VZCZCXRO6936
PP RUEHBC RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHDE #0543/01 0371208
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 061208Z FEB 06
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8136
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 1038
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBAI 000543 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR TSOU; PARIS FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/5/2016 
TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP EU IR
SUBJECT: IRANIANS CLAIM NUCLEAR CRISIS HELPS GOVERNMENT 
 
DUBAI 00000543  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L Davis, Acting Consul General, Dubai, UAE. 
 
REASON: 1.4 (b) 
 
1.(C) Summary:  In recent conversations, two Iranian political 
activists - one who has worked from inside the Iranian 
government and one from outside government - both maintained 
that the current crisis served the interests of the conservative 
government as an excuse to crack down internally.  Both 
advocated a diplomatic resolution, saying anything else could 
turn the Iranian people against the West.  The first put the 
onus on the U.S. to resolve the situation; the second on the 
Iranian government.  Other Iranian interlocutors also pressed 
for continued public and multilateral diplomacy.  End summary 
 
Former MP Elaheh Koulaei: Work Within Current Constraints 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
2.(S) A prominent reformist member of the previous Majles, 
Elaheh Koulaei (please protect) told PolEconChief February 4 
(prior to that day's passage of an IAEA Board of Governors 
resolution to refer Iran to the UN Security Council) that the 
current state of crisis over the nuclear issue benefits the 
Iranian regime.  (Her views on the reform movement in Iran are 
reported septel.)  Currently a senior member of Iran's largest 
reform party (Islamic Iran Participation Front or Mosharekat 
Party) and professor at Tehran University, Koulaei believes it 
is likely the regime is deliberately trying to stoke the fires 
in order to have an excuse to crack down on the internal 
opposition.  Her advice to the U.S. was confidence-building in 
both the public and governmental spheres and said that changing 
attitudes in Iran about U.S. intentions was key. 
 
Changing the Iranian Public Mindset 
----------------------------------- 
 
3.(S) Koulaei said the Iranian government has been successful in 
convincing the Iranian people that the U.S. opposes any aspect 
of nuclear energy or technology for Iran and that the U.S. only 
seeks to advance its own interests in the region.  She 
maintained that the Iranian people are skeptical of U.S. and 
European intentions regarding Iran, given recent events in the 
region.  She cited as an example a comparison of U.S. rhetoric 
regarding elections in Iran and Azerbaijan, which she maintained 
were similar in lack of transparency.  In the case of Iran, the 
U.S. urged people not to vote.  In the case of Azerbaijan, she 
maintained, the U.S. remained silent.  This, she said, was 
viewed by Iranians as proof that U.S. interests, not democracy, 
were the U.S.'s principal driving force, and that in fact, the 
Iranian people did not have the support of the U.S. in their 
fight against their despotic regime.  Regarding the UK, she said 
the visit of Prince Charles at the time of the most recent 
parliamentary elections, after the Guardians Council excluded 
the candidacies of many standing members of parliament - herself 
included, was also seen by the people as an indicator that the 
UK stood with the Iranian government. 
 
4.(S) To counter Iranian government propaganda, she advised that 
the USG send a clear message to the Iranian people of its views 
on whether Iran should have any access at all to nuclear energy 
- separate from the issue of uranium enrichment.  (Note: she 
acknowledged the difficulty of reaching the Iranian public and 
bypassing state media and said VOA and Radio Farda's websites 
had been blocked for quite a while, as had the BBC's Persian 
site.) 
 
5.(S) Koulaei said she believed that expatriate Iranian groups 
are giving the U.S. government an inaccurate view of the 
internal situation in Iran and feared the consequences of this. 
In her view, radicalization of the current situation would be 
very dangerous.  She believed that too much pressure, such as 
international economic sanctions on Iran, would only drive the 
Iranian people closer to their government. 
 
Changing the Iranian Government Mindset 
--------------------------------------- 
 
6.(S) Koulaei called on the U.S. government to work to change 
attitudes inside the Iranian government, in order to build 
confidence in U.S. intentions.  She advocated sending a U.S. 
envoy to Tehran for dialogue, although she acknowledged that 
this was unlikely to be accepted from either side.  She also 
thought the U.S. could play the role that Russia was offering, 
i.e. involvement in joint nuclear-related projects.  She also 
suggested holding conferences in third countries to which 
conservative members of parliament could be invited to help 
change their attitudes on the nuclear issue. 
 
DUBAI 00000543  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
Student Activist Ali Afshari: Change the System 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
7.(S) Student activist, longtime political prisoner, and 
political outsider Ali Afshari (please protect) told 
PolEconChief mid-December that the opposition in Iran supports 
Iran's right to a nuclear program but objects to their 
government's prioritization of the issue.  Many other issues 
were more important.  He claims that many in Iran are unsure 
whether or not they want a nuclear bomb, but he believes some 
conservatives think the broader Islamic world -- beyond Pakistan 
-- needs nuclear weapons. 
 
8.(S) Afshari outlined for PolEconChief, the "next steps" he 
believes Iran must take, starting with a suspension of 
enrichment until Iran can obtain the trust of the international 
community.  Afshari advocates a popular referendum to decide the 
form of the Iranian government, a step he predicts the 
government would only accept under pressure from large-scale 
civil disobedience.  When asked whether there was any 
inclination among the public to engage in civil disobedience, he 
pointed to recent labor unrest as evidence of receptivity. 
Afshari believes that once Iran became democratic, its nuclear 
program would not pose any danger to the international 
community. 
 
9.(S) At the same time, Afshari cautioned, the opposition inside 
Iran opposes war to stop the nuclear program. Iran poses a very 
different situation than Iraq or Afghanistan, and change must 
come from within Iran.  Afshari maintained that President 
Ahmadinejad actually wants to provoke a limited war, such as 
strikes against Iran's nuclear infrastructure.  The regime would 
capitalize on such an event to destroy the opposition, just as 
the new revolutionary government did after the Iraq invasion in 
¶1980. 
 
10.(S) He also advised against any effort by the West to keep 
Iran out of the World Cup over the nuclear issue.  Given the 
huge popularity of the sport, such a move would go a long way in 
turning Iranians against the West. 
 
Other Views from Iran 
--------------------- 
 
11.(S) The view expressed by both Koulaei and Afshari -- that 
Ahmadinejad wants to provoke a "controllable" crisis -- has been 
echoed by numerous Iranian contacts.  They believe that the 
government is trying to use this crisis as a unifying force with 
the Iranian public, portraying it as a Western attempt to 
dominate Iran.  In addition to being an excuse the squelch the 
opposition, they believe the government is also trying to use 
the crisis to distract attention from Ahmadinejad's failure so 
far to deliver a better economic situation, as promised on the 
campaign trail. 
 
12.(C) A conservative businessman from Tehran recently commented 
to PolEconChief that he thought the current U.S. course of 
action, which he described as a "calm" effort to build support 
among third countries for pressure against Iran, was a positive 
one with no downsides.  He, like Koulaei, also thought that the 
U.S. needed to do more to counteract the Iranian government's 
propaganda campaign against the U.S.  He said Iranians initially 
supported the invasion of Iraq but were disappointed in the 
aftermath.  Particularly since the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in 
Iraq, he said, the Iranian government stepped up efforts to 
portray the U.S. as a "monster," and it blames the U.S. for 
everything Israel does.  As a tactic, he advocated emphasizing 
to the Iranian people via VOA that the U.S. was responsible for 
removing Saddam Hussein - the person who had inflicted so much 
harm on Iran. 
 
13.(C) This contact claimed - without citing any evidence - that 
he did not believe Iran had the indigenous ability to build a 
bomb.  Another contact said his relative, who he claimed headed 
Iran's nuclear program prior to the revolution, recently told 
him he does not believe Iranian scientists have the necessary 
skill level to build a bomb. 
 
14.(C) Another contact claimed former IAEA negotiator Hossein 
Mousavian had predicted to him that with sufficient pressure, 
Iran would ultimately agree to the Russian offer of uranium 
enrichment in Russia. The conservative Tehran businessman cited 
above said he thought allowing other countries to cooperate in 
Iran's nuclear program was a good compromise. 
 
15.(C) Many of these contacts advocate a tougher line with Iran 
 
DUBAI 00000543  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
than Koulaei laid out, saying sticks work better than carrots 
with Iran.  That said, few of them support war as a solution. 
Most contacts maintain that outside military intervention would 
rouse Iranians' nationalism and rally them around their 
government. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
16.(C) The majority of people we see in Dubai are relatively 
moderate, westernized, and affluent, which almost by definition 
means they are anti-Ahmadinejad.  Many of them are also seeking 
U.S. visas, which can color what they say to a USG official. 
The Tehran businessman, however, was not applying for a visa and 
was introduced to PolEconChief as a conservative bazaari, who 
said he and other bazaaris had not supported Ahmadinejad's 
candidacy and are unhappy with his performance in office.  Many 
of these people have predicted that -- one way or another -- 
Ahmadinejad is likely to be pushed out within a few months if he 
does not do a better job in office; it is unclear whether that 
assessment is based on real knowledge or merely represents 
wishful thinking. 
 
17.(C) Comment continued: In general, we do not see many people 
from the provinces or from lower economic classes in Dubai, 
although some Iranian workers in the spice souk in Dubai told 
PolEconOffs recently (not knowing they were talking to USG 
officials) that they liked Americans but not U.S. policy, and 
that they liked Ahmadinejad because "he is strong and will fight 
against corruption and the U.S. government." 
DAVIS