VZCZCXRO9935
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0300/01 0331219
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021219Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2442
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000300 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AMMAN FOR REFCOORD CLAIRE KANESHIRO 
CAIRO FOR REFCOORD GERRY CHEYNE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016 
TAGS: PREF PTER PINR PINS PREL IZ IR JO UNHCR PRM
SUBJECT: (U) QUSHTEPE OFFICIALS COMMENT ON AL TASH 
RELOCATION 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 277 
     ¶B. 05 STATE 180059 
     ¶C. 05 BAGHDAD 3918 
     ¶D. 05 KIRKUK 188 
     ¶E. 05 AMMAN 6270 
     ¶F. 05 AMMAN 297 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR 
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  On January 25, RefCoord accompanied 
UNHCR to Kawa to monitor and evaluate the PRM-funded, 
UNHCR-implemented relocation of Iranian Kurds formerly 
resident in the Al Tash refugee camp near Ramadi in Al 
Anbar governorate.  Ref A covered assistance work at the 
camp.  En route to the site, RefCoord and UNHCR called on 
the Mayor of Qushtepe and the Qushtepe Chief of Police, 
whose mandates extend to Kawa, to explore the local 
government perspective on the Kawa project.  Although the 
local government officials made vague allegations about 
links between former Al Tash residents and insurgents, 
they indicated that Erbil remained committed to accepting 
up to 2,000 Al Tash Kurds and would take in the remaining 
Al Tash populations barring specific information that 
could be linked to individuals.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------ 
(SBU) BACKGROUND ON AL TASH RELOCATION 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Al Tash Refugee Camp for Iranian Kurds in Al 
Anbar is no longer viable.  Security concerns have 
undermined provision of adequate humanitarian assistance 
and protection.  The Government of Jordan has been 
anxious to see the camp moved out of Al Anbar to northern 
Iraq.  Hundreds of refugees from Al Tash have already 
flooded into Jordan; the GOJ is concerned about future 
flows (refs E and F).  Ninety-seven percent of the Al 
Tash Kurds wanted to go to Sulaymaniyah, to join several 
thousand former Al Tash residents who had previously been 
relocated.  The Department and UNHCR sought and won 
agreement from KRG-Erbil (KRG-E) to relocate 2000 Al Tash 
Kurds to Erbil.  The KRG-E offered an acceptable site 
above the green line at Kawa (refs C and D). 
 
¶3.  (SBU) As of January 25, almost all of the Al Tash 
Kurds have relocated.  1273 have traveled to Kawa with 
UNCHR assistance; the remainder has spontaneously 
migrated to Sulaymaniyah without objection from KRG-S. 
UNHCR does not have a firm figure for Iranian Kurds left 
in Al Tash camp proper, but estimates approximately 150. 
Another 189 Al Tash Kurds remain on the Jordanian border 
hoping that they will be admitted to Jordan and referred 
for third country resettlement.  UNHCR is seeking better 
information about how many individuals remain at each 
location, who they are, whether they are UNHCR recognized 
refugees, and why they have not yet accepted relocation 
to Kawa. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
(SBU) VIEWS OF QUSHTEPE MAYOR AND CHIEF OF POLICE 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (C) Before visiting the Kawa relocation site to 
monitor assistance levels (SEPTEL), RefCoord and UNHCR 
met with the Qushtepe Mayor and Chief of Police (COP) to 
explore the local government's view of the project.  Both 
indicated they had security concerns about the Kurds 
remaining in Al Tash.  The COP asserted that all people 
who live two or three years in Ramadi have some 
involvement with terrorist groups.  He said the 50 
families remaining in Al Tash don't want to move North 
because they are involved in terrorist activities.  The 
COP claimed to have information that terrorist attacks 
had been planned in the camp.  (Note: MNF-I is following- 
up.) 
 
¶5. (C) The Mayor was uneasy about travel back and forth 
between Ramadi and the Kawa site.  He noted that a number 
of the refugees at the Kawa site had legitimate business 
to settle in Ramadi.  However, he expressed concern that 
traveling to and from Ramadi might "create an opportunity 
that the terrorists can exploit."  The refugees at the 
Kawa site are allowed to travel to Ramadi, conditional on 
a police investigation including interviews with the 
police before and after the trip.  Visitors to the Kawa 
site from Ramadi and Iran are required to register with 
 
BAGHDAD 00000300  002 OF 002 
 
 
the Qushtepe authorities. 
 
¶6. (C) UNHCR asked whether the refugees at the Kawa site 
posed a security problem.  The Mayor said that in dealing 
with security issues, it is prudent to always suspect and 
investigate.  However, he noted that the refugees at the 
Kawa site were allowed into Erbil without an 
investigation.  The COP confirmed that in principle the 
local government has no problem with the remainder of the 
Al Tash Kurds coming North.  He said that if he had any 
solid evidence of anything, they would not be allowed, 
but he did not have any such evidence.  The COP said that 
they had specific information implicating one refugee 
leader in an alleged bomb preparation incident in 
December, and they would arrest him if he came north. 
UNHCR asked if the Mayor and COP knew of Iranian 
government activity in Kawa; they said no. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Mayor said that ID cards from Ramadi are 
being accepted in Erbil.  Students are attending local 
schools and universities.  One refugee is working as a 
shuttle bus driver.  Some refugees have shops in 
neighboring villages.  The Mayor indicated he wanted the 
refugee population at the Kawa site to be locally 
integrated.  He said 205 families would be given ID cards 
indicating they were refugees in Qushtepe.  Per the COP, 
these ID cards would serve as residence permits, and 
would be valid for six months "so if they are resettled 
in third countries we will know who has left."  As to the 
time frame, the Mayor said "we are working on it" and 
expressed a desire for the IDs to be issued as quickly as 
possible. 
 
¶8. (SBU) According to the Mayor, the refugees are free to 
work anywhere.  The COP said a contractor regularly hires 
day laborers from the Kawa site.  Per the COP, the 
refugees can get driver's licenses through the same 
process as the local people. 
 
¶9. (SBU) According to the Mayor, all of the refugees at 
the Kawa site will get new Ministry of Trade ration cards 
in 2006, but the cards will be issued in Ramadi. 
Transferring the cards from Al Anbar to Erbil will take 
some time.  The Mayor remarked that ration cards are a 
general problem throughout Iraq. 
 
¶10. (SBU) UNHCR informed the Mayor about its hopes to 
persuade the 189 Al Tash Kurds on the Jordanian border to 
move to Kawa.  UNHCR is trying to organize a delegation 
of local officials and refugee representatives to tell 
the 189 at the border about the Kawa site.  The Mayor 
indicated he would be willing to join the delegation, if 
the Ministry of the Interior and the Erbil Governor 
agree.  The Mayor reiterated that the KRG-E is committed 
to accepting 2,000 Al Tash refugees.  So far only 1273 
have moved to Kawa; KRG-E remains willing to take an 
additional 727. 
 
----------- 
(U) Comment 
----------- 
 
¶11.  (C) UNHCR's relocation of the Al Tash refugees to 
northern Iraq is thus far a success.  The refugees, now 
out of harm's way, are beginning the process of locally 
integrating; the reported access to education and work 
are positive signs.  The reports of bad apples remaining 
at Al Tash and a limited number of refugees traveling 
between Al Tash and Kawa are bear monitoring.  The local 
authorities' security concerns about Al Tash Kurds (paras 
4 and 5) seem to conflict with continued KRG-E 
willingness to accept relocation of more of them to Kawa. 
The Mayor and COP's motives to espouse these 
contradictory positions were not clear, but may be laying 
the groundwork to justify limiting the refugees' freedom 
of movement.  Although the officials claimed there were 
no such limits per se, and promised to help resolve 
existing problems, they could use security concerns as an 
excuse later for not following through. 
 
KHALILZAD