This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006706 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR FOR DAS BRYZA, AND EUR/SE SILLIMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL SY TU SYRIA
SUBJECT: FM GUL PLANS TO VISIT SYRIA TO URGE COOPERATION 
 
REF: MCELDOWNEY - BRYZA TELCON 11/14/05 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for Reasons 1.4 (b and d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary and Action Request.  MFA Middle East DG Oguz 
Celikkol called in CDA November 14 to inform her that FM Gul 
plans to travel to Damascus on Wednesday, November 16, for a 
focused, three-hour visit with the purpose of encouraging 
Syrian President Bashar al-Asad to cooperate with the UNIIIC, 
as well as to prevent the entry of terrorists from Syria into 
Iraq and to cease support to Islamic Jihad.  While in 
Bahrain, Gul was reportedly encouraged by UK FM Straw, EU's 
Solana, and Arab counterparts to consider ways Turkey could 
be helpful with Syria.  Celikkol noted Syrian FM al-Shara had 
made conciliatory statements in Bahrain suggesting Syria was 
ready to cooperate on providing access to persons of interest 
to the Mehlis Commission. CDA noted Secretary Rice's earlier 
request to Gul that Turks not/not meet with Syrians at a high 
level and cautioned that such a visit could be misperceived 
by the international community, and manipulated by the 
Syrians.  CDA advised that, if Gul nonetheless insists on 
going to Damascus, the MFA should make it absolutely clear -- 
publicly and in advance -- that Gul will demand Syrian 
cooperation with UNSCR 1636 as well as better Syrian behavior 
on Iraq and Palestine.  Action Request:  Post requests 
Department guidance on Gul's proposed visit as well as any 
specific points for MFA by OOB November 15.  End Summary and 
Action Request. 
 
¶2.  (C)  DG Celikkol told CDA that, while in Bahrain, Gul had 
met with U.S. officials as well as with UK Foreign Secretary 
Straw, the EU's Solana, and Arab counterparts, who all 
encouraged Turkey to consider ways to help break the deadlock 
with Syria over cooperation with the Mehlis Commission 
(UNIIIC) under UNSCR 1636.  Moreover, Celikkol reported, 
Syrian FM al-Shara had shown up unexpectedly in Bahrain and 
had made surprisingly conciliatory statements indicating 
Syrian willingness to make persons of interest to the UNIIIC 
available at a UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) 
facility or at an Arab League facility outside of Syria and 
Lebanon.  According to Celikkol, Gul made the decision to go 
to Syria only upon his return to Ankara from Bahrain. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Celikkol said Gul's visit to Damascus, scheduled for 
the afternoon of Wednesday, November 16, would be short 
(three hours or less), devoid of protocol, and focused 
entirely on a meeting with al-Asad (and perhaps al-Shara) to 
press the Syrians to cooperate with the Mehlis Commission. 
With key U.S. concerns in mind, Celikkol said, Gul would also 
urge the Syrians to prevent the entry of foreign fighters 
into Iraq via the Damascus International Airport as well as 
the land border, and to cease support for Islamic Jihad.  Gul 
is willing to convey other U.S. messages to Syria as well. 
Finally, Gul plans to encourage al-Asad to move forward on 
domestic political reforms. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The MFA does not plan to go public with the visit 
until the day of Gul's departure, when it will make a 
straightforward statement of Gul's mission.  Celikkol 
elaborated that Gul believes his mission is urgent and 
necessary to break the political deadlock over UNSCR 1636. 
Should the Syrians fail to cooperate with UNIIIC before 
December 15, the MFA is convinced the targeted sanctions that 
will likely go into place will not be effective.  The MFA 
also fears a broader embargo against Syria will not be 
sustainable.  Celikkol explained the broader MFA concern, 
reinforced by Gulf state FMs to Gul, that continued Syrian 
isolation would only bring Damascus under increasing Iranian 
influence.  Gul's conclusion is that Syria must see that 
there is still time to "do the right thing," Celikkol said. 
 
¶5.  (C)  CDA reminded Celikkol of the Secretary's earlier -- 
and quite explicit -- request to Gul that Turkey not/not meet 
with Syrian officials at a high level.  In that context, she 
could not predict USG support for Gul's mission.  She 
undertook to request Department guidance and respond to the 
MFA in short order.  Should the trip proceed nonetheless, she 
urged Celikkol to consider a very forceful public statement 
of intent upon Gul's departure, making clear that Gul will 
tell the Syrians categorically that they must cooperate with 
the Mehlis Commission, stop entry of terrorists into Iraq, 
cease support for Palestinian extremist groups, and act more 
responsibly in the region.  Gul's trip, in short, must be 
perceived as in full harmony with the international 
community's goals for drastically improved Syrian behavior in 
the region.  Asad should not gain the impression he can wait 
out his difficulties.  Celikkol took the point, saying any 
MFA statement would be made in "diplomatic" terms but would 
clearly convey Gul's purpose.  He said the MFA would await a 
formal response from Washington, both on the trip itself and 
on any specific points the USG may wish Gul to raise. 
MCELDOWNEY