Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05MANAMA1633, SCENESETTER: VISIT OF SECRETARY RICE TO BAHRAIN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05MANAMA1633.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05MANAMA1633 2005-11-07 09:36 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Manama
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 001633 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
STATE ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL BA OVIP RICE CONDOLEEZZA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: VISIT OF SECRETARY RICE TO BAHRAIN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William T.Monroe.  Reason: 1.4 (b)(d) 
 
1. (C) We warmly welcome your November 11-12 visit to Manama 
for the Forum for the Future meeting. The Bahraini 
leadership, which values its relationship with the United 
States and yearns for more high-level engagement, looks 
forward to receiving you here.  This will be your first 
opportunity to meet newly-appointed Foreign Minister Shaikh 
Khalid, and you will meet with King Hamid after the Forum. 
Although Bahrain fully supports our effort in Iraq, the 
King's recent letter to the President asking for an envoy to 
come to Bahrain reflects anxiety that developments in Iraq, 
especially Iranian involvement and Shia empowerment, could 
have an adverse impact on this side of the Gulf. 
Ahmadi-Nejad's recent belligerent comments have only added to 
that anxiety. 
 
2. (C) In this context, the King greatly appreciates USG 
friendship, and the security afforded by the U.S. Naval 
presence here (the Fifth Fleet/Navy Central Command has it 
headquarters in Bahrain).  Bahrain hopes early U.S. 
ratification of the Free Trade agreement will strengthen ties 
and boost an economy that does not benefit from the rich 
oil/gas resources of its neighbors.  Bahrain's relationship 
with the U.S. has come under some criticism from certain 
elements of the Bahraini public recently, most notably for 
Bahrain's decision to close its Israeli boycott office under 
USG FTA-related pressure, and as a result of continuing press 
reports of allegations of mistreatment of Bahraini detainees 
at Guantanamo.  Increased media and parliamentary criticisms 
of the U.S. are, ironically, a by-product of the King's 
political reforms.  These reforms, while criticized by Shia 
opposition as insufficient, will receive a boost if, as 
expected, the main Shia opposition society, which boycotted 
the last election, decides to participate in next fall's 
parliamentary vote.  Still, finding a way to satisfy 
Bahrain's Shia majority and gain its support for the King's 
reforms will remain an overriding challenge for the 
Government of Bahrain in the coming years. 
 
3. (S) Key Issues: 
 
-- Iraq: Iraq is a major concern for Bahrain, and it is the 
reason behind King Hamid's recent request for discussions 
with a U.S. presidential envoy.  The King has been fully 
supportive of the U.S./coalition effort in Iraq, although he 
does look at it through the prism of a country with a Sunni 
royal family and a Shia majority population.  Bahraini 
leaders have noted that Bahrain sits on the Sunni-Shia 
sectarian divide, and worry that a rise in sectarian strife, 
or even consciousness, in Iraq can influence attitudes in 
Bahrain.  Moreover, Bahraini officials regularly express 
concern about Iranian inroads in Southern Iraq.  Still, 
Bahrain remains steadfastly supportive and is ready to be 
helpful, although it lacks the financial resources to be a 
major donor.  Regionally, it participates in meetings of 
Iraq's neighbors.  Plans to upgrade its diplomatic 
representation in Iraq were put on hold when Bahrain's 
long-serving Charge d'Affaires, who had been extremely 
helpful to U.S. officials in Baghdad, was wounded in July in 
a kidnapping attempt just as he was about to be named 
Ambassador.  In his meeting with you, the King will reaffirm 
his support for U.S. policy, while welcoming an opportunity 
to give his perspective from the Gulf. 
 
-- Iran: Bahrain, with its Shia majority population, has 
traditionally worried more about Iran than Iraq.  Although 
Iran has been less active in Bahrain's domestic affairs in 
recent years, it is widely believed to have helped fuel 
violent Shia opposition activities in the 1990s, and the 
government remains wary of Iranian intentions here.  Earlier 
this year, the government expressed concern when Shia 
marchers displayed pictures of Khomeini and Khamenei during 
Ashura processions.  The election of Ahmadi-Nejad touched off 
new alarm bells, raising concerns that his government will be 
more aggressive towards smaller Gulf countries like Bahrain. 
Bahraini officials blamed a reappearance of Khomeini/Khamenei 
placards during last month's Al-Quds Day demonstration on 
Ahmadi-Nejad's recent comments on Israel.  King Hamid shares 
our concerns about Iran's nuclear program, recognizing the 
danger it poses for the Gulf, but strongly hopes that 
military action will not be necessary -- both because of its 
impact on Bahrain's Shia majority and because Bahrain would 
be a prime location for Iranian retaliation. 
 
-- Free Trade Agreement: Bahrain views the FTA it signed with 
the U.S. in 2004 as an important symbol of its close ties 
with the U.S., and a significant element in its effort to 
develop and transform its economy, which does not benefit 
from the oil riches of its neighbors.  Bahrain shrugged off 
harsh criticism by Saudi Arabia for its decision to move 
forward on the FTA while the Saudi WTO accession languished, 
and in fact Bahrain's determination to press ahead helped 
rejuvenate Saudi accession talks.  Bahrain's parliament 
ratified the FTA nearly unanimously in July, although 
Bahrain's subsequent decision to close down its Israeli 
boycott office under USG pressure in order to help secure 
Congressional ratification has generated sharp parliamentary 
and public criticism.  U.S ratification is currently hinged 
on agreement on a few remaining labor issues, which are under 
discussion.  Failure to ratify the FTA before Congress 
recesses -- and thus effectively postponing implementation 
until 2007 -- would be a major disappointment for the Bahrain 
Government. 
 
-- Guantanamo Detainees: The big story in Bahrain this week 
has been the return of three of six Bahraini detainees held 
at Guantanamo.  Since they were first taken to Guantanamo 
some four years ago, the detainees have not been a big issue 
in U.S.-Bahrain relations, and the government had not pressed 
hard for their return.  Recently, however, the issue took on 
a higher profile as parliamentarians, human rights activists, 
and others pressed for their return and criticized the 
government for its ineffectiveness in securing agreement from 
Bahrain's close friend and ally to bring them home.  Press 
reports of torture allegations and suicide attempts by one 
Bahraini detainee and a hunger strike by another put the 
government further on the defensive.  The November 5 transfer 
of the three detainees will alleviate some of the pressure, 
although focus will now shift to the three still there (who 
include the high-profile suicide case and the hunger striker). 
 
-- Counterterrorism: Bahrain's mishandling of six Sunni 
terror suspects in the summer of 2004 generated concern in 
Washington about Bahrain's resolve in confronting Sunni 
terrorism and precipitated the withdrawal of all U.S. Navy 
dependents (some 1,000) from Bahrain.  Since then, the 
government has shown greater determination to deal with, and 
cooperate on, our CT concerns.  While the Sunni terror 
suspects remain free and in legal limbo as the 
constitutionality of the charges against them is considered, 
the government has attempted to keep them under surveillance, 
and has improved cooperation in other areas, critical as we 
deal with Sunni extremist networks on island.  In a hopefully 
positive sign, the King recently appointed former Ambassador 
to the U.S. Shaikh Khalifa as head of the Bahrain National 
Security Agency.  The Minister of Interior is seeking USG 
assistance in helping Bahrain stand up a new Joint 
Counterterrorism Center.  Passage of a new anti-terrorism 
law, which would facilitate terrorism prosecutions, is 
stalled in the parliament, in part on human rights concerns 
that it would revive aspects of the now defunct internal 
security act, which was used in the 1990s to crack down on 
Shia protesters.  A well-regulated banking system facilitates 
cooperation on terror financing, although enforcement remains 
a concern. 
 
-- Political Reform: King Hamid is proud that Bahrain has 
been a leader in introducing political reform in the Gulf, 
and greatly appreciates public USG recognition of his 
efforts.  That said, political reform in Bahrain is a work in 
progress.  Bahrain's Shia have long been disgruntled by 
political and economic inequalities in Bahrain, and Bahrain's 
main Shia political society -- Al-Wifaq -- boycotted the 2002 
parliamentary elections, contending that the political 
structure put in place denied them the ability to compete 
fairly.  Principal concerns were an appointed upper house, 
which could block measures by the elected lower house, and 
gerrymandering, which overrepresented the Sunni minority. 
The King has argued that these measures were necessary to 
protect the rights of the minority in the short term, and 
that any changes could and should be made inside the 
parliament.  In the meantime, the parliament itself has 
started to play a more meaningful role, most notably in the 
budget process and in bringing accountability to the 
government and its ministers.  Al-Wifaq, apparently 
calculating that it can be more effective inside the 
parliament and unable to make the King budge on reforms 
outside the parliamentary process, appears to have decided to 
participate in the 2007 elections, and will announce its 
decision on participation in January. More extreme elements 
in Al-Wifaq, who have been aggressive in leading protests and 
demonstrations against the government over the past year -- 
mostly over the issue of unemployment, which effects Shia 
disproportionately -- oppose any move towards participation, 
have broken away from Al-Wifaq, and can be expected to 
continue demonstrating against the government. The USG has 
been active in promoting democratic reform in Bahrain with 
MEPI programs, most notably through NDI, which has an office 
in Bahrain and has worked to reach out to all elements in 
Bahrain.  Among NDI's programs has been promotion of women's 
participation in the electoral process, something that has 
the support of the Royal Court. 
 
4. C) Key points to make in your meeting with the King: 
 
-- Thank the King for Bahrain's active participation in the 
G8/BMENA reform initiative, and for stepping up and 
volunteering to co-host the second meeting of the Forum for 
the Future.  Note in particular the hard work of the Foreign 
Minister and his team in organizing this major event, and 
brief the King on key results of this Forum, including the 
Foundation for the Future. 
 
-- Recognize the long history of cooperation between our two 
countries, as reflected in Bahrain's status as a Non-NATO 
Major Ally and the support Bahrain provides for our U.S. Navy 
presence in the region.  Thank the King for Bahrain's support 
for OEF, OIF, and U.S. policy in Iraq. 
 
-- Brief the King on the latest developments in Iraq, and 
solicit his views on the situation there as seen from the 
Gulf. 
 
-- Brief the King on Iran. 
 
-- Commend the King's steps on political and economic reform, 
and encourage Bahrain to continue on this path of reform. 
 
-- Commend Bahrain for its decision to be the first in the 
Gulf to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with the U.S., and 
pledge full Administration backing for U.S. ratification of 
the FTA as soon as possible. 
MONROE