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Viewing cable 05TELAVIV6751, SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR BROOKS' DECEMBER 6-9

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TELAVIV6751 2005-12-02 12:38 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tel Aviv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 006751 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOE FOR NNSA ADMINISTRATOR AMBASSADOR LINTON BROOKS 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IPA (MAHER) AND NP/RA (ODLUM) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV PTER EAID ENRG ETTC MASS OTRA PARM TRGY TSPL GOI INTERNAL GOI EXTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS ISRAEL RELATIONS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR BROOKS' DECEMBER 6-9 
VISIT TO ISRAEL 
 
Classified By: DCM Gene A. Cretz.  Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). 
 
1. (C) Mr. Ambassador: Your visit to Israel will be taking 
place at a time when Israel's domestic political situation is 
in flux and progress is being made on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.  Anxiety in Israel is high about Iran and its 
nuclear weapons program, political instability in Syria and 
Lebanon, and the terrorist threats that emanate from those 
two countries, as well as from Palestinian controlled areas. 
Amid all of this, the U.S.-Israel relationship remains 
strong, based on our support for Israel since its formation 
in 1948, our shared cultural and political values, and our 
common strategic interests.  Despite some turbulence in the 
relationship over significant technology transfer scandals, 
our cooperation in scientific research areas involving the 
DOE, the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, and Israel's Soreq 
Nuclear Research Center has proceeded and is viewed 
positively by the Israeli side. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
ISRAEL'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN FLUX 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Since the withdrawal of Jewish settlers, and the 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) protecting them, from the Gaza 
Strip and four settlements in the northern West Bank in 
August, Israel's political situation has been in flux, with 
"rebels" from Prime Minister (PM) Ariel Sharon's own Likud 
Party -- and former PM Binyamin Netanyahu -- challenging 
Sharon's leadership.  Then, on November 9, Labor Member of 
the Knesset (MK) Amir Peretz successfully challenged former 
PM Shimon Peres for the leadership of the Labor party, 
securing for himself leadership of the second largest party 
in PM Sharon's coalition government.  Labor subsequently 
withdrew from the government.  In a bold response to the 
rebels within his own party, PM Sharon then left Likud and 
asked President Katsav to dissolve by decree Israel's 
parliament, the Knesset.  Labor's calls for early elections 
led to an agreement by all parties to hold general elections 
in March 2006 (instead of, as scheduled, in November), 
kicking off the general election campaign.  PM Sharon is now 
building up his new "Go Forward" (Kadima) Party with MKs 
defecting from Likud, Labor and other parties in the Knesset. 
 At the same time, he is reaching out to mayors across Israel 
to garner support from Israel's political center. 
 
3. (C) You are scheduled to meet with PM Sharon on December 
8.  Our GOI contacts caution, however, that the meeting could 
be canceled as a result of fast-breaking political events. 
Our contacts have assured us that the meeting -- organized by 
the Israel Embassy in Washington, D.C. -- is essentially a 
courtesy call, and that any substantive discussions would be 
limited to a general, positive review of the DOE's 
cooperation with its Israeli counterparts. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
PROGRESS IS BEING MADE ON PALESTINIAN ISSUES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) In a process the Israelis called "disengagement" and 
the Palestinians called "withdrawal," Israel under PM Sharon 
took the bold step in August of withdrawing from the Gaza 
Strip and a portion of the northern West Bank Jewish settlers 
and the IDF units protecting them.  The withdrawal process 
went very smoothly and was broadly hailed as a bold and 
creative step.  As a result of the execution of Sharon's 
disengagement policy and implementation of the November 15 
Agreement on Movement and Access, brokered by Secretary Rice, 
the Palestinians now have a significant degree of control 
over the Gaza Strip.  The agreement brokered by the Secretary 
opens the way to (a) opening the Rafah border crossing 
between Gaza and Egypt; (b) resuming convoys between Gaza and 
the West Bank; (c) increasing throughflow at crossing points 
between Israel and the occupied territories; (d) decreasing 
restrictions on movement within the West Bank, and (e) making 
progress on a seaport and airport for Gaza. 
 
5. (C) Problems remain that could significantly affect future 
progress on the Israel-Palestinian conflict.  The PA is 
having difficulty asserting its authority in Gaza and the 
West Bank as its ruling party, Fatah, is riven by internal 
rivalries, and is being challenged by terrorist groups like 
Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and other 
armed militias and clans.  Palestinian Authority (PA) 
President Mahmud Abbas secured an agreement from Hamas in 
March to stop attacks in order to allow disengagement to 
proceed, but Hamas and PIJ have conducted some attacks since 
this "Hudna" (calm) went into effect.  The GOI continues to 
press PA President Abbas to assert his authority and 
dismantle the Palestinian terrorist groups as the first step 
in implementing President Bush's road map.  The PA prefers to 
address the situation more gradually, fearful of provoking 
widespread clashes.  The GOI has also called on the PA not to 
allow Hamas to run in January 2006 Palestinian Legislative 
Council elections.  Its argument is that terrorist groups 
should not be allowed to participate in democratic elections. 
 The PA response has been that elections will empower the PA 
to disarm militias subsequently.  It is widely expected that 
Hamas candidates will run in the election. 
 
6. (U) U.S. policy remains firmly anchored in President 
Bush's historic vision -- first enunciated in June 2002 -- of 
two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in 
peace and security.  The USG remains committed to the 
performance-based road map under the auspices of the Quartet 
(the U.S., Russia, UN and EU) as the means for achieving the 
President's vision.  The Israeli and Palestinian sides have 
endorsed the road map -- both with reservations -- but need 
to take additional steps.  Israel must continue to work with 
Palestinian leaders to improve the daily lives of 
Palestinians, while avoiding any activity that prejudices 
final status negotiations.  As the President has noted, this 
means that Israel must remove unauthorized West Bank outposts 
and stop settlement expansion.  It also means that the 
barrier now being built to protect Israelis from terrorist 
attacks must be a security barrier, rather than a political 
one, and take into account its impact on Palestinians who do 
not threaten Israel's security.  On the other side, the 
Palestinians must stop terrorism, dismantle the terrorist 
infrastructure within their society, and take steps to ensure 
that a democratic society -- with open and transparent 
governance -- takes root.  The storming by armed militants of 
polling stations in Gaza during the Fatah primaries on 
November 28 shows that they still have a number of major 
issues to address, just as continuing Israeli settlement 
construction and planned barrier construction in sensitive 
areas shows that progress remains to be made on the Israeli 
side. 
 
7. (U) Because of both ongoing negotiations to implement the 
Secretary's November 15 agreement and political campaigning 
 
SIPDIS 
by Israeli officials in the run-up to the March elections, we 
suggest that you avoid these topics to the extent possible, 
and engage your hosts on the broad range of DOE issues. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORHOOD PRESENTS CHALLENGES 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Israel maintains that the greatest existential threat 
it faces is a nuclear-armed Iran.  This issue of Iran's 
nuclear weapons program and how we intend to confront it are 
the subject of intense interest and concern on the part of 
Israel's political and military leadership.  Israel's 
position is that the international community should press 
Iran harder -- diplomatically and via the threat of sanctions 
-- to get it to abandon its weapons program.  They accept 
that the USG continues to support the EU3 process, but Israel 
is frustrated by what it believes is the EU3's record of 
concessions to Iran (e.g., uranium conversion) for little in 
return.  Privately, GOI and IDF contacts have said that, at 
best, we can slow down Iran's program, but probably cannot 
stop it.  Most Israeli officials also do not believe at this 
stage that anyone could successfully confront Iran 
militarily, noting that elements of Iran's nuclear program 
are dispersed throughout Iran and, in some cases, probably 
are hidden. 
 
9. (C) Israel's northern border with Lebanon and Syria 
remains tense, and flared up on November 21 with attempted 
Hizballah incursions into Israel with the likely aim of 
kidnapping Israeli soldiers.  IDF units positioned along the 
border -- operating under strict orders to show restraint in 
responding to Hizballah challenges -- successfully repelled 
the November 21 attacks, killing four Hizballah fighters. 
Israel returned the bodies of the fighters to the Lebanese 
government with the assistance of the Red Cross.  The border 
is currently calm.  Since Israel's withdrawal in 2000 from 
Southern Lebanon, the GOL has consistently resisted all 
international pressure to move Lebanese Armed Forces into 
areas along the border occupied by Hizballah.  For the time 
being, UN peacekeepers assigned to the UN Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) try to maintain an uneasy calm on the 
Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon border, often times 
within eyeshot of Hizballah positions -- a situation that 
causes consternation within the GOI and IDF. 
 
10. (C) As the Mehlis investigation into the assassination of 
former Lebanese PM Hariri gets closer to supporters of Syrian 
President Al-Assad, there is concern within the GOI that 
Syria will lash out at Israel to deflect international 
attention away from the investigation.  Indeed, the general 
consensus within the GOI is that this was the reason for the 
Hizballah attacks on November 21.  GOI and IDF officials 
maintain that Al-Assad needs to be pressured into behaving 
according to international norms, but should not be pushed to 
the point of collapse, as this would -- in their view -- 
likely result in his regime's replacement by the growing 
Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. 
 
11. (C) Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty in 1979, and 
relations between the two countries have been peaceful, if 
somewhat cold, since then, with marked progress made during 
disengagement as a result of Egyptian-Israeli coordination 
over the Egypt-Gaza border.  Israeli defense planners 
maintain that Egypt remains a serious potential military 
threat, and note that President Mubarak could in the future 
be replaced by a leader less friendly to Israel.  As a 
result, GOI officials frequently complain about U.S. military 
sales to Egypt. 
 
12. (C) Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994, and 
relations between the two countries are good.  Jordan has 
control of its border with Israel and prevents infiltration 
in either direction. 
 
13. (U) We recommend that you avoid answering requests to 
comment on Iran's nuclear program and how to deal with it. 
If you are pressed, we suggest you answer as follows: 
 
-- Iran's pursuit of the nuclear fuel cycle makes no sense 
considering the oil wealth of that country, and considering 
the lack of domestic uranium reserves in Iran to support a 
nuclear fuel cycle.  It is unnecessarily provocative and 
destabilizing to regional and international security. 
 
-- The U.S. is pursuing a multilateral approach to dealing 
with Iran's nuclear weapons program, supporting the efforts 
of the EU3 and other like-minded nations that are rightly 
concerned with Iran's program.  We are committed to widening 
the diplomatic consensus on the steps Iran must take to 
resolve this issue -- including cooperating fully with the 
IAEA and agreeing not to seek fissile material production 
capability in Iran. 
 
-- If Iran refuses to return to negotiations on that basis, 
the next step should be an IAEA Board decision that reports 
Iran to the UN Security Council. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. IS EXCELLENT 
-------------------------------------- 
 
14. (C) The U.S. enjoys a strategic partnership with Israel, 
and overall relations between our two countries are 
excellent, based on U.S. support for Israel since its 
formation in 1948.  The relationship recently suffered a 
bumpy period, however, due to high-profile tech transfer 
scandals -- the most noteworthy in recent times being 
Israel's sale of Harpy UAVs to China, an act that the USG 
maintains helped to put U.S. and allied forces in the Pacific 
at risk.  In response to our concern about these transfers, 
Israel signed a Statement of Understanding (SOU) with the 
Pentagon in August requiring coordination on future, 
sensitive defense sales to third countries.  GOI and IDF 
officials go overboard to stress that the signing of the SOU 
means that technology transfer scandals are "water under the 
bridge."  The USG position is that Israel still has much work 
to do in order to restore the USG's trust in Israel's export 
control system. 
 
15. (C) Israel and the U.S. exchange information and 
coordinate on policy through our annual Strategic Dialogue, 
the Joint Political-Military Working Group (JPMG), and the 
Defense Policy Advisory Group (DPAG).  The last round of the 
Strategic Dialogue took place in Washington, D.C. November 
28-29.  The next JPMG is scheduled for January 2006. 
 
16. (C) The fallout over the technology transfer scandals has 
not affected cooperation between the Department of Energy and 
the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and Soreq Nuclear 
Research Center (NRC) under the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) and the February 2000 Letter of Intent (LOI).  Work 
continues on the several projects covered by the MOU and LOI. 
 In August, a DOE delegation visited the Soreq NRC as part of 
an effort to enhance U.S.-Israel cooperation on combating 
radiological terrorism and mitigating the effects of 
radiological device detonations.  The Israeli side was very 
pleased with that visit and looks forward to cooperation on 
this and other issues.  In March, we discussed with Israel 
the idea of its participation in the Foreign Research Reactor 
Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance program, but the Israelis 
declined because (a) they claim that the DOE management fee 
is too expensive for them; and (b) contrary to the program's 
requirements, they wish to continue operating the Soreq NRC 
on highly-enriched uranium fuel.  The Megaports project has 
been embraced as an integral part of Israeli border security 
by a GOI interagency team that includes key members of 
Israel's National Security Council, the IAEC, and customs 
authorities. 
 
17. (U) This cable has been cleared with State's NP/RA and 
NEA/IPA. 
 
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JONES