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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAE #0339/01 1030700
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130700Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8070
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 5836
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 2744
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0058
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0970
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1694
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1116
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1286
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4540
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000339 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
STATE FOR AF/E 
STATE FOR AF/EPS 
STATE FOR EB 
STATE FOR PRM/AF 
STATE FOR IO 
USAID FOR AA/DCHA, FFP, OFDA 
USAID FOR AA/AFR AND AFR/EA 
KAMPALA FOR USAID/FFPO 
NAIROBI FOR REDSO/RFFP 
ADDIS FOR USAID/FHA 
KHARTOUM FOR SHA 
LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL EAID ECON EGAD ER
SUBJECT: FOOD AID FOR ERITREA: A PENDING CRISIS WITHOUT A 
RESPONSE 
 
CLASSIFIED BY:  AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
REFTEL: A) Asmara 201 B) Asmara 280 
 
¶1. (C) With the ever growing humanitarian crisis in the 
Horn of Africa, concerns over Eritrea's food needs and the 
Government of the State of Eritrea's (GSE's) plans 
escalate.  Reports from the various regions present a dire 
picture regarding food security and livestock health.  Food 
remains undistributed and of the approximately 98,000 
metric tons in warehouses 70% nears its shelf life.  The 
unofficial results of the incomplete National Nutrition 
Survey conducted nearly two months ago show global 
malnutrition values of over 20% in some areas.  The GSE's 
National Household Survey (to determine food needs and the 
ability to work) has been terminated, reportedly due to 
statistical problems and an alternate "registration" begun. 
The GSE also still appears determined to implement a Food 
for Work program, which would be problematic for some 
donors and NGOs. (Septel) 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador will meet WFP-Eritrea Director Cebron on 
April 12 and will urge him to draw together donors and UN 
agencies to discuss next steps with GSE and a strategy to 
respond to humanitarian concerns in Eritrea.  We know that 
several donors are already examining the issue individually 
and pondering next steps but coordination among donors is a 
critical missing component. The UN is planning for a late 
April visit of UN Special Humanitarian Envoy for the Horn 
of Africa, former Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne 
Bondevik.  According to the UN FAO representative, the 
agenda for his planned visit has not yet been set, 
including at what level he hopes to meet with GSE 
officials.  Last week the Dutch mission sent a notice to 
The Hague regarding food security, presenting in more 
detail the situation here and inquiring about Dutch 
thinking and plans.  A recent visit to Eritrea by DFID 
staff also examined food security, however, any additional 
British support for food aid would be targeted and most 
likely focused on supplemental feeding. The German mission 
continues to inform Berlin of the growing problem here yet 
has no immediate plans to take action. 
 
¶3. (C) Humanitarian Aid partners, such as UNFAO, UNWFP, 
Mercy Corps and Catholic Relief Services, express great 
worry over the situation in the different regions, offering 
anecdotes that paint a dire picture of the situation - 
80,000 livestock dead, the livestock market withering away 
(a common occurrence in times of food stress), empty 
therapeutic feeding centers because there is only food for 
the infants and not enough for the caregivers, schools 
closing early as they can not feed the students, and 
traders unable to procure grains.  Efforts to get an 
accurate picture are complicated by a marked unwillingness 
in communities to talk candidly about food shortages or 
government failings.  WFP recently began thinking about 
options for the donor-provided food already in-country, 
considering transferring the food out of Eritrea or using 
it for in-patient hospital feeding rather than allowing it 
 
to rot while awaiting GSE agreement to resume general 
distributions.  The NGOs, meanwhile want to act but feel 
subject to the mercurial whims of the GSE and to donors' 
commitments and political concerns.  Meanwhile, the cry for 
help from the population, if not from the government, is 
getting louder. 
 
¶4. (C) Comment:  Eritrea's pending food crisis is different 
from the rest of the Horn of Africa only in that the GSE 
refuses to fully acknowledge the problem or engage the 
international community in an effort to address it.  An 
unyielding determination to be self-reliant and avoid 
dependence on donors (who Eritrea views almost universally 
with suspicion) will not change the fact that Eritrea will 
face a severe food security crisis and will need food.  The 
GSE's lack of engagement with the international partners, 
including the World Food Program, and its seven-month long 
suspension of general distribution of food already in 
country raises serious questions about GSE thinking and 
intentions. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Comment continued:  Meanwhile, GSE sensitivities 
about others telling it how to care for the people of 
Eritrea are acute and the visit of the Special Envoy may - 
for the GSE - bring unwelcome international attention to 
the food security issues in the country.  The GSE may 
interpret a high profile and well publicized visit as an 
attempt to back them into a corner, a position that usually 
results in the GSE to digging in its heels.  Such a 
publicized visit may provide "cover" for the donors and the 
UN, however, as we seek to get food moving again.  Post 
will continue to explore options with WFP but proposals to 
transfer food out of Eritrea will require careful 
consideration and may be non-starters given GSE control of 
warehouses, trucks, ports, etc.  Post will also urge the UN 
agencies here to take a stronger leadership role, with 
support of the donors, in pressing the GSE for more 
constructive engagement and for a food aid plan.  End 
Comment. 
 
DeLisi