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RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER WASHDC
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0044
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000333 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/WHA, S/CT, AND WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2016 
TAGS: ASEC KSAC PGOV HO
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 17684 
     ¶B. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 00557 
     ¶C. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 767 
     ¶D. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 1859 
     ¶E. TEGUCIGALPA 0288 
     ¶F. TEGUCIGALPA 0104 
 
Classified By: CDA JAMES WILLIARD Reason 1.4 (C) and (D). 
 
¶1. (U) The following responses are keyed to the Security 
Environment Profile Questionnaire (reftel A). 
 
--------------------------------- 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Demonstrations: 
 
(A.)  Yes.  Additionally, there are a number of organizations 
and groups under the loose collective leadership of (and 
affiliated with) the Bloque Popular that have been carrying 
out demonstrations against U.S. foreign policy, as well as 
demonstrations targeting local issues.  The following 
organizations have been involved in anti-American political 
activities to varying degrees.  They are listed in 
alphabetical order, utilizing Spanish acronyms where 
applicable.  Post notes that the majority of those 
organizations are left-leaning NGOs or unions, many of whom 
maintain good relations with the Embassy. (List updated 
February 2006): 
 
- ARTISTAS DE LA UNAH 
 
Artists of the National Autonomous University of Honduras 
(A-UNAH) 
 
- BLOQUE POPULAR 
Popular Block 
 
- COCOH 
Farmers' Cooperatives Union 
 
- CODECOH 
Honduran Consumer Protection Committee 
 
- CODEH 
Honduran Committee for Human Rights 
 
- COFADEH 
Honduran Committee of Family Members of the Detained and 
Disappeared 
 
- COHAPAZ 
Honduran Committee for Action for Peace 
 
- COLPROSUMAH 
Honduran Professional Teachers College (a teachers' union) 
 
- COMPA-H 
People of the Americas Convergence Movement (COMPA)-Honduras 
 
- COPEMH 
Honduran Association of Secondary School Teachers 
 
- COPINH 
Civic Council of Popular Organizations and Indigenous Groups 
of Honduras (also appears as COPIN) 
 
- COPRUMH 
Honduran Professional Association Teachers' Union 
 
- CGT 
General Workers Central (the largest of Honduras' three 
national labor confederations) 
 
- CTH 
Confederation of Honduran Workers (arguably, the strongest of 
the three national labor confederations) 
 
- CUTH 
United Confederation of Honduran Workers (the most left of 
the three national labor confederations) 
 
- FPR 
Popular Revolution Forces, a shadowy alleged revolutionary 
group. 
 
- FUTH 
United Federation of Honduran Workers (the largest component 
of CUTH, above) 
 
- FSM 
Feminist Movement (details needed) 
 
- FUR 
University Revolutionary Front 
 
- GRUPO LOS NECIOS DE LA UNAH 
UNAH Fools Group - Activist group in UNAH that "cheerleads" 
and motivates demos 
 
- MEH 
Honduran Student Movement 
 
- PARTIDO DE LOS TRABAJADORES DE LA FACULTAD DE PEDAGOGIA DE 
LA UNAH 
Teaching Faculty Workers' Party of UNAH 
 
- RADIO GUALCHO 
Leftist/Activist radio station (1510Mhz) that works closely 
with Bloque Popular and is actively involved in most 
demonstrations 
 
- REPRESENTANTE DE FRENTE Y REFORMA DE LA UNAH 
Reform Front Representative of UNAH 
 
- SERUNAH 
New UNAH coalition group, like Bloque Popular (but not as 
prominent) 
 
- SITRAINFOP 
National Institute of Professional Formation Workers' Union 
 
- SITRAINA 
National Agrarian Institute Workers' Union 
 
- SITRAIHSS 
Institute of Social Security Workers' Union 
 
- SITRAUNAH 
UNAH Workers' Union 
 
- SITRAUPEN 
A Workers' Union (details needed) 
 
- STIBYS 
Beverage and Associated Industries Workers' Union (plays a 
key organizing and logistics role for many demos)- Leader of 
STIBYS is also the leader of the Popular Block. 
 
- SITRAPANI 
Child Welfare Association Workers' Union 
 
- UD 
Democratic Unification Party (remnants of the Communist Party 
of Honduras and other former Marxist parties; represented in 
the National Congress) 
 
- UNAH 
National Autonomous University of Honduras 
 
- URP 
Revolutionary People's Union 
 
NOTE: The most fervent anti-U.S. groups are: MEH, URP, UD, 
Bloque Popular, STIBYS, COPINH, and COMPA-H.  The following 
groups have committed and participated in acts of political 
vandalism (against the Honduran Government and other 
entities) that resulted in the destruction of public and 
private property: Bloque Popular, COPINH, Democratic 
Unification Party (UD), and The Revolutionary People's Union 
(URP). 
 
(B.) Yes.  There have been approximately 31 demonstrations in 
Tegucigalpa since February 2005, including 7 demonstrations 
either held outside or near the U.S. Embassy.  However, most 
demonstrations  are not directed against the U.S. Government, 
although some are convoked to protest against U.S. foreign 
policy initiators, such as the ongoing war in Iraq or the 
Central American Free Trade Agreement. 
 
(C.)  Roughly 25 percent of the demonstrations noted above 
have taken place near U.S. Mission facilities.  There have 
been no demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy during 
the last six months. 
 
(D.)  The size of demonstrations at the Embassy, when they do 
occur,  varies from twenty to over three hundred 
participants.  The larger demos usually consist of supporters 
from six to more than twelve different organizations, which 
operate as a loosely structured coalition under the guidance 
of Bloque Popular. 
 
(E.)  Over the most recent months, and largely due to 
expectations of a new liberal party government to "right past 
wrongs", the focus of demonstrations has been shifting back 
towards unresolved domestic issues:  civil service salaries, 
privatization, gasoline prices, and public transportation. 
Objections to U.S. foreign policy still trigger 
demonstrations, mainly over the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA) as well as ongoing U.S. actions in Iraq and 
previous U.S. involvement in Venezuela and Haiti.  The 
following statements, demands, and gestures have been made 
repeatedly during past demos at the Embassy:  No to war in 
Iraq, No to war, Stop Plan Colombia, Pro-Human rights, World 
Peace, Stop Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), 
U.S. Forces out of Honduras (Soto Cano AB), U.S. Military out 
of Cuba, U.S. destroy your WMD, Stop intervention in 
Venezuela, Stop Standard Fruit from exploiting the indigenous 
people, Opposition to CAFTA, No to privatization, Stop 
intervention in Haiti. 
 
The following is a summary of some demonstrations triggered 
by both U.S foreign policy initiatives and local issues: 
 
-- On March 8, 2005, several groups protested against the 
CAFTA resolution which was passed by the Honduran Congress on 
March 3 (reftel B). 
-- On April 8, the Honduran public sector unions protested 
against alleged back pay, and the Honduran police used water 
and tear gas to break up the crowd (reftel C). 
-- On May 11, approximately 150 people from the Consejo 
Civico de Organizaciones Populares e Inigenas de Honduras 
(COPINH) and the Bloque Popular again protested against 
CAFTA. 
-- On September 7 and 8, protesters comprised of mainly 
public transportation (taxi) drivers blocked streets in 
protest against an increase in gasoline and other basic 
products.  Access and egress from the main airport in 
Tegucigalpa were shut-off for approximately 14 hours (reftel 
D). 
-- On January 19, 2006, approximately 600 people from various 
worker's unions, supported by the Bloque Poplular, gathered 
in front of the Congress to protest the privatization of the 
national telephone company, Hondutel, and to protest against 
CAFTA. 
--On February 14, 2006 a thousand protesters from the 
Honduran Unitary Federation of Workers (FUTH) blocked roads 
near the Honduran Presidential Palace. The workers were 
protesting the possible dismissal of large numbers of the 
public sector workforce by the new ZELAYA ADMINISTRATION, 
both for reductions in staff of government offices and the 
traditional replacement of politically appointed personnel, 
even in the lower ranks of government (reftel E). 
--On February 16, 2006, approximately 600 protesters from 
FUTH marched to the National Congress building to again 
protest the dismissal of public workers. 
 
(F.)  Generally peaceful, but demonstrators have burned U.S. 
flags and thrown rocks. 
 
(G.)  N/A. 
 
(H.)  N/A. 
 
(I.)  Yes. 
 
(J.)  Yes.  Occasionally they will pass by the Embassy. 
 
(K.)  The average size varies from 200-1000 people. 
 
(L.)  Generally peaceful, but fences, grillwork, and windows 
have been destroyed near the National Congress, as well as 
many tires burned.  At times, suspected plain-clothes police 
have been held and beaten by hard-core protesters within the 
demonstrations. 
 
On occasions, small groups of thug-like cadre have 
initiated/instigated violence against static police guards by 
attempting to strike them in the lower leg areas, which are 
not protected by riot shields with heavy placard poles with 
large nails embedded in the ends.  Several police officials 
have been injured in unsuccessful attempts to get the police 
to use force. 
 
(M.)  N/A. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶2. (SBU)  Macro Conflict Conditions: 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
(A.)  No. 
 
(B.)  N/A. 
 
(C.)  N/A. 
 
(D.)  N/A. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
¶3. (C)  Host Country Capabilities: 
------------------------------------------- 
 
(A.)  No. 
 
Police are somewhat mediocre in professionalism and training; 
they are also somewhat apathetic toward post residential 
security requirements, including response to alarms and 
investigation of incidents in Mission neighborhoods; they 
have definite resource/manpower limitations that inhibit 
their deterrence or response effectiveness. 
 
The National Preventive Police and Criminal Investigations 
Directorate General (DGIC).  Both departments suffer from a 
lack of manpower, training, equipment, low pay, and 
motivation.  Honduras has the lowest per capita ratio of 
police in Latin America.  They lack the capital to purchase 
and maintain vehicles (including gas) and radio equipment. 
There is no standard service weapon.  Despite numerous 
training programs and efforts by many nations, including the 
U.S., the DGIC is lacking in morale, leadership, and 
resources.  In numerous traffic accidents involving Mission 
personnel, the response time has exceeded several hours by 
the transit police.  The courts, prosecutors, and police are 
extremely susceptible to bribery and influence, causing 
reversals in judgments against the Embassy.  Terminations 
have been numerous for both political as well as criminal 
reasons and extend beyond positions normally considered 
political appointees.  In other cases, certain high-ranking 
police cannot be terminated for technical reason.   Morale 
and integrity in the DGIC is seen as low.  It remains to be 
seen whether the existing conditions will improve or decline 
with the newly elected Liberal Party government.  President 
Manuel "Mel" Zelaya was inaugurated on January 27, 2006 to 
serve a constitutionally-mandated maximum term of four years. 
 
(B.)  Yes.  Training by U.S. Border Patrol Tactical (BorTac) 
teams is good, but GOH security infrastructure needs major 
improvements. 
 
(C.)  Yes.   Corruption is widespread throughout almost all 
agencies within the GOH, including the national law 
enforcement departments.  Corruption is especially rampant 
within the Honduran Immigration system.  Most recently, RSO 
has been working  in conjunction with Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), in the investigation of an ongoing smuggling 
ring involving immigration officials from Guatemala and 
Honduras.  This ring is smuggling Brazilian nationals from 
Sao Paulo to the United States.  Recently, one group of 
Brazilians were detained by Honduran officials and they 
provided information about how the operation works.  RSO and 
DHS has learned as many as three Honduran immigration 
officials may be involved, a Honduran Frontier Police 
Captain, who is not directly involved in this illicit 
operation, may be corrupt (reftel F). 
 
(D.)  No.  However, GOH intelligence units have an 
institutional awareness of and a modest capability of 
penetrating indigenous radical groups. 
 
(E.)  Yes. 
 
(F.)  No.  (They have almost no capability to detect or 
disrupt international terrorist activities). 
 
(G.)  Yes. 
 
(H.)  Poor.  There is widespread corruption within 
immigration and customs and a measurable lack of security 
coordination within the airport.  Physical security is also 
inadequate, as the perimeter lacks effective fencing, vehicle 
barriers, and lighting. 
 
(I.)  Ineffective.  Corrupt officials are easily bribed, and 
therefore pose a real threat to U.S security interests. 
Honduran passports, for example, have been fraudulently 
obtained through immigration and customs officials for use by 
subjects not legitimately entitled to them. 
 
(J.)  Average/Ineffective.  A unit within the Ministry of 
Public Security called the Frontier Police handles border 
patrol duties.  The unit is making positive steps towards 
border control, but lack of funding and manpower are limiting 
the effectiveness of the unit. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶4. (SBU) Indigenous Terrorism-Anti American Terrorist Groups: 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
(A.)  No. 
 
(B.)  N/A. 
 
(C.)  N/A. 
 
(D.)  N/A. 
 
(E.)  N/A. 
 
(F.)  N/A. 
 
(G.)  N/A. 
 
(H.)  N/A. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶5. (SBU)  Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups: 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
(A.)  No. 
 
(B.)  N/A. 
 
(C.)  N/A. 
 
(D.)  N/A. 
 
(E.)  N/A. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶6. (C/NF)  Transnational Terrorism 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
(6-A.)  No.  However, there are rumors that in the past there 
have been Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), IRA, and 
Chiapas (Zapatistas) sympathizers in Honduras who could be 
involved in advising indigenous groups.  Some Hondurans are 
studying in Cuba and also conceivably could be receiving 
training in subversion and terrorism, although it is more 
likely they are being indoctrinated as agents of influence. 
As this Cuban program for Hondurans is in its infancy, there 
have been no indications that such training is taking place. 
 
Additionally, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) has a limited presence in Honduras, especially in the 
northern coastal areas, where they trade arms for drugs / 
drugs for arms.  There is evidence that weapons originally 
sold to Honduras have been turned-in or seized in Colombia. 
Some individuals associated with the FARC, or who have 
facilitated arms trafficking from Honduras to Colombia, have 
been apprehended in the last year. 
 
(B.)  N/A. 
 
(C.)  N/A. 
 
(D.)  N/A and No. 
 
(E.)  N/A. 
 
(F.)  The only known hostile intelligence presence of note is 
Cuban.  While the Cuban mission appears to have extensive 
contacts with leftists and indigenous groups, there is no 
indication they are planning or supporting terrorism. 
Likewise, while there is concern over alleged Venezuelan 
contact with and possible funding of Leftist organizations, 
there is no indication that they are planning or supporting 
terrorism. 
 
(G.)  There is no shortage of weapons in Honduras.  It would 
also not be difficult for hostile terrorist elements to 
import weapons and/or explosives from neighboring countries. 
Ford