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C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000500 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ALL NEAR EAST COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016 
TAGS: PREL PARM PBTS IR WI MO SY LE AG
SUBJECT: HAMAS, IRAN, LEBANON, SYRIA, AND THE WESTERN 
SAHARA ON THE MENU FOR MFA SECRETARY GENERAL LAMAMRA'S 
LUNCH WITH NEA A/S WELCH 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Over a March 14 working lunch with MFA Secretary 
General Lamamra, NEA A/S Welch explained the U.S. view that 
taking the Iran nuclear issue to the Security Council would 
strengthen possibilities of resolving the problem through 
diplomacy; urged Algeria to ensure assistance was channeled 
to the Palestinian people and not to a Hamas-led government; 
said the United States sought changed Syrian behavior, not a 
change of regime; and argued that Hamas must go beyond 
acceptance of Arab League summit resolutions to accept the 
existence of Israel, renounce violence, and accept previous 
Palestinian commitments.  On the Western Sahara, Welch said 
the U.S. supported a political solution within the framework 
of the UN and favored greater Maghreb cooperation and 
Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement.  Lamamra reiterated that 
Algeria did not want to see Iran or any other country violate 
the NPT but was concerned that moving the Iran nuclear 
dossier to the Security CouQil could provoke international 
divisions and Iran's exit from the NPT.  On Hamas, he argued 
it would be a mistake to try to isolate a Hamas-led 
government, signaled that Algerian assistance would continue, 
and was confident Hamas would have to moderate its current 
positions.  On the Western Sahara, he said Moroccan 
unilateral moves would automatically be rejected; saw 
Morocco's rejection of the Baker Plan as a missed 
opportunity; stressed that the parties to the dispute were 
Morocco and the Polisario; and dismissed both France and 
Spain as either too biased or ambivalent to play a serious 
role in resolving the dispute.  (End Summary.) 
 
GOA RESERVATIONS ON OUR APPROACH TO IRAN 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Over lunch with Secretary General Lamamra and other 
MFA officials March 14, A/S Welch, accompanied by Ambassador, 
DCM and PolEc Chief, expressed disappointment over Algeria's 
abstention in the February 2 IAEA vote to send the Iran 
nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council.  Iran had pursued 
an undeclared nuclear program for 18 years and, as a result, 
had lost the confidence of the international community.  The 
U.S. believed taking the issue to the UNSC enhanced prospects 
of resolving the dispute through diplomacy.  While Iran 
threatened to escalate the situation if the matter was turned 
over to the UNSC, we believed the greater risk came from the 
international community not standing firm on matters of 
principle. 
 
¶3.  (C) Lamamra said Algeria supported the right to develop 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and did not want to see Iran 
or anyone else violate the NPT.  It abstained in the IAEA 
vote because it worried that moving the issue to the Security 
Council risked dividing the international community.  Welch 
noted there was, in the U.S. judgment, a solid majority of 
the UNSC in favor of a presidential statement laying out what 
was required of Iran.  The U.S. chose this path precisely 
because it wanted to seek consensus.  Lamamra said any vote 
of the UNSC on the issue implied a movement toward action 
under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, something that Lamamra 
reiterated would divide the international community.  Welch 
replied the real problem was that it was not at all clear the 
Iranians really wanted a solution.  Iran was hoping to defeat 
the international community in a series of step-by-step 
maneuvers aimed at buying Tehran time to develop a nuclear 
weapon. 
 
¶4.  (C) Lamamra cautioned that Iran's withdrawal from the NPT 
a la North Korea was a real concern.  Welch countered that 
Iran was not North Korea.  The latter stayed inside itself 
and did not seek to project its influence.  Iran, in 
contrast, sought to project its influence across the region 
and constituted a greater danger to the Arabs than to the 
U.S.  Asked about the possibility of dialogue with Iran, 
Welch said the U.S. did not see any moderate tendencies; 
Lamamra commented that the U.S. had become the "hated actor" 
in Iranian internal politics and that not all players in 
Iranian politics were satisfied with the direction the new 
president's policies were taking the country. 
 
 
 
ISOLATING HAMAS WOULD BE A MISTAKE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Turning to dealings with Hamas and the upcoming Arab 
League summit in Khartoum, A/S Welch said the new Palestinian 
Government should accept the results from Arab League summits 
in Beirut, Tunis, and Algiers.  However, Hamas needed to go 
beyond that step, which was necessary but not sufficient. 
Hamas also had to accept the existence of Israel, renounce 
violence and terror, and accept inherited obligations such as 
Oslo.  Signing up to the Arab League decisions alone was not 
enough.  Lamamra argued that reducing assistance to the 
Palestinians would lead to more, not less, terrorism.  Any 
time living standards diminished, terrorism increased.  It 
was important to recognize that Hamas had won the elections 
democratically. 
 
¶6.  (C) Welch agreed that Hamas fairly won the elections and 
that it was essential to support the Palestinian people. 
There was a distinction, though, between support for the 
government and support for the people themselves.  The U.S. 
would continue to support the Palestinian people, but it 
would not channel aid through government channels so long as 
Hamas refused to accept the pro-peace conditions of the 
international community, the Quartet, and even Palestinian 
President Mahmoud Abbas.  Mahmoud Abbas was also duly elected 
to his position and his mandate to work for a negotiated 
peace also had to be respected.  Lamamra argued it would be a 
mistake to try to isolate a Hamas government and insisted 
that Algeria would continue to provide assistance. 
 
¶7.  (C) Welch suggested that the GOA continue to give money 
to the interim government.  Once Hamas formed a new 
government, however, if it did not respond satisfactorily on 
Israel, violence, and in honoring Palestinian commitments, 
then the GOA should direct its assistance directly to the 
people, bypassing government channels.  It would be easier to 
get the U.S. to say "yes" (i.e. accept a Hamas that had 
accepted the three conditions), Welch commented, than it 
would be to get Hamas to say "yes" to the U.S. conditions, 
which were also supported by Abbas and the Quartet.  Lamamra 
said it was clear that Israel existed, and no one understood 
its existence better than the Palestinians, who lived with 
Israel every day.  Why not expect Hamas to come around to 
stating the obvious?  Welch said some believed Hamas was in 
fact pursuing a much more radical agenda.  In this view, 
Hamas was a part of the Muslim Brotherhood and shared the 
Brotherhood's agenda and tactics.  It sought to take over 
institutions step-by-step in a methodical effort that began 
in Gaza, continued to the West Bank and diaspora, and was now 
entering a new phase of conquest inside the Palestinian 
Authority.  Welch challenged Algeria to dissuade Hamas from 
following that route.  Lamamra said it was not in Algeria's 
interests to let that happen. 
 
U.S. VIEW ON SYRIA AND LEBANON 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Lamamra asked Welch for the U.S. view on Lebanon and 
Syria.  The A/S said the U.S. was being patient on 
implementation of UNSC Resolution 1559, insisting on Syrian 
withdrawal but not wanting to create more divisions by 
pushing for the immediate disarming of Hizballah.  The first 
step is the Presidency, and there was now a consensus in 
Lebanon to change the President.  The U.S. believed strongly 
that Syria needed to understand that there was a price to be 
paid for interference.  Syria continued to use Hizballah as a 
proxy to attack Israel in order to divert attention from its 
own situation.  Lahoud is Syria's agent.  Washington wanted 
to protect Lebanon but also convince Syria to change 
behavior.  We were not interested in regime change in 
Damascus, even though President Asad was not showing 
sufficient leadership and had underestimated the extent of 
Arab and international concern about his policies.  The U.S. 
wanted the investigation into Hariri's murder to be credible; 
it would "go where it goes."  Welch observed that if the 
Syrians had nothing to fear as they maintain, they should 
cooperate fully with the investigation. 
 
UNILATERAL MOVES ON WESTERN SAHARA WILL BE REJECTED 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C) Welch noted that Algeria was an important player in 
the region, with an important voice, and that we hoped to see 
improved relations between Algeria and Morocco and greater 
cooperation throughout the Maghreb.  On the Western Sahara, 
Welch said the U.S. continued to support a political solutionQ the UN framework.  There was no disposition in Washington 
to insert ourselves in finding a solution.  Baker was a 
heavy-weight in the U.S. system, and we were all disappointed 
that his efforts to resolve the issue of the Western Sahara 
did not bear fruit.  The U.S. continued to want increased 
security and stability in the area and was urging Morocco to 
develop its autonomy ideas.  Better Moroccan-Algeria 
bilateral relations in our view would improve the overall 
environment for resolving the Western Sahara issue. 
 
¶10.  (C) Lamamra argued that Algeria had really hoped the 
Baker Plan would succeed.  He offered that the 1988 
communiquQ issued by Morocco and Algeria announcing the 
resumption of their diplomatic relations called for the 
respect of previous agreements, further integration, and a 
referendum for the Sahrawis living in the Western Sahara. 
Under the Baker Plan, given the influx of Moroccans who would 
have been able to vote, it was arithmetically possible for 
Morocco to win the envisaged referendum.  He also suggested 
that it would have also been possible to extend the period of 
autonomy under the Baker Plan.  There was much opportunity 
for forging a creative solution, stressed Lamamra.  Morocco's 
rejection of holding a referendum and of self-determination 
did not help.  Unilateral decisions of this nature would 
automatically be rejected by the Polisario.  It was important 
that the UN remain fully involved in resolving the status of 
the Western Sahara so as not to send the wrong message to 
Morocco. 
 
¶11.  (C) Lamamra argued that recognition by 74 countries of 
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic was evidence that the 
international community had grown tired of Morocco's 
stalling.  The enemy for Morocco was no longer the Polisario 
on the other side of the berm; it was the Sahrawis 
demonstrating against Moroccan occupation on the western side 
of the berm.  Lamamra said he hoped the UNHRC would be able 
to visit the Moroccan side of the berm and observe the 
situation.  A/S Welch said the U.S. supported access for 
human rights organizations.  Asked for Algeria's assessment 
of other key nations' roles on the Western Sahara, Lamamra 
dismissed France as being completely in the Moroccan camp and 
Spain as being only marginally less unreliable due to its 
ambivalence and thQct that the Western Sahara was a 
domestic issue in Spain. 
 
¶12.  (U) A/S Welch has cleared this message. 
 
ERDMAN