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Viewing cable 05BANGKOK7124, THAILAND: COURT SUSPENDS PRIVATIZATION OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BANGKOK7124 2005-11-16 09:36 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bangkok
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 007124 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EB, AND EB/ESC/IEC/ENR 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR 
COMMERCE FOR JEAN KELLY 
ENERGY FOR IN AND PI 
JUSTICE FOR STUART CHEMTOB 
TREASURY FOR OASIA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG EINV EPET KPRV TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: COURT SUSPENDS PRIVATIZATION OF 
STATE-OWNED POWER PRODUCER EGAT 
 
REF: A. 04 BANGKOK 1504 
     B. BANGKOK 6761 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY:  Thailand,s Supreme Administrative Court 
has ordered the Minister of Energy and EGAT Plc to suspend 
the initial public offering (IPO) of shares of the 
state-owned power producer,s stock scheduled for November 
16-17, 2005.  The Court,s decision represents an unexpected 
victory for the Confederation of Consumer Organizations (COO) 
and other civic groups currently protesting the privatization 
of EGAT on the grounds that the two royal decrees 
facilitating the corporatization of the public utility are 
against the law and counter to the public interest.  The 
time-frame for the suspension remains undetermined, and 
investors have expressed disappointment at the delay of the 
largest share issuance of a state enterprise to date.  The 
resulting uncertainty sends a negative but accurate message 
about the potential risks of investing in Thailand.  While 
this outcome stands as an example of how the Royal Thai 
Government,s rushed implementation of basic economic policy 
can turn out badly, the suspension also gives the RTG a 
second chance to get its privatization policy right. END 
SUMMARY 
 
2.  (U) THE PETITION:  The Supreme Administrative Court,s 
decision arises from the petition of the CCO, led by Rossana 
Tositrakul and ten other petitioners.  The petition against 
the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister,s Office, the Energy 
Minister, the Energy Ministry, and the Cabinet alleges damage 
as a result of two royal decrees of 2005 that facilitated the 
corporatization of the state-owned Energy Generating 
Authority of Thailand, which filed for company registration 
as EGAT Plc in June 2005, and the transfer of state assets to 
EGAT Plc.  All shares in EGAT Plc are still held by the RTG. 
The petition alleges that the two royal decrees were against 
the law because they were issued without public hearings 
required by Article 19 (9) of the Corporatization Act of 
1999, and that their transfer of state-owned property to EGAT 
Plc is against the public interest, particularly the right to 
receive public services from the state.  The petitioners 
asked the Court to suspend enforcement of the two royal 
decrees and to suspend EGAT Plc,s share listing and IPO, 
scheduled for November 16-17, 2005. 
 
3.  (U) THE DECISION:  After considering the matter 
inconclusively for weeks, the Supreme Administrative Court 
was forced to act in view of the November 16 IPO date. 
Without making a determination on the legality of the two 
decrees in question, the Court ordered the suspension of the 
IPO on the grounds that, if the Court finds for the 
petitioners on the issue of the two decrees after shares have 
been sold, there would be extensive damage to a large number 
of buyers of EGAT shares as well as the authorities 
concerned.  The Court dismissed the request to suspend 
enforcement of the two royal decrees, because doing so would 
cause problems for the operations of EGAT Plc. While the 
Court emphasized in its announcement that there should not be 
any effect on investors, confidence from its ordering the 
suspension of the IPO, it has not specified a time frame for 
its decision on the two royal decrees in question. 
 
4.  (U) PUBLIC PROTEST:  The daily front-page newspaper 
coverage of the court case in recent days highlights the 
extent to which protest against EGAT privatization has 
suddenly become a highly visible point of contention between 
a wide range of civic groups and the government of Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.  On November 15, representatives 
from the Confederation of Consumer Organizations of Thailand 
and other groups gathered in front of the U.S. Embassy and 
presented a letter to the Ambassador warning foreign 
investors of their opposition to the sale of EGAT shares. 
Econoff accepted the letter on behalf of the Ambassador. 
Groups represented included:  People Living with HIV & AIDS, 
Thailand Four Regions Slum Network, Alternative Agricultural 
Network, FTA Watch, and Alternative Energy Project for 
Sustainability.  These and other groups have conducted 
regular demonstrations at EGAT and elsewhere.  A major rally 
is planned at Sanam Luang this week.  While the opposition 
Democrat Party has been silent on the matter until this 
month, Democrat leader Abhisit Vejjajiva has joined the fray, 
promising to renationalize EGAT if the IPO goes through. 
 
5.  (U) CONCERNS AT ISSUE: The basic reason why EGAT 
privatization is controversial with the Thai public is that 
it is expected to result in higher electric power rates.  The 
RTG has long intervened in one way or another to subsidize 
electricity rates.  The dramatic rise in world fuel prices in 
recent months has in fact raised the cost of such 
intervention to the point it is untenable, and one of the 
stated aims of privatization is to put electric power pricing 
on a sustainable foundation at market-clearing rates.  The 
Thailand Four Regions Slum Dwellers Network, for example, 
counters that slum dwellers would be severely hit by price 
increases.  The civic groups, arguments in court and in 
their public appeals generally anchor their position on EGAT 
in a blanket opposition to privatization.  For example, 
according to Somsak Kosaisuk, advisor to the State 
Enterprises Relations Confederation, "People are now aware 
that its (EGAT,s) listing is tantamount to selling off the 
nation,s property." 
 
6.  (U) FOCUS ON THE GOVERNMENT:  The public discussion has 
also highlighted aspects of EGAT privatization that are of 
concern to Thais who, in principle, support privatization as 
national policy.  These include the RTG,s failure to pass a 
basic energy law establishing a National Energy Commission to 
serve as an independent regulator and the lack of 
transparency in policy-making on the matter to date.  Finance 
Minister Thanong Bidaya immediately reaffirmed that 
privatization remains a key plank in the Thaksin 
government,s economic policy, which seeks to raise the 
efficiency of state enterprises.  If the court sees the laws 
as unsuitable, he said, we will amend the laws. Energy 
Minister Viset Choopiban commented to similar effect, and 
continued his insistence that the IPO process was proper 
under the law. 
 
7.  (U) INVESTOR REACTION:  Investors have expressed their 
disappointment over the suspension, as the IPO has been a 
much-anticipated event for several weeks.  The concern is not 
only about the prospects for a future EGAT IPO, but the 
impact the suspension will have on investment in other state 
enterprises about to float shares.   Praphad Phodhivorakhun, 
Chairman of the Federation of Thai Industries expects a 
significant short-term impact on Thai capital markets as 
foreign investors will likely be reluctant to invest in Thai 
stocks.  Embassy contacts have emphasized that the suspension 
heightens uncertainty about the EGAT IPO and the market 
generally, but they do not expect the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand index to fall dramatically going forward.  At 
mid-day November 16, the SET index stood at 676.05 points, 
down by 5.53 points, with the trading value of 5,445.68 
million baht.  According to news reports, Worapak Tanyawong, 
Managing Director of JP Morgan, EGAT,s financial consultant, 
said the immediate loss is about US$ 1 billion, which is the 
cost of pre-subscription from foreign investors.  The planned 
road show in New York, Boston, and San Francisco has been 
postponed.  Of the 26,000 EGAT employees who planned to buy 
shares, those who borrowed money also stand to lose money as 
their interest payments come due in December. 
 
8.  (U) A SECOND CHANCE TO GET IT RIGHT?:  The reaction of 
industry experts to the whole question of the EGAT IPO since 
its initial failure in March 2004 (see REF A) suggests that 
despite being a temporary setback, it does provide a second 
chance. Industry insiders such as Piyasvasti Amranand have 
sharply criticized the government,s lack of transparency, 
and the absence of more competition in the RTG,s plans to 
date (REF B).  Pointing to prior privatizations, they have 
highlighted the failure to improve efficiency or end monopoly 
control of the market.  Even the EGAT IPO that has been 
suspended would have left the government the majority 
shareholder.  The same experts and even many supporters of 
privatization generally have also criticized the government 
for not making the case for privatization more forthrightly, 
so as to address the concerns raised by the civic groups 
rather than stipulating the argument that state management of 
the power grid is inherently superior to private 
administration.  After hearing of the suspension, Mr. 
Piyasvasti said that the government should use the 
opportunity to go back and do what it should have done 
before, namely pass a basic energy law and set up an 
independent regulator. 
 
9.  (U) COMMENT:  While we do not share the petitioners, 
blanket opposition to EGAT privatization, we think that the 
controversy has focused public attention on real weaknesses 
in the RTG,s privatization policy, particularly the lack of 
transparency in policy-making, the failure to establish an 
industry regulator, a lack of clarity regarding the 
price-setting mechanism, and the expected persistence of 
EGAT,s monopoly control.   The failure to launch an EGAT IPO 
represents a setback for the Prime Minister, and we expect 
that the attendant uncertainty will result in a short-term 
decline in investor confidence as investors see clearly the 
risks of investing in Thailand.  By demonstrating visibly how 
the Thaksin government,s rushed implementation of basic 
policy can turn out badly, it also reaffirms our 
long-standing concerns about the Thaksin government,s 
ability to manage many large-scale endeavors simultaneously 
such as the proposed mega-projects.  Longer-term, we think 
that if the suspension forces the RTG to address legitimate 
concerns by enacting a basic energy law and setting up an 
independent regulator, the result will be to put EGAT 
privatization on a much firmer foundation. 
BOYCE