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Viewing cable 06SEOUL76, ROK SCHOLARS BELIEVE DPRK "CLAMPING DOWN" IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SEOUL76 2006-01-06 09:19 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0076/01 0060919
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060919Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5236
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9825
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7035
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9900
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1006
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SEOUL 000076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MNUC MARR KN KS
SUBJECT: ROK SCHOLARS BELIEVE DPRK "CLAMPING DOWN" IN 
ANTICIPATION OF STRONGER U.S. MEASURES IN 2006 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Two ROK scholars believed the DPRK'S New Year's 
message for 2006 showed Pyongyang planned to brace itself for 
hostile action from the United States and focused its 
attention to psychologically and ideologically prepare its 
citizens to maintain strong support for the Kim Jong-il 
regime.  Although North Korea would likely remain engaged in 
the Six Party process, negotiations would not yield 
substantial progress.  The scholars argued, however, that the 
DPRK would not take actions sufficiently bold to scuttle 
negotiations, such as a nuclear test.  They predicted 
moderate progress in inter-Korean relations, as well as the 
possibility of North Korea agreeing to a second North-South 
summit.  The scholars noted that, despite the emphasis on the 
military-first policy, the New Year's message also 
potentially foretold more authority being given to the DPRK 
cabinet, as well as the rejuvenation of the Korean Workers 
Party's functions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU) In separate meetings on January 3, poloff discussed 
the DPRK's New Year's message, which was featured in a joint 
editorial in three major North Korean state-run media 
outlets, with Dr. Choi Jin-wook, Senior Research Fellow at 
the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU), and Dr. 
Koh Yoo-hwan, Professor of North Korea Studies at Dongguk 
University.  Both are respected scholars of North Korean 
policies and society.  The scholars agreed that the message 
for 2006, as a whole, did not allude to substantial policy 
changes but reflected a number of notable differences from 
the previous year on Pyongyang's priorities for foreign 
policy, inter-Korean relations, military affairs, and 
domestic agenda. 
. 
STRONG FOCUS ON MILITARY, NOTABLE MENTION OF PARTY, CABINET 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Both Choi and Koh stressed that repeated emphasis 
on North Korea's military-first policy was the most prominent 
aspect of the New Year's message.  The text underscored the 
military-first policy's important role in maintaining the 
regime and called upon the masses to "fight to protect the 
'Dear Leader.'"  This meant that Pyongyang put regime 
stability above all goals, Choi asserted.  The emphasis on 
the military, particularly the passage reading, "no matter 
how the political situation should change, the party and the 
state's position to place importance on military affairs 
remains unchanged," indicated the regime's readiness to take 
stronger measures against outside subversion, especially the 
perceived U.S. hostile policy.  It was also a way for Kim 
Jong-il to stifle dissent by flaunting his "absolute" 
authority as Chairman of the National Defense Commission. 
 
4.  (SBU) Koh pointed out, however, that while the joint 
editorial strongly emphasized the military, it also mentioned 
the transfer of some economic authority to the cabinet and 
the prominent role of the Korean Workers Party (KWP).  This 
indicated a new sense of pragmatism on the part of Kim 
Jong-il and his desire to minimize the military's role in 
managing the economy.  Koh added that the expanded role of 
the cabinet could also signal the normalization of the KWP's 
political functions after being marginalized since Kim 
Jong-il spearheaded the military-first movement in 1995. 
Choi agreed, believing it was possible that Kim Jong-il might 
allow the KWP Central Committee to convene a plenary session 
in 2006 -- the first time since December 1993.  The party's 
Central Military Affairs Committee might also resume normal 
operation, Choi said. 
. 
FOREIGN POLICY: INCREASED VIGILANCE ON U.S. INTENT 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
5.  (SBU) Both academics noted that the editorial gave 
minimal hints on foreign policy objectives for the year, but 
instead focused largely on the military-first policy and 
measures to rally the public's allegiance to Kim Jong-il. 
The text repeatedly called for increased vigilance against 
"U.S. imperialism," possibly hinting at the sole foreign 
policy priority for 2006.  The message made no mention of 
 
either the Six Party Talks or specific plans to improve 
relations with China, Russia, or EU countries.  (NOTE: The 
DPRK released several specific messages on the Six Party 
Talks in subsequent press statements.  ROK analyses of those 
statements will be reported septel.  END NOTE.) 
 
6.  (SBU) Professor Koh of Dongguk University asserted that 
the lack of stated foreign policy goals reflected Pyongyang's 
sense of uncertainty regarding U.S. intent toward the DPRK 
and the Six Party process.  As such, the Kim Jong-il 
government likely redirected its focus in the joint editorial 
to raising the profile of its military and warning its 
citizens to "brace themselves" for increased pressure from 
the United States.  The timing of U.S. law enforcement 
actions against North Korea's financial crimes, various 
negative recent remarks from senior U.S. officials, and the 
U.S. focus on North Korean human rights conditions all 
contributed to the sense of uneasiness in Pyongyang, Koh said. 
. 
MISSILE TEST PREP POSSIBLE, BUT NUCLEAR TEST UNLIKELY 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The two scholars predicted that the DPRK would 
remain engaged in the Six Party process but would seek to 
bolster its negotiating position by taking bolder steps, 
including preparing for -- but not actually conducting -- 
missile launch tests.  Koh dismissed the possibility of a 
nuclear test, noting that the DPRK knew well that conducting 
a nuclear test would "seal its coffin."  Dr. Choi of KINU 
agreed, arguing that North Korea continued to believe that 
brinkmanship would place Pyongyang in a stronger bargaining 
position while simultaneously making it possible for North 
Korea to augment its anti-American propaganda. 
. 
LIKELY TO RETURN TO 6PT, LITTLE POSSIBILITY OF MOVEMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Choi added that excessive belligerence from the 
DPRK would undermine its strategy to shift the blame for 
heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula to the United 
States.  As such, the DPRK would probably return to the Six 
Party Talks but would not exercise any flexibility in the 
negotiations during the first half of the year.  If the 
United States took stronger action in response to the lack of 
movement in the Six Party process, Choi argued, Pyongyang 
could argue in the latter half of the year that Washington 
was at fault for raising tensions on the Korean Peninsula. 
. 
N-S RELATIONS: "OUR PEOPLE," ASSISTANCE FROM ROK 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
9.  (SBU) Choi observed that the joint editorial was 
generally upbeat on inter-Korean relations.  The text was 
positive toward contact and exchanges between the two Koreas 
and emphasized solidarity among the Korean people.  Choi 
noted, however, that the central theme of North-South 
relations appeared to be 1) honoring the spirit of the June 
15 North-South Joint Declaration and 2) countering American 
imperialism through efforts "just between our people."  He 
pointed out that the expression "just between our people" was 
repeated in several paragraphs, culminating in the 
recommendation for designating June 15 as "Our People's Day" 
-- a national holiday during which Koreans from the two 
Koreas and abroad would rally against U.S. imperialism.  The 
editorial also stressed the need for increased collaboration 
among pro-unification organizations in both Koreas to counter 
efforts by conservative South Koreans to delay progress in 
inter-Korean relations.  Choi predicted that the DPRK would 
begin making preparations in the second half of 2006 for the 
2007 festivities honoring the 95th anniversary of Kim 
Il-sung's birth.  North Korea might also agree to a second 
inter-Korean summit in the latter part of the year to begin 
influencing the ROK's 2007 presidential elections. 
 
"PROGRESS" IN N-S RELATIONS LIKELY 
---------------------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) Professor Koh of Dongguk University believed the 
joint editorial's focus on solidarity among all Korean people 
meant two things:  first, the DPRK would attempt to solicit 
 
increased economic assistance from the ROK and would plan a 
variety of cultural events to attract larger numbers of South 
Korean visitors, thereby increasing the influx of cash into 
North Korea.  This would necessitate more frequent 
inter-Korean working-level talks and generally more 
agreements resulting from cabinet-level talks.  The ROKG 
would certainly oblige, given its desire for progress in 
inter-Korean relations.  Second, given that calls for unity 
among all Koreans were North Korea's time-tested propaganda 
tool for consolidating the public's allegiance to the regime, 
Pyongyang was signaling more public rallies honoring Kim 
Jong-il, the revolution, and the superiority of DPRK-style 
socialism.  This also meant there would be a rise in 
anti-American propaganda. 
. 
A HINT OF THE SUCCESSION ISSUE?  NOT QUITE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
11.  (SBU) Choi thought it was interesting that the joint 
editorial had also made multiple references to the need to 
uphold and maintain the DPRK's version of socialism, 
specifically targeting members of the military and the youth. 
 The text warned against the corrupting and subverting 
influences of outside media and emphasized the need to 
cultivate a new generation of "ideologically pure heroes of 
the revolution."  More importantly, however, the message 
emphasized preparing "the third and fourth generations of the 
revolution" ideologically and politically, possibly signaling 
Kim Jong-il's thinking that his successor must be one of his 
offspring.  Choi nevertheless thought it was premature for 
Kim to discuss the successor issue publicly, arguing instead 
that the message suggested weakened psychological and 
ideological cohesion among younger citizens and members of 
the military.  To promote socialism and absolute loyalty to 
the regime, the DPRK leadership would likely mobilize 
available government resources to crack down on any criticism 
of Kim Jong-il using a variety of suppression tactics. 
Sensitive to U.S.-led international criticism of human rights 
abuses, however, the DPRK would likely minimize extreme 
methods, such as public executions, Choi said. 
VERSHBOW