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2006-02-15 20:34:00
06MEXICO858
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL

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TAGS: PGOV PINR MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 000858 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: PRI DISSIDENTS SPEAK OUT 
 Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR WILLIAM H. DUNCAN, R 
EASONS: 1.4(B/D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In order to broaden our understanding of the 
dynamics within the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), 
over the past two weeks, poloff met with three dissidents 
within the party's congressional faction, two of whom had 
just announced their defection from the party.  In frank 
conversations, our contacts described a party held hostage to 
the personal agenda of presidential candidate Roberto 
Madrazo.  While the party appears to have achieved a thin 
veneer of unity, this unity could easily be fractured if the 
party's legislative lists do not satisfy the ambitions of key 
activists, or if Madrazo's candidacy continues to languish in 
the polls.  While much could happen in the four and one-half 
months remaining until election day, our conversations with 
these PRI dissidents confirm the impression that the party 
leadership's apparent willingness to subjugate the PRI's 
broader interests to Roberto Madrazo's troubled candidacy 
could have serious long-term consequences for the party.  End 
summary. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Madrazo Has Two Months To Turn It Around 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) On February 14, poloff met with Senator Genaro 
Borrego of Zacatecas, the most-high profile dissident within 
the PRI's congressional delegation.  A founding member of 
Everyone United Against Madrazo (TUCOM, for its Spanish 
acronym) faction within the PRI, Borrego reiterated what he 
told us last October:  that under no circumstances would he 
ever support Madrazo, whom he characterized as "corrupt."  He 
said that while the party superficially had unified around 
the candidate, this unity was "fragile" and "artificial." 
Confirming what we have heard from numerous other sources, 
Borrego said that Madrazo's day of reckoning would come in 
March, when the party would finalize its legislative lists. 
He said that given the numerous competing promises that 
Madrazo has made to various allies, inevitably some important 
PRI leaders would find themselves omitted from the lists, 
possibly posing a severe test to party unity.  He speculated 
that if, by mid-April, Madrazo had not risen to a solid 
second place position in the polls, many in the party would 
quietly abandon his campaign as a lost cause, forging 
alliances with other parties to protect their own interests. 
He said it was difficult to predict what effect a second 
consecutive defeat in the presidential contest would have on 
the PRI, intimating that in the wake of such a defeat, many 
party members might seek a political home elsewhere, 
threatening the party's future. 
 
¶3.  (C) Borrego blamed the poor state of Madrazo's campaign 
largely on the candidate himself, noting that his on-going 
feud with teachers' union leader Elba Esther Gordillo and his 
own long-tarnished reputation make his candidacy a very tough 
sell.  Nevertheless, he discounted press reports that some in 
the party were seeking to replace Madrazo, saying that both 
party rules and Madrazo's own dominance of the PRI's 
machinery made such a move virtually impossible. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
A Climate of Insecurity Could Favor the PRI 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Notwithstanding the difficult electoral scenario 
Madrazo now faces, Borrego said there were three factors that 
could work to his advantage.  First, he noted that the 
current climate of public insecurity might lead the 
electorate to vote their fears, leading them to favor the 
candidate -- i.e., Madrazo -- whom they viewed as more 
heavy-handed and ruthless.  Borrego also noted that low voter 
participation would favor the PRI, as a low turnout would 
magnify the effect of the party's base of loyal voters (voto 
duro) which, although shrinking, is still much larger than 
that of the two rival parties.  Grinning, he insisted that 
Mexico's performance in the soccer World Cup could have an 
unpredictable but significant effect on the national mood, 
noting that the quarterfinals would be played 1-2 days before 
the election. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Madrazo Casting Local Leaders Aside 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Deputy Benjamin Sagahon Medina, a former teacher and 
indigenous leader in San Luis Potosi, told poloff that his 
position in the PRI had been tenuous ever since he voted 
against the "desafuero" of then Mexico City Mayor Andres 
Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO).  In the wake of that vote, he 
found himself increasingly frozen out of the party, asserting 
that recently, he and some five other dissident deputies were 
 
MEXICO 00000858  002 OF 002 
 
 
threatened with expulsion.  He told poloff that faced with 
that possibility, he decided to abandon the PRI and to join 
the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD).  He returned to his 
home district two weeks ago and called an open meeting of 
supporters to seek their support for his decision.  He claims 
that the great majority of the approximately 1,400 supporters 
who attended the meeting -- including numerous lifelong 
PRIistas -- ratified his decision to leave the party and 
support AMLO.  He predicted that at least five other PRI 
deputies would defect in the next few months. 
 
¶6.  (C) Deputy Laura Reyes-Retana of Coahuila explained her 
recent decision to defect from the PRI quite bluntly, telling 
poloff:  "I don't like Roberto Madrazo."  She criticized his 
leadership style as authoritarian, adding that he favored 
party elite at the expense of local leaders like herself. 
She said that she expected a number of additional defections 
from the ranks of PRI deputies, including at least four of 
the approximately 20 deputies aligned with Elba Esther 
Gordillo.  While those who are offered posts in other parties 
will announce their defections publicly, those who are not 
courted by other parties will leave quietly.  She said she 
expected the PRI to delay announcing its legislative lists 
until after the PRD and PAN finalized theirs, so that 
disappointed PRIistas will have less incentive to defect. 
 
----------------------- 
An End to Party Loyalty 
----------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Reyes-Retana described Madrazo as a poor leader, who 
had contributed to the balkanization of the party.  She said 
that in the past, loyal PRIistas would support the party's 
presidential candidate even at great personal sacrifice. 
However, she said Madrazo's ruthless and self-interested 
management of the party penalized, rather than rewarded, 
those who put party interests ahead of personal interests. 
When asked about her own political plans, Reyes-Retana said 
she planned to support AMLO, who she described as a 
"disaffected PRIista" like herself.  She noted that AMLO was 
considerably more moderate than the PRD as a whole, for which 
she has little enthusiasm.  While she expected AMLO to win 
the election, she noted that the PRI remained capable of 
electoral chicanery. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Comment: Can a Third Place Candidate Afford to Burn Bridges? 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Neither Deputy Sagahon nor Deputy Reyes-Retana were 
ever party heavyweights, so taken individually, their 
defections hardly represent a major blow to the Madrazo 
campaign.  Likewise, Senator Borrego's considerable influence 
within the national party has been waning for years. 
However, strong grass root support has always been a key 
element in the PRI's traditional formula for electoral 
success.  Each of the three undoubtedly commands a 
considerable degree of loyalty within their respective 
constituencies, and each may well have influence over 
thousands of votes.  Moreover, we suspect that the dissidence 
and defections reflected by these three candidates is being 
replicated, albeit quietly, in numerous other legislative 
districts across Mexico, and that this phenomenon may 
intensify once the party's legislative lists are published. 
It is difficult to see how a third place candidate can 
possibly gain ground by cavalierly alienating local party 
leaders. 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity 
 
KELLY