This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 000820 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
H FOR CODEL CROWLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP BG BG BGD
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL CROWLEY 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) Everything and nothing has changed since your last 
visit to Bangladesh in January 2004.  The economy continues 
to grow annually at a robust 5-6 percent, but infrastructure 
and other problems prevent real inroads on poverty reduction. 
 The feared loss of jobs in the garment industry with the end 
of MFA quotas failed to materialize; indeed, garment exports 
last year rose 27 percent.  JMB's stunning campaign of terror 
in the second half of 2005 finally forced the Bangladesh 
Government to acknowledge that terrorism and extremism exist 
in Bangladesh, but domestic politics remain as polarized as 
ever.  One positive development is the government's 
increasingly consistent protection of Ahmadiyyas from 
Islamist bigots.  The general election expected in January 
2007 remains crucial to Bangladesh's future. 
 
Extremism 
--------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Jamaat ul-Mujahideen (JMB) came close to 
traumatizing the country in early December.  While its 
violence claimed only 32 lives over a span of several months 
in a country of 144 million people, the randomness and 
nationwide scope of the attacks scared many normally 
complacent Bangladeshis into wondering if they might be next. 
 The ruling BNP and its coalition partner Jamaat Islami (JI) 
showed signs of strain as even some, mostly dissident, BNP 
MPs criticized the government's handling of the crisis and 
questioned the rationale of the BNP-JI coalition. 
Predictably, as they do after any incident of high-profile 
violence, BNP and AL leaders blamed each other.  But by the 
time the Id holidays arrived in January, the mood had 
shifted, thanks to the halt in violence following major 
arrests and weapons recoveries in December.  Unless and until 
the violence resumes, the BNP will continue to claim it has 
largely "broken the back" of JMB. 
 
¶3. (SBU) BNP leaders say: 
 
-- The total rejection of JMB violence by civil society, 
including Muslim clerics and Islamic scholars, underscores 
that Bangladesh is still a tolerant, moderate country with no 
stomach for extremism. 
 
-- Islam is a religion of peace, so no Muslim could accept 
JMB's actions. 
 
-- Since terrorism and Islam are by definition mutually 
exclusive, we should look at who benefited from JMB's 
violence.  The answer is those (read India and the Awami 
League) who seek to defame and destabilize the country. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Awami League president Sheikh Hasina, on the other 
hand, asserts that BNP and JI instigated the violence to 
distract people from the government's multiple governance 
failures.  As proof of their complicity, she cites the four 
BNP ministers widely linked to JMB leader Bangla Bhai. 
 
Elections 
--------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Bangladesh's zero-sum political culture makes any 
election a winner-take-all affair, but the 2007 general 
election is make or break for the two major parties.  For the 
BNP, victory shatters the strong anti-incumbency bias of 
Bangladesh, and South Asia, that has denied any Bangladeshi 
administration a second term in office.  It would also 
position Tariq to succeed his mother as Prime Minister in the 
next five years.  For the AL, defeat or boycott implies ten 
years out of power, a bitter pill for a party that prides 
itself as Bangladesh's rightful ruler.  There are divisions 
in the Awami League, but its leadership threatens to boycott 
the election without major changes to the caretaker 
government and electoral systems.  The BNP indicates it might 
consider some electoral reforms but categorically rejects 
caretaker changes. 
 
¶6. (SBU) With both the AL and BNP attached to the politics of 
money and thuggery, there is every reason to think the next 
election will be extremely turbulent.  The BNP's stacking of 
the Election Commission in January is the latest example that 
it can act clumsily to advance its perceived political 
interest. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Polls suggest that support for AL and BNP is neck 
and neck, with a large undecided bloc.  However, there is 
strong popular confidence in the integrity of the electoral 
system, which suggests the AL could have a hard time 
justifying a boycott.  Whether the issue was attacks on the 
AL leadership, terrorism, rising commodity prices, or acute 
energy and power shortages, the AL has repeatedly failed to 
generate serious political pressure on the government to hold 
early elections. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The AL's recent return to Parliament is probably a 
temporary tactical expedience to avoid losing its seats to 
non-attendance.  However, the return was widely welcomed, and 
the first several days of parliamentary debate have been 
reasonably civil and free of procedural controversy. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The BNP says: 
 
-- It is committed to a free and fair electoral process 
because, as the stronger party, it wants the will of the 
people accurately reflected. 
 
-- The re-election of the AL mayor in Chittagong last year, 
and the upset win of an independent Hindu in a JI safe seat 
in December, underscores the current system's impartiality. 
-- The real problem is the AL does not practice what it 
preaches on democracy.  It boycotts parliament and spurns 
offers of inter-party dialogue in favor of confrontation on 
the streets.  The USG should urge it to change course. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Awami League says: 
 
-- BNP/JI alliance moves to fix the election leave it with no 
alternative to boycotts and hartals absent early elections 
and major changes to the caretaker and electoral systems. 
 
-- The BNP/JI alliance is out to eliminate the AL as a viable 
party. 
 
-- The USG should recognize and do more to counter the 
imminent threat posed by Taliban-like Islamists to 
Bangladeshi society. 
 
-- Assertions by two recently sentenced JMB leaders, Sunny 
and Awal, that they had a relationship with the AL's 
religious affairs secretary, and Sheikh Hasina confidant, are 
a torture-induced lie. 
 
Religious Minorities 
-------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The ban on Ahmadiyya publications remains hung up 
in the courts and essentially unimplemented.  After some 
slippage in April 2005, the Bangladesh Government has acted 
effectively to protect Ahmadiyya mosques from seizure by 
Islamist bigots.  In December, as many as 70 demonstrators 
were hospitalized after clashing with police as they tried to 
march towards the Ahmadiyya central mosque in Dhaka. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Hindus have previously reported problems at 
elections because of their presumed support for the AL.  We 
are increasing our monitoring of this potentially vulnerable 
group to detect any negative trends well in advance of actual 
polling. 
CHAMMAS