VZCZCXRO0792
PP RUEHBC RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHDE #0010/01 0021228
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 021228Z JAN 06
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7577
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0015
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0008
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0068
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0060
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0095
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0459
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1171
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEASRB/COMUSARCENT-CDRUSATHIRD FT MCPHERSON GA
RUCANAV/COMUSNAVCENT REAR MACDILL AFB FL
RUEADWD/DA WASHDC
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DUBAI 000010 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM, NEA, NEA/ARPI, NEA/I, NEA/ELA, INR; SECDEF 
FOR OSD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/2/2016 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PTER XF TC IR IZ SY LE XD SO
SUBJECT: GENERAL ABIZAID MEETING WITH ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE AND 
DUBAI CROWN PRINCE 
 
REF: A. ABU DHABI 5124; B. ABU DHABI 4715 
 
DUBAI 00000010  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Acting Consul General, Dubai, 
UAE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid met December 
27 in Dubai with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme 
Commander of the UAE Armed Forces General Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ) and Dubai Crown Prince and UAE Minister of 
Defense General Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum (MBR). 
They discussed Iraq, Iran, Syria/Lebanon, and the war on 
terrorism.  Both sides were in agreement over most issues, other 
than the question of loyalty to Iraq on the part of Iraqi Shia. 
In an earlier Abu Dhabi meeting with UAE Armed Forces Chief of 
Staff, General Abizaid discussed many of the same themes. End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (S) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of 
the UAE Armed Forces General Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
(MBZ) flew CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid, CENTCOM Director 
of Intelligence Brigadier General Custer, CENTCOM Deputy 
Director of Plans and Policy Brigadier General Kimmitt, and USLO 
Chief Colonel Simm to Dubai by helicopter December 27.  They met 
Dubai Crown Prince and UAE Minister of Defense Genera Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum (MBR) for dinner, joined by the 
head of Dubai State Security Directorate (SSD), as well as MBZ's 
oldest son, Sheikh Khalid Bin Mohammed Al Nahyan, MBZ's personal 
associate Bessam Sreih, MBZ's principal aide and Director of 
International Affairs Yousef Al Otaiba, and acting Consul 
General Jillian Burns (notetaker). 
 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶3. (S) Abizaid's primary message was that for Iraq to succeed, 
Sunnis must abandon the insurgency and participate in the new 
government.  The responsibility is on all of us to convince 
Sunnis that in this regard, their interests and U.S. interests 
dovetail.  MBR asked why the Sunnis should trust the U.S. 
Saying he did not want to rehash a point he has made in the 
past, MBR called the dismantling of the Iraqi army a mistake. 
Sunnis were left with no jobs or resources.  Abizaid replied it 
was in Sunnis' own long-term interest to participate 
politically.  If they did so, Abizaid was optimistic that Shia 
and Kurds would not be able to squeeze Sunnis out of power.  One 
issue hurting the Sunnis, however, was the lack of strong 
political leaders emerging from among their ranks.  MBZ and MBR 
took the point but demurred when Abizaid asked their own views 
on Sunni leaders. 
 
¶4. (S) MBZ and MBR stressed that in Saddam-era Iraq, many had 
joined the Baath party out of necessity rather than conviction 
and should not now be excluded.  Abizaid agreed, saying he 
believed the list of those excluded should be short, and the 
rest should be allowed to contribute to the new Iraq.  He 
mentioned, however, that the Unified Iraqi Coalition (555) 
wanted a much longer list of names of former Baathists 
blackballed. 
 
¶5. (S) Abizaid gave a positive overview of progress of standing 
up the Iraqi army, mentioning as an example that Iraqi forces 
are responsible for security for 25 percent of Baghdad.  A 
significant obstacle, however, was the mindset among some in the 
Iraqi military that their job was to terrorize their own people, 
not grasping that there will be a reaction to such abuse of 
power.  Abizaid noted that success with rehabilitating the Iraqi 
police lagged behind the rehabilitation of the Iraqi military. 
 
DUBAI 00000010  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
ZARQAWI/BAATHIST INSURGENCY 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) Abizaid underscored the progress made against al-Qa'ida 
as a whole and specifically the Zarqawi network in Iraq, 
including cutting off sources of funding.  All agreed the 
November 9 Amman bombings had greatly hurt Zarqawi's stature 
(presumably region-wide).  Abizaid and Custer assessed that the 
Baathists probably had a lot more money than al-Qa'ida, 
squirreled away pre-war in accounts around the world by the 
Iraqi intelligence service or taken by fleeing Baathists into 
Syria.  Unfortunately, no one knew yet who has control of these 
accounts. 
 
¶7. (S) Custer briefed that while there was friction between 
Zarqawi and al-Qa'ida, they were united.  Zarqawi certainly had 
a more direct hand these days in the operational aspect of the 
organization, compared to Zawahiri or bin Ladin, which boosted 
his stature. 
 
IRAN IN IRAQ 
------------ 
 
¶8. (S) MBZ and MBR's principal message to Abizaid was their 
strong concern over the foothold Iran is gaining in Iraq.  MBR 
said that while he views Shia as Muslims, he worries where their 
allegiance lies.  Both MBZ and MBR believed that with the Shia 
tradition of veneration of religious figures, Iraqi Shia 
loyalties were more to their religion and, by extension, to 
Iran, than to their own country. 
 
¶9. (S) Abizaid reiterated the fact that it behooves Sunnis to 
play a positive role, because chaos in Iraq serves only the 
interest of Iran.  He agreed Iran is a danger and stressed that 
the U.S. and all the countries in the region must work together 
to contain Iranian expansionism.  He made clear that the U.S. 
stands with Iraq against Iran and that U.S.'s vast military 
superiority should not be discounted. 
 
¶10. (S) On the other hand, Abizaid questioned this assumption 
about Iraqi Shia loyalties and said he did not believe Iran was 
calling the shots with all Iraqi Shia politicians.  He 
maintained that as a rule, Iraqi Shia were Iraqi before they 
were Shia, citing the thousands of Shia who died fighting Iran 
in the Iran-Iraq war.  He also did not believe there was much 
support among the Shia for a theocratic system of government in 
Iraq. 
 
IRANIAN PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11. (S) All agreed with Abizaid that Iran's new president 
Ahmadinejad seemed unbalanced, crazy even, and MBR shook his 
head at the idea of Ahmadinejad acquiring nuclear weapons.  MBR 
and MBZ mentioned the rumors about Ahmadinejad's belief in the 
imminent return of the missing Imam and said some think that 
Ahmadinejad believes himself to be an incarnation of the 
"hidden" Twelfth Imam.  Abizaid said Sultan Qaboos of Oman 
forecast to him that Ahmadinejad would be sidelined in a few 
months (Note: a view many Iranians have expressed to AmConsulate 
Dubai).  MBZ noted that Ahmadinejad's rhetoric follows the line 
of Khomeini and that he does have a populist following.  Custer 
added Ahmadinejad seemed to be mimicking Moqtada al Sadr's 
strategies in Iraq for attracting followers among the poorer 
strata of society. 
 
FIGHTING TERRORISM IN THE UAE AND ELSEWHERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
DUBAI 00000010  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶12. (S) Abizaid commended UAE efforts against terrorism and said 
the UAE was a role model in terms of its success in providing a 
strong economy for its people.  Abizaid asked for their 
assessment of vulnerability to an attack in the UAE.  MBZ said 
he thought it more likely that al-Qa'ida would try again soon to 
hit the U.S. in order to rebuild its credibility, and said it 
was mostly luck that had spared the U.S. a repeat attack to date. 
 
¶13. (S) MBZ and MBR saw a continuing threat in the region from 
the Muslim Brotherhood (a term Emirati leadership uses 
generically to refer to Islamic extremists).  The Dubai SSD 
Director mentioned how difficult it was to monitor the sermons 
here.  He also said the UAE kept anyone who went to Afghanistan 
under close eye and had arrested some of them.  He 
differentiated between those who had gone in previous years to 
fight the Soviets with the newer generation.  MBR then told the 
story of going to visit someone who had been planning an attack 
here.  The man was living in miserable conditions in a small 
room of a big house and complained about quality of life in the 
country.  MBR said the conditions here are not like in Saudi 
Arabia or Afghanistan and reminded him of all the government 
made available to him in terms of land and money.  MBR told him 
it was your father, not the government, who had deprived you of 
what was yours.  The man then changed his ways and later turned 
in a colleague who was planning to abduct U.S. soldiers, after 
he failed to convince him to abandon his plans. 
 
¶14. (S) Abizaid, Custer, MBZ, and MBR all agreed that Somalia 
posed the highest risk as a new site for terrorist training 
grounds.  The Dubai SSD Director mentioned operations the UAE 
had been involved in regarding Somalia.  Abizaid said the U.S. 
base in Djibouti was an asset necessary to monitor the situation. 
 
SYRIA/LEBANON 
------------- 
 
¶15. (S) Rather than give their own assessment of the situation 
in Syria and Lebanon, MBZ and MBR asked Bessam Sreih, a local 
businessman of Lebanese origin with UAE citizenship and a 
personal friend of MBZ, to tell the Americans what he thought. 
Sreih said in unequivocal terms that he thought the government 
in Syria was archaic, Stalinist, and irredeemable.  He believed 
the decisions to assassinate Hariri, Tueni, and others went all 
the way to the top to Bashar al-Asad.  Sreih claimed that in the 
entirety of Hafez al-Asad's regime, the father had assassinated 
10 people, while Bashar had killed more than that in one year. 
He also said Saudi Secretary General of the National Security 
Council Prince Bandar bin Sultan told him after meeting Bashar 
three times that Bashar never once mentioned reform.  Sreih's 
greatest concern was that the U.S. would strike a bargain with 
Syria that would allow the regime to stay in power. 
 
¶16. (S) MBR did not seem to share Sreih's complete condemnation 
of President Asad.  He mentioned that when Bashar had visited 
him in Dubai (most likely December 2003), Bashar looked around 
him and said, give me a year (to bring similar economic change 
to Syria).  A while later, Bashar revised his estimate and said 
he'd need five years. 
 
¶17. (S) Abizaid said that there had been some limited 
improvement in Syrian cooperation along the Iraqi border, and 
that he was optimistic about the future of Lebanon.  Regarding 
Syria, he said no regime that does not modernize and listen to 
the demands of its people will survive. 
 
¶18. (S) Comment:  After the meeting, General Abizaid shared with 
USLO some of his observations.  He was taken by the change in 
Emirati priorities, which used to be Iraq, al Qa'ida, Iran (in 
 
DUBAI 00000010  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
that order), and now appears to be Iran, al Qa'ida, Iraq.  He 
repeated that he does not agree with the Sheikhs regarding the 
Shia:  he believes Iraqi Shia are Iraqis first, and Shia second, 
and that they will not be swayed by Tehran if it is not in their 
direct, national interests.  End comment. 
 
ABU DHABI MEETING WITH UAE ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶19. (S) In an earlier meeting that day with UAE Armed Forces 
Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Hamad Thani Al Rumaithy at 
General Headquarters in Abu Dhabi, attended by CDA and USLO 
Chief, General Abizaid discussed many of the same themes.  He 
opened by expressing thanks for the ongoing contributions of UAE 
Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan.  Hamad Thani responded 
that he was satisfied with both the roles assigned to UAE SOF as 
well as their integration in the Coalition campaign.  Abizaid 
also thanked Hamad Thani for UAE's contributions to Pakistan 
following the November 2005 earthquake, especially UAE's 
contribution (at CENTCOM request) of much-needed spare parts for 
Pakistan's over-tasked MI-17 helicopter fleet.  Abizaid 
continued by assuring Hamad Thani that the recently announced 
plan to reduce U.S. forces in Iraq was a calculated decision 
based upon the improving capability of Iraqi forces to assume a 
greater share of the burden.  Hamad Thani expressed his concern 
that any premature withdrawal of U.S. forces would lead to an 
inevitable clash between Sunni and Shia Iraqis, but was 
satisfied that the planned reduction was timely. 
 
SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA, AL-QA'IDA 
------------------------------ 
 
20.(S) When asked by Hamad Thani about Syria, Abizaid noted the 
Syrians are doing a much better job of controlling their border 
with Iraq, especially their efforts to stem the flow of foreign 
fighters, but that the network remaining inside Syria -- 
especially the hardcore Baathists -- ultimately poses a bigger 
threat to Syria than it does to Iraq.  Hamad Thani agreed. 
Regarding the situation in Saudi Arabia, Hamad Thani offered his 
opinion that the roots of terrorism lay in the problems there. 
He further noted that if the Saudi government were to fail, "we 
may be next (referring to the spread of Islamic radicalism)." 
Hamad Thani then offered his opinions regarding the status of 
al-Qa'ida.  He acknowledged that AQ was certainly weaker now 
than at any other point in recent years, but that it was not yet 
ready to break.  He asserted his belief that "we must continue 
to join our efforts" to defeat this common enemy.  He then 
concluded that "as Muslims, we must disprove what al-Qa'ida 
asserts about Islam." 
 
¶21. (U) This message has been cleared by General Abizaid and 
Embassy Abu Dhabi. 
BURNS