in Baghdad.  Such 
precautionary measures did not allow judges to "fool around" 
with case procedures, he said.  Furthermore, if judges refused 
to hear cases it would only reflect poorly on Hadeed, which 
could also cost him his job. 
 
9.  (C) Admitting their forces had committed procedural errors, 
Generals Jamaal and Al Qudir extended an olive branch to Hadeed. 
 
MOSUL 00000039  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 Crime scenes had to be protected, they agreed, and evidence not 
compromised (ref b).  The judges had to see the IA 
investigators, Hadeed requested, since the case would have to 
otherwise be thrown out.  The ISF could not keep moving 
detainees to different courthouses, such as Dohuk, that were 
outside of Ninewa's jurisdiction and could not adequately hear 
the cases, he said.  Al Qudir said the IP would work better with 
IA investigative experts to protect crime scenes and better 
collect evidence.  Moving one step further, Jamaal recommended 
the ISF form a committee for IA agents to meet and work with the 
judges.  There should be cooperation between investigative 
judges and the IA investigators, he said.  Investigative Judge 
Hammedi agreed and said more would need to be done to train ISF 
investigators on interrogation and investigation procedures. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10.  (C) Building the capacity of the criminal justice system to 
identify, investigate, and successfully prosecute dangerous 
criminals is key to bringing the security situation under 
control.  As the capacity of the ISF to perform their security 
function increases, building their capacity to perform their 
investigative function to assist the courts is of equal 
importance.  Because the courts in Iraq ultimately control the 
investigative process and also act as the prosecuting authority, 
cooperation and coordination with the ISF is critical.  As is 
clear today, an ISF raid that captures an insurgent cell leader, 
for example, is only truly successful if the suspect can be 
taken off the streets and incarcerated consistent with Iraqi 
law.  The NCJC is a small but important step in efforts to make 
such successes the rule rather than the exception.  In addition, 
[consistent with the PRT mandate] the NCJC places the 
responsibility for strengthening the relationship between the 
ISF and courts in the hands of the Iraqis themselves.  However, 
due to the distrust and finger pointing of the past, the 
committee will likely continue to require U.S. facilitation in 
the near term.  In time, the goal is that the police, army, and 
courts will see the value in working together to secure the 
province under the rule of law and will continue to do so after 
U.S. facilitation ceases. 
MUNTER