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Viewing cable 06SEOUL425, WHAT IS GOING ON WITH NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SEOUL425 2006-02-07 07:00 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0425/01 0380700
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070700Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5853
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0035
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7079
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0120
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 2701
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 2521
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC 1318
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000425 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D, EB AND EAP 
NSC FOR WILDER AND CHA 
MOSCOW HOLD FOR VLADIVOSTOK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016 
TAGS: EAID EAGR EFIN PREL KN KS
SUBJECT: WHAT IS GOING ON WITH NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC 
POLICY? -- SOUTH KOREA'S EVOLVING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow, for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) In the three years following North Korea's July 2002 
economic reform program, most South Korean experts on the 
North Korean economy came to share certain assumptions about 
the state of transformation of economic policy in the North. 
Some of the key elements of that shared "conventional wisdom" 
were: 
 
-- The July 2002 economic reforms originated in response to 
unplanned changes already taking place in the North Korean 
economy -- including increased use of market-type mechanisms 
-- and ratified and institutionalized selected portions of 
those changes. 
 
-- However, the July 2002 reforms also accelerated and gave 
added impetus to certain trends in the North Korean economy, 
including widening inter-regional economic gaps and a shift 
from planned production of heavy industrial goods to 
less-planned investment in tradable consumer items. 
 
-- The reforms were supported by pro-reform elements in the 
North, although disliked by the North Korean military and 
ideological conservatives. 
 
-- Nevertheless, the policy changes themselves were 
significant, and "irreversible" in the sense of not being 
easily undone, because the reforms were already succeeding in 
establishing new modes of commerce, and associated North 
Korean stakeholders. 
 
-- Finally, in the context of the above changes, North 
Koreans would eagerly seek to learn from their South Korean 
brothers about international modes of capitalism and 
international development.  Thus, North-South economic 
cooperation activities, however they were designed, would 
inevitably convey important educational content and have a 
real impact on the design of additional economic policy 
changes in the North. 
 
2. (SBU) This conventional wisdom, however, has been shaken 
by four factors emerging over the past year: 
 
-- First, disappointment with the educational content and 
impact of North-South collaborations; 
 
-- Second, North Korea's shutdown of economic cooperation 
channels with international organizations and NGOs, and by 
extension with European governments; 
 
-- Third, the reversal of some economic reforms, including 
the termination of cell phone service and the 
re-establishment of the Public Distribution System as the 
primary channel for food rationing; and 
 
-- Fourth, increasingly obvious evidence of rapidly deepening 
economic relations between North Korea and China. 
 
3. (C) In the face of these challenges to their conventional 
wisdom, some South Korean experts are coming to the 
uncomfortable conclusion that the Republic of Korea, which 
viewed itself as a driver of change through its "Sunshine 
Policy," is in fact playing a passive role as a facilitator 
of a North Korean survival strategy whose ultimate winners 
may be North Korea and China. 
 
4. (C) Nevertheless, the large majority of South Koreans 
remain committed to South-North economic engagement, due to 
their desire for peaceful and stable relations with the 
North, their continuing hope that North Korea will reform in 
the long run, and their desire not to lose to China in the 
two nations' implicit competition to influence economic 
policy directions and ultimately to control economic assets 
in the North.  End Summary. 
 
DPRK STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC CHANGES: THE VIEW FROM SEOUL 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
5. (SBU) Post has taken advantage of recent opportunities to 
expand dialogue with several of our best contacts in the 
South Korean academic and policy community who specialize in 
observing and interpreting economic performance and economic 
policy trends in North Korea. 
 
6. (SBU) The consensus view among our ROK interlocutors is 
that DPRK economic conditions have improved in the past 
several years, following very difficult times in the late 
1990s.  Their perspective on the North Korean economy 
encompasses the following empirical observations: 
 
-- The DPRK's agricultural economy has stabilized, but is 
highly dependent on foreign inputs:  North Korea will never 
be capable of feeding itself. 
 
-- North Korea's industrial economy has also stabilized, but 
at a very low level of activity:  Heavy industry is seen by 
ROK experts as the weakest part of the DPRK economy, but they 
do not see it as "near collapse."  In fact, South Koreans 
believe it has already collapsed, and that much of the 
productive capacity of North Korea's "old" economy is now 
obsolete and unlikely to be used again.  As a result, there 
is widespread cannibalization of depreciated assets. 
 
-- The DPRK service and trading economy is growing smartly, 
powered by external trade with China:  South Korean experts 
believe that the July 2002 reforms assisted in the expansion 
of consumer goods sales, particularly imports.  They believe 
that Chinese statistics undercount cross-border trade, and 
that "non-productive" consumer imports will continue to 
expand.  (On the negative end, many ROK experts see North 
Korea as positioned in a classic low-value-added development 
trap, trading raw materials and primary goods for more 
valuable manufactures.  In this sense, they see little 
prospect for North Korea's chronic trade deficit to be 
resolved over the medium term.  Rather, absent increased 
foreign investment and better technology, North Korea will 
continue to experience worsening terms of trade, inflation 
and downward pressure on its currency.) 
 
-- Finally, in a structural sense, North Korea is undergoing 
significant income redistributions:  South Korean experts 
believe that the winners are Pyongyang's relatively 
well-connected urban cadres and the newly-rich farmers in 
southern and western North Korea, who are able to leverage 
their better land and growing conditions to sell into urban 
markets.  The losers are salary-dependent urban workers and 
the increasingly poor farmers working marginal lands in the 
central and northeastern regions of the DPRK. 
 
7. (SBU) Behind these empirical changes, almost all ROK 
experts agree that North Korea's July 2002 economic reforms 
accelerated and gave added impetus to the above trends. 
Although many note that the economic reforms originated at 
least in part in response to unplanned changes already taking 
place in the North Korean economy, the South Korean consensus 
view has been that, nevertheless, the economic reform process 
in North Korea has begun in earnest, is significant, and is 
not likely to be easily reversed. 
 
8. (C) South Korean experts also share the view that even 
though the July 2002 economic reforms were disliked by the 
North Korean military and ideological conservatives, they 
were supported by Chairman Kim Jong-il and pro-reform 
technocratic elements in the North.  Therefore, North Korean 
economic policy reform has already achieved sufficient 
momentum that South Korea can hope to participate in and 
benefit from additional reforms in the future.  As noted by 
Yoon Deok-ryong, a leading expert at the Korea Institute for 
International Economic Policy (KIEP), "Until recently at 
least, Seoul economists working on the DPRK were expecting a 
flood of invitations from the North, seeking technical advice 
on how to push forward with a second round of reforms to 
complement the July 2002 initiative." 
 
EMPIRICAL CHALLENGES TO ROK CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
9. (C) The Year 2005, however, saw many challenges to the 
South Korean conventional wisdom about economic policy reform 
in North.  Previously, most ROK experts told us that they saw 
the July 2002 economic reforms as "irreversible" because the 
reforms had already succeeded in establishing new modes of 
commerce, and associated North Korean stakeholders.  Their 
confidence in the momentum of economic reform in North Korea, 
however, was challenged in early 2005 by the decision of DPRK 
authorities effectively to terminate cell phone service in 
the North, except for continued access by high-level 
government officials.  Subsequently, and more significantly, 
the North Korean government reestablished the Public 
Distribution System (PDS) as the sole legal channel for grain 
distribution in North Korea.  This measure was followed by a 
ban on internal monetized trade in grain and government 
seizures of grain held outside the PDS.  These DPRK steps may 
have been partially motivated as inflation control measures, 
but they were perceived in Seoul as a reassertion of central 
control over the North Korean economy.  Soon thereafter, the 
DPRK government commenced an initiative to shut down 
cooperation channels with a large sub-set of NGOs and 
international organizations -- including the World Food 
Program -- which the DPRK found more troublesome than 
valuable to the maintenance of the North Korean economy. 
 
10. (C) In the area of bilateral North-South activities as 
well, South Koreans in 2005 started to see signs that their 
hopes for a substantive impact on North Korean economic 
policy through bilateral engagement were not working to the 
extent they originally hoped.  The North, for example, cut 
back on study tours to Pyongyang by South Koreans after the 
Ryongchon train explosion and channeled most ROK visits to 
the capital district in the form of safe "Arirang Festival" 
tourism.  The year 2005 also saw an increasingly cynical DPRK 
approach to inter-Korean economic cooperation talks, for 
example demanding millions of pairs of shoes in return for 
"allowing" South Korea to complete the rebuilding of a 
functioning railway from the DMZ to Kaesong City.  Several 
initiatives, including the railways and tourism to Mount 
Baekdu, Kaesong City and Pyongyang ran up against 
unreasonable demands from DRPK partners. 
 
11. (C) Meanwhile, more South Koreans experts have found 
themselves disappointed with the educational content of 
North-South collaborations.  In particular, it has become 
clear that the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) -- intended 
by the South to be a potent "Trojan Horse" of capitalist 
economics -- is intended by the North to be an arms-length 
transaction with minimal direct interaction between 
responsible officials on each side.  Companies operating in 
the KIC have reported that they often must communicate to 
their workers through "safe" foreman intermediaries, and do 
not pay wages directly to North Korean workers (in fact, they 
have no idea how much the workers are really receiving of the 
USD 57.00 per month paid to Pyongyang). 
 
12. (C) These empirical challenges to the effectiveness of 
the "Peace and Prosperity Policy" are causing some 
readjustment in the reasoning and expectations behind 
North-South economic cooperation, as expressed to us by ROK 
experts.  For example, Kim Byung-yeon, an economics professor 
at Sogang University specializing in North Korea, told the 
Ambassador at a recent Embassy gathering of DPRK economy 
experts that he had come to the reluctant conclusion that the 
ROK's engagement policy is having little or no impact on the 
internal economic policies of North Korea.  Professor Kim 
also does not think additional near-term increases in ROK aid 
would have any greater impact under the current circumstances 
and modes of inter-Korean interaction.  Despite his 
skepticism, however, Kim said he continues to support 
North-South economic cooperation for its long-term effects, 
and in order to maintain peaceful and stable relations with 
the North.  "As with a small child," Kim said, "we must be 
patient with North Korea as it learns the facts of the real 
world." 
 
CHINA MAY BE THE WINNER 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
13. (C) The other increasingly common justification for 
North-South economic engagement heard among ROK experts is 
the need to counter-balance rapidly deepening economic 
relations between North Korea and China.  The new 
conventional wisdom among ROK academics and many government 
officials is that the North Koreans find interaction with 
Chinese less demanding and less risky than working with South 
Koreans.  For example, Professor Nam Sung-wook of Korea 
University, the ROK's leading authority on DPRK agriculture, 
told the Ambassador that North Koreans still do not trust 
South Koreans, since they know that South Korea would like to 
see the Kim Jong-il regime come to an end.  Therefore, they 
will accept South Korean investments only in small quantities 
and under tightly-controlled conditions, whereas Nam believes 
that North Korea is much more accepting of Chinese 
investment.  Chinese employers, Nam said, are permitted to 
pay their North Korean employees directly, unlike ROK 
employers in the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 
 
14. (C) Kim Jong-il's January visit to multiple cities in 
southern China has only deepened the conviction in Seoul that 
Chinese businesses enjoy better access to the DPRK than South 
Koreans, and there is increased talk here of the ROK 
competing with China for control of North Korea's economic 
assets.  For example, Deputy Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, who 
is a strong supporter of South-North economic engagement, 
recently told the Ambassador that "South Koreans worry that 
when it comes time for reunification, we'll find that Chinese 
have already seized all the best assets in the North." 
Former President Kim Dae-jung made a similar point to the 
Ambassador this week. 
 
CONCLUSION: SHIFTING RATIONALES FOR ENGAGEMENT 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
15. (C) The South Korean expert community is home to both 
optimists and "Doubting Thomases" about the future course of 
DPRK economic reform.  The optimists still see North Korea as 
sincerely interested in pursuing a China-style or 
Vietnam-style course toward broad economic reform and opening 
to the outside world.  The DPRK, they reason, is only held 
back by worries about social stability.  The Doubting 
Thomases now see North Korea's goals as more modest -- the 
North just aims to capture easily-available productivity 
increases by inserting market prices into some elements of 
the economy, at the same time benefiting the DPRK elites and 
keeping them happy. 
 
16. (C) The year 2005 saw some experts in Seoul shifting from 
the optimistic to the doubtful camp, as mounting empirical 
evidence pointed to a lack of sincerity about economic reform 
in the North.  It is important to note, however, that both 
camps in the ROK remain supportive of South-North engagement. 
 In doing so, they reflect the consensus desire of the South 
Korean citizenry for peaceful and stable relations with the 
North.  In addition, South Koreans are also now united in 
their concern about the possibility of South Korea losing to 
China in an implicit competition to maintain influence over 
the North Korean economy.  Even opponents of the Roh 
Administration tend to view engagement with the DPRK as the 
ROK's least-bad option, and even skeptics in the Seoul 
academic community maintain some hope that North Korea will 
become more earnest about economic reform and opening in the 
long run. 
 
17. (C) One final observation: Frustration in Seoul over the 
apparent powerlessness of South-North economic cooperation to 
motivate more earnest economic reform in the North could 
inspire new approaches on the part of the South Korean 
government.  Therefore, it is possible that in the coming 
year, even as South-North contacts continue to expand, we 
will see an increased emphasis on aiding the North in ways 
that are more likely to result in real improvements in North 
Korean infrastructure and more focused investments in the 
development of human, environmental and agricultural capital. 
 
18. (C) On the other hand, we do not think any significant 
 
change in direction is likely.  The ROKG will be reluctant, 
in the first instance, to initiate many changes in direction 
during the run-up to the impending 2007 national elections, 
where South-North ties will certainly be a matter of debate. 
Moreover, at political levels in the Roh Administration, we 
have seen scant evidence that anyone shared the academics' 
doubts about the efficacy of the ROKG's engagement policy. 
On the contrary, citing the large number of ROK visitors to 
the North, incoming Minister of Unification Lee Jong-seok has 
called 2005 the "breakout year" for North-South contacts. 
Presidential candidates from both the ruling and opposition 
parties are expected to debate the tactics of the 
government's engagement policy, but not the wisdom of the 
policy itself. 
VERSHBOW