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C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000230 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV ETRD SOCI ELAB PINR UY
SUBJECT: THE VAZQUEZ ADMINISTRATION AT THE ONE-YEAR MARK 
 
REF: A. 05 MONTEVIDEO 00665 
     ¶B. 05 MONTEVIDEO 1429 
     ¶C. MONTEVIDEO 0207 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶D. MONTEVIDEO 0175 
     ¶E. MONTEVIDEO 0229 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires James D. Nealon 
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Frente Amplio (FA) Government completed 
its first year in power on March 1 with more achievements 
than setbacks.  In typical fashion, little fanfare marked the 
day as President Vazquez had sent his state-of-the-union 
report to Congress a week earlier.  It is clear that his 
adroit and pragmatic leadership (along with Uruguay's strong 
institutions and the basically conservative nature of its 
society) have prevented the radical tilt some observers had 
predicted during the 2004 electoral campaign.  The President 
seems to prefer the term ""progressive"" rather than ""leftist"" 
to describe his administration.  Looking back, Vazquez' 
campaign promise to ""shake the trees to their roots"" has 
meant more in terms of rejecting outdated socialist thinking 
than anything else.  The moderates have the upper hand, and 
Vazquez has been more challenged by the radicals in his FA 
coalition than he has by the two discredited opposition 
parties (Blancos and Colorados) who ruled the country during 
the past century.  In this effort, he relies on a relatively 
small cadre of experienced officials to get things done.  A 
key ally in this regard has been AgMinister and ex-Tupamaro 
guerrilla leader Jose Mujica, who has been useful in 
countering the ideologues on the far-left.  Vazquez was also 
able to appease many radicals by addressing the human rights 
abuses committed during the ""dirty war"" period of the 
military dictatorship and by finding the buried bones of 
disappeared persons.  His leadership style is now 
predictable: he stays above the fray and allows competing 
factions in the FA to debate an issue to exhaustion and then 
weighs in with a final decision.  This method will be sorely 
tested in 2006 as the GOU attempts to reform taxes, 
education, and defense -- and possibly face a showdown with 
powerful labor unions. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary Continued:  Foreign policy is another 
formidable challenge, compounded by a stubbornly ideological 
Foreign Minister (Reinaldo Gargano). The most serious problem 
is the dispute with Argentina over the construction of giant 
paper mills on a shared river -- not only because of soured 
bilateral relations with Uruguay's closest neighbor, but also 
because of the implications to foreign investment, 
independent foreign policy, and Mercosur.  After briefly 
flirting with Cuba and Venezuela (to establish his ""leftist"" 
credentials), Vazquez has tended to exert a moderating 
influence on his regional counterparts, including Hugo Chavez 
who has twice visited here.  Vazquez appears to model himself 
more after Chile's ex-President Ricardo Lagos, and his mild 
leadership style stands in sharp contrast to Hugo Chavez, 
Nestor Kirchner and Evo Morales.  A well-qualified economic 
team pursues prudent and sensible macroeconomic policies and 
further reflects the administration's pragmatic emphasis. 
While much of the region has lurched to the left, Vazquez has 
gone out of his way to seek good relations with the U.S.  In 
a recent meeting with the Charge on March 7, we heard from 
the President himself that he seeks an FTA with us (ref E). 
Vazquez' efforts to expand trade with the U.S. offer the USG 
a golden opportunity to send a message to the region that we 
favor pragmatic democratic governments, regardless of their 
political label.  Below is an appraisal of the GOU's 
successes and reversals during its first year.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------- 
Foreign Policy: Positives 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Relations with the U.S. - Early on, Vazquez went out 
of his way to state publicly and privately that he wanted to 
have good relations with the U.S., in spite of ideological 
opposition from the more radical elements of his FA 
coalition.  (Note: More than 30 pct of the FA Government is 
composed of the Popular Participation Movement (MPP) - 
Tupamaro, ex-guerrillas faction. End Note.)  Vazquez took 
several positive steps to translate his statements into 
action.  The Open Skies Agreement, signed under the previous 
administration, was unanimously ratified in July 2005. 
Later, the GOU offered meaningful assistance to the victims 
of Hurricane Katrina and persuaded the radicals to support 
UNITAS naval exercises with the U.S.  After allowing a heated 
debate on the ratification of the Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(BIT) with the U.S. to take its course, Vazquez became 
personally engaged during his trip to the U.S. in September, 
when he proposed that several controversial articles be 
amended.  The ensuing agreement on these cosmetic changes to 
the BIT allowed Vazquez to sign the document in Mar del Plata 
in November and to have it ratified by Congress in December. 
After returning from the U.S. in September, Vazquez sent out 
a trial balloon, saying that the BIT should be followed by 
enhanced commercial talks with the U.S.  This was followed in 
January 2006 by a front-page interview by Economy Minister 
Astori, in which he advocated (on Vazquez's behalf, we 
believe) that Uruguay should negotiate a Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) with the U.S.  (Note: Uruguayan Ambassador to 
Washington Carlos Gianelli had earlier told Charge that this 
was the direction Vazquez wanted to follow. See ref B.  End 
Note.) On March 7, we also heard from the President himself 
that he seeks an FTA with us. 
 
¶4. (C) Vazquez also signaled early on that he wanted to meet 
with POTUS, and a short meeting was arranged on the margins 
of the Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata.  A POTUS 
meeting is now set for May 4 at the White House. (Note: And 
so is a pull-aside meeting with the Secretary in Chile on 
March 11. End Note.)  Key members of Vazquez's kitchen 
cabinet (Finance Minister Astori, Industry Minister Lepra and 
Agriculture Minister Mujica) have continuously advocated for 
closer relations with the U.S. and pushed for the development 
of a smooth, business-like relationship.  While the MFA was 
pressing to sue the U.S. at the WTO over rice subsidies, 
Lepra and Mujica prevailed in convincing Uruguayan rice 
exporters to hold off and try to resolve the issue 
bilaterally.  Several productive meetings have since taken 
place between GOU and USG delegations on the margins of the 
WTO.  Finally, the GOU has pushed for a resumption of the 
Joint Commission on Trade and Investment (JCTI), a mechanism 
started under the Batlle administration.  The next JCTI 
meeting is set to take place in Washington in early April. 
For two years now, the U.S. is Uruguay's largest export 
market, absorbing some 25% of the country's exports and 
overtaking Mercosur as the prime destination.  Trade has 
clearly become the engine of our bilateral relationship. 
 
¶5. (C) Mercosur - After initial signals that strengthening 
Mercosur and developing Latin American integration would be a 
main priority, Vazquez has become seriously disenchanted with 
the trading bloc.  His first foreign policy actions  were to 
renew diplomatic relations with Cuba, sign trade and cultural 
agreements with Venezuela, sign an agreement on human rights 
with Argentina and welcome Brazilian investment into Uruguay. 
 However, Uruguay's lackluster pro-tempore Mercosur 
presidency, the increasing tendency of Brazil and Argentina 
to negotiate bilateral agreements without consultations, and 
recurring market access problems for Uruguayan exports with 
both larger countries all contributed to a sense of deep 
frustration with Mercosur.  The nail in the coffin appears to 
have come from Argentina's blockade of the three access 
bridges linking it with Uruguay, because of the paper mills 
dispute (ref C).  Brazil's complete silence on Argentina's 
violation of a basic tenet of Mercosur -- the free movement 
of goods across borders -- seems to have convinced Vazquez 
that Mercosur is of little use to Uruguay.  While the GOU, 
under the influence of ForMin Gargano, pushed for the 
induction of Venezuela into Mercosur, it appears increasingly 
unlikely that this act will bring any benefit to Uruguay. 
The GOU is now looking for relationships outside of Mercosur, 
with Astori stating that the government's main economic 
priority for this year will be to negotiate bilateral FTAs 
with the U.S. and with China. 
 
¶6. (C) Argentina and Brazil - Even prior to the conflict with 
Argentina and the estrangement from Mercosur, the GOU was 
already showing a decided trend towards independent action 
from the bloc.  Uruguay did not vote for the Brazilian 
candidate to the IDB (it supported the USG-backed Colombian 
candidate), perhaps in retaliation for the GOB's lack of 
support for Uruguay's candidate to the WTO, Perez de 
Castillo.  Vazquez was incidentally reported to have 
developed an excellent personal relationship with President 
Uribe when he visited Colombia on his return trip from the 
U.S. His public statements in both New York and Bogota were 
moderate and constructive. 
 
¶7. (C) Pol/Mil Issues - Vazquez has been able to maintain 
overall good relations with the Uruguayan military despite 
the paltry defense budget and the sensitive investigations 
into the human rights violations committed during the period 
of the military dictatorship (1973-1985).  Embassy believes 
that there is little chance that the GOU will sign an Article 
98 agreement, though some GOU officials might not be quite as 
enthusiastic about the ICC since Argentina is taking Uruguay 
to the International Court in The Hague in the papermill 
dispute. Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) are a source of pride 
(and much-needed revenue) for the Uruguayan armed forces.  On 
a per capita basis, Uruguay maintains the largest number of 
deployed peacekeeping troops in the world.  Of the 3,083 PKO 
troops total, some 1,897 are deployed in Africa (MONUC) and 
965 in Haiti (MINUSTAH).  After much acrimonious debate in 
Congress, Uruguay's navy was authorized to participate in 
UNITAS exercises, though many in the FA have promised not to 
allow it next year until the defense policy is overhauled. 
U.S./Uruguayan mil-to-mil relations remain positive despite 
U.S. cuts in funding. 
 
¶8. (C) Mar del Plata - As pro-tempore President of Mercosur, 
Vazquez delivered Mercosur's rejection of the FTAA, but 
presidential advisors told us that Vazquez felt ambushed by 
the Argentines who presented him with the strongly worded 
statement at the last minute, which Uruguay did not have a 
part in elaborating.  Vazquez tempered this rejection by 
adding that conditions for an FTAA were not appropriate at 
the time.  In defiance of Chavez' call to shun President 
Bush, Vazquez chose the Summit as the venue to sign the BIT 
with the U.S. and worked hard to meet with POTUS on the 
sidelines of the Summit. 
 
¶9. (C) Paper mills dispute with Argentina - This is the most 
serious foreign policy challenge that the Vazquez 
administration has had to face.  The GOU see the mills as 
vital to investment, jobs and export diversification. 
Vazquez' measured but firm approach is to appeal to the 
international community in the hope that the GOA will 
eventually succumb to outside pressure, and reign in the 
protesters blocking the bridges.  Even after Argentine Entre 
Rios Governor Jorge Busti implied that Vazquez was accepting 
kickbacks from the international firms involved in the 
projects, the President's response has remained calm. 
Vazquez' tactics may prevail in the long run, but no one 
doubts that the controversy has put a severe strain on 
Argentine/Uruguayan bilateral relations. 
 
------------------------- 
Foreign Policy: Negatives 
------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Uncertain relationship with Cuba and Venezuela - 
There have been no direct contacts with Castro, but the GOU 
has accepted medical assistance (eye operations, Uruguayan 
doctors trained in Cuba, etc.)  Chavez visited Uruguay twice 
and continues to talk of oil deliveries and investment in 
spite of the fact that he has delivered very little.  The GOU 
asked the Venezuelan television network not to mention 
Uruguayan participation in Telesur until the Congress 
approved the partnership with the Venezuelan initiative.  The 
GOU has also expressed concern about Telesur's coverage of 
FARC guerrillas and the networks association with the Arab 
television station Al Jazeera. 
 
¶11. (C) Foreign Ministry - Although both belong to the same 
Socialist Party, ForMin Gargano has publicly disagreed with 
or contradicted Vazquez on several occasions.  Gargano has 
made a series of mistakes (particularly on relations with 
Argentina and the U.S.), which highlight his lack of 
experience in foreign affairs and lack of professionalism. 
There has been talk of a Cabinet shuffle in June or September 
2006, and some observers believe Gargano will be one of the 
first to go. A few believe that Gargano's ineptness serves 
the purpose of discrediting the old socialist hard line, 
while Vazquez uses other emissaries to carry out his foreign 
policies. 
 
¶12. (C) Pro-tempore presidency of Mercosur - Little was 
achieved during Uruguay's presidency of Mercosur, except for 
the induction of Venezuela into the bloc, one of ForMin's 
Gargano's pet projects.  So far, Venezuela appears to be more 
a weight than a solid addition to Mercosur, as ForMin 
officials and high-level members of the Mercosur Secretariat 
tell us they strongly doubt that Venezuela will ever 
implement the necessary changes to become a full member.  The 
reading here is that Chavez obtained what he really wanted -- 
a forum to promote his cause with more force-- and that he 
never intended to comply with the complex trade and tariff 
structure of Mercosur.  Chavez is said to be content to 
remain a ""member in the preparatory stages of accession"" for 
the foreseeable future.  Uruguay's presidency also saw Brazil 
and Argentina negotiate a bilateral market access mechanism 
(MCA) without consulting their partners.  Insiders have told 
us that Vazquez was incensed by the dismissal and duplicity 
shown by his neighbors.

¶13. (C) Relationship with Argentina - Again, ForMin Gargano's 
handling of the paper mills crisis has been criticized.  He 
is seen as having reacted late and incoherently to the issue 
and to have allowed the dispute to spin out of control. The 
GOU believes that President Kirchner's attitude has been 
intractable because he is reluctant to take on part of his 
domestic constituency (Province of Entre Rios, the 
protesters, etc,).  The papermills are a matter of vital 
national interest for Uruguay. 
 
------------------------- 
Comment on Foreign Policy 
------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) After an initial period of espousing strong linkages 
with other left-of-center governments in the region, the GOU 
appears to have been rudely awakened to the reality that most 
countries in the region act in their own self-interest.  The 
result has been a dramatic shift away from Mercosur, brought 
about by a deep disillusion with the organization and its 
members.  At the same time, the growing importance of the 
U.S. market at the expense of Mercosur (which now  absorbs 
only 20% of Uruguay's exports, compared to 60% in 1998) has 
made closer relations with the U.S. an inescapable necessity. 
 The trade relationship has become key.  Stuck between two 
overbearing neighbors, Uruguay needs, in the words of 
Industry Minister Lepra, an ""uncle to protect it against its 
bully brothers.""  Vazquez has favored a pragmatic approach to 
foreign affairs, much more similar to that of Lagos than of 
Kirchner or Chavez.  He is a consensus builder, reasonable 
and unabrasive, who has refused to enter into a verbal fight 
with Kirchner, while not backing down from his firm 
convictions.  He appears to exert a moderating influence on 
Chavez and could possibly exert the same on Evo Morales.  End 
Comment. 
 
-------------------------- 
Economic Policy: Positives 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Relationship with the IFIs - Early on, Finance 
Minister Astori negotiated agreements with the IMF, the IDB, 
and the World Bank, in record time.  This generated 
confidence in the administration's capacity to handle the 
economy and to manage the country's debt burden.  One year 
on, the latest IMF reports indicate a continued positive 
evolution of the economy and note that Uruguay is on track 
with the major elements of its program with the Fund. 
 
¶16. (C) Macroeconomic management - Astori continued to 
implement the orthodox macroeconomic policies of the previous 
administration. Debt management has been excellent, with 
sustained, timely payment of obligations.  The GOU placed 
over $1.0 billion of new debt under quite favorable 
conditions, thereby allowing it to retire expensive debt 
contracted at the height of the 2002 crisis.  Uruguay 
currently commands a lower country risk rating than either 
Brazil or Argentina.  Growth in 2005 exceeded 6% and is 
expected to continue at about 4% for 2006.  Inflation was 
contained at 4.9% in 2005 and is expected to climb to a 
manageable 6.5% in 2006.  The first year also saw a 
significant increase in tax collection, due to increased 
compliance and better controls.  Astori resisted MPP Leader 
Mujica's initial calls for price controls and for tampering 
with exchange rates to balance out the declining value of the 
dollar.  He also resisted calls to impose compulsory 
refinancing of debts. 
 
¶17. (C) Wage negotiations - While the private sector had 
initial reservations about negotiating wages through 
sectorial wage councils, the initiative worked out 
surprisingly smoothly and the government kept to its role as 
arbiter.  Formalizing of employment has continued apace. 
 
¶18. (C) Foreign investment - Forestry has absorbed the major 
part of new investment.  Finland's Botnia and Spain's Ence 
are investing $1.8 billion in giant paper mills, and Sweden's 
Sore Ensa has announced plans to build a $600 million paper 
mill.  Meanwhile, U.S. forestry firm Weyerhaueser, which has 
already invested $300 million in Uruguay, is planning a $500 
million expansion of its activities in pressed wood 
manufacturing.  The strong GOU position to insulate paper 
mill companies from the dispute with Argentina has sent a 
positive signal to investors regarding the importance of the 
rule of law and Uruguay's favorable investment climate. 
 
¶19. (C) Financial system - The financial system is still 
under consolidation, but progress was made in cleaning up 
problems left by the 2002 crisis.  The GOU sold Nuevo Banco 
Comercial (NBC), the successor of the failed Banco Comercial, 
to a private investor group under good conditions in a 
transparent process.  The GOU also appropriately handled a 
crisis in the financial cooperative COFAC within the first 
days after it took office, and is currently working out a 
permanent solution to COFAC's problems through the sale of 
the entity to a foreign group. 
 
-------------------------- 
Economic Policy: Negatives 
-------------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) Unemployment and labor unions - Unemployment still 
remains high at 12%, and labor relations may be the Achilles 
heel of this government.  The GOU may have over-empowered the 
powerful trade unions (in particular the radical PIT-CNT) by 
derogating a decree which enabled police to evict workers 
occupying plants and by passing the Union Protection Law. 
The result has been a rash of plant occupations, some of them 
violent (ref D).  The government is now considering a new law 
which would regulate the conditions under which a plant may 
be occupied.  Still, this may be too little too late. 
 
-------------------------- 
Comment on Economic Policy 
-------------------------- 
 
¶21. (C) The GOU's excellent overall macroeconomic management 
could be an example of steadfastness for countries in the 
region.  Continued growth, sound public debt management and 
an openness to the outside are all good omens for the future. 
 The fact that this left-of-center government basically 
continued the policies started by the preceding government 
may show the beginning of a general public consensus on sound 
economic policy, as is the case in Chile.  The GOU appears to 
have understood that continuity in economic and investment 
policy, coupled with a strict respect for the rule of law 
(historically Uruguay's strong point), are essential for the 
country to attract and retain foreign investment.  The only 
area of concern relates to the GOU's relationship with the 
unions, where demagoguery in catering to its electorate may 
cost the FA dearly in the long-run.  It will be difficult to 
wring back concessions from the unions without a fight, and 
lack of action to restrain union abuses may spoil an 
otherwise good investment climate.  End Comment. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Domestic Politics and Policy: Positives 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (C) Leadership and style--Vazquez projects a thoughtful 
impartiality which so far has assuaged the expectations of 
impatient citizens who were promised rapid change.  Vazquez 
popularity remains high, in part because of his soft-spoken, 
hands-off management style. He allows ministers to speak 
freely in public, often disagreeing with one another, and he 
uses the Uruguayans' love of a thorough discussion to clear 
the air.  After stakeholders have expended their passion, a 
process he recently called ""the rhythm"" of Uruguayan 
politics, he weighs in and his policy is quickly accepted. 
Based on our experience with the passage of the BIT, the 
approval of UNITAS exercises, and initial discussions of an 
FTA, we believe that Vazquez to a large degree orchestrates 
the rhythm of these debates in order to harmonize the 
conclusion with his original intent.  A practicing 
oncologist, Dr. Vazquez manages the country with a gentle 
bedside manner and decisive surgical skill. Thus far, this 
approach has made Vazquez a ""Teflon president,"" has allowed 
him to direct the debate, and has given him considerable 
authority when he decides to call for order on an issue.  He 
places pragmatism over personal glory or flashy ideology and 
analytically pursues what he believes to be Uruguay's best 
interests. 
 
¶23. (C) The FA Coalition--Under Vazquez' leadership, the 
moderate left now encompasses all parties but the extreme 
radicals (26 de Marzo), the Communists, and a small sector of 
the Socialist Party.  Rather than confront the extreme 
radicals, Vazquez retains them within the FA coalition where 
he can keep an eye on them.  Much of the leadership on the 
left is over 60 years old.  Only a few have the energy and 
experience to follow Vazquez whole-heartedly, but the large 
majority acquiesce to the FA's new direction.  Actual 
leadership of the GOU rests with a pragmatic and moderate 
kitchen cabinet including Finance Minister Astori, Industrial 
Minister Lepra, and Agriculture Minister Mujica.  Astori and 
Lepra hold strongly orthodox views on economic growth and 
development and have extensive experience with international 
institutions, finance, and commerce.  Jose Mujica, a former 
guerrilla, has proven to be pragmatic, responsible, and a 
reliable partner for Vazquez on several critical issues. 
Mujica has kept his MPP in line with the moderate FA course 
and plays a pivotal role in moderating the left.  This has 
given Vazquez significant leeway to steer the Frente Amplio 
coalition without serious political distractions.  We believe 
these developments are creating lasting changes within the 
Uruguayan left.  The MPP quickly fell in line behind Mujica's 
moderate leadership because they found themselves unable to 
organize or govern based purely on ideology, and several 
Socialist leaders told us that the future of their party 
rests with Vazquez rather than with the ideologues of 
previous generations. 
 
¶24. (C) Domestic achievements - The GOU was able to smoothly 
pass the public budget because the FA controls Congress, but 
it was also apparent that there was little room for 
discretionary spending.  The GOU managed to make a modest 
increase in educational spending, but the increase cannot 
cover many of the serious needs in the system.  Perhaps the 
GOU's greatest domestic achievement has been its skillful 
handling of the potentially-explosive issue of human rights 
abuses committed during the ""dirty war."" The GOU managed to 
bring an element of closure to the issue without alienating 
the military or provoking a backlash from the right-leaning 
segments of the society.  Vazquez entrusted this sensitive 
portfolio to his closest advisor, Secretary to the Presidency 
Gonzalo Fernandez. He also received excellent cooperation 
from former commander of the Armed Forces General Angel 
Bertolotti. Fears that the GOU might have opened a ""Pandora's 
box"" by dredging up a past that had been largely untouched by 
previous administrations, dissipated when a GOU team located 
the bones of a ""disappeared"" victim in a field in November 
¶2005. Since then, other forensic evidence has clarified parts 
of this terrible chapter in Uruguay's history.  Vazquez' 
administration is the first to pursue physical remains of the 
victims, and the search produced tangible evidence of the 
GOU's commitment to this issue, comforted families, and 
mollified the left. 
 
-------------------------- 
Domestic Policy: Negatives 
-------------------------- 
 
¶25. (C) Welfare Plan - The GOU's emergency welfare plan 
(PANES) and other social programs under the FA-created 
Ministry of Social Development have proven ineffective and 
disorganized.  Despite promises of tempering the most extreme 
forms of poverty, the new Ministry can point to no tangible 
results, and some have begun to question the transparency and 
cost of the new programs.  Members of the FA have publicly 
questioned Minister Marina Aresmendi's loyalty to Vazquez and 
her common sense.  She once suggested bringing Cuban reading 
teachers to Uruguay which already has a 98% literacy rate. 
The GOU ignored the proposal, and there are rumors that she 
may be dismissed in a future cabinet reshuffle. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Interior Ministry - The press frequently criticizes 
the Interior Ministry for poor law enforcement and portrays 
its minister as out of touch and ""on vacation.""  Theft and 
robbery have increased dramatically in the last few years, 
and citizens protested against crime in one neighborhood of 
the capital.  The Ministry came under extreme criticism after 
it failed to anticipate property damage during several 
downtown demonstrations, and in a separate incident, the 
police watched a violent labor altercation but did not 
intervene. 
 
¶27. (SBU) Prisons - Uruguay's prisons remain overcrowded and 
under-funded.  A recent television documentary showed leaking 
roofs, twelve men in a cell designed for two, and unsanitary 
conditions.  Despite a recent early release program, civil 
rights groups estimate that the prisons are overcrowded by 
fifty percent and that none of Uruguay's prisons are in good 
repair.  The GOU did not address penal system reform, prison 
modernization, or prison conditions during the year. 
 
¶28. (SBU) Education - As part of a budget reallocation, 
schools in Uruguay reduced their English language instruction 
by twenty-five percent.  The trade off for this reduction was 
unclear.  The average public school student in Uruguay 
receives less than four hours of instruction each week in any 
foreign language.  The education system remains severely 
under-funded, and an extensive child welfare system competes 
for funds with public schools.  Most elementary students 
attend school half day and schools are chronically short of 
books and supplies. 
 
¶29. (C) The opposition - The government currently has poor 
relationship with both opposition parties.  Despite the 
positive initial step of signing a joint framework document 
on foreign policy, education and the economy, the 
relationship deteriorated rapidly.  The opposition felt 
short-changed by the government's offer of participation and 
did not join the boards of state-owned enterprises.  Senator 
Larranaga, the leader of the Blanco opposition, told us that 
the government had taken no initiative to consult his party, 
the largest in opposition, on legislation or new initiatives. 
 (Note:  Uruguay has a long tradition of cooperation between 
the administration and the opposition, but this is the first 
government in 50 years in which the president also has an 
aboslute majority in Congress.  End Note.) 
 
-------------------------- 
Comment on Domestic Policy 
-------------------------- 
 
¶30. (C) The GOU's greatest success has been in dealing with 
the human rights abuses of the military dictatorship.  The 
issue has also conveniently served to distract some of the 
far-left from more mundane issues such as jobs and salaries. 
Its greatest challenge continues to be managing the 
heightened expectations of the poor, estimated at about 
one-third of the population.  Less was accomplished than was 
hoped for in terms of jobs, crime, prison overcrowding and 
effective social programs.  Some folks complain that there 
has been little change at all.  Still, the field of moderates 
in the GOU has expanded, while r","adicals have become fewer, 
though some are remain quite vocal.  How Vazquez will deal 
with an emboldened labor sector remains open to question. 
There were fewer strikes in 2005, but increased number of 
cases in which workers occupied factories or businesses. 
Brain drain remains a serious problem and many young 
Uruguayans emigrate abroad in search of jobs.  Drug use is 
another growing problem, particulary ""pasta base"" from 
Bolivia.  End Comment. 
 
------------------------- 
What Will 2006 Look Like? 
------------------------- 
 
¶31. (C) The GOU's stated priorities for this year are to 
introduce structural reforms on tax, education, health and 
defense and to open up trade negotiations with partners 
outside of Mercosur, namely the U.S. and China. Tax reform 
will be the most difficult and there are already rumors that 
the GOU is considering postponing some reforms. While 
economic growth should continue, with inflation under 
control, the country's debt burden will continue to weigh 
heavily on what the government can actually achieve.  There 
are already indications that a reform of the health system, 
estimated to cost upwards of a billion dollars, will be 
postponed until 2007.  The proposed tax reform, which for the 
first time will introduce a personal income tax, is facing 
strong opposition from all quarters and may be debated all 
year-long.  Relations with the military are likely to 
continue to be good, with the GOU pursuing the issue of 
disappeared persons, but postponing an eventual discussion of 
the amnesty law until 2007. 
 
¶32. (C) What could go wrong?  This scenario could alter 
drastically if any of the following events were to occur: 
 
#¿NOMBRE?
catastrophic for Uruguay.  Beef exports have led the economic 
recovery and represent the country's first export item.  They 
are also the leading Uruguayan export to the U.S. 
 
#¿NOMBRE?
Astori-Lepra wing of the GOU is seen as reflecting Vazquez's 
thinking and clearly has the upper hand within the FA.  This 
wing has generated a clear momentum in favor of an FTA with 
the U.S.  A cold shoulder by the U.S. to this initiative 
would certainly strengthen the radicals, whose mantra has 
always been that it is not worth talking to the U.S. 
 
#¿NOMBRE?
wholesale retreat by the GOU, or a decision by Botnia or Ence 
to suspend their projects, could have a serious impact on 
growth, the business environment and the overall relationship 
with Argentina. 
 
#¿NOMBRE?
the recently strengthened umbrella labor union (PIT-CNT), 
which is likely to fight tooth and nail any rollback of the 
major concessions it was granted.  While unlikely, a battle 
of wills with the unions could get out-of-hand or cause a 
rash of strikes. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Comment: A Pragmatic Government Worth Cultivating 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶33. (C) The Embassy has been relieved and impressed by the FA 
administration's balance sheet during its first year in 
power.  Vazquez remains firmly in control and the latest 
polls show he has a 54% approval rating.  Despite the lack of 
experienced personnel (in both the executive branch and 
Congress) and having to clarify or reverse years of populist 
opposition rhetoric, the FA government has clearly moved 
towards the political center.  Barring some unfortunate 
event, we expect it to finish out its term (2009) on a 
moderate course.  In the meantime, the Embassy is greatly 
pleased that the USG has responded favorably to GOU's 
friendly overtures demonstrated over the last year.  While we 
recognize the limited influence of this small country, we 
remain convinced that this bilateral relationship is in the 
U.S. interest and worth cultivating.  Strong ties with 
Uruguay send a powerful signal to the region that we favor 
good relations with sensible, pragmatic governments who 
respect democracy and institutions, regardless of their 
political label.  End Comment. 
Nealon