VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0595/01 0540758
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230758Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6125
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0131
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7126
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0210
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1085
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SEOUL 000595 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PINR MNUC SOCI KN KS
SUBJECT: THE DPRK LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION: ROK OBSERVERS 
DIVIDED ON WHO WILL SUCCEED KIM JONG-IL, WHEN HE WILL DO IT 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) ROK academics interviewed in recent weeks by poloff 
were divided on whether North Korean leader Kim Jong-il would 
name his successor in the near future, and on whether Kim 
would choose one of his sons as his heir or seek outside the 
Kim family.  Most believed Kim Jong-il's second son, Kim 
Jong-chul, was the most likely heir, although one scholar 
asserted that third son Kim Jong-un was his father's 
favorite.  Others argued, however, that Kim's sons are too 
young and inexperienced to develop the credentials needed to 
assume leadership and predicted Kim Jong-il would reach 
outside his family for a successor.  A senior South Korean 
diplomat managed to predict both outcomes at the same time, 
saying Kim would install one of his sons as a figurehead 
leader while real political power would lie elsewhere.  There 
was also no consensus on the timing of the succession, with 
some of our contacts emphasizing that Kim Jong-il's advancing 
age mandated rapid moves toward designating a successor, 
while others believed the DPRK would need to secure a more 
favorable security environment for the regime and improve the 
nation's abysmal economic conditions before any serious 
discussion on succession could take place.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) A flurry of recent South Korean and foreign reports 
have speculated that North Korea was signaling its leader, 
Kim Jong-il, would soon name his successor.  Poloff engaged 
the following Embassy contacts over the past few weeks to 
discuss these reports and solicit their views on the 
succession issue: 
 
- Dr. Choi Jin-wook, Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute 
of National Unification (KINU); 
 
- Dr. Chon Hyun-Joon, Senior Research Fellow and Planning and 
Coordination Division Director, KINU; 
 
- Dr. Cho Myungchul, Head of the Office of International 
Cooperation for Korean Unification, Korea Institute for 
International Economic Policy (KIIEP); 
 
- Dr. Lee Sang Hyun, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast 
Asian Security, Sejong Institute; 
 
- Dr. Koh Yu-hwan, Professor of North Korean Studies, Dongguk 
University; and 
 
- Dr. Ryoo Kihl-Jae, Dean of Academic Affairs, College of 
North Korean Studies, Kyungnam University. 
. 
VIEWS DIVIDED ON "WHEN" AND "WHO" 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The South Korean academics were sharply divided on 
the questions of who would succeed Kim Jong-il and when the 
DPRK would announce the successor.  Half thought KJI's second 
son, Kim Jong-chol, was the most likely heir, while the other 
half were split among those who believed KJI would choose as 
his successor one of his other two sons or a well-qualified 
technocrat who was not related to the Kim family.  They also 
diverged in their views on the timing of announcing a 
successor, from as early as next year to a non-specific point 
in the future when, after the DPRK presumably resolved many 
outstanding security and economic issues, KJI would feel more 
secure about revealing his heir. 
. 
SUCCESSOR COULD BE NAMED AS EARLY AS 2007 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Some of the analysts believed KJI was close to 
naming a successor and that the announcement could come as 
early as 2007, timed to the 95th anniversary of the birth of 
Kim Il Sung on April 15.  Dr. Chon Hyun-Joon, Senior Research 
Fellow at the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU), 
observed that: 
 
- KJI was getting old; 
 
- his sons, all relatively young, would need to begin 
 
"preparing" for succession; 
 
- KJI went through a lengthy and arduous process of 
consolidating his support base before and after being named 
successor to his father, as well as before and after his 
father's death; and, 
 
- the DPRK tended to mark special anniversaries (such as the 
95th year since Kim Il Sung's birth) with grandiose political 
events. 
 
Chon concluded from the totality of these factors that the 
95th anniversary of his father's birth would be an 
appropriate time for KJI to announce his successor, partly 
because he could not afford to waste any more time in 
preparing his heir, but also because the imagery of Kim Il 
Sung during the celebratory events would act as a visual 
reminder to the masses that the Kim family legacy should live 
on. 
. 
"SIGNS" FROM PYONGYANG 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Dr. Lee Sang Hyun, Senior Research Fellow at Sejong 
Institute, opined that it could take ten years or more for 
any of KJI's sons to build up the credentials necessary to 
garner the political support from high-ranking party and 
military officials that would be required to be viable as a 
successor.  Since KJI was 64, even if he were to begin the 
succession process immediately, he would be in his 
mid-to-late 70s by the time his son established his 
credentials.  These factors all argued in favor of rapid 
moves to establish a successor. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In fact, Lee argued, there were indications from 
Pyongyang that preparations for the succession had already 
begun.  First, a personality cult had formed in 2002 around 
KJI's third mistress, Ko Young-hee, who was the mother of 
KJI's second and third sons (Kim Jong-chol and Kim Jong-un). 
This was reminiscent of the deification of KJI's mother, Kim 
Jong-suk, shortly before Kim Il Sung named KJI his successor, 
Lee said.  Second, KJI removed his brother-in-law, Chang 
Song-taek, and Chang's close aides from their offices in the 
KWP and the military in 2004.  Chang was not seen in public 
until January 2006, when he reportedly assumed a different 
position in the KWP but with far less authority than before. 
Lee said this was KJI's clear warning to Chang -- widely 
thought to have been the second most powerful figure in DPRK 
politics until his purge -- to stay out of the succession 
issue.  Third, the DPRK's 2006 New Year's joint editorial and 
other forms of official propaganda made repeated references 
to "the third and fourth generations of the revolution," 
possibly hinting that preparations for succession would begin 
in 2006.  Finally, KJI had replaced many KWP and cabinet 
"elders" from the Kim Il Sung era with younger officials, 
beginning with Pak Pong Ju as Premier in 2003; these younger 
officials would presumably be more welcoming to a younger 
heir than would their older colleagues. 
. 
BAD TIMING: KJI WANTS BETTER SECURITY AND ECONOMY FIRST 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Most of the scholars, however, believed that 
available evidence of a succession process was still 
inconclusive.  Dr. Koh Yoo-hwan, Professor of North Korean 
Studies at Dongguk University, was skeptical that KJI or his 
confidantes would be in the right frame of mind to 
contemplate succession, given the DPRK's urgent security and 
economic concerns.  Noting reports that KJI had effectively 
wrested most real political power from his father years 
before Kim Il-sung's death, Koh added that KJI would be 
acutely aware of the potential for political realignment if 
he were to announce his successor prematurely.  Before he 
would risk becoming a lame duck, KJI would want to ensure 
that DPRK economic conditions improved and the nation's 
security concerns were resolved through the lifting of U.S. 
economic sanctions, removal from the list of state sponsors 
of terrorism, advances in U.S.-DPRK relations, and 
normalization with Japan.  Given the current stalemate in the 
Six Party process, real movement toward naming a successor 
 
was therefore highly unlikely. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Similarly, Dr. Choi Jin-wook, Senior Research 
Fellow at KINU, asserted that the DPRK did not appear to be 
preparing for a successor.  He cautioned that most observers 
predicting a 2007 succession based their argument on some 
generous assumptions, rather than on solid evidence.  Indeed, 
given the uniqueness of its political structure, Choi 
expressed doubt that the DPRK even had any specific long-term 
plan on succession.  KJI maintained a constant vigil against 
any attempts by officials to challenge his authority under 
the guise of supporting his heir.  An example of Kim's 
extreme paranoia about insubordination, Choi said, was KJI's 
practice of delegating responsibility for all key cabinet 
ministries and KWP departments to his cronies as first vice 
ministers and vice directors.  These officials all reported 
directly to KJI, sidestepping the ministers and directors, 
who were elder party officials kept in place primarily as 
figureheads.  This system of close monitoring by KJI 
effectively prevented anybody from even mentioning succession 
without risking retribution.  Moreover, KJI's reported order 
in December banning all discussion on succession was a clear 
indication that only he would select his heir, and that he 
would do so at a time of his choosing. 
. 
SON NUMBER TWO? 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Four of the six academics we consulted thought KJI 
would choose his successor from among his three sons, with 
three of the four picking 24-year-old Kim Jong-chol, KJI's 
second son and the eldest of Koh Young-hee's children, as the 
heir apparent.  Sejong Institute's Lee asserted that a 
combination of factors made Kim Jong-chol the favorite, 
despite the presence of an older half-brother, Kim Jong-nam. 
The reports of a personality cult forming around Koh 
Young-hee, Kim Jong-chol's mother, as well as his positions 
in the KWP Organization and Guidance Department and the 
Propaganda and Agitation Department -- both offices in which 
KJI had begun his own career before being named successor -- 
were strong evidence that Kim Jong-chol would succeed KJI. 
If accurate, recent reports that Kim Jong-chol's picture was 
displayed along with KJI's in party officials' offices, that 
he accompanied KJI to China during his January visit to 
China, and that the young Kim visited and laid flowers before 
the grave of Kim Jong-suk, KJI's mother, would further 
support the argument that he would succeed KJI, Lee said. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Dr. Ryoo Kihl-Jae of Kyungnam University's College 
of North Korean Studies echoed Lee's analysis.  Noting that 
Korean tradition typically favored the eldest son in matters 
of family inheritance, Ryoo argued that KJI's first son, Kim 
Jong-nam, was effectively put out of the running when he was 
deported from Japan in 2001 for traveling on a falsified 
Dominican Republic passport.  Even without the fiasco in 
Japan, however, the fact that his mother, Song Hye-rim, had 
ended her relationship with KJI on a bad note was already a 
disadvantage for Kim Jong-nam, Ryoo argued. 
. 
PERHAPS EVEN SON NUMBER THREE 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Despite Kim Jong-chol's clear advantages, KJI's 
third son, the 21-year-old Kim Jong-un, ought not be 
dismissed, asserted KINU's Chon Hyun-joon.  A number of 
observers, such as KJI's former Japanese chef Kenji Fujimoto, 
asserted that KJI showed greater affection for Kim Jong-un 
than for his other children.  Fujimoto wrote in his memoirs 
that KJI adored Kim Jong-un for resembling himself, both in 
image and in personality.  KJI thought Kim Jong-chol, in 
contrast, was "too effeminate" to be a strong leader.  In 
fact, noted Chon, Kim Jong-chol might have problems with the 
levels of estrogen in his system, as recent reports indicated 
that he exhibited female secondary sex characteristics.  This 
would seriously impede his chances of succeeding KJI, who 
would frown upon any "unmasculine" characteristics from 
someone whom he would trust to continue his military-first 
policy. 
. 
FORMER DPRK ACADEMIC ALSO PREDICTS DYNASTIC SUCCESSION 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Dr. Cho Myungchul of the Korea Institute for 
International Economic Research, a former professor of 
economics from North Korea's Kim Il Sung University who 
defected to the ROK in 1994, said that in the DPRK's cultural 
and political context, the successor to KJI would undoubtedly 
come from among his sons.  The entire Kim family was idolized 
in the North, meaning that the people of North Korea 
automatically revered all offspring of Kim lineage.  It 
naturally followed that officials would be able to rally 
support immediately for a son of KJI if he were to assume a 
high-profile position.  The only real question was which son 
KJI would choose. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Cho argued that a second reason why succession had 
to take place within the family was the history of succession 
in the former Soviet Union, which demonstrated that 
non-dynastic succession resulted in severe criticism of 
former leaders by their successors.  KJI, who had every 
interest in ensuring that both his accomplishments and his 
idolization remain untouched after his passing, had no choice 
but to choose from among his offspring. 
. 
FIRST TO GRAB OFFICE, WAVE FATHER'S FLAG WINS THE CROWN 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Cho, based on his experience living among the DPRK 
elite (his father was former Construction Minister Cho Chul 
Jun), believed that whichever son was the first to 
consolidate his position and display absolute loyalty to his 
father would become KJI's heir.  Having attended school with 
KJI's half-brothers for years, Cho recalled from his school 
days that, up until high school, Kim Il Sung heavily favored 
KJI's half-brother Kim Pyong-il as successor.  Kim Song-ae, 
second wife to Kim Il Sung and Kim Pyong-il's mother, even 
arranged to have Kim Pyong-il, who was 13 years younger than 
KJI, begin government work early by shortening his primary 
and secondary school education from 12 years to a total of 
11, and allowing early graduation from KIS University.  By 
the time Kim Pyong-il graduated, however, KJI had already 
seized control of all key areas and convinced his father that 
he was the only one fit to succeed him. 
. 
OR PERHAPS A TECHNOCRAT 
----------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Choi Jin-wook of KINU argued that another 
generation of dynastic succession was unlikely, as KJI's 
children probably did not have the ability to grapple 
successfully with the current challenges before the DPRK, as 
well as those that would arise with the resolution of the 
nuclear issue and improved economic conditions.  The sons 
would not have sufficient time to develop the ability to 
manage large-scale changes in the DPRK.  The ideal candidate 
would therefore ascend from the ranks of the military, the 
cabinet or the KWP.  He would also need to have demonstrated 
absolute loyalty to Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong-il, and their 
legacy for the DPRK. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Koh Yoo-hwan of Dongguk University likewise 
believed that KJI's successor would be a technocrat with 
well-established credentials.  Noting that KJI wrote 
extensively on his "successor theory" in the years leading up 
to his own ascension, Koh stressed that KJI's own writings 
provided the best indication of the ideal qualities for his 
successor.  KJI expected his successor to have demonstrated 
absolute loyalty to himself and to the workers' revolution. 
The successor needed to demonstrate leadership and strong 
ethics, a thorough knowledge of both Kim Il Sung's and KJI's 
ideology, and a full grasp of both international and domestic 
affairs.  He also had to enjoy absolute confidence from the 
public through real achievements.  Under such criteria, KJI's 
sons were probably not viable candidates.  For example, most, 
if not all of the sons had studied in the West, allowing 
critics to argue that they were "ideologically impure." 
Furthermore, Koh argued, no official DPRK publication had 
ever declared the need for dynastic succession. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Both Choi and Koh acknowledged that it was far 
 
more difficult to identify potential candidates to succeed 
KJI among technocrats than among his sons.  No DPRK official 
was sufficiently visible at the moment.  They noted, however, 
the rapid rise of an official named Paek Se-bong, a 
mysterious individual who seemingly appeared out of nowhere 
to become a member of the National Defense Commission in 
2003, bypassing a number of senior military and KWP 
officials.  The academics speculated that Paek Se-bong could 
be the pseudonym of somebody being groomed by KJI to succeed 
him.  (NOTE:  Paek need not be a technocrat; some observers 
have suggested Paek is a pseudonym for one of Kim's sons. 
END NOTE.) 
. 
THE JAPAN MODEL 
--------------- 
 
¶18.  (SBU) A former National Security Advisor predicted to us 
several months ago that the DPRK would resolve the succession 
issue by adopting the "Japan model" of an imperial family 
acting as head of state, while real political power lay 
elsewhere.  Under this hypothesis, KJI would install one of 
his sons as a figurehead leader, thereby securing the 
legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the people, ensuring 
the well-being of his children, and protecting his own 
legacy.  Recognizing that none of his sons were equipped to 
run the country, however, KJI would put one or more 
technocrats in charge of the government.  Like the Japanese 
Imperial Family, the Kim family would reign but not rule. 
Cho Myung-chul, however, did not believe such a system was 
viable for the DPRK, as it would contradict KJI's own 
writings on both party ideology and successin theory. 
VERSHBOW