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Viewing cable 05TAIPEI4769, TAIWAN PREPAREDNESS FOR AVIAN AND PANDEMIC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TAIPEI4769 2005-12-01 05:17 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TAIPEI 004769 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO AIT/W, EAP/RSP/TC AND OES/IHA 
 
HHS PLEASE PASS TO ERIKA ELVANDER AND OES DAN SINGER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMED AMGT CASC ECON SENV SOCI TBIO TW ESTH
SUBJECT: TAIWAN PREPAREDNESS FOR AVIAN AND PANDEMIC 
INFLUENZA 
 
REF: A) SECSTATE 209622, B) SECSTATE 153483, C) SECSTATE 
151549 D) TAIPEI 00058 E) 2004 TAIPEI 0249 F) 2003 TAIPEI 
03339 G) 2004 TAIPEI 00479 H) TAIPEI 01881 H) TAIPEI 03598 
 
Summary 
------- 
1.  Summary.  Taiwan remains free of Avian Influenza (AI) 
and seems determined to try and keep that status.  Drawing 
on its experience with SARS in 2003, Taiwan continues to be 
very proactive in its efforts to prevent, detect and respond 
to an AI outbreak.  Wide coverage of AI educational programs 
appear daily on all TV channels.  President Chen Shui-bian 
chaired a second National Security meeting on October 31 
(the first one was August 19) in order to emphasize the 
President's personal attention on AI issues and the need for 
all agencies to work together to combat AI.  End summary. 
2.  Per reftel A, this cable is divided into three parts: 
Section A, paras. A-1 to A-15, covers 
Preparedness/Communication; Section B, paras. B-1 to B-10, 
covers Surveillance/Detection; and Section C, paras. C-1 to 
C-14, covers Response/Containment.  End Introduction. 
SECTION A:  PREPAREDNESS/COMMUNICATION 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
Preparedness Plan 
----------------- 
A-1. Taiwan has a comprehensive preparedness plan for 
monitoring, detecting and combating AI.  The Preparedness 
Plan includes: a disease alerting and reporting system, 
disease surveillance and collaboration at all levels of 
government, border controls, a protocol for personal 
temperature monitoring, a hospital disease prevention and 
control network, epidemiological studies, case investigation 
protocols, facilities usage and controls, communication 
measures and vaccination plans, the establishment of a new 
emergency response center at Taiwan's Center for Disease 
Control (TCDC), and a program to stockpile the anti-viral 
influenza pharmaceutical Oseltamivir (Tamiflu).  Currently 
Taiwan has stockpiled enough doses of Tamiflu to treat 0.7 
percent of its population.  Taiwan has allocated NT$27 
billion (USD 844 million) for long-term plans to develop and 
manufacture influenza vaccines, but is still several years 
away from being able to produce its own vaccines. 
 
AI Upgraded to National Security level 
-------------------------------------- 
A-2. With the lessons learned from the 2003 SARS crisis, 
Taiwan has been continually drafting, reviewing and revising 
its response to a potential influenza pandemic.  Taiwan 
claims that of the 168 World Health Organization 
recommendations for preparing for an HPAI outbreak, Taiwan 
has met 122. As the head of the Executive Yuan and 
responsible for all interagency coordination, Taiwan's 
Premier, Frank Hsieh Chang-ting, is the key go-to person on 
AI in Taiwan. 
 
A-3. Following the first meeting on August 19, 2005, 
President Chen Shui-bian called a second meeting on October 
31 of the National Security Council (NSC) to discuss AI.  He 
wanted to emphasize to his Cabinet and the public the 
priority Taiwan is placing on preparing for a potential HPAI 
outbreak.  In addition to emphasizing the importance of 
learning from mistakes made in countering the SARS epidemic 
in 2003, Chen focused on allaying public fears and urged 
health authorities to enhance their links with the 
international public health network in order to closely 
monitor global efforts to prepare for the potential of an 
increase in human-to-human transmission.  At the meeting, 
Taiwan's Department of Health announced that two drills 
would take place in December to test the response to a 
simulated AI outbreak.  Chen also asked the Executive Yuan 
to resolve the Tamiflu patent issue quickly and begin 
stockpiling Tamiflu.  On November 25 Taiwan's Intellectual 
Property Office granted a compulsory license to the 
Department of Health to manufacture a generic version of 
Tamiflu in the event that Roche is unable to supply Tamiflu 
to Taiwan in accordance with its contract. 
 
A-4. Taiwan has appropriated a special budget of NTD 27 
billion (USD 844 million) for all measures to 
prevent/contain a potential epidemic: NTD 21 billion (USD 
656.5 million) for prevention programs and supplies, and NTD 
6 billion (USD 187.5 million) for the research and 
development of vaccines and anti-viral drugs.  The Council 
of Agriculture (COA) has also committed NTD 1 billion (USD 
31.2 million) to buy nets to cover Taiwan's poultry and 
swine farms in order to minimize migratory bird and domestic 
livestock interaction. 
 
A-5. Taiwan set up an International Health Regulation (IHR) 
Interagency Committee on July 15, 2005 with TCDC as the 
chair.  The committee is reviewing Taiwan's Law of 
Infectious Disease Control to make it as consistent with the 
IHR as possible and plans to complete the review by the end 
of this year. Any required revisions of the regulations 
would start early next year and be finished and presented to 
the Legislative Yuan by the end of 2006. 
 
Recruitment of New Physicians 
----------------------------- 
A-6.  Following SARS, Taiwan revised TCDC's organizational 
structure so that it could attract and employ 27 new 
physicians, increasing the number of physicians at TCDC from 
3 to 30.  These new regulations have allowed doctors to get 
higher salaries and to be exempt from taking the civil 
service examination.  In addition, doctors who choose to 
work for TCDC are provided with additional financial 
incentives/rewards to entice them to leave careers in 
hospitals or clinics.  These changes were made directly as a 
result of recommendations made to President Chen Shui-bian 
by USCDC representatives during SARS. 
 
Taiwan Administers Flu vaccine 
------------------------------ 
A-7. Healthcare professionals administered over 2 million 
doses (almost 9 percent of Taiwan's population) of seasonal 
influenza vaccine during the 2004-2005 season.  Senior 
citizens over 65, children between 6 months and 3 years old, 
those with serious diseases, healthcare workers, workers in 
avian industries and health case workers were provided 
vaccines free of charge. 
 
A-8. Taiwan's flu season does not typically begin until 
December so vaccines for the upcoming season have not yet 
been administered, but a vaccination plan is in place for 
the 2005-2006 season.  For the long-term, Taiwan has set 
aside USD 187.5 million for the research, development and 
production of a flu vaccine.  Academia Sinica, the National 
Health Research Institute and Industrial Technology Research 
Institute are already working in close collaboration to 
develop and produce vaccines on an expedited basis.  They 
hope to be able to produce vaccines in three to five years. 
 
International Collaboration 
--------------------------- 
 
A-9. Taiwan places a high priority on international 
collaboration to address the threat of an HPAI pandemic.  In 
particular Taiwan is hoping to work closely with the United 
States, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United Kingdom and 
Australia.  Taiwan officials would be very receptive to 
messages regarding AI from U.S. officials either bilaterally 
or in multilateral forum such as APEC or the WHO.  Taiwan 
seeks international recognition of its role in supporting 
efforts to combat AI.  In the summer of 2005, Taiwan donated 
600,000 courses of treatment of oseltamivir to Vietnam, in 
part to help out a neighbor, in part to demonstrate its 
willingness and ability to address cross-border issues. 
Taiwan also has plans in place to educate and provide 
support for Taiwan businessman in China and Vietnam 
regarding HPAI prevention. 
 
Donations to APEC 
----------------- 
 
A-10. Though unable to enter the World Health Organization 
(WHO), Taiwan has demonstrated its willingness to join 
efforts to combat a possible AI outbreak.  The latest 
donation was made at the 13th Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation summit.  To show its support of building a safe 
economic environment in the Asia Pacific region, Taiwan 
contributed USD 500,000 to the APEC Supportive Funding on 
the regional fight against bird flu through exchanging 
information and jointly developing vaccines and drugs, as 
well as border storage and supply. 
 
A-11. Regarding Taiwan's relationship and communication with 
AIT, Taiwan is extremely open and committed to building on 
the very positive working relationship with the US Centers 
for Disease Control (USCDC) and AIT established during SARS. 
Following initial attempts to cover up SARS cases in early 
2003 when the disease first struck Taiwan, after AIT and 
USCDC interventions, Taiwan completely changed its approach. 
Following the abatement of SARS in summer 2003, eager to 
build upon the positive relationship with the USCDC, Taiwan 
has consistently contacted the USCDC and AIT immediately 
upon learning of infectious disease outbreaks (i.e., Taiwan 
immediately informed AIT of a SARS infection at a laboratory 
in late 2003, a Tuberculosis outbreak in a hospital in late 
2003 and of recent outbreaks of meliodosis and enterovirus 
infections in Taiwan).  AIT's key contacts on this issue 
include:  Minister of Health Hou Sheng-mou, Council of 
Agriculture Minister Lee Ching-lung, Taiwan Center for 
Disease Control Director General Steve Kuo, and Director of 
Animal Health Research Institute Sung Hwa-tsung. 
 
Media coverage of AI 
-------------------- 
 
A-12.  In addition to multiple announcements on personal 
hygiene practices that all citizens need to be aware of, 
several doctors and public health experts are speaking on TV 
and in seminars.  Officials of the Animal and Plant 
Inspection Bureau are giving special instructions on how to 
deal with pets.  On a TV travel channel, statistics on 
global human infection cases are released for people who 
plan foreign trips.  Starting from October 22, 2005, pet 
owners are no longer allowed to bring their pets on any 
public transportation in Taiwan. 
 
A-13. All civil servants have to complete required courses 
on AI prevention.  Special classes on AI prevention are also 
given to all elementary school students.  All households, 
including rural areas of Taiwan, receive pamphlets from DOH 
on joining efforts with the authorities to prevent AI. 
Premier Frank Hsieh has urged the public to be on high alert 
and develop good hygiene to reduce the risk of an outbreak 
of AI. 
 
A-14. The Taipei City Government also distributed leaflets 
to shop and street vendors in Taipei giving them guidelines 
to avoid a potential AI outbreak.  Street vendors commonly 
wear gloves when preparing food dishes, a legacy of the SARS 
outbreak.  Taiwan's Department of Health maintains a website 
that includes a weekly update on AI issues.  The site is 
available in both Chinese and English.   The URL for the 
English language version is: 
http://www.doh.gov.tw/EN/Webpage/list.aspx?de pt=L&class_no=3 
37&level_no=1&show=show&Lmenu=Lmenu3&Rmenu=. 
 
Interagency Collaboration 
-------------------------- 
A-15. Laboratory surveillance results are being communicated 
to relevant agencies and ministries.  In addition, TCDC, the 
Department of Health, the Bureau of National Health 
Insurance, COA and other relevant government agencies have 
been working together since the emergence of LPAI in early 
2004. For instance, Taiwan's Coast Guard is tasked with 
reporting to TCDC any fishermen coming from the affected 
area detected with a fever.  The Coast Guard intercepted a 
shipment of smuggled exotic birds on October 14, quarantined 
them and turned them over to COA  for testing. A portion of 
the birds tested positive for H5N1 and were destroyed. 
Similarly, the COA reports to TCDC any smuggled bird from 
the HPAI affected areas.  The Straits Exchange Foundation 
(SEF) is in touch with the PRC regarding border control 
measures.  SEF also disseminates  domestic border control 
information and HPAI information/guidance to Taiwan 
businessmen in China. 
 
Risk Communication 
------------------ 
 
A-16. Following SARS, TCDC designed and built a new 
emergency response center at its headquarters (modeled after 
the USCDC center) to implement its emergency response plans 
in the event of an influenza, SARS or other infectious 
disease outbreak.  In addition, the Government Information 
Office (GIO) is working closely with all relevant government 
agencies and is responsible for all official public 
announcements regarding the disease.  Many government 
agencies and most private sector companies and individual 
citizens do not have contingency plans in place.  Taiwan 
needs to do a better job communicating the importance of 
contingency planning.   In an interview on CNN on October 
26, TCDC Director Stephen Kuo noted that he is most 
concerned about the spread of the virus from the PRC to 
Taiwan since there is a lot of cross-strait traffic, 
especially during Chinese New Year. 
 
SECTION B:  SURVEILLANCE/DETECTION 
---------------------------------- 
 
Human Surveillance System 
------------------------- 
B-1. Taiwan is well prepared to detect and react to new 
strains of influenza among people and animals.  Taiwan's 
Center for Disease Control (TCDC) has drafted a five-year 
"Influenza Preparation and Response Plan" (Flu plan). 
Taiwan has also established a reporting and alert system to 
facilitate and accelerate domestic reporting and laboratory 
surveillance.  450 contract "sentinels for novel influenza 
sampling" have been set up, which cover 90% of townships in 
Taiwan.  A new alerting network has also been established. 
Once a new flu case is confirmed, TCDC's draft Flu Plan 
details who, when and how to report on a probable flu 
patient.  It specifies how and when each level of government 
should respond to a reported case.  Furthermore, it 
establishes a new alerting network, which will enable the 
TCDC to directly communicate instructions with local health 
officials using mobile phones as soon as a case is reported. 
It also provides protocols for cooperation across 
ministries.  The plan requires 455 elementary schools 
distributed throughout Taiwan to report on all unusual cases 
of school absences on a weekly basis. 
 
TCDC's 5-level Influenza Response System 
---------------------------------------- 
B-2. On average, during the winter months, Taiwan suffers 
from an estimated three million cases of influenza per year. 
 Thus, TCDC's flu plan includes a comprehensive system to 
distinguish among SARS, influenza A/B and  influenza H5N1, 
giving guidelines to the medical workers to minimize 
confusion between the various types of viruses during the 
influenza season.  Similar to SARS prevention and control 
measures, TCDC has implemented a 5-level Influenza Response 
System. 
 
a) Level 0/Alert: no human-to-human transmission globally 
and no domestic avian-to-human transmission 
 
b) Level A1: confirmed cases of human-to-human transmission 
outside of Taiwan. 
 
c) Level A2: confirmed cases of domestic bird-to-human 
transmission; a laboratory suspected case in Taiwan; or an 
imported suspected case, but no signs of local human-to- 
human transmission. 
 
d) Level B: one or more confirmed cases of initial human-to- 
human transmission reported domestically. 
 
e) Level C: Secondary human-to-human transmission reported 
domestically. 
 
B-3. At the 0 level, COA has the lead for HPAI directives. 
At the A1 and A2 levels, DOH will take the lead.  At the B 
and C levels, the Executive Yuan will take the lead.  As 
there are no confirmed cases of human-to-human transmission 
abroad, Taiwan is currently at the 0 level. 
B-4. Currently DOH said that it would not raise the alarm 
level further for tourists from China despite the 
confirmation of human cases of bird flu in China.  Beginning 
from October 26, travelers from China are asked to exercise 
a 10-day health self-management from the time of their 
arrival, including travelers entering Taiwan via Hong Kong, 
Macau or Taiwan's outlying island of Kinmen and Matsu. 
Border Surveillance 
------------------- 
B-5. Based on the above response levels, Taiwan has a 
surveillance program for avian influenza and SARS at its 
borders.  At the 0/Alert Response level, TCDC urges all 
travelers to countries with avian influenza outbreaks to 
avoid touching raw poultry in those places.  All incoming 
travelers are subjected to temperature checks.  Passengers 
with fevers are further assessed prior to immigration.  At 
the 0/Alert and A1 levels, Nasopharyngeal washing or Throat 
Swabs are taken from any inbound passengers with fevers in 
excess of 38 degrees.  At the A1 level and above, in 
addition to the above measures, passengers from the affected 
areas are required to self-monitor for fevers twice a day 
for 10 days.  At level B and/or above, medical doctors will 
be posted at the borders to assist in these processes.  Also 
at level B, any outbound passenger with a fever over 38 
degrees must obtain a doctor's note confirming the person 
has been influenza-free for at least 24 hours, before they 
can depart.  Finally, at level B and above, any passengers 
suspected of having avian influenza will be sent by 
ambulance to the designated hospitals for further 
assessment, where a series of lab tests will be conducted. 
 
B-6. On November 18, the Kaohsiung Harbor Bureau (KHB) set 
up a task force in charge of emergency preparedness against 
a possible AI outbreak.  The KHB has coordinated with the 
Center for Disease Control and COA to educate shipping 
agents and staff on the proper precautionary measures 
against AI infection and has stockpiled supplies such as 
masks, disinfectant and protective gowns.  The KHB also 
requested airline companies and travel agents to notify 
travelers to avoid bringing any live flu virus into Taiwan. 
 
Laboratory Facilities 
--------------------- 
B-7. Taiwan CDC has contracted with nine P3-level 
laboratories located in major medical centers around Taiwan 
to conduct all human AI flu tests.  The hospitals include: 
National Taiwan University Hospital, Veterans General 
Hospital and Kaohsiung Medical University Hospital. 
Offshore islands in Kinmen and Matsu are to report to labs 
in the northern part of Taiwan and the island of Penghu will 
report to a lab in Kaohsiung.  In addition to the nine 
contracted laboratories throughout the island, TCDC has a 
plan to set up more laboratories if needed.  COA works with 
a single accredited laboratory in Tamshui. 
 
Sampling Criterion of Novel Influenza 
------------------------------------- 
B-8. Patients with pneumonia, epidemiological exposure and 
patients with criteria clinical influenza symptoms who 
deteriorate rapidly without explanation will be sampled. 
Criteria clinical symptoms refers to any case that is shown 
by throat swab or serum test to show type A flu but not 
subtype H1 or H3, or any case that has both X-ray-confirmed 
pneumonia and conjunctivitis.  Such cases will be 
immediately provided oseltamivir (Tamiflu) while further 
tests for subtype H5 and H7 are conducted.  Epidemiological 
exposure is defined as patients with flu symptoms who have 
had exposure within 10 days of illness onset to one of the 
following three potential exposure routes: 
 
- domestic birds/livestock (or fecal matter) or a novel 
influenza suspected case; 
 
- places abroad where human-to-human transmission has 
occurred or animals have tested positive within the past 
three months; 
 
- an HPAI testing/research laboratory. 
 
Animal Demographics Overview 
----------------------------- 
B-9. Taiwan has a modern poultry and livestock industry. 
Both poultry and swine are produced on medium-to-large scale 
farms with regular service by professional veterinarians. 
Farms are devoted to a single species and all species are 
kept widely separated.  The major poultry species are modern 
broilers and layers, traditional colored chickens, and ducks 
as well as a small population of geese and turkeys. There 
are 132,000 poultry farms with a total bird population of 
415 million. There are 13,000 swine farms with a total pig 
population of about 7 million.  Statistics are not available 
on the proportion of the population engaged in poultry/swine 
production, but if we multiply 145,000, the total number of 
poultry and swine farms, by an estimated average work force 
of 5 persons, the total work force is 725,000 or about 3 
percent of the population. There are 3 major poultry 
wholesale markets that the Bureau of Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection and Quarantine (BAPHIQ) and DOH have placed under 
close surveillance.  In addition, live poultry is sold and 
slaughtered in traditional markets scattered throughout 
Taiwan's cities and towns.  Vendors have been educated by 
local authorities to be aware of signs of AI and practice 
good sanitation in their slaughter.  However, the 
traditional markets would be a cause for concern if Taiwan 
were to have an outbreak of HPAI. 
 
Surveillance for Animal Influenza                          - 
-------------------------------- 
B-10. Taiwan has an active surveillance program for 
commercial poultry, wild fowl, and migratory birds.  Of the 
approximately 230,000 migratory birds that pass through 
Taiwan annually, currently 2,000-3,000 fecal samples are 
tested for HPAI and LPAI each year.  Furthermore, COA is 
compiling a contact database of every chicken, duck and bird 
farm and every poultry market.  If there is an HPAI 
outbreak, this database will help in implementing 
preventative measures. 
 
SECTION C:  RESPONSE/CONTAINMENT 
-------------------------------- 
 
Hospital Infection Control Measures 
------------------------------------ 
C-1. TCDC's Flu plan's hospital infection control measures 
include: detecting and surveying fever patients promptly; 
implementing a standard operating procedure for infection 
control in all hospitals; recruiting qualified 
epidemiologists to help prevent inter-hospital transmissions 
by modeling outbreaks, evaluating nursing procedures to 
facilitate reorganizations that might be necessary; 
instituting fever surveillance and alert programs; 
establishing a mechanism to assess the efficacy and 
efficiency of hospital infection control programs; providing 
comprehensive and intensive infection control training for 
hospital staff, preventing any unsafe or unnecessary 
transportation of patients with a communicable disease; and 
implementing protocols for waste handling and personal 
hygiene.  In addition to having 546 negative pressure beds 
available for use, the government has recently adopted a 
plan to allow for a quick conversion of several sports 
stadiums throughout Taiwan into large-scale isolation 
facilities as necessary.  It also has contingency plans for 
closing all large public spaces in the event of an outbreak. 
 
 
C-2. In addition to the measures above, TCDC requires all 
hospitals and clinics to ask flu patients if they have had 
any contact with poultry or farm owners.  Any patients who 
have had such contact are given the antiviral medication of 
oseltamivir (trademarked as Tamiflu) for five days.  Subject 
patients are required to have follow-up checkups. 
 
C-3. Finally, enhanced nosocomial (intra-hospital) infection 
control measures have been in place since SARS.  TCDC now 
has a network for epidemic control, which includes two 
national hospitals, six regional hospitals and 18 county 
hospitals throughout Taiwan.  Hospitals in the network will 
be activated in accordance with the needs of a flu 
pandemic. 
 
C-4. On October 31, DOH submitted an application to the 
Intellectual Property Office for a compulsory license to 
allow Tamiflu to be produced in Taiwan.  DOH expects that 
mass production of Tamiflu will come at the end of March 
2006 at the earliest, and in June will reach the stockpile 
level recommended by the WHO, enough for one-tenth of the 
population of Taiwan, or 2.3 million people. 
 
Stockpile of Antivirals 
----------------------- 
 
C-5. Taiwan was the first in the world to purchase 
oseltamivir (Tamiflu) stockpiles.  According to the 
Department of Health (DOH), Taiwan currently has a stockpile 
of about 160,000 packs of 10 tablets of oseltamivir (each 
pack of 10 tablets is enough for one full course of 
treatment), enough for treating 0.7 percent of Taiwan's 
population.  DOH is hoping to increase the stockpile to 
cover 4 percent of Taiwan's population by the summer of 
2006, with the ultimate goal of growing the stockpile to be 
able to treat 10 percent of Taiwan's population. 
 
Availability of Respirators and Protective Wear 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
C-6. TCDC is responsible for supplying N-95 respirators or 
equivalent, surgical gloves, goggles and garments for health 
care workers.  Currently TCDC has 25 million masks (for a 
total population of 23 million), 4 million protective 
garments and a large supply of gloves for healthcare 
workers.  COA is responsible for the purchase of protection 
supplies for poultry industry workers and also has adequate 
supplies on hand.  TCDC is also committed to work with COA 
to ensure that it obtains whatever supplies are needed. 
 
Movement of Avian Livestock 
--------------------------- 
C-7. To minimize the risk of interaction between migratory 
birds and domestic livestock, Taiwan has established a Task 
Force on Preventing Animal Infections co-chaired by Minister 
Without Portfolio Hu Sheng-cheng (concurrent Chairman of the 
Council Economic Planning and Development), COA Chairman Lee 
Ching-lung and DOH Minister Hou Sheng-mou. 
 
C-8. Farms on which AI is suspected or detected are isolated 
and, if detection is confirmed, the farms are depopulated. 
Furthermore, poultry within a 3-kilometer radius of a farm 
on which AI is detected are subject to movement control and 
intensive surveillance for 6 months.  Illegal smuggling of 
livestock is also a concern.  In an effort to reduce this 
potential vector, Taiwan recently raised the level of 
criminal punishment for smuggling livestock and poultry so 
that it is equivalent to the penalties for smuggling arms or 
people. 
 
Poultry Laboratory Testing 
--------------------------- 
C-9. Animal samples are tested for influenza at four 
Regional Poultry Health Centers and then confirmed by the 
National Institute of Animal Health in Tamshui, Taipei 
County.  Taiwan uses PCR testing, DNA sequencing and 
pathogenicity index testing to establish the type and 
pathogenicity of the influenza.  Laboratory capacity is 
sufficient and the results are communicated to COA. 
 
Culling Practices 
----------------- 
 
C-10. Culling takes place when tests establish that avian 
influenza is present on a farm.  Whether it is Low 
Pathogenic (LPAI) or High Pathogenic (HPAI), the farm is 
depopulated.  To date, Taiwan has only detected LPAI and 
that was in early 2004 (except in spring 2004 when six ducks 
with H5N1 HPAI were detected in Kinmen island.  These ducks 
were later determined to be contraband smuggled from 
Mainland China).  Birds are euthanized via their feed or 
water and then incinerated.  Farms are disinfected.  Cullers 
wear masks, boots, gloves and protective clothing and are 
trained and supervised by the Livestock Disease Control 
Center.  In the past, cullers were not given prophylaxis 
antivirals, however, the plan is to provide oseltamivir to 
cullers in the future.  To date, 380,000 birds have been 
culled.  Culling protocols are available in Chinese.  Based 
on the 1997 Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak, Taiwan has a 
great deal of experience in dealing with serious animal 
disease outbreaks.  Taiwan also has a relatively modern 
veterinary and quarantine infrastructure. 
 
Taiwan cleared of deadly flu virus 
---------------------------------- 
C-11. After examining 212 dead birds abandoned by owners on 
November 17 at the Metropolitan Park in Taichung City, the 
central part of Taiwan, animal health officials ruled out 
infections by the deadly bird flu virus.  Other tests showed 
a strain of avian flu, H7N3, discovered in migratory bird 
droppings at Shi Tsao wetland reserve, also on November 17, 
in Tainan County (southern part of Taiwan) was a low 
pathogenic form of the virus.  COA has erected warning signs 
in the marsh where the droppings were discovered, advising 
residents to stay away.  COA assured that no poultry farms 
are nearby, and chicken and duck raisers are alerted to 
carry out thorough anti-flu measures including quarantine 
and disinfection.  This was the second time the H7N3 strain 
had been detected in Taiwan. The first case was discovered 
in the outskirts of Taipei in April 2005. 
C-12. Taiwan has had to tackle a weaker strain of the bird 
flu virus, LPAI/H5N2.  Nonetheless, Taiwan fully recognizes 
that the HPAI/H5N1 risk will increase as large numbers of 
migratory birds arrive in Taiwan.  In addition, officials 
are concerned that live birds smuggled from HPAI-infected 
countries remain a potential channel for introducing the 
disease into Taiwan. 
Poultry farmers to be fairly compensated 
---------------------------------------- 
 
C-13. Speaking at the legislative caucus of the opposition 
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) on Taiwan's preparedness for 
the possible onslaught of avian flu, Lee Chin-lung, Chairman 
of the COA said that they would compensate the losses of 
poultry farmers based on market prices.  Lee stressed that 
extermination of poultry has to be thorough because 
surviving poultry could well become loopholes in disease 
prevention. 
 
Animal Vaccination 
------------------ 
C-14. At this time, vaccination for AI is not permitted, 
although BAPHIQ suspects that individual farmers have been 
illegally using vaccines based on the Mexican AI strain. 
However, COA is currently revisiting this issue at this time 
to consider the adoption of an animal influenza vaccine 
plan. 
 
C-15. According to Article 17 of Taiwan's Law of Infectious 
Diseases, the DOH, with the approval of the Executive Yuan, 
can draw upon the resources, facilities and relevant 
agencies to control the spread of infectious diseases.  If 
necessary, it can call upon the military to impose 
quarantine and other measures to contain any spread. 
 
Comment 
------- 
3. TCDC's infection control and fever surveillance efforts 
are particularly strong due to its significant preparations 
for another potential SARS outbreak and the H5N2 Low 
Pathogenic outbreak in Taiwan in early 2004.  In addition to 
the educational programs designed for elementary school 
students and civil servants, the general public needs to be 
better informed because they continue to have a relaxed 
attitude towards AI.  Some even consider that Taiwan might 
be AI-free because they think Taiwan's sanitation is more 
advanced compared with some of its neighbors.  End comment. 
 
PAAL