VZCZCXRO7879
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0536/01 0311745
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311745Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8641
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 000536 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: JESUS ORTEGA: AMLO CAMPAIGN INSIDER OR OUTSIDE 
LOOKING IN? 
 
 
Summary 
 
¶1. (U) On 01/24, Poloffs and WHA/MEX Deputy Director met with 
Jesus Ortega, campaign coordinator for Andres Manuel Lopez 
Obrador (AMLO), to discuss the upcoming campaign agenda, what 
effect the continued public infighting between the Democratic 
Revolutionary Party's (PRD) Mexico City factions was having 
on the party's unity and AMLO's campaign, and what were his 
concerns leading into this summer's election.  Although he 
seemed to have a grasp of the themes covered, it became 
apparent Ortega may not be completely informed on all aspects 
of the campaign.  It is likely, considering the growing 
divisions within the party, that Ortega's nomination to 
campaign coordinator serves only to placate his faction 
within the PRD.  End Summary. 
 
Problems?  What Problems? 
 
¶2. (SBU) Poloffs and WHA/MEX Deputy Director were interested 
to hear Ortega's position on the public infighting taking 
place between the PRD's Mexico City factions.  An apparently 
sour subject (Ortega lost the party's nomination for Mexico 
City mayor to AMLO-protege Marcelo Ebrard), Ortega grudgingly 
admitted that the fighting was a concern for the campaign but 
that they were working to get it under control.  He discarded 
any insinuation that the fallout from all the bickering will 
split the party or threaten the stability of the PRD's 
alliance with the Worker's Party (PT) and Convergence Party 
(Convergencia). 
 
¶3. (SBU) Regarding the campaign itself, a more confident 
Ortega explained that AMLO's strong support in Southern 
Mexico will shift the campaign's focus to the center and 
north of the country.  Of the three main contenders, he 
claimed, AMLO was in the best position.  According to Ortega, 
April polls are the most significant of the campaign season. 
At that stage, it is practically impossible for the third 
place candidate to gain more votes, and the contest becomes a 
two-person race with support for candidate number three being 
split among the two frontrunners.  AMLO cannot lose as long 
as he maintains his eight to ten point lead in the polls, he 
declared.  Ortega continued, stating that Roberto Madrazo of 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) suffers from too 
many internal problems and little support from PRI governors 
in the North.  He believes a growing battle over the party's 
candidate list for congress will erupt in April when the 
lists are finalized and create a break in the PRI with 
conservative members supporting Felipe Calderon and the more 
liberal members moving toward AMLO.  Finally, Ortega 
commented that Felipe Calderon of the National Action Party 
(PAN) is running on "fake" support.  He noted that Calderon's 
opening day campaign rally in Mexico's main bullfighting 
ring, where all PAN candidates launch their campaigns, did 
not fill the stadium, a bad omen in his view.  He accused the 
PAN of exagerating Calderon's support, but did admit that of 
the two Calderon would be AMLO's biggest threat.  For that 
threat to materialize, however, Ortega explained that 
Calderon must first consolidate his party's support, steal 
conservative votes from within the PRI, and focus heavily on 
independent voters. 
 
Trail Talk 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ortega provided a more detailed explanation of 
AMLO's three-stage campaign strategy.  The first stage, he 
said, focuses on AMLO the leader - fully supported by and in 
control of his alliance and ready to govern.  The second 
stage, scheduled for March through May, will focus on AMLO 
the team player - appearing at alliance campaign events to 
support senate and federal deputy candidates.  The final 
stage, according to Ortega, will focus on closing the 
election out in June.  This stage, he explained, is still up 
in the air and will be directed primarily by polling results 
in April and May. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ortega brushed over a few of AMLO's platform 
positions, repeating a number of points made by AMLO during 
breakfast with the Ambassador the day before, especially 
AMLO's immigration/economic proposal (septel).  We explained 
that immigration, and more importantly the "regularization" 
of Mexicans in the United States, was a domestic, 
congressional affair and not something that could be 
negotiated.  We proposed that Mexico's role should be geared 
more toward controlling its border and emphasizing all legal 
migration tools.  Ortega appeared to understand our position 
and noted he would discuss it with others. 
 
Comment 
 
¶6. (SBU) Although he appeared fully briefed on campaign and 
platform issues, Ortega was surprised to hear the meeting 
 
MEXICO 00000536  002 OF 002 
 
 
between AMLO and the Ambassador had already taken place. 
This was not the only sign Ortega, as the supposed campaign 
coordinator, did not know what was going on.  When presenting 
his business card, Ortega noted he held a private office 
outside the campaign headquarters but offered no further 
explanation.  He also acknowledged that he was not traveling 
with AMLO on the campaign trail nor was he participating in 
AMLO's morning television infomercials - a major campaign 
component.  It is possible Ortega's title serves only to 
placate his faction of the PRD (which represents the majority 
of the party), and he has no real campaign responsibilities. 
According to other PRD contacts, Ortega was asked to step 
down in the PRD's most recent election to chose the party 
president in order to make room for AMLO-favorite Leonel 
Cota.  In exchange, Ortega was told he could run unobstructed 
for the party's nomination for Mexico City mayor.  That was 
not to be, however, as party leaders again pressured Ortega 
to step aside to make room for AMLO-protege Marcelo Ebrard. 
Ortega did not back down, but eventually lost to Ebrard in a 
December 4 internal election.  It is unclear at this time 
what Ortega's role really is within the campaign and whether 
or not he will serve as a good point of contact for the 
campaign.  End Comment. 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity 
 
GARZA