VZCZCXRO3150
OO RUEHDBU RUEHDT RUEHLMC RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPB
DE RUEHEK #0496/01 1040244
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140244Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7112
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMCM/MCC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMCT/MCC THRESHOLD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0532
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1475
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0175
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1856
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1239
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000496 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM PHUM KG
SUBJECT: COUP OR DEMONSTRATION?  OPPOSITION MAKING BIG 
PLANS FOR APRIL 29 
 
REF: BISHKEK 01379 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1.  (C) On April 12, President of the local NGO Coalition 
for Democracy and Civil Society Edil Baisalov detailed to 
PolOff plans for a major demonstration in Bishkek on April 
¶29.  According to Baisalov, at an April 12 meeting of the 
demonstration's main organizers, opposition parliamentarians 
revealed plans to use the demonstration to force President 
Bakiyev to either enter into dialogue with the opposition or 
else resign from office.  According to Baisalov, opposition 
leaders have already decided who will fill the positions of 
President, Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament, should 
Bakiyev be forced from office.  Baisalov said that 
influential parliamentarian Kubatbek Baibolov stressed that 
"no buildings will be stormed or taken over."  Baisalov's 
account closely dovetails with a version given to PolOff on 
April 7 by International Republican Institute (IRI) Country 
Director Jeff Lilley (strictly protect) following his meeting 
with the Chairman of the Central Election Commission on April 
¶7.  In a chance April 13 meeting with the Ambassador, 
parliamentarian Melis Eshimkanov also confirmed the plans for 
April 29, but suggested that the demonstrators would be 
prepared to try to forcibly seize the President's office. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF A PLOT 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) On April 7, IRI Country Director Jeff Lilley 
(strictly protect) told PolOff that he had been summoned to 
the office of CEC Chairman Turgunaly Abdraimov for an "urgent 
meeting."  During the meeting Abdraimov told Lilley that he 
and others "were fed up with Bakiyev."  He alleged that 
Bakiyev's son Maksim had used Ryspek Akmatbayev to kill 
Bayaman Erkinbayev (reftel b) and others, and was flying to 
Moscow every week with bags of cash, delivered to Maksim from 
the local electric monopoly (and thoroughly corrupt) 
Severelectro. 
 
¶3.  (C) Abdraimov then detailed to Lilley plans to "confront 
Bakiyev at the end of April with a list of demands."  The CEC 
Chair said that he, Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism 
Almaz Atambayev, the Governor of Chui Oblast Turgunbek 
Kumurzaev, parliamentarian Azimbek Beknazarov and others 
would demand that Bakiyev cut his ties to organized crime, 
fire unspecified people in the government, and move to attack 
corruption.  According to Lilley, Abdraimov did not directly 
say but strongly implied that if Bakiyev did not agree to the 
demands, he would be removed from power and replaced by 
either Almaz Atambayev or former Speaker of Parliament 
Omurbek Tekebayev. 
 
DEMONSTRATION OR COUP D'ETAT? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) On April 8, the Coalition, joined by numerous other 
NGOs and political parties, staged a peaceful march and rally 
in Bishkek in support of law and order and constitutional 
reform.  At a peaceful April 8 procession and rally in 
Bishkek, Baisalov told the crowd that the demonstrations will 
continue until President Bakiyev "fulfills his campaign 
promises."  Immediately after the April 8 rally, the 
Coalition announced plans to organize an even larger 
demonstration for April 29.  Baisalov's stated goal of the 
protest is to pressure President Bakiyev to live up to his 
campaign pledges, particularly fighting corruption and 
supporting constitutional reform. 
 
¶5.  (C) Baisalov said at the April 12 meeting to plan for 
April 29, a group of deputies from Bishkek and surrounding 
suburbs vowed to bus at least 10,000 supporters to Bishkek's 
central square on April 29.  There the demonstrators would 
erect yurts and stay on the square until President Bakiyev 
 
BISHKEK 00000496  002 OF 003 
 
 
agrees to enter a dialogue with opposition leaders. 
Demonstrators will demand that Bakiyev fire unspecified 
officials and move forward on reforms. 
 
¶6.  (C) Baisalov said that only after he pressed the 
parliamentarians at the meeting for more information, did 
they reveal that it had been decided that should Bakiyev 
resign or be forced from office, former Speaker of Parliament 
Omurbek Tekebayev would be installed as President, Almaz 
Atambayev as Prime Minister, and Kubatbek Baibolov as Speaker 
of Parliament.  Prime Minister Kulov appears to be out of the 
picture.  Baisalov said that the opposition members present 
at the meeting seemed to have decided that, should Bakiyev be 
toppled, the next president should be a southerner as well. 
Baisalov said that a number of influential deputies from the 
south, including Doronbek Satybaldiev and Ishkak Masaliyev 
were also present.  Baisalov said that the plans for April 29 
were by no means a secret, and that plans were openly 
discussed in front of everyone else in the room. 
 
¶7.  (C) Baisalov cautioned that he himself does not support 
any plans to remove Bakiyev from power.  Baisalov said he 
doesn't object to Bakiyev as president, and simply wants 
Bakiyev to follow through on his own campaign promises to 
root out corruption and pursue real constitutional reform. 
 
INFLUENTIAL PARLIAMENTARIAN CONFIRMS PLANS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) During a chance meeting on April 13 while visiting 
injured civil society leader Edil Baisalov in the hospital 
(septel), parliamentarian Melis Eshimkanov confirmed to 
Ambassador all of the details for the April 29 demonstration. 
 Accompanied by three very large, gun-toting bodyguards, 
Eshimkanov said that he had even discussed the plans with 
Deputy Head of the SNB (and brother of President Bakiyev) 
Janyshbek Bakiyev.  Eshimkanov claimed he told Bakiyev that 
if their demands are not met "protestors will remain on the 
square and might even storm the White House."  According to 
Eshimkanov, Janyshbek Bakiyev laughed at this, at which 
Eshimkanov replied that he wasn't joking.  Eshimkanov said 
organizers will have no problem bringing 10,000 demonstrators 
onto the square and claimed that President Bakiyev, being in 
the "heart of opposition territory," could not control 
Bishkek.  Eshimkanov said he had already met with senior 
people in the Interior and Defense ministries, and that they 
would refuse to open fire on demonstrators. 
 
COMMENT: DEJA COUP ALL OVER AGAIN? 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The planning for April 29 is eerily reminiscent of 
opposition plans to "peacefully occupy" Bishkek's central 
square on March 24, 2005.  In the days leading up to March 
24, two opposition figures appealed to PolOff for money to 
feed and house demonstrators.  In the event, the "peaceful 
occupation" turned into the overthrow of President Akayev 
when demonstrators seized the Kyrgyz White House.  But this 
time, there is a major difference ) in 2005, no one among 
the opposition anticipated or planned to overthrow President 
Akayev.  This time, it seems that some in the opposition are 
already measuring for drapes in the White House, a full two 
weeks before the date of the demonstration. 
 
¶10.  (C) It is clear that opposition figures are making no 
secret of their plans.  They openly discuss them in large 
 
SIPDIS 
meetings, with foreigners, and even with President Bakiyev's 
family.  What is not clear, however, is how much support 
these opposition figures really have and how many people they 
can put on the streets.  Although the chief organizers of the 
April 29 demonstration are wealthy and powerful, with bases 
of support in and around Bishkek, they have in the past 
overestimated the numbers of people they can bring out onto 
the streets.  Nevertheless, Almaz Atambayev brought thousands 
of anti-Akayev demonstrators onto the central square on March 
 
BISHKEK 00000496  003 OF 003 
 
 
24, 2005, and they played a key role in beating back the 
stick-wielding goons the Akayev government had bussed in to 
defend the White House. 
 
¶11.  (C) Also unclear is what will be the reaction of the 
government.  While Bakiyev has made clear that he will use 
force to defend the White House, it is an open question 
whether the security forces, particularly the MVD and Defense 
Ministry, will support Bakiyev and use force to disperse or 
crush a large demonstration.  It is also uncertain which, if 
any, business and/or political elites would come to his 
defense should the opposition put thousands of people on the 
streets.  Bakiyev's base of support is the south, a good 
ten-hour drive from Bishkek, and he lacks any real popular 
support in the north, particularly Bishkek.  It is also 
possible that, should push come to shove, few in the 
government would rally to his defense. 
 
¶12.  (C) What Bakiyev and his increasingly small inner circle 
are left with, then, is to compromise with the opposition and 
meet some of its demands.  It is unknown whether Bakiyev 
would be willing to do this, and he has certainly not shown 
any flexibility in the past.  Melis Eshimkanov predicted that 
Bakiyev would fiercely resist any effort to force him to the 
table for discussions with the opposition. 
 
¶13.  (C) A more dangerous possibility is that Bakiyev could 
turn to organized crime figures, such as Ryspek Akmatbayev, 
to do what government forces cannot or will not do. 
President Akayev did just this on several occasions, using 
mob-provided thugs to pummel opposition demonstrators on 
March 23 and 24, 2005. However, in that confrontation the 
Akmatbayev and Bayaman Erkinbayev thugs who were supporting 
Bakiyev won the day. 
YOVANOVITCH