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Viewing cable 06AMMAN2073, JORDAN'S PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION OF PHOSPHATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06AMMAN2073 2006-03-22 07:21 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Amman
VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAM #2073/01 0810721
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 220721Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9062
INFO RUEHBD/AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 0002
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0184
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 3242
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4096
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1538
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 2664
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2355
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2269
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0056
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0072
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0903
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0303
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 3797
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 002073 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2016 
TAGS: EFIN KPRV EMIN EIND ECON JO BX
SUBJECT: JORDAN'S PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION OF PHOSPHATE 
COMPANY OPENS DOOR TO INVESTMENT DOLLARS FROM BRUNEI 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Jordan's recent sale of a 37% stake in the 
Jordan Phosphate Mining Corporation (JPMC) to the Brunei 
Investment Agency (BIA) for US$110 million met with public 
and parliamentary disapproval before the deal was concluded. 
Given BIA's overall size of over US$100 billion, the 
investment in JPMC is small for BIA but represents its first 
venture into the Middle East.  While other international 
companies expressed interest in taking a stake in JPMC, GoJ 
officials indicate the strategic decision to pursue a deal 
with BIA was made in 2004 at the highest levels.  Some MPs 
voiced opposition to the sale, prompting negative publicity 
and a GOJ effort to convince legislators of the benefits of 
the transaction.  The sale's price and conditions, however, 
indicate a highly favorable deal for Jordan, and a successful 
first step by King Abdullah to court the Sultan of Brunei and 
pave the way for future investments from the BIA.  It remains 
unclear if this privatization enhances JPMC's position in 
global phosphate commodity trading; only a promised BIA 
business plan will tell.  END SUMMARY. 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE DEAL 
--------------------- 
 
2. (U) The cabinet March 14 approved the GoJ's sale of 37% of 
JPMC, the world's sixth-largest miner and producer of 
phosphate and phosphate-based products, to BIA for US$110 
million, leaving 26% of the company in government hands. 
Through continuing investments by Jordan's pension 
administrator, the Social Security Corporation, the 
government retains another indirect 16% of the company, for a 
total of 40%.  Additionally, the government will continue to 
collect US$16 million annually from JPMC in mining fees and 
taxes.  BIA's purchase price was US$4/share, above the 
US$3.80/share valuation by HSBC (the GoJ's  banking advisor 
on the sale), but less than the US$6/share the company was 
trading on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) when the deal was 
signed.  As part of the sale, the government retains its veto 
power on all management decisions.  Additionally, BIA is 
barred from reducing the workforce - described by financial 
analysts who track the company as being 25-33% overstaffed - 
for the next three years. 
 
WHY OWN THE COW WHEN YOU GET THE MILK FOR FREE? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
3. (C) As it moves forward on its privatization agenda, the 
GoJ's financial rationale for the sale of JPMC relies heavily 
on the logic that it will continue to collect a majority of 
its current revenue from JPMC without owning a majority of 
the company.  In 2004, JPMC turned profit for the first time 
in many years.  With a 66% stake in JPMC, the US$6.1 million 
profit generated US$4 million for the government's share in 
the company.  This number was dwarfed by the additional 
US$11.2 million generated in mining fees plus US$5.7 million 
in taxes for the government.  With the 37% share sale, the 
GoJ will continue to collect mining fees and taxes but will 
forego 37% of the company's profit.  Using 2004 financials as 
a baseline, this is approximately US$2.24 million, an amount 
that would take, at current profit levels, approximately 49 
years to equal what BIA is paying for its stake.  In a 
meeting with EconOff on March 16, Executive Privatization 
Commission (EPC) Chairman Mohammed Abu-Hammour cited a 
similar rationale, pointing out that future profits for the 
company are not guaranteed with "things not in favor for the 
company long-term." (See para 6.) 
 
ALLEGATIONS OF A LOW SALE PRICE 
------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Asked to address the concern by some that the GoJ had 
sold the 37% JPMC share at a major discount to the company's 
share price on the stock exchange, Abu-Hammour provided a 
number of explanations.  First, the price paid by BIA of 
US$4/share is above the fair market price of US$ 3.80/share 
that HSBC determined for JPMC.  Second, only 3% of the 
company trades on the stock exchange.  According to 
Abu-Hammour, attempting to "float 37% of the company on the 
 
market would lead to a fall in the price," generating a more 
realistic valuation than the US$6/share the stock was trading 
at when the BIA purchase was announced.  Third, in his own 
estimation, the ASE "is in a bubble" and suffers from 
overvaluation and speculation that do not provide a fair per 
share price for the company. 
 
WHY BRUNEI? 
----------- 
 
5. (C) GoJ officials confirmed that negotiations for a JPMC 
stake with BIA were initiated as early as 2004.  Abu-Hammour 
admitted that he was surprised when, after becoming Chairman 
of the EPC in April 2005 and requesting interest from 
international bidders in JPMC, the Prime Minister informed 
him that a fast-track process had already been underway with 
BIA since 2004.  Abu-Hammour said he requested and received a 
letter from the Prime Minister stating that Bassem Awadallah, 
then Minister of Planning, had initiated negotiations with 
BIA at the request of the King.  Abu-Hammour went on to say 
that the letter gave him clear instructions to carry out 
negotiations solely with BIA and to complete the sale by the 
end of 2005. 
 
6. (C) When asked if the retraction to other interested 
parties in October 2005 may have fostered a lack of 
transparency, Abu-Hammour replied that the transaction was 
handled with as much transparency as possible, and that the 
GoJ was motivated more by closing the deal by the end of 2005 
to ensure a high valuation.  The process involving 
international bidders was stopped before a request for bid 
was published, dispelling any concern that the GoJ had 
violated a good faith initiative with bidders, he added. 
According to Abu-Hammour, involving international bidders 
would not necessarily have netted the GoJ a higher price for 
the sale, but would have guaranteed that the process would be 
delayed considerably as all offers were evaluated. 
Abu-Hammour added that with a "new Saudi phosphate-fertilizer 
company coming on-line in 2008," the value of JPMC would 
decline.  Hence, the need to move quickly on the transaction. 
 
7. (C) Above all else, GoJ officials indicate, the King's 
decision to foster a strong investment relationship with the 
Sultan of Brunei was the primary driver of the 37% sale of 
JPMC (This point was made by the King to the Ambassador when 
this deal was first discussed, in the fall of 2004). 
Abu-Hammour cited BIA's investment in JPMC as its first in 
the Middle East, and a potential huge boon for future 
investments.  A great price, retention of employees, and veto 
power for the GoJ were additional gestures that BIA was more 
than willing to concede to, said Abu-Hammour.  GoJ Spokesman 
Nasser Judeh concurred, telling EconOff on March 16 that this 
transaction allowed the Sultan to "slip money into Jordan's 
pocket," a positive development the King "should be credited 
for facilitating." 
 
PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION TO SALE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Many in the public and parliament spoke negatively of 
the sale, complaining of a low-sale price and the surprise 
nature in which the government had conducted the deal.  Asked 
why the GoJ had not done more to sell the public and 
parliament on the sale before announcing it, Abu-Hammour 
cited legal regulations that do not require the Cabinet's 
privatization council to do so, the sensitive nature of the 
sale based on the decisions of higher principals, and 
instruction from the previous PM to conclude the sale 
quickly.  While two MPs on the Finance Committee expressed 
their opposition to the sale by submitting a letter of 
complaint and walking out of parliament, Abu-Hammour believes 
he was able to convince most others of the benefits of the 
deal in a question- and-answer period held with MPs the week 
of March 12.  COMMENT:  A few MPs have continued to question 
the sale in private to PolOff, but do not plan to raise their 
doubts further in public.  END COMMENT.  Additionally, the 
press has stopped carrying stories of public opposition to 
the sale. 
 
OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES 
------------------------ 
 
9. (C) When pressed on why offers from other parties were not 
considered, Abu-Hammour suggested that most would not make 
much business sense.  Where would companies from Tunisia and 
Morocco (who also mine phosphate rock and were interested in 
taking a stake in JPMC) cut production if world prices of the 
raw material fell, he asked rhetorically. "Obviously in 
Jordan," he replied, rationalizing why BIA, a company with no 
background or interest in other phosphate companies, is a 
good fit.  In a discussion with EconOff on March 16, Indian 
Ambassador to Jordan R. Dayakar disagreed, citing the 
interest of Indian fertilizer companies in investing as a 
means to meet growing demand for downstream products like 
fertilizers.  In his opinion, the GoJ had "not made a 
strategically wise decision" in going with BIA because it had 
no background in the business and would not see the value in 
cultivating the production of high-end, downstream products. 
Chairman of JPMC Mohammed Salin Bader Khan agreed that demand 
for downstream products was growing in the Far East, 
especially in India and China, but questioned whether 
investment by a customer-oriented company would "bring any 
value to JPMC." 
 
FUTURE OF THE COMPANY 
--------------------- 
 
10. (C) Khan stressed that the future of the company depends 
on how BIA plans to diversify the product line.  He was 
enthused that BIA was joining the board if it meant future 
capital investments in the company and an accelerated plan to 
diversify the product line by focusing on downstream 
products.  If JPMC focuses heavily on raw phosphate 
extraction, "the national value is limited to cluster 
businesses prone to cyclical prices," whereas a focus on 
downstream commodities like fertilizers guarantees higher 
profit margins and makes the "company immune to cyclical 
downfalls," Khan said.  He cited a growing market for 
phosphate commodities in East Africa and the Far East as an 
opportunity JPMC needs to seize.  Whether BIA will capitalize 
will be more clear when they submit a promised business plan 
within six months. 
 
11. (C) COMMENT:  While the GoJ's failure to lay the public 
groundwork for the sale of a high-profile national asset led 
to public and parliamentary disapproval of the sale, in the 
end, positive engagement with parliament helped push the sale 
through.  The bottom line, however, is that the GoJ received 
a good price for the 37% stake, with a number of concessions 
that should prevent backlash from JPMC employees.  What 
remains unknown is whether the sale will promote investment 
in the development of downstream products of phosphate that 
are in growing demand on the world market. 
 
12. (U) Read all of Amman's Classified cable traffic at 
http://cables.state.sgov.gov/ncddos/cable/cou ntry/JOR/ 
home.html. 
HALE