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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 011357 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2015 
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER MOPS FARC CO
SUBJECT: PLAN PATRIOTA PHASE 2B: STATUS REPORT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) President Uribe relieved Joint Task Force Omega 
(JTF-O) Commander General Fracica, who was in charge of 
carrying out Plan Patriota's Phase 2B in Southeastern 
Colombia, because he had failed to produce concrete results 
against high value targets (HVTs), Uribe's top security 
objective.  Fracica's replacement, Army Fourth Division 
General Rocha, has a good reputation for his leadership of 
the division.  His genuine concern for the morale of his 
troops will probably contribute to greater results for JTF-O. 
 Rocha, however, will have to address low morale, a hostile 
jungle environment, disease, resource shortages, and the 
FARC,s dogged determination to stay in the area.  Moreover, 
if the capture or killing of HVTs is going to be his 
measuring stick, Rocha's cautious nature could produce a 
tenure as frustrating as Fracica's.  As the election season 
get underway, Rocha's mission in the short-term is to 
eliminate at least one HVT, but keep combat losses to a 
minimum.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
BACKGROUND ON GOC's PLAN PATRIOTA 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Plan Patriota, the GOC's military campaign to extend 
government control and security presence throughout the 
national territory, has forced illegal armed groups onto the 
defensive.  The Plan is composed of two major phases: Phase 
1, the planning and preparation for the forceful removal of 
armed groups; and Phase 2, which was divided into three 
components: 2A, 2B, and 2C.  Phase 2A, which took place from 
June to December 2003, was the removal of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) from Bogota and Cundinamarca 
Department. Phase 2B, which began in February 2004 and 
continues today, includes Meta, Caqueta, and Guaviare 
Departments.  This is a large part of the area that comprised 
the "despeje," or the area President Pastrana had conceded to 
the FARC.  Phase 2C, which is the forceful removal of FARC 
from Antioquia Department, was scheduled to begin late in 
2005, but has been postponed. 
 
¶3.  (C) Plan Patriota's Phase 2B initial surge in mid-2004 
was an impressive feat that forced the insurgents to react 
and adjust to the new military presence.  The military's top 
objectives were to capture/kill senior insurgent leaders, 
destroy the FARC's logistical infrastructure, and establish 
governmental control of the area.  Although the military 
never captured or killed any senior FARC leaders, operations 
strained guerrilla logistics and drug trafficking activities 
in 2004, forcing insurgents out of areas they had held 
uncontested  for years and seek new routes to replenish their 
stocks of war materiel.  The FARC found itself unable to use 
bases and logistical routes that had been safe for years. 
Camps where leaders had found safe haven were destroyed. 
Still, none of the key FARC leaders were killed. 
 
------------------------------- 
LEADERSHIP CHANGES IN JTF-OMEGA 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) On November 11, Minister of Defense (MOD) Ospina 
announced changes and promotions within the Colombian 
Military (COLMIL) leadership as is customary during this time 
of year.  Changes in the Colombian Army (COLAR) hierarchy 
were modest because Uribe wishes to limit significant 
changeover on the eve of congressional and presidential 
elections.  The only major announcement was the replacement 
of Joint Task Force Omega (JTF-O) Commander General Fracica 
with General Rocha, who, as Commander of the Army,s Fourth 
Division in Villavicencio, Meta Department, had a strong 
reputation for his leadership of the division.  Our contacts 
in the GOC and the press say that Fracica was relieved 
because he had failed to produce concrete results against 
high value targets (HVTs), one of President Uribe's top 
security objectives. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
JTF-OMEGA RESULTS UNDER FRACICA,S LEADERSHIP 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Fracica took control of the JTF-O in December 2004 
from General Castellanos (who was promoted to Chief of Staff 
of the Army).  Despite Fracica's more than 100 operations in 
the Departments of Meta, Guaviare, and Caqueta, the military 
was unable to capture or kill any FARC Eastern Bloc HVT.  The 
JTF-O launched at least five operations against members of 
the FARC Secretariat in 2005.  Despite the lack of success 
against HVTs, the GOC's success in reestablishing a 
government presence in areas it had long ago abandoned has 
heightened public confidence in the government and the 
military.  The COLMIL's Plan Patriota under Uribe has 
dramatically altered the playing field, particularly in the 
JTF-Omega area.  JTF-Omega's campaign in the south has 
damaged the rebels' logistics and transportation 
infrastructure and is probably reducing the drug income 
available for financing FARC activities, particularly in the 
Eastern Bloc.  The increased unreliability of the FARC as a 
supplier of cocaine due to capture of FARC camps and 
infrastructure, seizure of cocaine loads, and government 
attacks on transportation routes has hurt the FARC. 
 
¶6. (C) JTF-O reports the following results for 2004-2005: 
 
                            2004     2005      Total 
                            ========================= 
Battles                     505      317       822 
COLMIL Troops Killed         67       25        92 
COLMIL Troops Injured       328       78       406 
FARC Members Killed            264      204       468 
FARC Members Captured       217      394       611 
FARC Deserters                 97       76       173 
Materiel Captured: 
Guns, Rifles, Support Arms  265      431       1,451 
Explosive Devices           2,752    3,074     5,826 
Explosives (KLS)           16,335   28,339    44,674 
Grenades                    4,440    5,962    10,402 
Munitions                   630,428  826,022 1,456,450 
Communication Equipment     235      363       598 
Mined Camps                 206       88       294 
FARC Camps                  421      619       1,040 
Caches                      117      363       480 
Cultivated Hectares           1,277    1,167     2,444 
Coca Paste and Base            10,292    869     11,161 
Laboratories                 32      196       228 
Vehicles                255      117       432 
 
¶7. (C) COLMIL officers say that Fracica's temperamental 
naturQRcQances for advancement. 
 
------------------ 
ROCHA'S CHALLENGES 
------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Rocha is expected to be the opposite of Fracica, in 
that his strong people skills and genuine concern for the 
morale of his troops are expected to contribute to greater 
results for JTF-O.  He oversaw the 2005 COLAR offensive 
operations against the FARC, known as &Operation Emperor8 
in the Macarena Ridge Area, which, while failing to net any 
HVTs, disrupted the FARC,s drug producing activities.  He 
also did well last year as second Brigadier Commander in 
Barranquilla.  If the capture or killing of HVTs is the 
measuring stick, Rocha's cautious nature could produce 
results as frustrating as Fracica's.  Observers say that his 
inability in the past to conduct HVT operations has been due 
to his unwillingness to take risks.  As the election season 
gets underway, Rocha,s mission is to try to eliminate at 
least one HVT but keep combat losses to a minimum. 
 
¶9.  (C) Rocha will have to overcome several challenges as 
Plan Patriota enters its third year.   The logistical strain 
of keeping 15,500 troops in the dense, hostile jungle miles 
away from their supply bases is a huge endeavor.  Rocha will 
have to address the effects of low morale, a hostile 
environment, disease, resource shortages, and an inability to 
drive the FARC out of the area.  He will have to continue to 
delay the third phase of Plan Patriota, &Phase 2C,8 
scheduled to begin in Antioquia Department by the end of this 
year, in favor of maintaining pressure on the FARC's southern 
stronghold, which has moved further southwest (to the 
Putumayo Department and Ecuadorian border) and northeast (to 
Arauca Department and the Venezuelan border). 
 
¶10. (C) According to information received from senior COLMIL 
officials in recent weeks, the following are points of 
concern for JTF-O success and sustainability of its 
operations in southern Colombia: 
 
-- Leadership Challenges:  Despite the COLMIL's significant 
accomplishments in recent years, senior officials say that 
the lack of willingness on the part of military leaders to 
take risks suggests that the military will continue to fall 
short of Uribe's goals and expectations.  Some COLMIL leaders 
have lamented publicly that Uribe appears to be running his 
presidential campaign on their backs.  The appointment in 
July 2005 of MOD Ospina has energized the security forces to 
conduct more frequent and aggressive operations against FARC 
leaders and pushed an unprecedented level of cooperation in 
joint operations.  Nevertheless, a top tier HVT success is 
important in the near-term if MOD Ospina is to sustain 
adequate senior COLMIL support.  Some generals say they were 
demoralized because Uribe was constantly berating them for 
failing to achieve high-visibility results against the FARC. 
Uribe fatigue within the COLMIL threatens to have detrimental 
consequences if he wins a second-term. 
 
-- Scarce Resources:  Military operational commanders 
complain that troop numbers and transportation resources were 
insufficient to support the overall concept of operations. 
The level and pace of COLMIL engagement against the FARC is 
not sustainable, certainly not through 2010, the end of what 
would be Uribe's second term.  Continued gains depend on 
sustainability of the military offensive and the ability of 
the GOC to hold territory cleared of illegal armed groups. 
The FARC appears to be avoiding combat, and drawing from 
their strategic reserves to keep their principal blocs in 
operation.  FARC units operating outside the Plan Patriota 
area of operations and along Colombia's borders have 
continued their trafficking operations with little 
disruption.  Moreover, the FARC has attempted to take 
advantage of perceived paramilitary weakness and establish a 
stronger presence along the Pacific coast. 
 
-- Adjusting to Change: While FARC forces in the area had 
adapted to the military presence and adjusted their 
logistical techniques by the end of 2004 with small, 
coordinated attacks, JTF-O has failed to adapt to the change. 
 According to the Defense Attache's Office, JTF-O has 
continued to operate in battalions and brigades to avoid 
being targeted by the FARC, which further strains their 
limited resources.  JTF-O officers have told us that 
"conditions are not right" for allowing smaller companies to 
operate more discretely and increase operations against the 
enemy.  Nevertheless, given the nature of the guerrilla 
conflict, the military incurs the burden of staying 
proactive, mobile, and bringing the battle to the enemy, 
while the FARC is merely required to evade the COLMIL and 
survive through the campaign; hence, the insurgency's "wait 
out the military" strategy.  According to the testimonies of 
recent FARC deserters, the insurgency has adjusted in three 
main ways: 1) the FARC has retreated to more jungle-like 
areas, which are harder for the military to access; 2) FARC 
leadership is increasing its control over the troops to 
prevent desertions; and 3) the FARC is increasing the control 
and manipulation over members' families and is successfully 
recruiting minors, who are easier to influence. 
 
-- Legal Constraints: According to COLMIL legal advisers, 
JTF-O executes military operations against FARC insurgents in 
southern Colombia under civilian legal rules.  Despite 
operating as an armed insurgency, the constitutional 
guarantees of captured or surrendered FARC guerrillas are the 
same as those of all Colombian citizens.  In the legal 
advisors' view, the remoteness of the jungle complicates 
legal processing of detainees, leading to the release of many 
captured fighters.  In 2005, over half of the nearly 400 FARC 
fighters captured in the JTF theater have been released by 
prosecutors (fiscales) for one of the following reasons: 
insufficient proof of FARC association; failure to press 
charges before a fiscal within the 36-hour 
constitutionally-mandated deadline; a lack of defense lawyers 
available at time of charges; and FARC-paid defense lawyers 
that find errors in the process and get detainees released on 
technicalities.  Moreover, detainees can and often do bring a 
countersuit against the military for illegal detention and/or 
obstruction of justice.  Therefore, the military battalion 
commander is vulnerable to years or even decades of 
investigations.  According to the advisors, the net effect is 
to condition military commanders in the field not to waste 
time, limited assets, and careers to try to process low or 
middle-level fighters. 
 
-------- 
COMMENTS 
-------- 
 
¶10. (C) JTF-O will have to make combat operational changes to 
go beyond its initial successes during Plan Patriota's Phase 
2A and the earlier part of 2B.  The military campaign Uribe 
has extracted from the COLMIL is not sustainable without 
additional resources and reinvigorated morale. 
WOOD