This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008128 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/PPD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KIRC KPAO OIIP OTRA FR NATO EUN
SUBJECT: Corrected Copy -- NATO Tour for Young French 
Political Leaders - October 13-14, 2005 
 
 
¶1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY:  The future shape of NATO as 
well as its ability to ensure collective security and co- 
exist with an independent European defense have been the 
subject of discussions in French political and media circles 
for some time.  At an illustrative debate at the French 
Senate last year, two members of the French Foreign Affairs, 
Defense and Armed Forces Committee were particularly 
critical of NATO.  Former Senator and member of the 
Commission, Jean-Yves Autexier, stated that "NATO is not a 
security alliance, but a tool for global American strategy. 
in this it is an obstacle for European Defense."  Helene 
Luc, Vice-president of the Committee said: "We should look 
at things honestly. NATO represents the American dominance 
of European defense."  Their comments represent an example 
of one French mindset. 
 
¶2. Given these types of French apprehensions, the Mission 
takes full advantage of NATO tours for select participants 
to broaden their knowledge of defense issues.  The Public 
Affairs Section recently arranged for a NATO tour for 
emerging political leaders, both left and right of center, 
and their tour highlighted NATO and European defense as 
compatible, not antithetical. The day at the Joint Force 
Command headquarters brought home that NATO is first and 
foremost a military alliance as opposed to a political 
organization.  The French participants, mostly staff aides 
on Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees at the French 
Senate and National Assembly selected by Embassy Paris, 
praised the tour for deepening their understanding of NATO, 
the role of the Joint Force Command, and the importance of 
collective defense to meet the challenges of the 21st 
century.  End Introduction and Summary. 
 
DAY ONE 
 
¶3. NATO headquarters: USNATO's Deputy Chief of Mission, John 
Koening, began the day of briefings with an overview of both 
the U.S.'s role in NATO and France's contributions to the 
Alliance. He noted that the U.S. and France share a common 
understanding of the strategic threats and most priorities, 
but differ over the role of NATO in addressing our common 
challenges.  Where Iraq is concerned, he noted that we 
appreciated the France's contributions to stability and 
reconstruction, but believed that France should reconsider 
its refusal so far to contribute forces to the NATO Training 
Mission and the ar-Rustamiyah center in Iraq." The DCM 
detailed U.S. involvement in various peacekeeping missions, 
including Afghanistan and the Sudan. He outlined how NATO 
coordinates humanitarian efforts and gave the example of the 
strategic air bridge to Pakistan that assisted the victims 
of the devastating earthquake earlier that month. 
 
¶4. The French Ambassador to NATO, Richard Duque, accompanied 
by his deputy welcomed the group to the French Mission to 
NATO. Ambassador Duque began the briefing with a history of 
France's involvement in NATO and the withdrawal from NATO's 
integrated military structure in 1966. He underscored that 
the fact that France does not belong to the integrated 
military structure is no longer an issue for France or for 
its allies, and in no way hinders France's ability to fully 
cooperate in NATO operations. The Ambassador described NATO 
as an "instrument of stabilization" and touched on NATO 
transformation, a term he said he finds "mysterious," but 
recognizes that it is  in the interest of France to promote 
greater interoperability. Ambassador Duque touched on the 
"ambiguous attitude" of the U.S. with regard to the EU, 
saying that the U.S. wants a strong Europe, but only within 
the Alliance.  NATO, he added, allows the U.S. to have a 
presence in Europe and an independent European defense would 
undermine this. The newest members to NATO are, according to 
Ambassador Duque, adverse to an independent European defense 
because they are intent on maintaining their strategic 
alliance with the U.S. and are generally wary of the EU. 
Finally, he suggested that the U.S. is not as present as it 
once was in NATO because today it is looking for more 
flexibility with the various ad hoc coalitions it has 
established in Afghanistan or Iraq for example. 
 
¶5. The Counselor for the Portuguese Delegation to NATO, 
Andre Melo Bandeira, gave a briefing in French on the 
Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperative 
Initiative that was very well received. Mr. Bandeira 
discussed the Broader Middle East Initiative emphasizing the 
difficulty in determining the boundaries of the Broader 
Middle East. He also spoke about Turkey's membership bid to 
the EU and again of the difficulty in defining the political 
and geographical boundaries of Europe. This briefing was 
followed by a discussion on NATO in Afghanistan and the 
challenges facing NATO in that region.  This discussion was 
led by Colonel Andrew Budd of the Strategic Policy and 
Concepts Branch of the NATO International Military 
Committee. In a frank presentation of the situation in 
Afghanistan, Colonel Budd regretted a lack of planning ahead 
on the part of NATO and SHAPE in Afghanistan. He said that 
this lack of vision is responsible for the problems that 
ISAF has experienced since 2004 and added that the massive 
sending of troops to the region was not the right solution. 
The fact that NATO commits to operations such as the ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan without sufficient attention to the 
"end state" is NATO's principal weakness, said Colonel Budd. 
He described the logistical problems that slow down both the 
reconstruction of the country as well as its stabilization. 
He explained the purpose of the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs) that are made up of military and civilian 
personnel and sent to remote regions to extend the authority 
of the Afghan central government, promote and enhance 
security, and facilitate humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction operations. He warned, however, of the 
dangers that the PRTs face, being isolated and at the mercy 
of local warlords. 
 
¶6. The working lunch was an occasion to discuss NATO-EU 
relations. Overall, briefers and guests agreed that France 
and the U.S. are more aligned than separate and that NATO 
and the EU generally speak with one voice. The briefing 
after lunch continued the discussion on NATO and the EU with 
a debate on the adaptability of the Berlin Plus agreement 
and whether or not Berlin Plus is the best way for the EU 
and NATO to work together. The example of Darfur was put 
forth as an instance where Berlin Plus does not work. The 
discussion also focused on the efforts that remain to be 
made toward greater interoperability between the NATO 
Response Force and the EU Battle Groups. The final briefing 
in French, by the Deputy Public Affairs Officer for USNATO, 
provided the group with a chance to recap the information 
that they had gathered over the course of the day and ask 
some final policy-related questions. 
 
DAY TWO 
 
¶7.  Brunssum - Joint Force Command Headquarters: The Press 
and Information Officer gave an extremely well-presented and 
informative presentation of JFC and its place within NATO's 
military structure. The group came away from this briefing 
with a broader view of JFC's organization, its mission range 
and its operational priorities. The briefer gave an overview 
of JFC's command of the NATO Response and ISAF operations in 
Afghanistan. The preparations for the upcoming exercise in 
Cape Verde, "Steadfast Jaguar," were outlined and the JFC 
Press Officer highlighted the extent of the challenges that 
face NATO because of the need to be operational quickly in 
any part of the world. Part of the briefing was devoted to 
NATO Transformation and what this means for the future of 
the Alliance. The participants' questions focused, for the 
most part, on Afghanistan and consequences on the ground of 
combining the commands of the NATO-led International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) peacekeeping operation 
with the U.S-led Operation Enduring Freedom. France has been 
outwardly opposed to combining these two operations and the 
group reflected this position.  The briefer stressed the 
danger of confusing peacekeeping and the war on terror. At 
the end of the day the group was unanimously enthusiastic 
about the day in Brunssum noting, however, that this 
briefing, which dealt with the operational and technical 
details of NATO missions ideally should have come before the 
day-long briefings at NATO headquarters that focused on 
policy and the decision-making aspect of NATO. 
 
¶8. CONCLUSION: The participants were extremely impressed by 
the quality of the briefings as well as by the briefers. 
Discussions in the train returning to Paris focused on the 
tour's usefulness in dispelling a common notion in France 
that NATO is an ageing institution that has become quasi- 
obsolete since the end of the Cold War. Instead, 
participants came away with a sense of NATO's adaptability, 
both in its peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations, 
and its new function in the war on terrorism. End Conclusion 
STAPLETON