VZCZCXRO8426
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHAH #0177/01 0381258
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071258Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6964
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2505
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000177 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SECSTATE FOR DAS BRYZA, EUR/CACEN, SA DAS GASTRIGHT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016 
TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET GG KZ PGOV PREL RS TX UP US
SUBJECT: EU SPECIAL ENVOY KUBIS GIVES READOUT OF NIYAZOV 
MEETING 
 
REF: A. ASHGABAT 151 
     ¶B. ASHGABAT 144 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey Ann Jacobson for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) EU Emissary to Central Asia Jan Kubis told the 
ambassador on 2/7 that he had raised energy issues with 
Niyazov at their meeting the previous day and tried to drive 
home the point that, despite the current lack of a 
coordinated EU energy policy, energy developments in 
Turkmenistan are of import to the EU.  Kubis felt he had made 
plain to Niyazov that energy "is no more just the domain of 
national policies" in the evolving EU:  the latter is 
preparing to engage as a unit in energy-issue dialogue with 
other parties.  Issuance of the EU Green Book, probably in 
late March, should mark the next stage in this process. 
Tacitly conceding that his and the EU,s dialogue with 
Niyazov had not/not previously featured the energy dimension, 
Kubis assessed it as serendipitous that he had broached the 
subject now, on a visit falling by chance amidst multiple 
other energy-linked VIP meetings in Ashgabat (Iranians on 
2/3, GazProm on 2/19, TAP stakeholders 2/13, Ukrainians 
2/14).  At the same time, he was frank about having come with 
no mandate for anything more than "listening mode" - let 
alone to negotiate -- and about his unfamiliarity with even 
broad technical details of the subject. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Judging from Kubis,s account, Niyazov,s comments 
during their talk about Turkmenistan,s energy scene were 
much akin to those he made to the Ambassador on January 23 
(Ref A):  in particular, an unenthusiastic review of the pros 
and cons of a Trans Caspian Pipeline, together with a rather 
more positive depiction of a potential Caspian-littoral 
pipeline, to be built jointly with Russia.  He repeated to 
Kubis what he last week told the Ambassador: that Putin told 
him the Kremlin would never consent to direct gas sales to 
Ukraine.  Kubis said Niyazov sounded adamant about not 
committing Turkmenistan,s gas long-term or indefinitely to 
Gazprom, though he would consider signing an agreement for up 
to two, maybe three, years.  At the same time, Kubis had a 
strong sense that Niyazov is acutely fearful of Moscow,s 
potential to do him harm, including physically.   Kubis,s 
overall impression:  Niyazov feels deeply isolated and is 
"frantically" trying to escape from the corner into which the 
Russians have squeezed him, but cannot himself actively 
promote the pipeline alternatives which would save him. 
 
 
¶3.  (C)  Ambassador asked Kubis about the social-issue 
content of his meeting.  Kubis responded that he had asked 
Niyazov a "normal" question about the GOTX,s recent pension 
"recalculation" (Ref B), referring to general reports of 
social distress in its wake.  Evincing surprise, Niyazov 
looked to his Ministers, who quickly assured him there had 
been absolutely no negative results.  Both the Foreign and 
Finance Ministers were "physically shaking" as the topic was 
discussed, Kubis related in near-amazement.  He surmised that 
no-one dares inform Niyazov of simple unpalatable facts. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Kubis went on to say that he would no longer raise 
the ICRC access issue as one of his standard points with the 
GOTX.   Recent feedback from the ICRC is that the latter "at 
least at the operating, if not political level" itself does 
not view strong public representation to be currently 
desirable.  In particular, Geneva was reportedly ruffled when 
its request for "toned-down" language in the latest UNGA 
resolution was disregarded by the EU co-sponsors last 
November. 
 
¶5. (C) Kubis said he had raised the case of Maral Yklimova, 
held under house arrest as a result of her father,s 
conviction in abstentia of coup plotting, with FM Meredov. 
Meredov agreed to report to the president, but stuck to the 
standard GOTX line that because she must have known what her 
father had been up to, she could not be permitted to leave 
Turkmenistan and join her family in Sweden. 
 
¶6. (U) Finally, Kubis noted that the EU now sees it must pay 
added attention to education programs in Turkmenistan.  The 
regime,s ongoing damage to its education system and future 
national competitiveness is worsening and has already spawned 
a yawning gap between Turkmenistan and even the other four 
former Soviet Central Asian republics.  He hopes to follow up 
 
ASHGABAT 00000177  002 OF 002 
 
 
on this topic during future visits. 
 
¶7.  (C)  COMMENT:  The official GOTX press release after the 
Niyazov-Kubis exchange bears out that Kubis,s readiness to 
discuss, in very general terms, EU interest in 
Turkmenistan,s energy-sector events had an acknowledged 
impact.  That said, Kubis afterwards reiterated to us that he 
not only does not now have, but cannot readily foresee 
having, a solid EU mandate with regard to given policies 
vis--vis Turkmenistan energy questions.  Ambivalent 
attitudes on the subject are liable to divide not only the 
EU,s membership, but its corporate and business interests, 
he pointed out. 
JACOBSON