This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000225 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2016 
TAGS: EPET PGOV ASEC PTER KHLS PINR ETRD CASC NI HOSTAGES
SUBJECT: NIGERIA:  HOSTAGE CRISIS HIDES POLITICAL CRISIS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (D & E) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY: The recent hostage incident in Delta State 
was a political conflict masquerading as a criminal incident. 
 Its resolution, although fortunate, does not address the 
underlying political issues. Consequently, more such events 
are likely in the future. The government response 
demonstrated its lack of vision and an inability to respond 
in the area. With the backdrop of violence, patronage of 
thugs, and political manipulation, the Delta's ongoing crises 
are not likely to go away on their own.  With the current 
crop of political leaders in place and little possibility for 
a change soon, the problems will likely continue. Real 
elections--combined with a leadership truly committed to 
halting corruption and not just a political effort to corral 
opponents--are necessary to put long term solutions into 
place. END SUMMARY 
 
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TEARS OF THE SUN 
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2.(C)  The recent hostage incident in the Delta, 
characterized by threats, counterthreats and a certain degree 
of ineptitude, was a political conflict masquerading as a 
hostage crisis.  It seems that the original capture of the 
hostages was part of a carefully planned attack on the 
"Liberty Service" carrying GON security operatives seven 
miles offshore and that events blossomed from there. The 
militia group that claimed responsibility, MEND, seems to 
have been cobbled together after the fact to mask the 
participation of other groups in the events that unfolded. 
Further complicating the situation are the linkages among the 
militants, government officials, and the unofficial liaisons 
that offer to mediate in crises. 
 
3.(C)  The resolution of the current event has little to do 
with the underlying political issues, and could signify that 
more such events are likely in the future. The militias 
involved with this kidnapping, as well as those watching from 
the sidelines in this event, have learned that they were able 
to coordinate attacks throughout the region, seemingly at 
will, make their escape, and garner international attention. 
The group directly behind this incident appears to be a 
senior partner to various other groups operating from Ondo to 
Akwa Ibom states. According to one contact very close to the 
group involved in this incident, the militants realize that 
holding foreigners hostage is not the best way to pursue 
their political goal: greater Ijaw participation in local and 
national government. The contact stated that one of the 
reasons this kidnapping went so long was that the group with 
the hostages did not want the new Governor of Bayelsa 
Goodluck Jonathan to gain any prestige from its resolution. 
 
4.(C)  The Director General (DG) of Nigeria's State Security 
Services mirrored Mission's current assessment of the 
situation in the Niger Delta in a meeting with the 
Ambassador. The DG characterized the insurgents in the Delta 
as "fragmented," matching our assessment that they are 
comprised of numerous groups that cooperate only when 
mutually beneficial. He also opined that the settlement of 
this crisis was "not the end" of problems in the Delta. He 
did not confirm the size of the monetary and political payoff 
in this instance, but worried that it provided a roadmap for 
future actions against central government authority. He 
stated that similar attacks "are likely" in the future. 
 
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A TRAGI-COMEDY OF ERRORS 
------------------------ 
 
5.(C)  The government response was disjointed.  In the early 
days of the crisis, GON officials treated the incident as a 
"business as usual" hostage situation inNigeria and appeared 
more focused on the demonstrations in Ibadan.  In those 
situations, payment of ransom to "community leaders" 
generally wins release of the hostages relatively quickly. In 
this case, however, it was evident from the beginning that 
the demands were of a more political nature. The failure of 
GON officials to recognize this probably prolonged the 
crisis.  The ongoing management of the situation was also 
open to political manipulation. The lack of communication 
between the Bayelsa governor, who recently assumed office 
after the impeachment of his predecessor under questionable 
legal circumstances, and the governor of Delta State, 
ostensibly a political opponent of President Obasanjo, 
characterized a haphazard operation that likely extended the 
stay of the hostages on the "Nigerian Riviera" by at least 
several days. One certainty from recent events is that the 
attack on the "Liberty Service" demonstrates that off-shore 
facilities are no longer immune to militant actions, 
endangering many other employees and facilities of all the 
major oil companies. 
6.(C)  Meanwhile, the happy talk from senior GON officials, 
including the President while he was in Davos, continues to 
mask the underlying reality. This is a political crisis 
directed against the Obasanjo government in the context of 
the upcoming elections, the President's ambiguity about a 
third term. The hostage dimension has merely been a means to 
an end, which could soon expand to the renegotiation of the 
terms of Federation. Added to this is the attempt to force 
Obasanjo to make clear his political intentions and revenge 
for the arrest of prominent Ijaw leaders former Bayelsa 
Governor DSP Alamieyeseigha and militia leader Mujahid 
Dokubo-Asari. 
 
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PERPETUATING POVERTY, CONSOLIDATING POWERLESSNESS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
7.(U)  The delta region has suffered conflict for much of 
Nigeria's history. The previous high mark was arguably the 
Ogoni protests against marginalization culminating in the 
hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 by the Abacha regime.  Since 
then, the Ijaw have been at the center of most of the area's 
conflicts, first in inter-ethnic violence with the Itsekeri 
from 2000-2003 and lately in conflict with the state and 
federal governments by various militias includingthat of 
Dokubo Asari. The region's economic destruction through 
pollution of water, farmland, and forests is a catalyst to 
violence and conflict. Exacerbated by the oil companies' and 
GON's utilization of "money politics," frequent clashes are 
normal. The GON takes advantage of disputes between oil 
companies and communities to shirk its responsibilities for 
the welfare of delta residents. The culture of cronyism and 
corruption plagues agencies, such as the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) set up to alleviate the 
problems caused by the oil industry. The GON regularly 
provides security services to the oil companies at the 
expense of the communities, further inflaming the already bad 
dynamic. Where it does intervene, the GON has a history of 
bias on behalf of the oil companies or on behalf of one group 
of combatants over another. The prevalence of small arms and 
the recruitment of unemployed youth by sitting governors and 
other politicians aggravate the conflict. Up to today, there 
has been no effective targeting of resources by the three 
tiers of the GON to address the underlying causes of conflict. 
 
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A LONG AND WINDING ROAD AHEAD 
----------------------------- 
 
8.(C)  With the current crop of political leaders in place, 
problems will likely continue. The long-term situation could 
be improved with a sincere effort to develop the region's 
infrastructure and provide economic incentives to eschew 
militancy. However, a degraded infrastructure and an economy 
barely functioning for the average Nigerian are endemic 
throughout the country, and the few economic reforms actually 
implemented by the Obasanjo Government have shown no sign of 
improving the national situation.  Controlling access to 
small arms and halting the oil bunkering are steps in the 
right direction. The challenge for President Obasanjo would 
be to convince an increasingly skeptical public that he could 
launch a program with sincere intentions. Currently, his 
reputation is that of political opportunism and favoritism 
towards anyone who obeys his directions. Still, the real and 
lasting solution would be a pragmatic plan for economic 
development and the right political leadership to implement 
it while combatting corruption. The best way to get that 
leadership would be truly representative elections combined 
with a leadership committed to economic/fiscal transparency 
and halting corruption, rather than political efforts to 
corral opponents in the name of fighting corruption. 
CAMPBELL