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Diana T Fritz  08/27/2006 05:46:04 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

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S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 04815

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: PAO
    INFO:   DAO POL AMB DCM ECON USLO

DISSEMINATION: PAO
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MJSISON
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: DCM:MRQUINN

VZCZCADI735
OO RUEHC RUCNRAQ RUEHIL RHEHNSC RUEKJCS RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #4815/01 3310907
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 270907Z NOV 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2519
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1465
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 5589

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 004815 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/I, NEA/ARPI AND NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL PINR PTER IR IZ SA AE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD VISITS ABU DHABI 
 
REF: A. ABU DHABI 4200 
     ¶B. ABU DHABI 4540 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On November 23, Ambassador Khalilzad met with 
Deputy Prime Minister/MinState for Foreign Affairs Sheikh 
Hamdan bin Zayed (HbZ).  They discussed the role Dubai-based 
Iraqi cleric Ahmed Al Kubaysi might play in encouraging 
greater Sunni Arab participation in Iraq's political process 
and discourage violence.  HbZ noted that he had helped former 
Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi (the UAE leadership's 
favorite) obtain meetings with the Qatari leadership.  HbZ 
then invited Al Kubaysi to join the meeting.  Al Kubaysi made 
clear his support for a non-sectarian, representative 
government in Iraq as well as for a professional military 
free of politics.  Al Kubaysi said the new government elected 
December 15 would need to show concrete results (i.e. 
guarantee security and stability and provide basic services) 
within a year. 
 
¶2. (S) Summary continued:  Ambassador Khalilzad met 
separately with Pakistan's Ambassador to the UAE and Special 
Middle East Envoy Ehsan Ullah Khan, who had earlier in the 
week accompanied Allawi to Riyadh to meet with King Abdullah, 
Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal, intelligence chief 
Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, and Chief of the General Staff General 
Saleh bin Ali bin Mohammed Al Muhaya.  The Saudis reportedly 
told Khan and Allawi that they would back Allawi's candidacy 
as Prime Minister and would cooperate with him in the future, 
and they expressed concerns about Iran.  Khalilzad also 
reviewed Iraq developments with former Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Adnan Pachachi.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (C) HbZ, who had delayed his departure for a two-week 
hunting trip in Pakistan in order to see Ambassador 
Khalilzad, split the November 23 meetings at his palace into 
two parts.  The first meeting, which lasted an hour, gave him 
an opportunity to speak with Ambassador Khalilzad and 
Ambassador Sison alone.  HbZ then invited Al Kubaysi to join 
the group for the second part, which lasted approximately 50 
minutes.  Major General Atiq Juma Ali bin Darwish, director 
of Defense Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid's Office for 
Military Coordination and a frequent UAE emissary to Baghdad, 
sat in on both meetings. 
 
Preview to Meeting with Iraqi Cleric Al Kubaysi 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4. (C) During the meeting without Al Kubaysi, HbZ said he had 
spoken with the Iraqi cleric the night before and Al Kubaysi 
appeared willing to cooperate "within a general framework" to 
encourage greater Sunni participation.  HbZ judged that many 
Shi'a were willing to listen to Al Kubaysi, too.  He said it 
would be necessary to "monitor" Al Kubaysi, however.  As a 
cleric, he was used to giving "a different sermon every 
Friday," but his message on Sunni participation and upcoming 
elections, as well as his post-election message, would have 
to be consistent. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad noted that it was important to 
form a new government as soon as possible after the December 
15 elections, and that the new government be seen as 
effective.  Military and police training remained critical 
needs, he said.  He and HbZ had a general discussion on the 
likely prime minister candidates, including former Prime 
Minister Iyad Allawi, Vice President Minister Adil Abdul 
Mahdi, Ahmad Chalabi, and Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari. 
They also discussed the role of Tariq Al Hashmi, leader of 
the Iraq Islamic Party. 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad agreed with HbZ that the goal was 
a successful Iraq in which all Iraqis, regardless of 
ethnicity, could see themselves playing a role in the new 
Iraq.  He said it was important to work together so that 
Iraqis could provide security and economic stability in their 
own country.  HbZ and General bin Darwish raised Sunni 
concerns on elections: the possibility that militias would 
intimidate would-be voters and prevent voter turnout; the 
possibility of intimidation at the polling places (he noted 
the importance of elections monitors); the possible 
controversy over the number of polling places; the need for 
electoral commission balance.  Ambassador Khalilzad said he 
had heard these concerns by Sunnis in Iraq and that the U.S. 
was working with the U.N. and the election committee to 
address legitimate concerns.  Ambassador Khalilzad raised the 
need for discussion about the possibility of declaring the 
insurgency "unlawful" (after elections).  He said this point 
should be broached with Al Kubaysi. 
 
¶7. (C) Turning to the discovery of 179 detainees in an 
underground bunker near the Iraqi Interior Ministry compound 
in Baghdad, Ambassador Khalilzad noted that many of the 
victims had shown signs of torture and mistreatment.  HbZ 
wanted to know who the victims were.  Khalilzad replied that 
approximately 70 percent were Sunni, with Shi'a and 
foreigners (Syrian, Egyptian, possibly Iranian) also 
represented.  HbZ emphasized that it was critical that Iraqis 
saw Americans as "just."  He highlighted the need to focus on 
the Interior Ministry's upcoming role in the elections to 
ensure that people accepted the results. 
 
¶8. (C) With respect to Iyad Allawi's political campaign, HbZ 
said that he had helped Allawi get in to see the Qatari Emir 
and Foreign Minister recently and that the meetings had gone 
well.  The Qataris pledged moral, financial, and political 
support.  HbZ said that campaigning had just begun and the 
media and advertising for Allawi's campaign would be 
important.  HbZ also said the Saudis did not seem to have 
made their support to Iraq concrete yet. 
 
Iraqi Cleric Al Kubaysi Joins Meeting 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) HbZ then invited Al Kubaysi to join the group for the 
second part of the discussion.  Al Kubaysi made the following 
points: Iraq needed a representative government that 
represented all citizens without regard to religion; Iraq 
needed a professional military "without politics"; the newly 
elected government would need to show concrete results 
(water, electricity, clean streets, security, stability, 
economic development) "from day one"; there needed to be 
changes before December 15 at the Interior Ministry. 
Ambassador Khalilzad noted that given the challenges, the new 
government would need time.  Al Kubaysi replied that the 
Iraqi people would expect results "within the first year." 
Al Kubaysi agreed that the USG and the Islamic region needed 
to work on these goals together.  Ambassador Khalilzad 
emphasized that the goal was a successful Iraq in which all 
Iraqis, regardless of ethnicity, could see themselves playing 
a role in the new Iraq.  There needed to be a political 
compact.  It was important to work so that Iraqis could 
provide security and economic stability in their own country. 
 There were no plans for a permanent presence of US forces in 
Iraq, he reassured Al Kubaysi.  Al Kubaysi said that the 
democratic system which allows a free media in the U.S. has 
allowed the "real story" of Iraq to be told.  He said Iraqis 
have a real attachment to the U.S., adding that they love 
American culture and education. 
 
¶10. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad asked Al Kubaysi to consider 
concrete actions that Al Kubaysi could take to encourage 
broad political participation both before and after the 
elections; encourage good government; bring down the level of 
the insurgency, including by declaring it illegitimate after 
the upcoming elections in which all communities will 
participate; improve the security and economic situation; and 
ensure regional balance so that constructive regional players 
played an increased role, while "negative regional players" 
played a lesser role.  (Note: Although Al Kubaysi said 
several times that he wanted to "put the past in the past and 
look forward to the future," he then spent 10 minutes 
defending his April 2003 sermon in the mosque just after the 
fall of Baghdad.  He insisted that he had never asked for a 
"fighting" jihad against US troops, but had asked for a 
"struggle of the pen" as well as for discussions and 
negotiations.  This sermon had been misreported and had led 
to the order being given to expel him from Iraq.  He said the 
real struggle now is to bring Iraq out of chaos, and to 
provide food and security to the people of Iraq. 
 
¶11. (C) Al Kubaysi also said that it had been a "disaster" to 
hand the Interior Ministry over to SCIRI and the "Iranian 
side"/"Persian agenda" and to disband the Army.  Al Kubaysi 
asked whether it was possible to make changes at the Interior 
Ministry before the December 15 elections.  The consensus 
from others in the group was that it was too late to change 
the Interior Ministry's leadership.  Later, Al Kubaysi noted 
that China, India, and Afghanistan had been able to achieve 
internal reconciliation by putting religion to one side. 
After HbZ departed the room to catch his plane for Pakistan, 
Ambassador asked Al Kubaysi whether he was optimistic about 
the December 15 elections.  Al Kubaysi replied that he was 
worried about the role of "outsiders" (presumably Iran).  He 
also discussed developments in Fallujah (his hometown) and 
the importance of bringing order, security, and hope to its 
people.  (Note: Al Kubaysi was in a palace anteroom during 
the first part of the meeting.  He became vexed at the length 
of time he had to wait before he was asked to join and had 
threatened at one point to leave the palace without seeing 
Ambassador Khalilzad.  Al Kubaysi gave no sign of this ire 
when he finally joined the meeting, however, and even joked 
at the end that he was 70 years old and had to "protect his 
reputation" despite this meeting with the Americans.  While 
Al Kubaysi spoke mostly in Arabic, his English is fairly 
good.  He exclaimed at one point, "Iran is very bad!" before 
referring to Churchill's description of Iranians as a 
"deceiving people."  End note.)  It was agreed that specific 
points on cooperation would be passed to MG bin Darwish who 
will work with Al Kubaysi to deliver them. 
 
Meeting with Pakistan's Special Middle East Envoy 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶12. (S) Following his meeting with Al Kubaysi, Ambassador 
Khalilzad met with Pakistan to UAE Ambassador Ehsan Ullah 
Khan.  Allawi and Khan were in Riyadh November 21.  Allawi 
met with King Abdullah, intelligence chief Prince Muqrin bin 
Abdul Aziz, Chief of the General Staff General Saleh bin Ali 
bin Mohammed Al Muhaya, and Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al 
Faisal.  Khan briefed Khalilzad about the Saudi leadership's 
decision to endorse Allawi.  Muqrin told Allawi and Khan that 
Allawi was "the man for the unity of Iraq."  When Muqrin 
added that "time was against us," Khan told his Saudi hosts 
that he had told them that six weeks earlier.  Khan said that 
the Saudis promised to contact Al Arabiya TV owner Walid 
Ibrahim, a member of the Saudi ruling family about giving 
Allawi an endorsement.  (Note: Allawi was also in Dubai 
November 22 and met Defense Minister/Dubai Crown Prince 
Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid.  End note.) 
 
¶13. (S) In addition, Khan said, the Saudis said they were 
interested in providing humanitarian assistance (i.e. food 
supplies) for the winter months to candidates on Allawi's 
slate to help them.  Khan said he told the Saudis that 
Allawi's campaign needed financial assistance now and more 
financial assistance immediately after the elections for 
"wheeling and dealing" to form coalitions.  Khan said he did 
not attend Allawi's meeting with King Abdullah, but reported 
that during the 35-minute session the King had been "very 
warm and very concerned about what was happening" in Iraq. 
The King was not "entirely happy" with some of the other 
candidates for Prime Minister.  Allawi also found Saud Al 
Faisal receptive at a subsequent meeting.  Khan said Al 
Faisal told Allawi: "We will be taking decisions on how to 
support you."  As Allawi and Khan waited at the airport to 
depart Riyadh, Khan gave Al Faisal and Muqrin a handwritten 
note in which he repeated his concern that financial 
assistance -) immediate and right after the elections )- 
was more important than humanitarian aid, and in underscored 
the importance of "putting pillars in place in Iraq first" to 
ensure "we win the election." 
 
¶14. (S) Khan said Muqrin also voiced concern about Iranian 
influence in Iraq, noting that Iran had "taken over" Basra. 
Khan also talked about Saudi concerns about the possible 
repercussions of a decision to refer Iran's nuclear program 
to the UNSC.  He said that an ex-Iraqi general working for 
the Saudis has information that should the Iranian nuclear 
issue be referred to the UNSC and the U.S. were to decide to 
take action against Iran, Iran would unleash sleeper cells in 
Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, and the UAE that would hit U.S. 
targets and seek to close the shipping lanes in the Straits 
of Hormuz.  Khan said the information was from a credible 
source and he had informed HbZ about it. 
 
¶15. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad also shared a two-hour 
one-on-one lunch with former Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan 
Pachachi and discussed Pachachi's desire to travel to the 
U.S. and his expectations on the election. 
 
¶16. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador 
Khalilzad. 
SISON