VZCZCXRO0620
PP RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0049/01 0661108
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071108Z MAR 06
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0157
INFO RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 0187
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0439
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA PRIORITY 0001
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0005
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000049 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV TH BM
SUBJECT: CHANGING ATTITUDES SLOWLY TAKING HOLD ON THAI-BURMESE 
BORDER 
 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000049  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
(SBU) SUMMARY. Thai government and refugee camp officials in the 
Thai border district of Mae Sot increasingly view political, 
refugee, and immigration problems as long-term issues. While 
this realization that the more-than two decades-old refugee 
situation is no longer a "temporary problem" has led to a 
dramatic shift in Thai policy toward Burmese refugees, this same 
sense of permanence to the refugees' status in Thailand has 
compounded the problems exile leaders face in maintaining 
influence inside Burma. Faced with diminishing contacts inside 
their home country, many dissidents have become fixated on a 
misguided hope that the U.S. military will help overthrow the 
regime. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.      (U) Mae Sot today is a classic boomtown, with new 
developments, shops and markets springing up around town, all 
driven by refugees, illegal immigrants, and one-day permit 
holders crossing the Friendship Bridge that links Mae Sot with 
Myawadi in Burma. Burmese nationals of varying ethnicities now 
make up an estimated 80 percent of the Mae Sot area's 
population, including refugee camps, and are the muscle behind 
the area's economy. Embassy Rangoon Charge d'Affaires Shari 
Villarosa traveled with ConGen PolOff in February to the Mae Sot 
border district in Tak province to meet with Thai government 
officials, NGOs, and members of the Burmese dissident community 
- one of many frequent visits in recent years by USG officials. 
Over the course of these visits, officers have noted the growing 
and significant role played by Burmese refugees in the area's 
economy and culture. 
 
¶3.      (SBU) No one expects the flow of refugees into Thailand to 
slow down any time soon. Col. Kasem Thanaporn, commander of the 
Royal Thai Army's 4th Infantry Task Force in Mae Sot, observed 
that Burma's military control over the border area was being 
consolidated and that armed opposition groups were gradually 
being surrounded by Burmese military forces. The recent move to 
a new capital in centrally located Pyinmana was due, in part, to 
the State Peace and Development Council's (SPDC) effort to 
better consolidate its grip on the ethnic border states, he 
suggested. 
 
¶4.      (SBU) Representatives of the Karen National Union (KNU) in 
Northern Thailand have stated that the SPDC's move to Pyinmana 
has strengthened the regime's hand against rebel forces, noting 
that the new capital is located in what had been Karen 
territory. Refugee activists and opposition groups say the 
Burmese regime is actively driving ethnic groups out of Burma, 
in part to remove ethnic minorities from the vicinity of 
Pyinmana and also to provide land to retired Burmese soldiers. 
These activists say the SPDC is using landmines and destroying 
bridges and crops to drive refugee movements toward and across 
the border, eliminating return routes back in to Burma for the 
Karen and other groups. They expressed gratitude that the Thais 
had recently been more lenient in giving refuge. 
 
The Good News: Thai Government and Refugee NGOs Adapting 
 
¶5.      (SBU) After long treating the refugee situation as a 
temporary problem - one that would eventually be solved when the 
refugees returned to Burma - Thai government officials involved 
with operating the Mae La refugee camp have accepted that 
Burma's economic decline and political conflicts are unlikely to 
reverse themselves anytime soon. Likewise, officials have begun 
taking basic steps to address the Burmese population in Mae Sot 
as more than temporary residents. 
 
¶6.      (SBU) Officers from the 4th Infantry Task Force have 
established productive contacts and communication with their 
Burmese counterparts on the other side of the border - a 
positive development when contrasted with the threats of armed 
skirmishes or Burmese shelling of refugee camps in Thailand a 
few years ago. Officers estimated that nearly 2,000 Burmese 
cross into Mae Sot from Myawadi each day on one-day passes, and 
that given the bustling, Burmese-centric economy in town, there 
was no doubt many more are coming in and staying. Col. Kasem 
said he did not personally see the situation in Burma improving 
soon and expected more refugees to find their way into Thailand. 
 
¶7.      (SBU) The Thai government's decision to begin teaching 
Thai language in the Mae La camp, an effort begun just in the 
past year, is a further encouraging sign that officials are 
looking at the refugee situation in a new light. Despite having 
become an overwhelming majority of the local workforce, Burmese 
ethnic groups and their children have had very little access to 
Thai language schooling. By teaching refugee children Thai, Thai 
officials are finally admitting that the refugees will be here 
for a while and taking steps to facilitate their assimilation. 
 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000049  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶8.      (U) Also encouraging is the extent to which civil society 
is active in Mae La. With some 50,000 residents, the camp counts 
as one of the North's largest population centers, and within it 
live various ethnicities, Christians, Buddhists, and Muslims 
under more or less stable circumstances. Initially a refuge for 
the Karen, Mae La and other camps in the region are now home to 
other ethnicities, dissident Burmans, and Muslim Rohingyas, who 
found their way from western Burma. Karen leaders have seen the 
numbers of Rohingyas climb from 1,000 to 10,000 in the past five 
years and say they have been accepted and recognized as good 
traders. Some groups, such as the Karen Women's Organization, 
are developing an increasingly stronger base of support for 
their target populations and finding opportunities for them away 
from the refugee camps. Charge and PolOff spoke to several young 
people working on their English in the hopes that they would 
receive scholarships or be accepted into resettlement programs. 
 
¶9.      (SBU) These changing attitudes among Thai officials 
reflect the important policy shift by the central government 
that has led to enhanced vocational and educational programs, as 
well as possible income generating opportunities for camp 
refugees over the past year. But despite these new attitudes 
among the Thais, many refugees continue to perceive the Thai 
government as solely interested in their return to Burma. During 
a Feb. 4 visit to Mae La with international diplomats, Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra reportedly focused some of his 
questions to the refugees on whether and when they would feel 
comfortable enough to move back to Burma. Two weeks after his 
visit, it was the perceptions of these comments - and not the 
increased Thai funding for educational and economic 
opportunities - that refugee leaders were discussing. Many 
refugees made it clear they have no interest in going back until 
their safety could be guaranteed, relating continued stories of 
rapes, forced labor, and forced relocations inside Burma. 
 
¶10.     (SBU) In addition, talk from Thai military officers that 
contacts have improved between border units and that cooperation 
is growing with Burma must be taken with a grain of salt. These 
warm statements toward their Burmese counterparts, for instance, 
were made in a room dominated by a statue of King Naresuan, the 
16th century monarch who famously liberated the Thais from 
Burmese invaders, facing toward the border - a noteworthy symbol 
that the centuries-old Thai-Burmese rivalry is far from 
forgotten. 
 
The Bad News: Dissident Groups Unfocused 
 
¶11.     (SBU) Meanwhile, exile groups are struggling with the 
effects of their long-term presence in Thailand on their overall 
goals for a future democratic Burma and their potential roles in 
the country's future. Rangoon Charge visited several 
organizations, among them the Assistance Association for 
Political Prisoners, the National Council of the Union of Burma, 
Karen National Union, Karen Refugee Committee, National 
Democratic Front, Burma Fund, All Burma Students Democratic 
Front, and Dr. Cynthia Maung's Mae Tao health clinic. These 
exiles see themselves as fervently working for democracy and 
assuming leadership roles inside Burma when democracy comes. 
 
¶12.     (SBU) After many years in exile, it may be inevitable that 
Thailand-based opposition groups are losing touch with their 
counterparts inside Burma and their influence is diminishing. 
Given the chance to rebut these criticisms during recent 
meetings, many opposition leaders came off as unduly focused on 
non-productive or unlikely scenarios. After Charge observed that 
exiles needed to focus more on a few areas of common agreement 
and less on unimportant issues, one NGO member replied that such 
action was proving to be difficult given the inability to agree 
on a name for an umbrella organization that would satisfy all 
Burmese ethnicities. Another said people must agree on a flag 
first.  When the Charge asked how exile groups planned to heal 
ethnic divisions caused by Burmese military divide-and-rule 
policies, one political dissident responded that exiles worked 
well with all the opposition groups in Thailand and had not 
caused those divisions. 
 
The Bad News for Them: Sorry Guys, the Cavalry is Not Coming 
 
¶13.     (SBU) Many opposition figures place misguided hope in the 
use of U.S. military assets to support their cause, citing 
everything from U.S. involvement in Iraq and increased U.S. 
pressure on the Burmese regime to the recent movie "Stealth" 
(which features a U.S. Navy airborne attack on terrorists in 
Rangoon). Nearly every group visited asked either subtly or 
directly when a U.S. attack would come. One exile leader warned 
that U.S. military planners would need to take into account 
rumored plans by the Burmese regime to assassinate Aung San Suu 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000049  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Kyi and other prominent opposition leaders in Burma in the event 
of an invasion. Rangoon Charge replied each time that such an 
invasion was not in the cards and that opposition groups should 
face the reality that only through uniting themselves could they 
overcome the current government's hold on power. The reaction 
was generally "we can't; we don't have guns." 
 
What Can Be Done Inside Burma 
 
¶14.     (SBU) The National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) is 
a broad-based umbrella organization of ethnic and political 
opposition groups that has been organizing Thailand-based exiles 
since 1992. Several leaders from the NCUB, including General 
Secretary U Maung Maung, outlined some of the organization's 
 
SIPDIS 
recent efforts to coordinate the widespread Burmese dissident 
community into coherent action, including efforts this past year 
to build international opposition to Burma's holding of the 
ASEAN chair in 2006. When Charge asked how the USG could better 
help those inside Burma, Maung Maung and other leaders responded 
that they needed increased funding for their National Endowment 
for Democracy grant ($85,000 in 2006) to build connections in 
the international community. When pressed about what could be 
done inside Burma, the NCUB requested 50 satellite phones to 
distribute inside Burma and recommended establishing more 
American Centers throughout Burma. 
 
¶15.     (SBU) Other Burmese activists working in Mae Sot are also 
making efforts to assist those inside Burma, such as leaders of 
the Mae Tao health clinic, which serves more than 50,000 
refugees in the border area. Clinic leader Dr. Cynthia described 
her program of sending trained medical personnel into the areas 
near the Thai border.  She also noted that one-third of her 
patients now come from inside Burma from as far away as Rangoon 
and Mandalay.  She suggested NGOs be encouraged to provide 
training for doctors and nurses inside Burma.  The Assistance 
Association of Political Prisoners, an organization that 
monitors more than 1,500 Burmese political prisoners, described 
their plans to increase the number of scholarships inside Burma 
for the children of political prisoners from 75 to 200.  They 
suggested that the U.S. could reach out to educate former 
political prisoners who cannot come to Rangoon for classes at 
the American Center. 
 
COMMENT: 
 
¶16.     (SBU) After nearly 20 years of increased inflows, the 
impact of Burmese refugees in western Thailand will continue to 
grow. Thai officials have realized that the economic and 
political situation in Burma is increasingly grave and unlikely 
to recover to the extent that refugees will return, as the 
Burmese economy will need a long time to recover from the damage 
that has been wrought. In fact, no one denies that more and more 
will find their way into Thailand. Teaching Thai to refugee camp 
children is an encouraging first step, as are enhanced 
educational and vocational training and work opportunities. 
Programs that focus on greater healthcare access and labor 
rights could further improve the quality of life and potential 
for those who have sought shelter in Thailand. 
 
¶17.     (SBU) Meanwhile, exile leaders must search for ways to 
refresh their understanding of and contacts with the opposition 
inside Burma if they hope to play a role in a future democratic 
government. Many dissidents rely primarily on family members for 
information about political developments inside Burma; it is 
apparent that most have only a surface understanding of recent 
events inside Burma. Opposition leaders based outside of Burma 
will face competition from those now on the inside to form a 
democratic government; a future democratic Burma will need the 
resources of both groups to succeed. 
 
¶18.     (SBU) Much of the exiles' focus concerns their role in a 
future national government at the expense of other issues, such 
as re-building the economy and establishing the rule of law in a 
post-SPDC Burma. Although exiles have had some successes 
organizing the varied ethnicities and interest groups of the 
Burmese dissident community in Thailand, the leaders of these 
organizations place too much faith in outside saviors (U.S. or 
otherwise) to solve their problems and not enough attention on 
uniting those to present a common front against the Burmese 
regime. 
 
¶19.     (U) This cable has been coordinated with Embassy Rangoon. 
CAMP