VZCZCXRO5715
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0049/01 0971145
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071145Z APR 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0296
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0314

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000049 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/7/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINR SOCI KISL IZ
SUBJECT: MOVERS AND SHAKERS IN THE BASRAH COMMUNITY 
 
REF: A) BASRAH 43, B) BASRAH 38, C) BASRAH 45, D) 05 BASRAH 142 
 
BASRAH 00000049  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Wielders of power and influence in Basrah 
outside of the local government can be classified into three 
general categories:  highly respected sheikhs and imams, thugs 
and militia leaders, and a nebulous third category of 
individuals in positions of power but whose influence on the 
Basrah community is neither definitively positive nor negative. 
The current security situation in Basrah, however, discourages 
any but the most powerful and wealthy from taking an active role 
in civil society.  By no means an exhaustive list of community 
leaders in Basrah, this cable builds on Ref A in identifying 
some of Basrah's key players and how they affect the province's 
current economic and security situation.  End Summary. 
 
Sheikhs and Imams:  Benefactors and Businessmen 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Seyid Ali Al Musawi is the most prominent Shia imam in 
Basrah and one of the wealthiest individuals in the city.  He is 
the spiritual leader of the Al Shakheyah sect, a minority Shia 
sect founded by Sheikh Ahmad Al Insa'i in the nineteenth century 
that has followers in several countries in the Middle East.  Al 
Musawi's political leanings are moderate; he shows tolerance 
toward Sunni and Christian minorities, and he is not actively 
engaged in local politics.  He owns and runs a private hospital, 
a construction company and a handful of small stores in central 
Basrah, in addition to leading the largest mosque in the city 
(Comment:  Al Musawi describes his mosque as the largest in Iraq 
in terms of square footage and available prayer space.  End 
comment).  His mosque attracts an unknown amount of funding from 
Shia communities outside Iraq, but the massive and ornate 
chandeliers, air conditioning in every room, and wall-to-wall 
carpeting inside the huge mosque suggest that these funds are 
considerable. 
 
¶3.  (C) Al Musawi is described by contacts as a "shrewd 
businessman" who "takes care of his followers."  His private 
hospital in Basrah supplies much-needed medical services in 
Basrah.  Another contact pointed out, however, that Al Musawi's 
hospital only performs expensive surgical operations and 
technical procedures and not routine health care.  The private 
hospital enhances Al Musawi's image as benefactor to society, 
but it is above all a moneymaking enterprise.  Al Musawi likely 
could have a positive impact on Basrah's political leadership if 
he diverted his attention in that direction.  Because of his 
advanced age and health problem (he suffers from diabetes and 
has had prostate problems), his son, Seyid Abd Ali Al Musawi, is 
now the driving force behind the Al Musawi business empire and 
eventually will take over the spiritual leadership of the Al 
Shakheyah when his father passes from the scene. 
 
¶4.  (C) Sheikh Mohamed Falik Al Malkee is a prominent Shia 
cleric who represents Ayatollah Sistani in Zubair, a town 
located 30 miles outside of Basrah, and whose influence extends 
to Basrah.  His sister, Seknaa, serves on the Basrah Provincial 
Council (BPC) as a political independent (Reftel A).  Openly 
critical of the political extremists in control of the BPC, he 
has attributed the recent decline in security in Basrah to the 
poor performance of the local government. 
 
¶5.  (C) Sheikh Mansour Al Kanaan is the leader of the Al Kanaan 
tribe and a former member of the Transitional National Assembly 
representing the Iraqi Unified Alliance.  Though no longer 
serving as an elected official, Sheikh Mansour wields 
considerable influence in the community because of his tribal 
leadership.  The Al Kanaan tribe, one of the largest, is known 
for looking after the interests of its members and providing 
them with a measure of security from militias and other tribes. 
A lawyer by training, Sheikh Mansour acted as a tribal judge, 
and his good relations with other tribes in Basrah enhances his 
reputation.  He also is a businessman and owns a newspaper, "Al 
Ashar," a construction company, Al Rahila, and an organization 
that promotes human rights called Al Rahmah.  A harsh critic of 
the dysfunctional BPC, Sheikh Mansour is seeking to establish a 
sort of counterweight, a movement that would have representation 
from a wide variety of non-political interests from "the best 
groups in Basrah."  It would be an informal council that could 
present its views, suggestions and criticisms to the BPC and, 
because of its membership, would assume some moral authority. 
The idea, while intriguing, is still in the developmental stage. 
 
Thugs and Militia Leaders 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Ismail Al Wah'il, brother to Governor Mohammed Moassibh 
 
BASRAH 00000049  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Al Wah'il (Fadillah), wields undeniable influence over Basrah's 
local government and is even rumored to occupy an office in the 
governorate building despite not being an elected official or an 
employee.  He is rumored to take over the Governor's role when 
Governor Mohammed is out of Basrah.  Contacts report that Ismail 
is in charge of the Fadillah party's militia in Basrah and is 
responsible for death squads in the city that conduct political 
assassinations.  Ismail ran for a seat in Parliament in the 
December 15 election on his own ticket, but did not win enough 
votes to secure a seat.  A thug with political aspirations and 
not much education, Ismail could wreak havoc on an already 
dismal political situation in Basrah should he win office in the 
provincial elections. 
 
¶7. (C) Seyid Yusif Al Batat, head of the Thar Allah militia, is 
a notorious figure in Basrah, and may soon occupy a seat on the 
Basrah Provincial Council (BPC).  Iranian funds reportedly 
supply his militia with uniforms and weapons.  Seyid Yusif keeps 
the streets of Basrah busy by waging undeclared war on Governor 
Mohammed's private militia and by trying to take out the 
Governor himself.  An arrest warrant was issued for Seyid Yusif 
in the fall of 2005 for the theft of a government vehicle but 
was subsequently removed when the car was returned to the local 
government.  With two BPC members elected to Parliament in the 
December 15 election, Seyid Yusif's name is next on the list to 
take one of the empty seats at the provincial council level.  He 
increasingly is insinuating himself into the political scene in 
Basrah and professes to have transformed Thar Allah from a 
militia into a political party that follows democratic ideals. 
 
Neither Here nor There 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) South Oil Company (SOC) Director Jabbar Ali Husayn 
al-Lu'aybi wields enormous economic influence in Basrah  (see 
reftels B, C and D), but his political leanings are unclear. 
With 25,000 employees and supplying most of the country's oil, 
SOC is the source of a significant percentage of the nation's, 
let alone the province's, income.  At the helm of the SOC is 
Jabbar, who asserts that he has no political aspirations of his 
own, but on whom the economic survival of the region rests. 
Knowing that his skill set and experience make him indispensable 
to the success of the SOC, Jabbar is in a position to influence, 
rather than be influenced by, local politics.  Still, he 
portrays himself as a non-political technocrat, only interested 
in running the company well.  In meetings with REO Basrah staff, 
Jabbar has made it clear that he would accept financial 
assistance from any country with the wherewithal to rebuild 
Iraq's crumbling oil infrastructure -- whether from the United 
States, Iran or Russia. 
 
¶9.  (C) Chief of Police Hasan Sewadi Al Saadi describes himself 
as a political independent.  He was appointed to his current 
position in January 2005 and has fought to retain it ever since. 
 The BPC has repeatedly sought to remove him, but he somehow 
continues to cling to his position, perhaps through his growing 
affiliation with the Governor.  Although he "talks the talk" of 
the need to replace most of the police force because of 
infiltration by militias, he is unable to effectively "walk the 
walk" and enforce much real change.  Militia infiltration 
continues to hamper the efficiency of the Basrah police.  Sewadi 
is well-respected and liked by the public, but his attempts to 
stop militia infiltration into the police and his role in 
disbanding Governor Wa'hil's internal affairs division in 
November 2005 have made him increasingly unpopular with local 
government leaders.  Sewadi clings tenuously to his position and 
may not be able to achieve any further changes in the police 
force, which would suit political extremists and their militias 
just fine. 
 
Comment 
-------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Influential members of the Basrah community are not 
limited to the pool of elected officials.  Without effective 
leadership in the provincial government and competent council 
members, however, Basrah's few benevolent and moderate leaders 
cannot promote economic growth and responsible government alone. 
 Worse, the rise in death squads and militias in Basrah makes 
wealthy and vocal figures prime targets for kidnapping and 
murder and dissuades them from taking a more active role in 
civil society.  Murders and assassinations in Basrah have spiked 
in number and audacity over the past month, some occurring in 
broad daylight, and thus far the perpetrators go unpunished.  A 
veil of fear and silence has fallen over Basrah, and the few 
vocal dissidents in the city risk their lives every time they 
open their mouths or appear in public. 
GROSS