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Viewing cable 06KABUL662, PRT/KABUL: PROVINCIAL SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL662 2006-02-13 06:28 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4196
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBUL #0662/01 0440628
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 130628Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8311
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0107
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2240
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASH DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2450
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1088
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5539
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 000662 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/FO (AMB MQUINN), SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
OSD FOR BREZEZINSKI 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2026 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC SNAR KCRS AF
SUBJECT: PRT/KABUL: PROVINCIAL SECURITY ASSESSMENTS 
DESIGNED TO DISRUPT SPRING OFFENSIVE 
 
KABUL 00000662  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: PRT DIRECTOR TOM PRASTER FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary:  A joint GOA - Coalition effort to 
address key problems in Zabul, Paktika, and Helmand 
Provinces could be a template for bringing greater stability 
to the southeast and help preclude an effective spring 
offensive by anti-government forces.  In a series of meetings 
starting in late December, the GOA's National Security 
Council along with U.S., UN and others has developed a series 
of short-term plans to replace ineffective district 
officials, strengthen local security forces, improve the 
transportation infrastructure and distribute assistance in 
key areas.  The hope is that such activity will undercut 
Taliban efforts to portray the central government as detached 
or ineffective and deny them a base among the local 
population. The focus has been short range, geared as it is 
to facing an expected tough Taliban spring offensive.  Thus 
the things that can be changed significantly are limited by 
immediately available resources and GOA administrative 
capacity. In Helmand, narcotics and security are intersecting 
to pose a particular challenge.  Whether the measures are 
successful or not, the exercise itself has proven useful for 
demonstrating GOA initiative and improving coordination 
inside the government and with the international community. 
End summary. 
 
2.  (C)  In December, GOA National Directorate for Security 
(NDS) Director Amarullah Saleh told the Ambassador and 
Lieutenant General Eikenberry that the GOA has significant 
intelligence on Taliban leaders and membership numbers in the 
southeast.  However, the central government's lack of 
effective lines of authority and weak district governments 
have prevented NDS from using that information to disrupt 
Taliban activity.  The Ambassador and CG suggested that the 
GOA develop specific plans that identified key areas of 
instability and how their problems might be addressed on a 
province-by-province basis in the run up to an anticipated 
Spring offensive.  In the meantime, we promised to form an 
interagency group (including ISAF) to examine the same 
regions one by one, and determine how we might assist. 
 
3.  (SBU)  As a result, we have attended  a series of 
interagency meetings chaired by National Security Council 
Director Rassoul, and attended by NDS Director Saleh, Acting 
Minister of Interior Zarar, Minister of Defense Wardak, and 
Army Chief of Staff Bismullah Khan, or their representatives. 
 The international community has been represented by the 
Ambassador or Charge, USAID Director or representative, CFC-A 
Deputy Commander Air Vice Marshal Luker, ISAF Deputy 
Commander Major General Lane, and ISAF Polad Batori or 
Reconstruction Adviser Skye.  OSC-A Deputy Director for 
Police Fitzgerald, British Ambassador Marsden and UNAMA 
Deputy Special Representative Alexander attended the meeting 
on Helmand.  Governor Arman of Zabol attended the second 
meeting on that province, and Governors Mangel and Daud 
attended the Paktika and Helmand meetings, respectively. 
 
4.  (SBU)  The GOA wanted to focus each meeting on a province 
of their choice, and we asked them to invite the governor to 
attend and present an assessment.  For our part, we and CFC-A 
have coordinated with each other and the relevant PRT and 
have prepared papers on the provinces in advance, but have 
used them only to contribute ideas after the GOA has made 
their assistance requests.  For the most part, that has been 
 
KABUL 00000662  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
unnecessary, as the GOA side has presented detailed 
intelligence assessments and generally reasonable requests. 
 
5.  (C) Throughout the process, the Embassy and CFC-A have 
made the following points: 
 
--    Actions need to be effective in the short term - the 
point of the exercise is to improve the GOA/Coalition ability 
to resist any spring offensive by anti-government forces. 
 
--    As much as possible, the population should see the GOA 
delivering these improvements. 
 
--    Whenever possible, local populations should contribute 
to the effort so they have a stake in the outcome. 
 
--    We will not contribute additional resources to these 
provinces if the GOA has its own resources to use and unless 
necessary changes in provincial and district personnel, as 
identified by the GOA, are made. 
 
--    Additional resource allocations must be focused and 
modest - although we are taking a province by province 
approach, we have to keep an eye on the cumulative effect of 
our changes. 
 
--    Changes will be made within the context of our overall 
strategic programs. 
 
6.  (C) Although we have asked the GOA to come to the 
meetings with international partners after internal 
discussions are complete and they have decided on a course of 
action, we are often witnesses to prolonged debate on the GOA 
side of the table.  Also, the discussions occasionally stray 
from the above points, especially from the governors, who are 
new to the process.  However, overall we believe the process 
has resulted in a reasonable and doable set of remedies.  The 
recent thrust of Karzai's direction from SCF (that GOA must 
take more responsibility itself, and not rely constantly on 
the Coalition) has been evident throughout the process. 
 
7.  (SBU) The first three provinces discussed were Zabol, on 
December 31 and again on January 3, Paktika on January 8, and 
Helmand on January 19.  On January 24, there was a follow-up 
meeting to review the recommendations and actions taken to 
date. 
 
Zabol 
----- 
 
8.  (C)  The government suggested concentrating on Shamulzai 
District, on the Pakistan border, and Dai Chopan bordering 
Uruzgan and a transit point for the Taliban.  The following 
actions were discussed, with actions taken to date: 
 
--    Remove both district Chiefs of Police, as well as CoPs 
in 3 other districts (GOA):  MoI has made these changes.  The 
governor traveled to Dai Chopan and explained the reasons for 
the changes. 
 
--    Provide more trained ANP officers (This was originally 
assigned to OSC-A, but OSC-A subsequently delivered its 
police fielding plan to MOI; any reprioritization, OSC-A 
suggested, should be done by MOI):  MOI announced on 1/24 
 
KABUL 00000662  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
that it has assessed the province and no longer sees a need 
for more police, just better equipment. 
 
--    More logistical support (vehicles and ammunition) for 
the Afghan National Police (ANP) in these districts:  OSC-A 
has said it is prepared to ensure current police forces have 
full complement of basic equipment.  List of supplemental 
equipment (heavy weapons, motorbikes) under review; some 
needs can be met but not all.  AVM Luker also noted that MoI 
needs to work with OSC-A on redistribution of equipment 
because distribution is tied to new (not existing) units 
under the strategic ANP fielding plan. 
 
--    Accelerate completion of Qalat radio transmitter which 
to reach the entire province, and distribute radios (CFC-A): 
It was determined that the FM station in Qalat, even when 
boosted, would not reach the target districts.  Instead, 
programming for the AM radio station in Kandahar, which does 
reach, should carry programming of interest to the districts. 
 Additional portable radios have been made available by CFC-A 
for distribution to selected districts. 
 
--    Accelerate construction of Shinkay through Shamulzai 
Road (USAID):  CFC-A Engineers estimated hard top cost of $40 
million, and gravel cost at $12 million, both beyond the 
scope of this project.   Instead, AID has begun preparing a 
food or cash for work program to do road repairs throughout 
the winter and spring. 
 
--    Distribution of food stuffs (USAID):  Food for Peace 
has prepositioned emergency staples in the region that can be 
issued after March 1 if there is no emergency in the interim. 
 CFC-A has agreed to bring more food to Qalat if necessary, 
but AVM Luker suggested that, in accordance with President 
Karzai's wish that this work have an "Afghan face," that the 
GOA do final distribution.  Minister Wardak said MOD can 
provide trucks, and helicopters if OSC-A can provide fuel. 
AVM Luker indicated that would be possible. 
 
Paktika 
------- 
 
9.  (C)  The government recommended a focus on Gomal 
District, which is the largest district and borders Pakistan. 
 The following actions were discussed, with actions taken to 
date: 
 
--    General Bismullah Khan to call Pakistani Vice Chief of 
Staff General Hyat about strengthening military-to-military 
cooperation across the border (GOA).  Call was placed through 
his deputy for operations. 
 
--    Follow-up Bismullah's call through diplomatic channels 
(US Embassy):  Ambassadors Neumann and Crocker, during a 
February 11 visit, stressed to President Karzai the 
importance we place on this initiative.  Embassy Islamabad 
will follow up with the Pakistanis. 
 
--    More ANP forces (GOA in consult with OSC-A):  MOI wants 
to move in 100 new ANP, but has not yet identified a source. 
OSC-A noted they will soon have police mentors in Sharana for 
the ANP and ANBP. 
 
--    Logistical support (vehicles and ammunition) for the 
 
KABUL 00000662  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
ANP (OSC-A):  OSC-A will transfer basic-issue equipment after 
redeployment of personnel.  Additional equipment under 
consideration. 
 
--    Movement of a small ANA element into the district 
(GOA):  Minister Wardak promised to bring existing ANA units 
to full strength throughout the province, and to bring in an 
additional company dedicated to Gomal. 
 
--    Increase NDS presence in the region (GOA): Awaiting 
decision of NDS, which Saleh says will hinge on sufficient 
support from ANP. 
 
--    Food-for-Work initiatives (USAID):  AID is in 
discussions with UNAMA to determine if they can better 
penetrate Gomal Province. 
 
--    Increase emphasis on the PTS (amnesty for Taliban) in 
the district (GOA):  GOA will try to persuade a former 
Taliban leader, who is now a member of the Meshrano Jirga, to 
visit the district and try and contact recalcitrant IAG 
leaders; however he is currently on the Haj. 
 
Note:  Sharana PRT Officer notes that the Gardez PTS head, 
Habibullah Mangal, has been very successful in Paktia 
Province and nominally covers Paktika as well.   However, he 
does not have the vehicles, security detail, or 
communications equipment to travel to the area.  We will 
explore with the GOA how to provide him the support he needs. 
End note. 
 
Helmand 
------- 
 
10.  (C)  The discussion on Helmand took a different turn, 
with an emphasis on province-wide institutional problems: 
the Highway Police and Border Police are actively involved in 
drug smuggling, renegade police chiefs own or control the 
police's vehicles and weapons (if they are fired the police 
resources will also disappear), and the educational system is 
breaking down under the weight of 100 plus students/class. 
It was noted by several officials that the Taliban is not 
strong in Helmand, but the GOA is particularly weak.  The 
following actions were discussed, with actions taken to date: 
 
--    Deploying 100 additional police under direction of the 
Governor (GOA):  MOI has sent 100 police, and is in the 
process of sending another 100, all from the quick reaction 
unit in Kabul - this is a short-term solution.  All need 
equipment. 
 
--    Assess AHP and decide whether to disband them within 
the province (GOA):  Hope to disband the AHP when have 
sufficient force in ANP and ANA.  In the meantime, will move 
AHP HQ closer to Helmand so it can be monitored, and replace 
the chief. 
 
--    MOD to increase presence over the next three months 
(GOA):  Minister Wardak decided to move the ANA brigade from 
Herat.  In the interim he will ensure in-place units are at 
full strength. 
 
--    Ministries of Finance and Education to resolve 
teachers' pay problems so they can expand hours to allow for 
 
KABUL 00000662  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
three shifts of classes a day instead of one (GOA):  Decision 
has been made to release the funds. 
 
--    Food for Work to reconstruct schools (USAID):  AID to 
work with government to implement Food for Work to construct 
security walls around schools and repair schools damaged by 
anti-government forces. 
 
11.  (C)  In Helmand the issue of security from the Taliban 
is beginning to intersect with the need for security to 
conduct poppy eradication.  This situation is different from 
that in other provinces.  But if the Coalition/GOA can meet 
the challenge they could score a significant strategic 
victory. 
 
12.  (SBU)  On February 4, the GOA convened another meeting 
to discuss Konar Province, with Nuristan to be discussed 
February 11.  We will report on those meetings, and continue 
to update progress on these first three provinces, in 
subsequent cables. 
 
13.  (C)  Comment:  If the GOA continues to follow through, 
and we can fulfill our part - mobilizing assistance resources 
in the most dangerous districts, and redeploying or 
re-equipping 300-400 police are not easy tasks - it will have 
an effect on the spring offensive - although how great an 
effect is uncertain.  Efforts to intensify cooperation with 
Pakistan on terrorist sanctuary and cross-border infiltration 
will play an important role.  There has been a clear learning 
curve in the ministries concerned but the limited number of 
qualified subordinates makes it harder for the relevant 
ministries to keep up the pace of follow-up with every 
province added.  The constant need for police reinforcements 
is unlikely to be met with trained personnel, as there is no 
adequate reserve to continue drawing upon.  More and more 
untrained or partially trained recruits are likely to be used. 
 
14.  (SBU)  What is certain is that the GOA has taken the 
initiative to identify obstacles to stability, developed a 
process to remove them, improved cooperation between crucial 
ministries, and strengthened its coordination with the 
international community - all things that will need to be 
done with increasing effectiveness if we are to ever beat the 
forces arrayed against us. 
 
15.   (U)   Dushanbe minimize considered. 
NEUMANN