This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 GENEVA 002719 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR NA-24 
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP 
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR RAR-3 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON 
UKRAINIAN SS-24 ELIMINATIONS, TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS, AND 
KARTALY SITE DIAGRAM 
 
REF: A. 04 GENEVA 2992 (JCIC-XXVI-040) 
     ¶B. GENEVA 1406 (JCIC-XXVII-020) 
     ¶C. GENEVA 2712 (JCIC-XXVII-038) 
     ¶D. GENEVA 2682 (JCIC-XXVII-034) 
     ¶E. STATE 194955 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-039. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 2, 2005 
                Time:  3:30 - 5:30 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Working Group meeting was held at the U.S. Mission 
on November 2, 2005, to discuss the Ukrainian proposal for 
elimination of the SS-24 rocket motor cases, the draft 
Statements of Policy (SOP) on Trident in Containers, and the 
Russian proposal on reductions to the boundaries of the 
Kartaly Site Diagram. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Ukrainian Delegation restated its position to 
propose a change to the Conversion or Elimination (C or E) 
Protocol which would permit the drilling of holes into the 
upper end dome of Ukrainian SS-24 ICBMs as a means of 
eliminating the motor casings.  The U.S. Delegation informed 
Ukraine that it was not convinced that drilling holes in the 
motor cases would serve as an acceptable substitute for the 
existing elimination procedures outlined in the C or E 
Protocol.  The Ukrainian Delegation suggested a potential 
demonstration of the ability of the motor case to sustain 
pressure after the holes have been drilled, as well as 
providing additional technical data concerning the effect of 
drilling holes into the motor casing. 
 
¶5.  (S) The Parties also discussed the draft Statements of 
Policy for Trident I SLBMs in Liners and Trident II SLBMs in 
Loading Tubes During Data Update Inspections.  The Russians 
proposed that the paragraph, that referenced the inspection 
team's right to request the removal of a Trident SLBM, be an 
independent statement relative to the rest of the proposal 
and requested that it be moved to the last paragraph of the 
document.  They also clarified that the Russian proposal was 
to request one removal for each Trident type, for a total of 
two each year.  The Russians suggested the United States 
consider language to distinguish the difference between 
requesting removal of a Trident from its container under the 
Statements of Policy versus requesting removal of a Trident 
from its container pursuant to Treaty right.  The United 
States responded to all points stating that it would take the 
proposal under consideration and prepare a response. 
 
¶6.  (S) Finally, the U.S. Delegation informed Russia that its 
proposed reductions to the site diagram boundaries of the 
Kartaly Maintenance Facility should be acceptable, but that 
the United States preferred to wait until after the close-out 
inspection had been completed before finalizing the JCIC 
S-Series Joint Statement (JS).  The Russian Delegation 
replied that it would be unprecedented to change the 
boundaries of a formerly-declared facility (FDF) and 
suggested that Russia would have no reason to initial the JS 
after the close-out had been completed. 
 
---------------------------- 
UPDATE ON UKRAINIAN PROPOSAL 
FOR SS-24 ELIMINATION 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Shevtsov opened the meeting by stating that the 
United States had received the draft text of a JCIC JS on the 
draft JCIC Agreement regarding changes to the C or E Protocol 
concerning additional procedures for the elimination of SS-24 
ICBMs, provided on October 25, 2004 (REF A), and stated that 
Ukraine had not received any feedback on the proposal.  Since 
it had not received a response, Ukraine was unsure what 
course to take, so it proceeded to further analyze the effect 
drilled holes would have on pressurized motor casings.  He 
said that all offers and assurances from the first part of 
JCIC-XXVII (June 2005) (REF B) remained in effect.  He 
expressed concern that the issue may be impacted by what 
Ukraine wanted to do regarding the change-in-function of the 
Pavlograd C or E Facility discussed earlier that day during a 
Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting (REF C).  Shevtsov stated 
that, if the Pavlograd C or E Facility were to change its 
function, Ukraine must know, in advance, what procedures the 
United States would find acceptable to consider the SS-24 
solid rocket motors to have been eliminated.  This would 
allow Ukraine to select an appropriate location, develop 
procedures, and allow for inspections without any undue delay. 
 
¶8.  (S) Fedorchenko voiced his support with the Ukrainian 
proposal, stating that there was merit in changing the C or E 
Protocol based on how long this issue had been discussed in 
the JCIC and remained unresolved. 
 
¶9.  (S) Mullins acknowledged that the United States had 
reviewed and studied the Ukrainian-proposed elimination 
procedures with an eye towards resolution within the confines 
of the C or E Protocol.  The United States remained 
unconvinced that the proposed method sufficiently altered the 
motor casing for it to be considered eliminated under the 
Treaty.  The United States was willing to listen to any other 
information the Ukrainians had to offer, to include alternate 
methods of elimination or additional technical data on SS-24 
motor stage construction. 
 
¶10.  (S) Shevtsov stated he wanted to ensure that he 
understood the U.S. position correctly, that the United 
States would not consider the missile eliminated if Ukraine 
used the proposed method of drilling additional holes in the 
end dome.  He opined that the motor case theoretically could 
not be pressurized to the point of being operationally used 
as an ICBM solid rocket motor after the holes were drilled. 
He offered to provide additional technical data on the 
effects of the drilled holes on the motor case and then 
proposed that Ukraine host a physical demonstration of the 
case's inability to be pressurized, which would be paid for 
by the United States.  Mullins completed the discussion by 
once again stating that the United States was willing to 
receive any additional information or alternative methods for 
elimination from the Ukrainian Delegation. 
 
--------------------- 
TRIDENT IN CONTAINERS 
--------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) The following Russian proposal for U.S. and other 
Parties' Statements of Policy (SOP) on Trident in Containers 
was the subject of the next Working Group discussion. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                      Official Translation 
                                      JCIC-XXVII 
                                      Draft Proposed by the 
                                      Russian Side 
                                      November 1, 2005 
 
Statement of Policy by (the Republic of Belarus, the Republic 
 of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine) Concerning 
Inspection of Trident I SLBMs in Liners and Trident II SLBMs 
       in Loading Tubes During Data Update Inspections 
 
     (Name of Party) makes the following statement concerning 
its plans with respect to inspection of Trident I SLBMs in 
liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading tubes during data 
update inspections. 
 
     Based on the results of the demonstrations provided by 
the United States of America on June 13-16, 2000, which 
illustrated the unique relationship between the Trident I 
SLBM and its liner and the Trident II SLBM and its loading 
tube, (name of Party) will instruct its inspectors, during 
all future data update inspections beginning 30 days from the 
date of this statement, at Strategic Weapons Facility 
Pacific, Submarine Base Silverdale, Washington, and Strategic 
Weapons Facility Atlantic, Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, 
to use the Trident Reference Aid in conjunction with the 
indirect measurement procedures set forth in JCIC Joint 
Statement 25 and viewing procedures set forth in the 
Inspection Protocol to confirm missile type for a Trident I 
and Trident II SLBM with the missile in its liner or loading 
tube, respectively. 
 
     (Name of Party) will as a matter of policy, instruct its 
inspectors to request the removal of an SLBM of these types 
from its liner or loading tube no more than once each year. 
 
     (Name of Party) notes the statement by the United States 
of America that safety and security considerations and time 
constraints during data update inspections at Silverdale 
Submarine Base and Kings Bay Submarine Base will not permit 
all the access hatches that were opened during the June 2000 
demonstrations to be opened on all liners and loading tubes 
containing SLBMs.  (Name of Party) understands that some 
access hatches opened for the June 2000 demonstrations will 
already be removed by that time to permit the viewing of 
unique features of the missiles to confirm their type. 
 
     As a practical approach to confirming the type of 
Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading 
tubes during future inspections, (name of Party) will 
instruct its inspectors to use the following procedures: 
 
     -  At the conclusion of pre-inspection procedures for a 
data update inspection at the Silverdale and Kings Bay 
Submarine Bases, the inspection team will randomly select any 
two liners or loading tubes containing missiles from a list 
of all missiles in liners or loading tubes provided by the 
in-country escort. 
 
     -  These two liners or loading tubes will have the same 
hatches removed as the liners or loading tubes in the June 
2000 demonstrations. 
 
     -  For any other missiles in liners or loading tubes 
located at the inspected facility, each of them will have at 
least one end hatch removed from each end of the liner or 
loading tube, respectively.  The inspection team may request 
the same access hatches removed for the June 2000 
demonstrations to be removed from these liners or loading 
tubes. 
 
     -  The United States of America will respond to any such 
requests to remove these access hatches from particular 
liners or loading tubes in a timely manner, but will not 
deviate from established safety and security procedures. 
 
     (Name of Party) notes the statement by the United States 
of America that inspection time constraints may limit the 
number of additional access hatches that can be removed 
during an inspection. 
 
     (Name of Party) understands that the United States of 
America will be prepared to implement the above procedures 
for each data update inspection that is conducted at the 
Kings Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base 
beginning 30 days from the date of this statement. 
 
     (Name of Party) notes that this statement of policy, and 
the statements of policy made by the other Parties on this 
matter, will enter into force 30 days after completion of the 
first data update inspection that is conducted at the Kings 
Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base after the 
date of this statement, provided that, during those 30 days, 
no Party raises questions through diplomatic channels that: 
 
     1) were recorded in the report for that inspection; 
 
     2) addressed the ability of inspectors to confirm 
missile type using the procedures contained in the statements 
of policy; and, 
 
     3) were not resolved on-site during the inspection. 
 
     (Name of Party) understands that the use of the Trident 
Reference Aid, the indirect measurement procedures set forth 
in JCIC Joint Statement 25, and the viewing procedures set 
forth in the Inspection Protocol in no way impinge on the 
inspection team's right to request the removal of a Trident 
SLBM from its liner or loading tube if the inspection team is 
unable to confirm the missile type by viewing and measuring 
the missile in its liner or loading tube in conjunction with 
the additional procedures set forth above. 
 
      Statement of Policy by the United States of America 
    Concerning Inspection of Trident I SLBMs in Liners and 
              Trident II SLBMs in Loading Tubes 
               During Data Update Inspections 
 
     The United States of America makes the following 
statement concerning its plans with respect to inspection of 
Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading 
tubes during data update inspections. 
 
     Based on the results of the demonstrations provided by 
the United States of America on June 13-16, 2000, which 
illustrated the unique relationship between the Trident I 
SLBM and its liner and the Trident II SLBM and its loading 
tube, the United States of America expects that, during all 
future data update inspections beginning 30 days from the 
date of this statement at Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, 
Submarine Base Silverdale, Washington, and Strategic Weapons 
Facility Atlantic, Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, 
inspection teams will use the Trident Reference Aid in 
conjunction with the indirect measurement procedures set 
forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25 and viewing procedures set 
forth in the Inspection Protocol to confirm missile type for 
a Trident I and Trident II SLBM with the missile in its liner 
or loading tube, respectively. 
     The United States of America understands that the 
inspecting Party will, as a matter of policy, request the 
removal of an SLBM of these types from its liner or loading 
tube no more than once each year. 
 
     The United States of America notes that safety and 
security considerations and time constraints during data 
update inspections at Silverdale and Kings Bay Submarine 
Bases will not permit all the access hatches that were opened 
during the June 2000 demonstrations to be opened on all 
liners and loading tubes containing SLBMs. The United States 
of America also notes that some access hatches opened for the 
June 2000 demonstrations will already be removed by that time 
to permit the viewing of unique features of the missiles to 
confirm their type. 
 
     As a practical approach to confirming the type of 
Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading 
tubes during future inspections, the United States of America 
will use the following procedures: 
 
     -  At the conclusion of pre-inspection procedures for a 
data update inspection at the Silverdale and Kings Bay 
Submarine Bases, the inspection team will randomly select any 
two liners or loading tubes containing missiles from a list 
of all missiles in liners or loading tubes provided by the 
in-country escort. 
 
     -  These two liners or loading tubes will have the same 
hatches removed as the liners or loading tubes in the June 
2000 demonstrations. 
 
     -  For any other missiles in liners or loading tubes 
located at the inspected facility, each of them will have at 
least one end hatch removed from each end of the liner or 
loading tube, respectively.  The inspection team may request 
the same access hatches removed for the June 2000 
demonstrations to be removed from these liners or loading 
tubes. 
 
     -  The United States of America will respond to any such 
requests to remove these access hatches from particular 
liners or loading tubes in a timely manner, but will not 
deviate from established safety and security procedures. 
 
     The United States of America notes that inspection time 
constraints may limit the number of additional access hatches 
that can be removed during an inspection. 
 
     The United States of America will be prepared to 
implement the above procedures for each data update 
inspection that is conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base 
or Silverdale Submarine Base beginning 30 days from the date 
of this statement. 
 
     The United States of America notes that this statement 
of policy, and the statements of policy made by the other 
Parties on this matter, will enter into force 30 days after 
completion of the first data update inspection that is 
conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale 
Submarine Base after the date of this statement, provided 
that, during those 30 days, no Party raises questions through 
diplomatic channels that: 
 
     1) were recorded in the report for that inspection; 
 
     2) addressed the ability of inspectors to confirm 
missile type using the procedures contained in the statements 
of policy; and, 
 
     3) were not resolved on-site during the inspection. 
 
     The United States of America understands that the use of 
the Trident Reference Aid, the indirect measurement 
procedures set forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25, and the 
viewing procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol in no 
way impinge on the inspection team's right to request the 
removal of a Trident SLBM from its liner or loading tube if 
the inspection team is unable to confirm the missile type by 
viewing and measuring of the missile in its liner or loading 
tube in conjunction with the additional procedures set forth 
above. 
 
End text. 
 
¶12.  (S) Mullins stated that the U.S. Delegation had reviewed 
the Russian Delegation's proposal on Tridents in Containers 
and highlighted the differences between the U.S. and Russian 
proposals, as follows: 
 
     - Treaty Right Paragraph.  Mullins noted that the first 
major change was the Russian move of the paragraph that 
referenced the inspection team's right to request the removal 
of a Trident SLBM.  This paragraph was moved to the end of 
the proposal.  Fedorchenko stated that this paragraph did not 
raise any concerns, but he believed it to be independent of 
the rest of the proposal, so as to not mix proposed SOP with 
Treaty rights.  Mullins acknowledged the proposed paragraph 
move, but also noted the omission of the phrase, "in good 
faith."  Fedorchenko fervently acknowledged the omission and 
stated that the noted phrase was "redundant and irritating." 
Fedorchenko added that he believed the Russian inspectors at 
the facilities would work in good faith.  Mullins 
categorically acknowledged Fedorchenko's statement and added 
that all inspectors work in good faith, as well as all of the 
delegates within the working groups. 
 
     - Trident I and II Removal Request.  Mullins sought 
clarification on the Russian's proposed statement that 
requested the removal of an SLBM "of these types" from its 
liner or loading tube no more than once each year. 
Fedorchenko agreed to delete the phrase, "of these types," 
but stated that Russia's intent was to request one removal of 
each type of SLBM (for a total of two opportunities, one 
Trident I and one Trident II) each year.  Mullins stated that 
the U.S. position was to allow the removal of only one SLBM 
(i.e., one opportunity) per Treaty year, but would take 
Fedorchenko's proposal under consideration and respond later. 
 
     - Proposed Policy Versus Treaty Right.  Fedorchenko 
proposed to distinguish the difference between the removal of 
a Trident from its container as a matter of policy versus 
requesting a removal of a Trident from its container pursuant 
to Treaty right.  In an attempt to make this distinction, 
Fedorchenko suggested utilizing the phrase "verification 
removal," which he defined as a confirmation of what the 
Russians were shown in the demonstration, for the sake of 
verifying the procedures.  Fedorchenko explained that the 
term "verification removal" would identify the removal 
request as a matter of policy, so as not to be confused with 
a removal request made pursuant to Treaty right.  He 
distinguished this point by illustrating that Russia did not 
want to lose its ability to request a removal under the SOP 
as a "verification removal" if earlier in the same Treaty 
year it exercised its Treaty right to request a removal 
because the inspection team could not confirm the type of 
missile.  Mullins stated that the United States would take 
Fedorchenko's proposal under consideration and prepare a 
response. 
 
--------------------------- 
KARTALY SITE DIAGRAM 
REDUCTION -- RUSSIA JUST 
TRYING TO TAKE CARE OF U.S. 
--------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Mullins raised for discussion the issue of the 
Russian-proposed changes to the Kartaly Maintenance Facility 
site diagram.  He stated that the United States was planning 
for the close-out inspection of the Kartaly Silo ICBM Base 
and intended to use the site diagram of the Kartaly 
Maintenance Facility, dated January 1, 1999, for that 
inspection.  He confirmed with Fedorchenko that Russia's 
proposal, as reflected in the new draft S-Series JS provided 
on October 31, 2005 (REF D), called for the use of the 
existing site diagram (1999) for the close-out inspection and 
the use of the new site diagram with the reduced boundaries 
for any subsequent FDF inspections at Kartaly.  Mullins 
informed Fedorchenko that the United States should be able to 
accommodate the proposed reduction, but preferred to wait 
until after the close-out inspection had been completed 
before finalizing the JCIC S-Series JS.  He said that by 
doing it this way would make for a simpler JS that could be 
either initialed at the next JCIC session or arrangements 
could be made to initial it in capitals during the 
intersession. 
 
¶14.  (S) Fedorchenko responded that the new Russian-provided 
S-Series JS could only be initialed at this session and he 
did not understand why the United States wanted to wait 
because it made no sense to initial the paper after the 
close-out had been conducted.  He suggested that the proposal 
should be dropped from the agenda, which would result in 
inspectors facing difficult times at that facility over the 
next four years, since the site would be abandoned with no 
one to watch over it.  Only those few buildings remaining on 
the site diagram would be in good shape.  He then opined that 
he could not imagine what the S-Series JS would look like 
after the completion of the close-out. 
 
¶15.  (S) Fedorchenko reminded the U.S. Delegation of the 
Russian notification of the closure of Kartaly transmitted on 
October 21, 2005 (REF E), and that the close-out needed to be 
completed prior to December 20, 2005.  He said that it would 
be unprecedented for the boundaries of an FDF to be changed 
and he did not believe that Russia would have any reason to 
initial the JS after the close-out.  Mullins observed that 
initialing the JS after the close-out would ensure that any 
future FDF inspection would be conducted only against the 
five remaining buildings and not the entire site. 
Fedorchenko said that Russia just wanted to take care of the 
U.S. inspectors, but it did not appear that the United States 
wanted to take care of its inspectors.  He concluded by 
implying that, with the number of FDF facilities and the 
annual quota of FDF inspections permitted under the Treaty, 
an FDF inspection may never be conducted at Kartaly. 
¶16.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Russia: 
    -- Russian-Proposed Draft of Coordinated Plenary 
Statement for Trident II RVOSI Procedures, dated November 2, 
2005 
 
¶17.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Buttrick 
Lt Col Deihl 
Mr. Dunn 
LCDR Feliciano 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hay 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mr. Miller 
Col Rumohr 
Mr. Singer 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Vogel 
Dr. Zimmerman 
Lt Col Zoubek 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
 
Russia 
 
Col Fedorchenko 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Mezhennyy 
Lt Col Novikov 
Col Osetrov 
Col Razumov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Gusev (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Col Taran 
Mr. Dotsenko 
 
¶18.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Moley