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Viewing cable 06TOKYO593, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/02/06

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO593 2006-02-02 08:40 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO9610
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0593/01 0330840
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020840Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8194
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 7031
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 4383
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 7442
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 4477
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 5589
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0364
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 6552
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8651
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 000593 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST 
DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/02/06 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1)  Iwakuni to hold reference on relocation of carrier-borne 
jets 
 
(2)  Mixture of motives of wanting to upgrading Defense Agency to 
ministry status; Defense Agency wishes to promote upgrade 
argument; Growing reluctance in New Komeito 
 
(3)  Editorial: Utterly corrupt DFAA lets officials lead bid 
rigging as official duty 
 
(4)  Japan-DPRK talks set for Feb. 4, with top priority given to 
progress on the abduction issue; Interview with Ambassador for 
Diplomatic Normalization Koichi Haraguchi 
 
(5)  Editorial: Japan cannot resume US beef imports under current 
conditions 
 
(6)  Shaky Japan-US-China relations - the light and shadow of 
Koizumi diplomacy (Part 2): Yasukuni issue certain to shackle LDP 
presidential race; China, ROK working together to block shrine 
visits 
 
(7)  Aso's call for the Emperor's Yasukuni visit sparks fears for 
the Emperor being used for political purposes; Some wonder why 
Aso made the comment with strong protests expected; Calls are 
genuine but too naive 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1)  Iwakuni to hold reference on relocation of carrier-borne 
jets 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
Evening, February 2, 2006 
 
Katsusuke Ihara, mayor of Iwakuni, today decided to hold a 
referendum to ask citizens whether or not they would support a 
plan to relocate carrier-borne aircraft from Atsugi Naval Air 
Station in Kanagawa Prefecture to Iwakuni Air Station in 
Yamaguchi Prefecture. The plan was included in the interim report 
on the realignment of the US forces in Japan. Coordination is now 
under way to set the vote for March 12. 
 
Iwakuni's ordinance on referendums stipulates that a referendum 
can be held at the mayor's instance. The poll will likely adopt 
an alternative formula, under which voters cast a ballot for or 
against the relocation plan. If a voter turnout falls short of 50 
PERCENT , the referendum will become void, and ballot counting 
will not take place. The outcome of the proposed referendum does 
not have binding authority, but the ordinance provides that the 
mayor, the local assembly and residents should respect the 
outcome. 
 
The interim report on the realignment of US forces in Japan, 
released by the governments of Japan and the US last October, 
incorporated the relocation of 57 career-borne jets from Atsugi 
Naval Air Station to Iwakuni Air Station. Mayor Iwakuni's 
position on the issue has been that the plan should be withdrawn. 
He had hinted at the possibility of holding a referendum at town 
meetings, "A referendum is one option in the event of the views 
of citizens and the municipal assembly splitting over the issue." 
 
TOKYO 00000593  002 OF 011 
 
 
 
In the meantime, voices calling for a conditional strike have 
been heard in the municipal assembly with one member saying, "We 
should hold talks with the central government on specific 
matters, under the premise that city will accept the proposal." 
Some of the chiefs of seven towns and cities, which are to be 
integrated into Iwakuni on Mar. 20, had voiced objection: "A 
referendum is not suitable," or, "The proposed date is too close 
to the date for the integration." 
 
(2)  Mixture of motives of wanting to upgrading Defense Agency to 
ministry status; Defense Agency wishes to promote upgrade 
argument; Growing reluctance in New Komeito 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) 
February 2, 2006 
 
In the wake of a bid-rigging scandal involving Defense Facilities 
Administration Agency (DFAA) officials, Defense Agency (JDA) 
Director General Fukushiro Nukaga announced that his agency would 
disband the DFFA and integrate it into the agency. Nukaga is 
worried that he might have to resign again from his post unless 
he came up with drastic measures to deal with the scandal, which 
is the most serious incident for JDA following the agency's 
procurement scandal in 1998. The government and ruling camp have 
been motivated to upgrade the JDA to the status of a ministry by 
integrating the DFAA into the JDA. However, since there is a 
growing cautious view in the New Komeito on upgrading the agency 
to ministry status, whether the JDA can carry out organizational 
reform is uncertain. 
 
In a Budget Committee meeting yesterday morning of the House of 
Councillors, Nukaga stressed the need for organizational reform 
by disbanding the DFAA and integrating it into the JDA, saying: 
 
"The Defense Facilities Administration Agency was established as 
a special procurement agency during the Occupation. Agency 
officials, having a sense of entitlement, did not have contact 
with the Defense Agency. Such circumstances created the breeding 
ground of corruption." 
 
Nukaga appears to have wanted to prevent the scandal from 
throwing a blanket on a growing mood of upgrading the JDA to 
ministry status, which is the agency's earnest desire. 
 
He seems to have thought that he should have carried out 
organizational reform when he stepped down from the JDA chief's 
post eight years ago to take responsibility for a procurement 
scandal. 
 
He also stepped down in 2001 as minister in charge of financial 
affairs to take responsibility for having received donations from 
the scandal-tainted KSD, a mutual-aid organization for small and 
medium-scale businesses, even though he was then regarded as a 
candidate for a presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). 
 
Due to the scandal this time, the New Komeito has put off making 
a decision to approve the submission of bills to revise the 
Defense Agency Establishment Law to the ongoing Diet session, 
although the government plans to do so. 
 
The revision bill is aimed to implement the largest-scale 
organizational reform since JDA was established in 1954. The bill 
 
TOKYO 00000593  003 OF 011 
 
 
calls for merging the Defense Equipment Development Department 
and Procurement Department, including the functions of the former 
Procurement Headquarters, and creating an "Equipment 
Headquarters" by the unified department. The bills also calls for 
transferring part of the DFAA's policy-making function regarding 
the US military bases in Japan to a "Defense Facilities 
Division," which would be set up in the JDA. The ruling camp seem 
unlikely to approve submission of the revision bill soon after 
DFAA officials were arrested on suspicion of playing leading 
roles in rigging bids for agency projects. 
 
The bid-rigging scandal has begun to have an dampening effect on 
the mood favoring the upgrade of the JDA to ministry status. 
 
The government aims to submit a set of bills upgrading the JDA to 
ministry status after the passage of a fiscal 2006 budget to the 
current Diet session and to pass them through during the session. 
A senior JDA official commented: "We would like to upgrade the 
agency to ministry status under the Koizumi government." The 
agency has regarded the ongoing Diet session as a good occasion. 
The LDP has paid attention to the New Komeito's moves, with a LDP 
member with closed ties to defense interests saying, "After 
consulting with the New Komeito, the question is when the Cabinet 
makes a decision to submit the bills." 
 
Commenting at a press conference on Feb. 1 on the scandal's 
effects on the notion of upgrading the JDA to ministry status, 
New Komeito leader Takenori Kanzaki said, "Some say that the 
scandal would apply the brakes, but others view that it has 
sparked the integration of the DFAA into the JDA." A senior New 
Komeito member was cautious: 
 
"We cannot discuss the issue of upgrading the JDA to ministry 
status under the situation where we don't know how far the 
scandal will develop. It is dangerous to speed up discussions." 
 
(3)  Editorial: Utterly corrupt DFAA lets officials lead bid 
rigging as official duty 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
February 2, 2006 
 
The special investigation squad of the Tokyo District Public 
Prosecutors Office arrested three officials at the Defense 
Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) on suspicion of leading 
bid-rigging schemes for air-conditioning projects ordered by the 
agency. The three are an incumbent deputy director general and 
two former officers. The bridge-construction scandal involving 
the vice president and other senior officials of now defunct 
Japan Highway Public Corporation last summer was disclosed last 
summer. Late last year, it was reported that electrical machinery 
makers rigged bids for projects at Narita Airport only late last 
year. These incidents have drawn growing public criticism of the 
pattern of collusive ties between the public and private sectors. 
Regarding DFAA, investigation is under way in yet another bid- 
rigging case involving other major general contractors. Seeing 
the repeated occurrence of big-rigging scandals, we feel a strong 
sense of anger and disappointment. 
 
Behind such bid rigging schemes is the practice of amakudari 
(descent from heaven), under which government officials land 
lucrative jobs in private firms after retirement. Officials 
involved in such a practice take advantage of their positions and 
 
TOKYO 00000593  004 OF 011 
 
 
use tax money for their own benefit. Don't they realize the 
viciousness and cowardice of the practice?  The case this time is 
particularly horrendous. It is suspected that successive agency 
deputy directors general have been engaged in selecting and 
determining which companies would be awarded contracts based on 
how many retired agency officials the firms hired. In some cases, 
deputy directors general reportedly ordered their juniors to 
hurriedly cover them up by changing the already determined 
bidders. 
 
In 1998, a breach of trust incident involving the former 
procurement headquarters in the Defense Agency was reported. The 
aim was to secure post-retirement jobs at the companies awarded 
the contracts for its officials. Reflecting on this, strict 
conditions have been attached for officials of DFAA or the 
Defense Agency to be hired within two years of retirement by 
firms with close ties to them. DFAA, however, had made 
arrangements to have judicial foundations hire deputy director 
generals temporarily until private firms hire them. 
 
It is outrageous that the DFAA had determined even temporary 
jobs. It is necessary to consider future options for public 
corporations, but the problem is that such crimes had been 
continued systematically. In the recent case, prosecutors have 
not arrested responsible executives on the corporate side, the 
reason being that the agency officials took the initiative. What 
is worse, most of the executives came from DFAA. The agency is 
utterly corrupt and has made light of the public. 
 
The deputy directors general appear to have engaged in bid 
rigging as part of their duties. It is likely that other senior 
officials were aware of such illegal practices and tacitly 
approved them. We expect the special investigation unit to carry 
out a thorough investigation to prove that the agency was 
systematically involved in the case as a whole. 
 
Under the revised Antimonopoly Act, administrative surcharge 
payments have surged since this January. This measure is expected 
to work effectively to restrict private firms from engaging in 
bid-rigging practices. As long as there are public servants who 
are looking for posts after retirement, however, big-rigging 
schemes will never disappear. There will be no other means in the 
end but to gradually raise the retirement age and completely 
abolish the amakudari system in reforming the public servant 
system. 
 
As shown by the recent DFAA case, the rule that was set by the 
National Personnel Authority to temporarily restrict retired 
government officials from being hired by firms with close ties to 
their agencies. Government officials must be prohibited from 
taking advantage of their positions to secure post-retirement 
jobs, although it is acceptable if they get jobs at private firms 
on their own. Using official positions in getting jobs is a sort 
of crime. The government is urged to work out measures to 
prohibit government agencies from arranging post-retirement jobs 
for their officers. 
 
A punitive clause also should be incorporated in the Law of 
Collusive Bidding at the Initiative of Government Agencies at an 
early date. 
 
(4)  Japan-DPRK talks set for Feb. 4, with top priority given to 
progress on the abduction issue; Interview with Ambassador for 
 
TOKYO 00000593  005 OF 011 
 
 
Diplomatic Normalization Koichi Haraguchi 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Almost full) 
February 2, 2006 
 
Prior to the upcoming talks between Japan and North Korea, 
Ambassador for Japan-North Korea Diplomatic Normalization Koichi 
Haraguchi was interviewed by the Tokyo Shimbun yesterday. 
Haraguchi emphasized: "Making progress on the abduction issue is 
a priority. Unless that issue is resolved, Japan cannot normalize 
diplomatic ties with North Korea." The following are the key 
points of the interview. 
 
Interviewer: Takayoshi Goto 
 
-- What is the outlook for the first bilateral talks with the 
DPRK in nearly three years and three months? 
 
Haraguchi: "The upcoming talks differ from past rounds in two 
respects. First, Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang in 2002 
and finalized the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. The 
declaration puts forward a direction (toward resolving 
outstanding issues). So, if we proceed along that direction in 
the negotiations, the talks will not run into the difficulties 
that have been experienced before. 
 
"Second, the upcoming negotiations will simultaneously deal with 
three separate issues, including diplomatic normalization, in 
three separate working groups. We learned from the past round of 
talks that trying to deal with everything in one forum was 
inefficient, as it was difficult to reach a consensus on how much 
time should be devoted to each issue. With this new approach, we 
hope the upcoming talks will make progress that will allow 
specific steps to be taken." 
 
-- What will Japan's basic approach be in these talks? 
 
"The top priority is to make progress on the abduction issue. 
Security issues, including North Korea's nuclear and missile 
development, are also extremely important. 
 
"Diplomatic relations will not be normalized without resolving 
the abduction and security issues. This policy line will not 
change. North Korea may put diplomatic normalization (that will 
directly lead to economic cooperation) ahead of other issues, but 
we on our part will respond in those talks after seeing how 
things are progressing in the other working groups, one on the 
abductions and the other on nuclear development." 
 
-- There is the concern among the families of abductees that the 
abduction issue may be put on the backburner. 
 
"I understand their feelings well. We will negotiate while 
keeping fully in mind our basic policy that we won't normalize 
diplomatic ties unless the abduction issue is resolved. North 
Korea has accepted our proposal to discuss pending issues in 
separate working groups, so I think they hope to see progress (on 
the abduction issue). If they want to move forward, then we will 
call on them to understand Japan's position." 
 
-- How much time do you think will be needed before diplomatic 
normalization? 
 
 
TOKYO 00000593  006 OF 011 
 
 
"Everything depends on how North Korea responds. If North Korean 
officials remain unwilling to resolve the abduction issue, it 
doesn't matter how hard we work. If they sincerely strive to 
resolve the issue, though, normalization will be possible." 
 
DPRK negotiating team led by Ambassador Song Il Ho 
 
The North Korean official in charge of diplomatic normalization 
talks is Ambassador Song Il Ho. Song is 50. He assumed office as 
deputy director-general of the Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs 
Department after serving in such posts as a standing committee 
member of the DPRK-Japan Friendship Association and a research 
fellow of the Foreign Ministry. He attended preparatory meetings 
for the second round of Japan-DPRK summit talks in May 2004 as 
the official on the ground responsible for working-level talks 
with Japan, and in subsequent Japan-DPRK talks, he was on the 
DPRK negotiating team. 
 
Jong Thae Hwa served as ambassador in the previous diplomatic 
normalization talks, but he retired last February. Since then, 
the post of ambassador had been left vacant, but this past 
January, Song was chosen to take the post. 
 
Kim Chol Ho, deputy director-general of the Foreign Ministry's 
Asian Affairs Department, is in charge of the abduction issue, 
and Jong Thae Yang, deputy director-general of the ministry's US 
Affairs Department, is tasked with the security issue. 
 
Kim has experience negotiating with Japan while in the post of 
chief of the Japan Division. Jong has served in the post of chief 
of the US Division. He attended the six-party talks held in last 
September. 
 
(5)  Editorial: Japan cannot resume US beef imports under current 
conditions 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
February 1, 2006 
 
Consumers' distrust of US beef is growing deeper, with 
allegations emerging that the government abandoned its plan to 
inspect US beef processors prior to resuming US beef imports last 
December. 
 
At a cabinet meeting, the government approved a report of replies 
to questions by Democratic Party of Japan members and submitted 
it to the Diet last November. The report included a plan to send 
Japanese officials to the US to inspect beef processors before 
and after resuming imports. But the government sent officers to 
the US only once. 
 
In a meeting of the House of Representatives, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) Minister Nakagawa 
said: "We did not take action based on the decision made at the 
cabinet meeting." He then apologized. Later in the day, however, 
he said that the government did not break a promise, explaining: 
"The US has authorized slaughter facilities on its own 
responsibility, so it is impossible for Japan to judge whether 
the slaughterhouses have taken proper measures prior to resuming 
imports." 
 
We cannot easily dismiss this problem as a simple mistake made 
when the written reply was worked out. The government's shifting 
 
TOKYO 00000593  007 OF 011 
 
 
explanations reflect the seriousness of the case. The government 
is now forced to pay the price for having given priority to 
quickly resuming imports over an effort to win consumer 
confidence. 
 
America's sloppiness is quite intolerable. Only one month after 
Japan resumed US beef imports, backbones - designated as a 
specified risk material (SRM) - were found in a US beef shipment 
to Japan, although the US government had reiterated that thorough 
safety measures have been taken. Consumers must be feeling that 
what they had feared has come to pass. 
 
Americans are less interested in the BSE issue and food safety in 
general than the Japanese, and we have doubts about the 
credibility of what the US promised. That is why Japan should 
have prepared an effective monitoring system on its own 
initiative. 
 
The Japanese government sent an inspection team to the US the day 
after it decided to resume imports. But the teams inspected only 
11 of the 40 facilities authorized by the US government.  The 
facility that shipped beef with backbones attached was accredited 
after the inspection team returned to Japan. 
 
At Japanese ports, imported beef is in principle subjected to 
sampling tests, so it is feared that SRM could be overlooked. 
 
The US government has decided to compile a report documenting the 
cause of the incident and preventive measures. It then will 
present it to the Japanese government. In this envisioned 
scenario, MAFF and the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare 
will examine the report, and if the report is acceptable, Japan 
will resume US beef imports. But the outlook for this is now 
uncertain. 
 
Japanese consumers have become very sensitive about the safety of 
US beef. In order to overcome the blunders made by both Japan and 
the US, the US must present a convincing report. 
 
Japan banned US beef imports for two years. The US Congress and 
government continued to pressure Japan to resume imports in order 
to protect the country's livestock farmers. It is consumers, 
though, who will decide whether to accept US beef. 
 
Japan also should expand its program of inspecting processing 
facilities in the US, as well as strengthen its quarantine 
system. Japan and the US should inspect a larger number of such 
facilities in the US. It might be an idea for both sides to share 
in the costs. 
 
In addition to the distrust in the US government, questions are 
also being raised about the measures taken by the Japanese 
government in response. We are far from a situation in which 
Japan can reopen its market quickly. In order to regain consumer 
trust in US beef, there is no option but for both countries to 
make utmost efforts. 
 
(6)  Shaky Japan-US-China relations - the light and shadow of 
Koizumi diplomacy (Part 2): Yasukuni issue certain to shackle LDP 
presidential race; China, ROK working together to block shrine 
visits 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
 
TOKYO 00000593  008 OF 011 
 
 
January 31, 2006 
 
On Jan. 26, when budget deliberations began in the Diet, Chinese 
Ambassador to Japan Wang Yi returned to his post after an absence 
of one and a half months since he temporarily left for Beijing 
last December. While he was away, a rumor flew about that he 
might have been recalled due to the complication of the Yasukuni 
issue. 
 
Last Dec. 20, Wang and senior government officials, including 
Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo, and a group of Japan experts 
from the government-affiliated think tank China Institute of 
Contemporary International Relations and the Chinese Academy of 
Social Science came together somewhere in Beijing to discuss 
Japan policy. 
 
"Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is expected to step down in 
September. If the new prime minister visits Yasukuni Shrine, 
China would never concede to Japan on the historical issues." 
 
The secret gathering aimed at reshaping China's basic policy 
toward Japan. That policy will form the core of diplomatic 
strategy toward Japan by the Chinese Communist Party's Political 
Bureau. 
 
It is highly likely that China's strategy targets Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Shinzo Abe, who favors prime ministerial shrine visits 
 
SIPDIS 
and is seen as the frontrunner in the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) presidential race to find a successor to Koizumi. With the 
prospect that Abe will succeed Koizumi, China, winning the United 
States and South Korea over to its side, intends to build a net 
to encircle Japanese lawmakers favoring a shrine visit. This is 
the point in the basic policy, says a source in Tokyo involved 
with Japan-China relations. 
 
This secret meeting also hammered out this policy line: "China 
will apply political through the force of good economic relations 
between Japan and China. The private sector will move the 
government." 
 
As if to tune in to China, South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Minister Ban Ki-moon stated: "If the successor to Prime Minister 
Koizumi pays homage at Yasukuni Shrine, summit meetings between 
the two nations would remain difficult to schedule." Ban made 
this remark on Jan. 16 to a group of Japanese reporters who were 
in Seoul as part of an exchange of Japanese and South Korean 
reporters. 
 
Some Japanese lawmakers have begun expressing discontent with 
Koizumi's shrine visits. On Jan. 17, former Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Yasuo Fukuda remarked in a speech at the Mainichi 
 
SIPDIS 
Public Opinion Forum in Fukuoka City: 
 
"If it is a matter of the heart, don't you think there are ways 
to avoid a dispute with other countries?" 
 
On Jan. 26, the non-partisan parliamentary group, Council to 
Study a National Memorial Facility, met after one and a half 
months, with Fukuda in it. 
 
The council is headed by Taku Yamasaki, former vice president of 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Yamasaki, who has come 
forward as a presidential candidate, reiterated: "Our Asia 
 
TOKYO 00000593  009 OF 011 
 
 
diplomacy is now stalled. This situation must not be disregarded. 
The next government's role is expected to be crucial." 
 
Former LDP Secretary General Koichi Kato, a council member, is 
critical of Koizumi's shrine visits. He noted: 
 
"It is not wise policy to fan the flames of nationalism. If you 
do so, it will come back to haunt you, and would end up flat on 
your back. Japan may be in the process of feeling this boomerang 
effect." 
 
Moreover, Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) Chair Hiroshi 
Okuda, influential in political circles said in his New Year's 
press conference that a successor prime minister should refrain 
from shrine visits. 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe is objecting to this trend, arguing 
that the Yasukuni issue "should not be put on the list of major 
campaign issues in the presidential election." It is all right 
not to use the Yasukuni issue in the election campaign, but what 
will happen in actuality if Abe becomes the premier. Ichita 
Yamamoto is a member of the House of Councillors from the Mori 
faction who is the central figure among the group of lawmakers 
supporting Abe as a presidential candidate. He notes: 
 
"Even if a pro-China lawmaker takes office as prime minister, 
relations with China would not go smoothly. If soon after taking 
office, Prime Minister Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine and then made 
a fresh decision, for instance, on freezing shrine visits for a 
while, then he would be able to contain the objections of the 
conservatives." 
 
Foreign Minister Taro Aso, who supports the prime minister's 
shrine visits, stated in a speech at a meeting of New Komeito 
Upper House members on Jan. 28: "The best way would be for the 
Emperor to visit the shrine." This remark has created a stir. 
 
The Emperor had visited to Yasukuni Shrine until 1975. Why did 
the incumbent foreign minister bring up such a visit at this 
time? There is speculation that he might have tried to project 
the difference in his approach from that of Abe, who has begun 
wavering. Needless to say, no one should link condolences to the 
souls of the war dead with political motives. But actual politics 
cannot free itself from the Yasukuni issue, given the entangled 
state of Japan's Asia diplomacy and the approaching LDP 
presidential election. 
 
(7)  Aso's call for the Emperor's Yasukuni visit sparks fears for 
the Emperor being used for political purposes; Some wonder why 
Aso made the comment with strong protests expected; Calls are 
genuine but too naive 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Pages 24, 25) 
February 2, 2006 
 
Foreign Minister Taro Aso's comment that it would be best for the 
Emperor to visit Yasukuni Shrine has created a sensation, 
immediately drawing fire from China, South Korea and other 
countries. It may have a serious impact on the race to determine 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)'s new president in September. 
Some also fear that it may end up embroiling the Emperor in 
political affairs. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000593  010 OF 011 
 
 
Aso held a press conference on Jan. 31, in which he explained his 
controversial Yasukuni statement this way: 
 
"I have never said that I would like to see the Emperor visit the 
shrine under the current situation. I simply wanted to present a 
question as to what should be done to allow the government and 
the Emperor to spontaneously express their condolences to those 
who gave their lives for the country." 
 
Aso sought the Emperor's visit to the war-related shrine in his 
speech in Nagoya on Jan. 28 in connection with Prime Minister 
Koizumi's shrine visits. 
 
The domestic media immediately reported it in a critical tone. 
The New China News Agency also decried it the following day as a 
typical rightist view. 
 
Such developments forced Aso to hold the press meeting Jan. 31. 
Later in the day, he also appeared on a nightly news show to 
minimize the impact of his comment, explaining that he made the 
statement from the viewpoint of the spirits of the war dead. 
 
During his tenure as policy research council chairman, Aso also 
made this sensational comment: "(Korean people) began voluntarily 
adopting Japanese names during Japan's colonial rule." Last 
November after assuming the current post, Aso also said 
provocatively, "In the world, China and South Korea are the only 
countries that talk about Yasukuni." 
 
Aso is not of course the first lawmaker who called for the 
Emperor's Yasukuni visit. In August 2004, Tokyo Gov. Shintaro 
Ishihara stated, "I would like to see the Emperor visit Yasukuni 
Shrine in his private capacity on behalf of the Japanese people." 
This statement also sparked controversy. 
 
Shiro Akazawa, professor of modern Japanese political history at 
Ritsumeikan University, wondered why Aso made such a 
controversial comment at a time like this, saying: 
 
"Mr. Aso has long been an advocate of official visits to the 
shrine. He seems to have turned up the volume of his call. Such 
calls were initially directed only at the Emperor and the prime 
minister, but the Emperor has gradually moved away from the 
focus, and the Imperial Household Agency apparently has no 
intention of setting foot in a minefield. I don't know what 
prompted Mr. Aso to make such a statement as foreign minister at 
a time like this when strong backlashes were expected from inside 
and outside Japan. He stressed the viewpoint of the spirits of 
the war dead in calling for the Emperor's shrine visit, but not 
all people hailed 'Banzai' for the Emperor when they died. We 
cannot assume that all did (like Mr. Aso)." 
 
Emperor Showa paid homage at Yasukuni on eight occasions in the 
postwar period, the one in 1975 being the last. 
 
Yasukuni's collective enshrinement, including Class-A war 
criminals, is often cited in explaining his discontinuation of 
shrine visits. Emperor Akihito has not visited the shrine since 
ascending to the throne in 1989. 
 
Last June, the government released a statement saying: "Emperor 
Showa had visited Yasukuni Shrine in his private capacity. The 
Emperor performs only such acts in matters of state as are 
 
TOKYO 00000593  011 OF 011 
 
 
provided for in the Constitution. Visiting shrines is not part of 
acts in matters of state." 
 
Aso's statement was taken to indicate that the capacity argument 
made it difficult for the Emperor to visit the shrine. 
 
But Akazawa thinks that Emperor Showa was opposed to enshrining 
Class-A war criminals at Yasukuni and that that was why he 
stopped visiting there after 1978. 
 
Some wonder if the Emperor, the quintessential public figure, can 
do anything in his private capacity, while some others fear that 
the Emperor might be used politically. 
 
Following Ishihara's comment urging the Emperor to visit 
Yasukuni, Imperial Household Agency Vice Grand Steward Shingo 
Haketa, currently grand steward, noted: "If the Emperor's conduct 
carries political significance, we have to think about it 
carefully." 
Akazawa also said, "The Imperial Household Agency is expected to 
remain cautious about calls for visits to Yasukuni by the 
Emperor. 
 
But many bereaved families and supporters backing Koizumi's 
Yasukuni visits are hopeful that his annual visits will help 
reopen the door for visits to the shrine by the Emperor. 
 
Kyoto Sangyo University Prof. Isao Tokoro, who is an authority on 
imperial affairs, explained: 
 
"To bereaved families and those worshiping the war dead, it is a 
long-cherished desire for the Emperor to start visiting Yasukuni 
because Emperor Showa kept visiting there until 1975 without 
creating any problems. Their desire is genuine but too naive. It 
is important to spread the correct perception of Yasukuni Shrine 
and the National Chidorigafuchi War Dead Cemetery throughout the 
world, including Japan." 
 
Aso is a possible candidate for the LDP presidency. Will his 
controversial comment have any impact on the race? 
 
Political commentator Minoru Morita said in a critical tone: 
 
"His grandfather, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, openly referred 
to himself as the Emperor's subject. I think Aso, a supporter of 
Prime Minister Koizumi's shrine visits, also broached the Emperor 
in an attempt to play up his political identity for the 
presidential race. But it simply backfired. Aso may or may not 
drop out of the presidential race, but such would be a minor 
political matter. But if Japan became isolated in the 
international community because of his comment, that might harm 
Japan's national interests, which would be a major problem." 
 
Saitama University Constitutional Law Prof. Takashi Miwa said: 
 
"Yasukuni Shrine is a religious facility. Under the Constitution, 
it would be problematical for any public figure -- whether it's 
the prime minister or the Emperor - to visit Yasukuni. Calls for 
a visit to the shrine by the Emperor, who carries greater 
authority than the prime minister, are a real a problem, 
especially for the Imperial Household Agency." 
 
SCHIEFFER