VZCZCXRO7219
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0051/01 0991529
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091529Z APR 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0299
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0317

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000051 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/9/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER EAID KISL SMIG SOCI IZ
SUBJECT: DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ INCREASE 
 
REF: A) HILLAH 45, B) HILLAH 56 
 
BASRAH 00000051  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Significant population displacement has taken 
place throughout southern Iraq since the attack on the Samarra 
mosque on February 22, both of Shia families moving into the 
provinces of Basrah, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, and Maysan, and of Sunni 
families leaving southern provinces.  Precise numbers of Shia 
families moving to the south are available from the Ministry of 
Displacement and Migration (MoDM) and the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM).  Figures of Sunnis leaving the 
south are available but less comprehensive; anecdotal reporting 
suggests that sizeable Sunni and Christian populations are 
leaving the southern provinces.  Displacement in the south is 
complicated by the presence of thousands of displaced families 
from the draining of the marshes that took place in the 1990's. 
Despite the challenges, local authorities and humanitarian 
organizations are providing adequate services to the new 
families seeking assistance in Basrah, and are even looking to 
extend help to Najaf.  Official denial of the emigration of 
minorities from the south, however, is strong.  We believe 
further evacuation of a significant portion of Basrah's 
estimated 400,000 minority population will take place this 
summer when the academic year ends.  End Summary. 
 
Current and On-Going Displacement 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Significant population displacement has taken place 
throughout southern Iraq since the attack on the Samarra mosque 
on February 22, both of Shia families moving into the provinces 
of Basrah, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, and Maysan, and of Sunni families 
leaving the south.  The IOM's April 4 "Displacement Due to 
Recent Violence" report provides information collected from the 
MoDM and other monitoring organizations about displacement in 
the southern provinces.  The MoDM and other organizations report 
that the number of displaced families in Muthanna is 360 and the 
number of displaced families in Maysan is 320 (Note:  The IOM 
estimates that each family has six members.  End Note).  In 
Basrah and Dhi Qar provinces, however, there is a discrepancy 
between the numbers of displaced families reported by the MoDM 
and the other monitoring organizations.  In Dhi Qar, the MoDM 
provided the figure of 575 while the other organizations put the 
number at 440.  In Basrah, the MoDM reports that there are 250 
displaced families while the other organizations put the number 
at 71.  (Comment:  The IOM report notes that the displacement in 
the south is "on-going" and can result in tabulation 
discrepancies among organizations.  A Red Crescent contact 
remarked that displaced families register with any available 
organization when seeking assistance, resulting in double 
counting.  Another REO contact suggested that the higher MoDM 
figure may be a cumulative account of displaced families, while 
the other organizations monitoring displacement have only been 
doing so since February 22.  End Comment.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Shia families moving into Basrah register with the 
MoDM as coming from Baghdad, Anbar, and Salah Al Din provinces. 
Those moving into Dhi Qar come from Baghdad, Anbar, Salah Al 
Din, Babylon, Tameem, and Diyala.  Those moving into Muthanna 
and Maysan are arriving from the Baghdad neighborhoods of Abu 
Greb, Aldora, and Mahmodiya. 
 
¶4.  (C) The IOM report includes April 2 figures from the MoDM 
that 345 Sunni families displaced from Basrah registered with 
the MoDM in Anbar province, in the cities of Ramadi, Habaniya, 
Khaldiya, Heet, Kubaesa, Hadetha, Ana, Rawa, Faluja, Karma, and 
Amiriya.  (Note:  Of the 345 Sunni families registering in 
Anbar, 192 of them registered in Faluja.  End Note.)  In 
addition, seven Sunni families originally from Maysan registered 
in Ana in Anbar, and eight Sunni families originally from Dhi 
Qar have registered in Ramadi and Heet.  Anecdotal reporting 
corroborates the displacement of Sunni families from Basrah and 
other southern provinces, and the number of Sunni families 
displaced from the south is likely to grow as reports come in 
from other provinces. 
 
¶5.  (C) Despite growing evidence of significant Sunni 
displacement from Basrah province, local officials in Basrah 
deny that such displacement is occurring.  In an April 6 
Humanitarian Sector Working Group meeting in Basrah organized by 
the UN representative in Basrah, Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) 
Member and Chair of the Humanitarian Committee Seyid Hasanein Al 
Safi, a Shia imam, estimated that only about five Sunni families 
had left Basrah since February 22 because of sectarian violence. 
 Sunni contacts, however, report that "thousands" are leaving 
Basrah.  Increased targeting of Sunnis and Christians in Basrah 
for threats, murders, and kidnappings will be discussed in 
 
BASRAH 00000051  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
septel. 
 
¶6.  (U) Local press coverage of displaced Shia families entering 
the south is increasing as the numbers of the displaced grow. 
"Al Sabah" on-line news (April 4) reported that 150 families 
moved into Dhi Qar near Nassiriyah from Baghdad and were living 
in mosques and schools.  "Al Manarah" news (April 2) reported 
that 70 families have registered with the Basrah Immigration 
Office and that the number is increasing. 
 
Local Support for Displaced Families Strong 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Displaced families have been receiving support from the 
BPC, Iraqi Red Crescent, World Health Organization (WHO), World 
Food Program (WFP), and the MoDM, among others.  Other 
assistance organizations, such as USAID, have been providing 
consistent help to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Iraq 
for more than a decade.  (Note:  The Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance has recently supported IDPs in Maysan province with 
$2.9 million in water and sanitation programs, as well as 
providing emergency support to this winter's flood victims in 
Safwan.  End Note.)  The system set in place for providing 
support to the displaced is well structured and operating 
smoothly. The BPC functions as the coordinator of the other 
assistance organizations.  The Red Crescent and WFP provide 
food, housing, school uniforms and supplies, and register 
families for assistance.  The WHO visits displaced families in 
order to vaccinate children and spray the areas against 
mosquitoes.  The MoDM assists families in transferring Public 
Distribution System ration cards from one province to another. 
Representatives from the above organizations agreed during the 
April 6 Humanitarian SWG meeting that the establishment of camps 
for displaced families is an undesirable solution to the current 
situation.  Camps would attract more families than could be 
managed and would be difficult to close, in addition to 
requiring substantial security and maintenance investments. 
 
¶8.  (C) Assistance organizations identified property claims 
disputes as a potential future complication during the April 6 
meeting.  Since many families left their homes under emergency 
conditions, they did not bring with them identification 
documents or legal deeds and titles to property in their 
provinces of origin.  Abandoned residences in other provinces 
are now suspected of being inhabited by squatters, and property 
claims disputes will be a problem when currently displaced 
families attempt to return to their homes and reclaim their 
property. 
 
¶9.  (C) Assistance organizations present at the April 6 meeting 
indicated that they planned to provide as much assistance as 
possible to Najaf province.  All agreed that the situation in 
Najaf was much worse than in Basrah (as per reftels A and B).  A 
meeting is planned to take place in Basrah on April 10 with 
representatives from Najaf to organize additional assistance. 
 
Previous Marshland Displacement 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.   (C) All four southern provinces were affected by internal 
displacement during the 1990s due to Saddam's policy of draining 
the marshes.  The IOM reports that about 17,000 families were 
displaced throughout the four provinces as a result of this 
policy.  Most of these families left the marshes to resettle in 
urban areas.  Since 2003, and with the partial rehabilitation of 
the marshes, some of these families have returned to the 
marshes.  However, a significant number of the families indicate 
that they desire to remain in their new location rather than 
return to a sharecropping existence in the marshes. 
 
¶11.  (C) Marshland displacement, unlike the current displacement 
due to violence, took place for the most part within provinces. 
Rather than moving from one province to another, marsh Arabs 
moved from the marshlands to a nearby town within the same 
province.  A significant number of marsh Arabs moved into the 
towns of Basrah, Nassiriyah, and Amarah. 
 
¶12. (C) The same organizations providing services and assistance 
to the displaced marsh Arabs of the 1990s are now tasked with 
providing assistance to growing numbers of displaced families 
from other provinces due to sectarian violence since February 
¶22.  One of the reasons why the assistance currently being 
provided to displaced families in the southern provinces is so 
well run may be because these organizations are well-established 
in the area and already have a lot of practice.  Long-term 
assistance to resettle marsh Arabs in the current places of 
residences has been identified as a significant need by these 
organizations, while the current displacement due to sectarian 
violence is being treated as a short-term problem. 
 
Comment 
 
BASRAH 00000051  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
------------ 
 
¶13.  (C) It is unclear if the current displacement in the 
southern provinces due to sectarian violence will be a long- or 
a short-term problem.  Sunni and Christian contacts report to us 
that many of them plan to wait to depart Basrah until the end of 
the school year in order not to disrupt their children's 
education.  Other minority contacts report that they are 
attempting to sell their houses and property before moving away. 
 They list northern Iraq, Baghdad, Jordan, and Syria as 
destinations.  We believe that the minority families who have 
already left Basrah fled quickly because they faced immediate 
danger and direct threats, and were living in the most volatile 
neighborhoods and areas of Basrah.  Those who plan to leave in 
the summer, after methodically withdrawing their children from 
school and selling off property, are those who do not face 
direct threats and feel safe for the moment, but who are 
unwilling to risk living in Basrah much longer because of the 
rising sectarian violence.  This amount of planning and 
forethought going into leaving Basrah indicates that many 
minorities do not intend to return to the area anytime soon. 
GROSS