VZCZCXRO6136
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHKU #0086/01 0091448
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091448Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2460
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000086 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARPI - BRUDER AND BERNS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL PINR IR KU KUWAIT IRAN RELATIONS
SUBJECT: SOMETIME STRATEGIC ADVISOR TO GOK SAYS IRAN 
"ABSOLUTELY" A THREAT TO KUWAIT 
 
REF: KUWAIT 71 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Dr. Sami Al-Faraj, the director of the 
Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies (KCSS) and a regularly 
contracted advisor to various government ministries in Kuwait 
on national security issues, told Poloff January 8 that the 
GOK views Iran as a threat.  According to Al-Faraj, the 
Government of Kuwait (GOK) recently began developing 
contingency plans to deal with three possible threats from 
Iran: direct military aggression, Iranian-backed low-level 
violence and/or terrorism, and a targeted propaganda "blitz." 
 The GOK is also "very concerned" about the possibility that 
an accident at one of Iran's nuclear facilities, specifically 
Bushehr, could have devastating environmental effects on 
Kuwait.  Al-Faraj stressed the GOK's preference to address 
its concerns with the Iranians diplomatically; he was 
optimistic that GCC diplomatic efforts would be more 
successful than European efforts, since GCC countries' vital 
interests were at stake and they could offer more "financial 
incentives."  President Ahmadinejad was no more a threat than 
previous leaders, Al-Faraj said, noting that, "Iran has 
always been a threat."  End summary. 
 
GOK Preparing Contingency Plans for Iranian Threats 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶2.  (C) In a January 8 meeting with liberal academic Dr. Sami 
Al-Faraj, whom the GOK regularly contracts to advise on 
national security issues and to prepare "sensitive" reports, 
Poloff asked if the GOK viewed Iran as a threat.  Al-Faraj 
responded emphatically, "Absolutely."  Specifically, Al-Faraj 
said the GOK had begun preparing plans in the last year to 
deal with three contingencies: a direct military 
confrontation, which "Kuwait could not handle"; 
Iranian-backed low-level violence and/or terrorism in Kuwait, 
which is a "great concern" for the GOK; and civil unrest 
sparked by an Iranian propaganda "blitz" focused on Kuwait's 
"80,000 plus" Iranian expatriates, Shi'a community 
(approximately 30-35% of the population), and Sunni Islamists 
who sympathize with Iran's hard line policies towards the 
U.S. and Israel. 
 
¶3.  (C) A direct military confrontation with Iran was beyond 
Kuwait's ability to even plan for, Al-Faraj said.  The GOK 
worried that even a substantial movement of Iranian forces 
within Iran's territorial waters could quickly "saturate" 
Kuwait's defense networks.  On the threat of 
Iranian-sponsored terrorism in Kuwait, Al-Faraj said he 
believed Iranian-backed terrorist cells were present in 
Kuwait.  When asked what measures the GOK was taking to 
counter this threat, Al-Faraj replied vaguely that the GOK 
was aware of their existence and was "monitoring" them. 
 
GOK "Very Concerned" About Possible Nuclear Accident 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶4.  (C) According to Al-Faraj, the GOK is "very concerned" 
about Iran's nuclear program, particularly "the best 
worst-case scenario": the possibility of an accident at one 
of Iran's nuclear facilities, specifically Bushehr, with 
devastating environmental consequences for the entire Gulf 
region.  Kuwait could not even contemplate the worst 
possibility arising from the Iranian nuclear program, he 
said.  Al-Faraj told Poloff that the GOK had commissioned 
several studies on the environmental impacts of a nuclear 
accident.  He also noted that currents in the Gulf flow 
counter-clockwise and would bring contaminants to Kuwait 
"before they reached the city of Bushehr."  (See reftel for a 
report on Kuwaiti radiation monitoring plans.) 
 
¶5.  (S) Al-Faraj said, and stressed repeatedly, that the GOK 
preferred to deal with Iran diplomatically and had conveyed 
its concerns about Iran's nuclear program to the Iranian 
Government through both front- and back-channel means, 
including through Iranian "spies."  He was very optimistic 
that GCC diplomatic efforts would be more successful than 
U.S. and European efforts to dissuade Iran from pursuing a 
nuclear program since GCC countries vital interests were at 
stake and they could offer more "financial incentives."  He 
noted, however, that Kuwait was unlikely to directly confront 
Iran over its nuclear program because it did not want to be 
seen as a U.S. puppet; although Al-Faraj claimed GCC 
countries, including Kuwait, use the U.S. military presence 
in the Gulf to exert pressure on Iran during negotiations. 
 
KCSS Training on "Escalation In Iran's Nuclear Crisis" 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
 
KUWAIT 00000086  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Al-Faraj shared with Poloff the content of a 
"strategic exercise on crisis management" from one of KCSS' 
training courses.  The exercise, entitled "Contingency 
Planning for a Possible Escalation In Iran's Nuclear Crisis," 
required students to "assess and evaluate" the following 
scenarios in order to draw lessons for "planning, organizing, 
and coordinating the national effort to manage the crisis": 
 
-  An Unidentified Pollutant or Radiation Emission; 
-  Terrorist Operations Against and Disruption of the 
Domestic Front; 
-  Confronting Conventional and Non-Conventional Attacks; 
-  Saturation of Emergency Services Due to Tempo of 
Operations; 
-  Threatening Strategic Economic Resources; 
-  Threatening Financial, Commercial Services, and 
Communications; 
-  Inability to Control Domestic Situation; 
-  Tension on the Diplomatic Front with Iran's Allies; 
-  The Armed Forces Reach a Situation of Attrition. 
 
(Comment: Given that the KCSS' training programs are designed 
almost exclusively for small classes of GOK political and 
military officials, this exercise may give some insight into 
the issues of concern to the GOK.  End comment.) 
 
Bio Note 
-------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Dr. Sami Al-Faraj is the director of the Kuwait 
Center for Strategic Studies, a private, research institute 
specializing in strategic planning, crisis management, and 
national security issues in the Gulf.  Al-Faraj teaches small 
classes of GOK political and security officials at his center 
and writes, what he terms, "sensitive" reports for the GOK. 
He said he also serves as an advisor to GCC Secretary General 
Abdul Rahman Al-Attiyah.  Al-Faraj, a former military 
officer, referred to himself as a "Najdi," suggesting his 
family is originally from the Najd region of Saudi Arabia. 
Al-Faraj is unmarried and appears to be in his mid-50s.  He 
speaks excellent English. 
 
********************************************* 
Visit Embassy Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website 
********************************************* 
LeBaron