This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 004190 
 
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STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON TW APEC
SUBJECT:  TAIWAN'S APEC DIPLOMACY: ROUND TWO 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  For the second time in as many months, 
Taiwan launched an APEC initiative that met quick refusal in 
Beijing.  First, it was President Chen Shui-bian's July 22 
announcement that he intended to personally represent Taiwan 
at the November APEC leaders' meeting in Pusan, which Beijing 
quickly rejected.  The second attempt was President Chen's 
announcement to the South Koreans on October 12 that he will 
send Legislative Yuan (LY) Speaker and Kuomintang Party (KMT) 
legislator Wang Jin-pyng to represent Taiwan in Pusan, which 
met a similar rejection.  The gallant offer of KMT Chairman 
Ma Ying-jeou to help facilitate the visit of his rival Wang, 
however, ran aground when the KMT learned that Beijing had 
privately rejected the Wang overture weeks earlier.  This 
suggested, at least to the KMT, that Chen's announcement may 
have had more to do with painting Beijing as the oppressor 
and splitting the opposition KMT than with Taiwan 
representation at APEC.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) President Chen personally informed South Korean 
special envoy Yun Hai-jung on October 12 of his decision to 
appoint Wang to represent Taiwan in Pusan.  Presidential 
Secretary General Yu Shyi-kun then informed the press that 
 
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Chen had told the envoy he was appointing Wang "to avoid 
making things difficult for South Korea."  At the same press 
conference, Presidential Deputy Secretary General James Huang 
said the U.S. had welcomed the appointment of Wang.  Later 
the same day, PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan stated 
the PRC's strong opposition to Wang's presence at APEC 
because of the 1991 APEC MOU which, Kong said, permitted 
"Chinese Taipei" only to dispatch the minister in charge of 
economic affairs related to APEC to attend APEC summits. 
 
Round One:  President Chen to Pusan 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Three months earlier, on July 22, President Chen 
Shui-bian announced that he wanted to personally attend the 
November APEC leaders' meeting in Pusan.  The ROK Taiwan 
Trade Office Political Chief told AIT at the time that Taiwan 
NSC officials had given the ROK Trade Office "a few days" 
warning that President Chen might announce his intention to 
personally attend the leaders, summit.  Meeting with 
Presidential Office Deputy Secretary General James Huang, the 
Director pointed out that any such initiative to have a 
serious chance of success should include prior consultations 
with AIT (Huang himself had informed the Director, but only 
on Friday afternoon, July 22, just before the press was 
informed).  Several weeks later, Huang told the Deputy 
Director that Taipei had fully realized Beijing would not 
accept Chen,s overture and that the real intention had been 
to demonstrate to the international community Taiwan's 
willingness to engage the PRC and even make concessions, such 
as Chen,s announcement that he would accept the nomenclature 
of "Taiwan, China." 
 
Round Two:  Speaker Wang to Pusan 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) On September 16, NSC Secretary General Chiou I-jen 
informed the Acting Director that if President Chen was not 
able to attend the APEC leaders' meeting, he was considering 
sending LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng as Taiwan's representative. 
Wang, he said, had indicated to Chen his interest in the idea 
without making any firm commitment. Chiou asked if the U.S. 
would convey this message to Beijing and ascertain Beijing's 
view of the idea.  The Acting Director noted that Wang could 
be problematic, because traditionally the Taiwan 
representative has been non-government, whereas Wang is a 
senior government official.  Chiou acknowledged this problem, 
but argued that Beijing would find LY Speaker and KMT leader 
Wang "interesting" and would "not get hung up on the issue of 
official position." 
 
¶5.  (C) Chiou then informed the Acting Director that Taipei 
"requests U.S. help" to prepare the way for the Wang 
appointment.  When asked if there had been any effort to 
float this on any basis with either Beijing or this year's 
host, the ROK, Chiou said no.  Three days later, the Acting 
Director informed Chiou that Washington believed it would be 
more appropriate for Taiwan to utilize its own channels to 
inform Beijing and Seoul about the Wang proposal. 
¶6.  (C) Seoul Taipei Representative Hwang told the Director 
on October 14 that just before Ambassador Yun departed Seoul, 
he had received a call from Taipei,s representative in Seoul 
informing him of Taiwan,s intention to nominate Wang 
Jin-pyng.  The Korean MFA did not have a chance to review 
this issue before Yoon departed, therefore Hwang had to 
deliver Seoul,s negative reaction, that it could not support 
Wang,s participation, in a separate meeting at Taipei,s 
MOFA on October 15. 
 
¶7.  (C) Presidential Office Deputy Secretary General James 
Huang told the Director on October 14 that, though unlikely, 
Kong Quan may have answered the question in the way he did to 
leave the door open for Wang to attend the informal leaders' 
meeting while still looking tough on Taiwan.  If so, Huang 
continued, perhaps the U.S. could pursue this possibility 
with Beijing.  Meanwhile, Huang told the Director, Taipei is 
pursuing its own channels to try to communicate on this 
subject with Beijing, details of which he was not now 
authorized to share with AIT. 
 
Chairman Ma Deftly Weighs In 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Following Beijing's announcement on October 13 that 
it would not accept Wang, KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou stepped 
in and told Wang that the party fully supported his 
appointment and would try to help facilitate Beijing's 
approval.  According to the local press, Ma telephoned Wang 
and expressed the party's support for his trip to Pusan.  In 
a smart political move, he also offered to utilize the 
KMT-CCP party-to-party channel that had been established 
following former KMT Chairman Lien Chan's April visit to 
Mainland China.  Wang, according to press reports, expressed 
appreciation for Ma's offer and pledged to meet with Ma in 
person once Wang's trip is confirmed.  Ma then directed KMT 
Research Director Chang Jung-kung to communicate with PRC 
officials via the party-to-party mechanism to help facilitate 
Wang's participation in the Pusan meeting. 
 
¶9.  (C) Chang Jung-kung told AIT late on October 14 that he 
immediately contacted the PRC side to initiate Ma's 
directive.  The PRC, however, informed Chang that both the 
Chen government and Wang himself had separately approached 
Beijing "a month ago" to propose the idea of Wang's 
appointment.  The PRC had rejected both overtures at that 
time, the KMT was told, not only because of the publicly 
stated reason (inappropriate representation) but also because 
Beijing believed Chen intended the Wang appointment to 
influence future Taiwan elections and to split the KMT. 
(Comment:  In fact, Chairman Ma's initial response to the 
October 12 announcement of Wang's appointment was very cool, 
suspicious and non-supportive.) 
 
¶10.  (C) When KMT leaders learned that Wang himself had been 
rejected, Chang explained to AIT, they realized that the 
special party-to-party mechanism had been effectively closed 
to them before they had even started.  Chang indicated that 
the KMT does not plan to make further efforts on behalf of a 
Wang visit.  Noting that Lien Chan himself had arrived in 
Beijing yesterday, October 13, and will have dinner with PRC 
Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Chun Yunlin, Chang said 
there were no plans to request Lien to weigh in on the Wang 
issue. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) So why, several weeks after receiving Beijing's 
informal rejection of the Wang Jin-pyng proposal, did 
President Chen go ahead and make the Wang proposal to 
Ambassador Yun and make such a big deal of it to the press? 
This appears to fit the pattern of the first Chen proposal 
which was offered, not as a viable, realistic possibility, 
but to demonstrate once more how the PRC is suppressing 
Taiwan and how Beijing rejects every Taiwan goodwill offer. 
In the scandal-ridden crisis atmosphere now prevailing in 
Taiwan, this may be viewed by Chen as a useful diversionary 
tactic.  Ma's offer to be helpful may help shelter him from 
being lumped with the mainland by President Chen. 
PAAL