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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9947
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1012
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RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000117 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 
TAGS: KNUC PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: SENATOR MURKOWSKI'S MEETING WITH UNIFICATION VICE 
MINISTER RHEE 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Ministry of Unification (MOU) Vice Minister Rhee 
Bong-jo on January 9 emphasized to Senator Murkowski and the 
Ambassador the importance of implementing the Joint Statement 
of principles issued in September after the fourth round of 
the Six Party Talks.  He suggested broadening the scope of 
the Six Party Talks to encompass counterfeiting and drug 
trafficking areas but at the same time advocated against 
pressing the North Korean regime too hard.  Senator Murkowski 
acknowledged Korean sensitivity about pushing the North too 
hard, but insisted that the USG would continue to enforce its 
laws prohibiting counterfeiting.  The Ambassador added that 
the Treasury Department would soon be sending a delegation to 
Seoul to consult with South Korean officials on 
counterfeiting and related issues.  END SUMMARY. 
. 
NEED TO IMPLEMENT SIX PARTY JOINT STATEMENT . . . 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2.  (C) On January 9, Vice Minister of Unification Rhee 
Bong-jo remarked to Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) that the 
North Korean nuclear issue began in the early 1990s, but we 
now had an opportunity to make progress by capitalizing on 
the Joint Statement of principles agreed last fall.  The 
issue now was implementation, despite differences about 
interpretations of the agreement.  He said North Korea was 
focused on two things, namely the timing of the provision of 
light-water reactors and the improvement of U.S.-DPRK 
relations.  The North, of course, wanted these benefits in 
return for an announced commitment to dismantle its nuclear 
programs. 
 
¶3.  (C) VM Rhee added that Seoul welcomed the Joint Statement 
in part because it removed major obstacles that had blocked 
progress in inter-Korean relations.  Now, he said, the South 
could move ahead with North-South reconciliation.  Once the 
Joint Statement was implemented, they could further 
inter-Korean relations.  If the United States came up with an 
action plan to implement the Joint Statement, this would also 
advance North-South relations.  Bilateral U.S.-DPRK issues, 
such as counterfeiting, could also be addressed within the 
framework of the Six Party process.  The United States and 
South Korea needed a new comprehensive approach to "manage" 
North Korea. 
 
¶4.  (C) In response to Senator Murkowski's question of 
whether the inclusion of additional items on the Six Party 
Talks agenda might complicate or delay our ability to deal 
with North Korea and its nuclear capability, VM Rhee 
responded that we needed to pursue all issues within the Six 
Party process.  The North was a peculiar country and might 
reject further talks if we tried to tackle the problems in 
different tracks.  It would be important to find a way to 
address bilateral issues while not diluting the main focus on 
the nuclear dismantlement. 
 
    BUT AVOID PUSHING TOO HARD ON COUNTERFEITING 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5.  (C) VM Rhee opined that U.S. steps taken against the 
circulation of counterfeit dollars had had a greater impact 
on the North than any other recent U.S. action.  He 
cautioned, however, that if we were to push North Korea too 
far, its leaders might see risks to regime security and 
stability, and this could weaken the momentum created by the 
Six Party process.  The North was reading different lessons 
from recent U.S. measures.  He insisted that the North would 
not behave in the future like had in the past, although we 
still needed a clear decision from the North that it would 
stop counterfeiting.  Then, we could turn our attention back 
to the nuclear issue.  Change happened very slowly in the 
North, perhaps slower than anywhere else in the region, but 
the North could not avoid changes, which were already 
occurring. 
 
¶6.  (C) Senator Murkowski said that she understood clearly 
that there was sensitivity in Seoul about not pushing the 
North too much, but the USG would not close its eyes to 
counterfeiting and related issues.  We needed to tell the 
North to stop its behavior and that the USG would continue to 
uphold its commitments in support of a resolution of the 
nuclear issue through the Six Party Talks. 
 
BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IMPORTANT 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) VM Rhee mentioned that we needed to ensure changes in 
the North were taking place in the correct direction, and 
that U.S.-ROK coordination was important to manage this 
process.  It would be hard to have an efficient or productive 
policy toward the North without close consultations.  He said 
coordination would also help the alliance maintain stability 
in Northeast Asia.  The Ambassador responded that the 
Treasury delegation's visit this month in Seoul to consult on 
counterfeiting and related issues was an opportunity to align 
our positions more closely. 
VERSHBOW