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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0321

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 000228 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/AS BOUCHER, SCA/DAS GASTRIGHT, EUR/DAS BRYZA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016 
TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET MARR PGOV PREL TX
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER FROM 
AMBASSADOR JACOBSON 
 
REF: (A) ASHGABAT 44 (B) ASHGABAT 209 
 
ASHGABAT 00000228  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey Ann Jacobson, for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d) 
 
Turkmenistan - Niyazov's Playground 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶1.  (C) Turkmenistan is a hydrocarbon rich, strategically 
located dictatorship ruled by "President for Life" Saparmurat 
Niyazov.  The South and Central Asia Bureau has inherited the 
eighth worst dictator in the world, according to "Parade" 
magazine; the third most corrupt country in the world, 
according to Transparency International; and a candidate for 
the Countries of Particular Concern list maintained by the 
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom.  Niyazov 
maintains a cult of personality frequently compared to that 
of North Korea's Kim Jung Il wherein he makes all the 
important decisions regarding the country and tolerates no 
dissent or freedom of expression.  Niyazov maintains a 
UN-blessed policy of neutrality which he uses to play 
important players off each other including the United States, 
Russia, China and Iran. 
 
¶2.  (C) U.S. policy in Turkmenistan is three-fold: 
 
-- encourage democratic reform and respect for human rights, 
 
-- encourage economic reform, growth of a market economy and 
development of energy resources, and 
 
-- promote security cooperation. 
 
Niyazov barely pays lip service to democratic or economic 
reform, is interested in maximizing his profits from his 
hydrocarbon resources for his own personal projects, and 
cooperates moderately well on security issues.  He is 66 
years old and has multiple health problems - though none of 
them appear to be imminently life-threatening.  He is likely 
to remain in power through the foreseeable future, and with 
no viable political opposition in-country or in exile, 
succession scenarios are not optimistic.  In addition to 
encouraging those marginal improvements possible under the 
current regime, embassy focuses on reaching the next 
generation both through outreach programs around the country 
and exchange programs, both of which are seriously 
under-funded; Embassy Ashgabat receives less than one percent 
of annual Freedom Support Act allocations.  Though embassy 
currently is right-sized, plans to eliminate our Diplomatic 
Readiness Initiative (DRI) pol/econ officer would reduce our 
pol/econ Foreign Service staff to one officer, seriously 
limiting our ability to carry out our mission in this 
challenging country.  I ask your support in retaining this 
position. 
 
Human Rights Record Abysmal 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Turkmenistan remains a tempting target for increased 
cooperation on energy and security but its abysmal human 
rights record makes this cooperation problematic.  Niyazov 
uses any and all high-level contact with the United States to 
augment his cult of personality and downplay USG criticism of 
the complete lack of democracy and freedom of expression, 
though embassy has been able to make small strides in 
religious freedom.  International media play up the more 
comic aspects of Niyazov's despotism -- bans on gold teeth, 
beards and lip-syncing, but the real effects are far more 
sinister.  His dumbing down of education is likely to succeed 
in removing the seeds of any critical thinking that could 
 
ASHGABAT 00000228  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
lead to a political opposition, but more tragically also will 
lead to at least one "lost generation" of Turkmenistani 
citizens who will lack the intellectual tools to run anything 
resembling a modern state.  Niyazov's emollient pablum served 
up in Ruhnamas I and II and concurrent poetry anthologies 
increasingly is substituting for legitimate academic study. 
Niyazov also systematically denies his people freedom of 
movement, speech, press and assembly, and there is no hope in 
sight that the people of Turkmenistan will be able to choose 
their own leaders anytime soon.  This is in spite of plans to 
hold a series of local and national elections, leading up to 
president elections in 2009, all of which he will closely 
control and populate with loyal members of his Democratic 
Party. 
 
Gas Games 
-------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The end of year Russian/Ukrainian gas standoff (ref 
A) renewed USG and European interest in diversification of 
Turkmenistan's gas pipelines, in the name of European energy 
security.  Niyazov cares about cash to feed his construction 
frenzy and other personal projects and is likely to sell his 
gas to the highest -- and most convenient -- bidder. 
Russia's gas monolith GAZPROM has a clear advantage, as it 
controls all of the currently available export pipelines 
apart from a 8-12 billion cubic meter pipeline to Iran. 
Niyazov has a healthy fear of Russia's ability to block or 
otherwise thwart alternatives.  Nevertheless, Niyazov 
continues to entertain the ideas both of a Trans-Afghan (TAP) 
and Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) and seeks USG political and 
financial support for both concepts.  Whether his interest is 
in actually developing the projects, or in using discussion 
as a bargaining chip with Russia, remains unclear.  Niyazov 
also is actively courting the Chinese in the hopes of PRC 
assistance in exploiting the reserves along the Amu Darya 
River. The volume and quality of actual reserves, however, 
remains a state secret and Niyazov even keeps the results of 
the latest audit for the TAP-related reserve locked up in his 
personal safe.  In the case of the TCP, negotiations for a 
similar project came to a bitter halt in 2000 when Niyazov 
requested a $500 million "advance," ostensibly to cover loss 
of revenues should GAZPROM cut him off.  Our current goal is 
to prevent the GOTX from signing a long term or high volume 
deal with GAZPROM which would reduce interest in TAP/TCP. 
Embassy intervention just prior to Niyazov's February 17 
meeting with GAZPROM CEO Miller resulted in a two month 
reprieve (ref B).  Regardless of the eventual customer(s) for 
Turkmenistan's gas, no one should be deluded into thinking 
that these profits will better the people of Turkmenistan. 
Oil and gas revenues are kept in an off-shore account that 
Niyazov personally controls to finance his pet vanity 
projects while health, education and infrastructure continue 
to deteriorate. 
 
Great Game 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) As obscure and isolated as Turkmenistan is, it 
continues to occupy a strategic location in the Global War on 
Terrorism.  Niyazov's UN-endorsed policy of "positive 
neutrality" keeps Turkmenistan at arm's length from Russian 
military encumbrances; Niyazov uses his minimal security 
relationship with the United States to show his 
"independence" from Moscow.  Turkmenistan grants overflight 
and refueling rights to USG aircraft in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and greets every U.S. 
VIP visitor with pledges of continuing security cooperation. 
He would welcome a further deepening of this security 
relationship by signing a divert agreement for use of Mary 
 
ASHGABAT 00000228  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Air Base, but will not provide, nor should the United States 
seek, agreement on anything in the way of basing rights.  In 
addition to OEF support, Turkmenistan also cooperates on a 
modest exchange program with Nevada National Guard, mostly 
focusing on disaster preparedness, and has marginal 
participation in NATO, EUCOM and CENTCOM exchanges.  In 2005 
CENTCOM provided $5 million in counter narcotics funding for 
the construction of border crossing stations on the Iranian 
and Afghanistani borders and embassy hopes to continue to 
working with CENTCOM on further Counter narcotics efforts, 
optimally through coordination with other SCA embassies. 
 
What the U.S. Can Do? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The United States cannot give up on the people of 
Turkmenistan, and must continue -- and even increase -- 
funding for critical civil society, education, health, 
counter narcotics, border security and Muslim Outreach 
programs.  Retaining our second pol/econ officer slot to 
report on these issues and implement our programs is 
critical.  As former EUR/DAS Kennedy told Niyazov during a 
February 2005 visit, "your greatest resources are your 
people, and not only are they ready for democracy now, 
they've been ready for a long time."  EUR/DAS Bryza 
reinforced this message during his January meeting with the 
president and further linked progress on human rights and 
religious freedom with USG cooperation on energy.  As SCA 
prepares for introductory visits to Turkmenistan, it should 
keep pressure on Niyazov to make political and economic 
reforms in addition to cooperation in security and energy. 
 
¶7.  (U) Embassy Ashgabat looks forward to working together 
with its new and old colleagues in SCA to promote democracy, 
economic development, and stability in this critical region. 
JACOBSON