This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002945 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM YE DOMESTIC POLITICS DEMOCRATIC REFORM
SUBJECT: FM QIRBI SAYS SALEH MAY "CHANGE HIS MIND" ABOUT 
NOT RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT; VOICES CONCERN OVER AMBASSADOR'S 
COMMENTS ON PRESS FREEDOM ABUSES 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( 
D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  During an October 10 meeting to review 
logistical arrangements for President Saleh's November visit 
to Washington, FonMin Abu Bakr al-Qirbi told Ambassador that 
Saleh was "nervous" about how a reversal of his announcement 
that he would not run for re-election in 2006 would be 
perceived in Washington.  Ambassador advised that some Yemen 
observers may criticize a bid by Saleh to stay in power, but 
that ulimately there would not be a great deal of surprise. 
Qirbi also criticized Ambassador for an interview with the 
local press in which he questioned the ROYG's commitment to 
democracy in light of recent press freedom abuses.  Qirbi 
asserted that political groups were using the comments for 
"political gain."  Ambassador said he would not stop 
defending press freedom, but assured Qirbi his role would not 
become a polarizing issue as the presidential campaign gets 
underway.  END SUMMARY 
 
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SALEH VISIT LOGISTICS 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Ambassador reviewed with Qirbi the preparations for 
President Saleh's upcoming visit, noting that it was not USG 
practice during a head-of-state visit to sign the sort of 
broad Memorandum of Intentions that the ROYG had proposed. 
Signing ceremonies are normally only held when the two 
leaders have a specific issue on which they wish to conclude 
an agreement.  For example, if Yemen's Millenium Challenge 
Account Threshold Program proposal is approved by the 
Millenium Challenge Corporation board, it may be possible for 
the two presidents to hold a public signing or announcement 
of the agreement.  Ambassador also suggested that an exchange 
of letters on specific topics between ROYG ministers and U.S. 
secretaries may be a posssibility. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶3. (C)  With regard to press opportunities, Ambassador noted 
that White House planners had not yet decided whether Saleh 
and POTUS would make a joint appearance before the press 
without an opportunity for questions, or if they would only 
issue joint press statements.  In the event joint statements 
are issued, he said, the USG would make an effort to 
incorporate many of the points suggested in the ROYG's draft 
Memorandum of Intentions. 
 
¶4. (C)  Ambassador informed the Minister that requests had 
been made for President Saleh to call on the Vice President, 
the Secretary, SecDef, National Security Advisor, FBI 
Director, CIA Director, and National Intelligence Director 
John Negroponte.  He said the Yemeni Embassy in Washington 
advised that Saleh would arrive on November 8 from Japan, but 
that meetings should not begin until the following day.  The 
meeting with POTUS would occur on November 10, followed by 
lunch, at which time the Yemeni Embassy advised that the 
"official agenda would end."  Ambassador also asked Qirbi for 
further details on several outstanding questions, including 
the composition of the Yemeni delegation and whether FonMin 
Qirbi will want to request separate meetings with the 
Secretary and others. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶5. (C)  Qirbi said he hoped the details of press statements 
and/or letter exchanges could be finalized quickly in order 
to avoid the "last-minute squeeze" that plagued Saleh's 2001 
visit.  The FonMin noted that the ROYG wants this visit to be 
"different from 2001" and to "establish a clear strategic 
relationship on the issues alluded to in the draft Memorandum 
of Intentions." 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ambassador reminded Qirbi that final decisions on 
all arrangments would be made at the White House, but 
promised to keep the FonMin informed as logistical plans 
become more firm.  On the substance, he said a discussion of 
the U.S.-Yemeni relationship over the medium to long term 
would certainly be part of Saleh's discussions with U.S. 
policymakers, but he cautioned the minister not to expect a 
great number of "deliverables" from the U.S. side.  He 
pointed out that, for the USG, the visit itself is a major 
"deliverable" to the ROYG.  Many world leaders are rarely, if 
ever, invited to meet POTUS, and this will be Saleh's third 
meeting with President Bush. 
 
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WHAT IF SALEH RUNS AGAIN? 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  After asking the Ambassador's and his own notetakers 
to leave the room, Qirbi then queried Ambassador on what the 
reaction in Washington had been to Saleh's surprise 
announcement in July that he would not run for president 
again in 2006.  Saleh is "nervous about how it would be 
perceived if he changed his mind."  Ambassador replied that 
there was a range of reactions within the USG and elsewhere 
to Saleh's announcement.  There were those who believed that 
Saleh would no doubt "reluctantly" accept his party's 
nomination to run again for the "sake of the nation," that he 
would win the election, and that this was probably not a bad 
thing for Yemen's overall stability given the alternatives. 
There were others who took Saleh at his word, but would not 
be surprised if he ran again, and still others who believed 
Saleh and would be surprised and critical if he ran again. 
 
¶8. (C)  Qirbi said that next year was "just too soon" for 
Saleh to step down, because there is "no one to take his 
place."  Saleh's son Ahmed Ali Saleh is "not ready" to assume 
the presidency and "does not have his father's qualities in 
relating to tribes and unifying the country."  The President 
has "not prepared his succession" and there is currently "no 
one out there" who can lead Yemen as successfully as Saleh. 
Ambassador said that, no matter what Saleh decides in the 
coming weeks, he should be prepared for U.S. officials and 
members of the press to ask if he remains committed to his 
announcement. 
 
----------------------------------- 
CONCERN OVER PRESS FREEDOM COMMENTS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C)  The FonMin then turned to the subject of Ambassador's 
comments made during an interview with the local Al-Ayyam 
newspaper, which Yemeni and other Arab news outlets had 
characterized as asserting that democratic progress in Yemen 
had "stopped."  Ambassador explained that his comments had 
been quoted out of order by the newspaper, but the substance 
was essentially correct.  There have been disturbing 
developments over the past several months involving 
unidentified government agents harassing, beating, and 
imprisoning journalists, all of which had led to questions in 
Washington about the ROYG's commitment to press freedom. 
Inasmuch as press freedom is an essential pillar for the 
development of democracy, Ambassador continued, it was fair 
to express concerns that Yemen's democratic progress had 
"stalled," which he pointed out was the word he used, not 
"stopped." 
 
¶10. (C)  Qirbi noted that it was unfortunate that the press 
had translated the word "stalled" as "tawaqf," which means 
"stopped," because the impression Yemenis were taking away 
from the Ambassador's comments were that the USG believes 
that there is no longer any democracy in Yemen.  Qirbi 
cautioned that such statements "provide fuel" for groups to 
agitate against the USG and that political groups were 
seeking to use the Ambassador's comments to score points. 
Local media outlets were carrying various reactions to the 
interview, and it had even become the subject of a 30-minute 
al-Jazeera talk show on October 9 (septel).  Yemen is gripped 
by "election fever," and for the next year, he said, "every 
little statement" made by the USG will "take on more 
importance" because of the high level of political activity 
in the run-up to the elections. 
 
¶11. (C)  Ambassador reassured Qirbi that he was aware of the 
weight comments by USG officials carried in Yemen, and was 
sensitive to the fact that, while USG policies will no doubt 
be an issue of great debate during the campaign season, the 
U.S. Ambassador should not himself become an election issue. 
That said, the USG will not stop defending press freedoms in 
Yemen.  The Secretary had made clear that supporting 
democratic reform is in the strategic interests of the United 
States, and that it will be USG policy to point out when a 
country is doing well in this regard, and when there is 
backsliding.  We have lauded Yemen's stated commitments to 
press freedom, and will continue to hold the ROYG to those 
commitments. 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT:  Qirbi's concerns about Ambassador's 
comments on press freedom were expected, although it is worth 
noting that this is the first time the FonMin has not seized 
the opportunity to defend ROYG policies with regard to the 
press.  Post shares Qirbi's assessment of Ahmed Ali Saleh's 
shortcomings and the likelihood that Saleh will ultimately 
run for another term next year.  The fact that we are hearing 
this for the first time from a cabinet-level official is 
probably a strong indicator that Saleh is moving closer to 
formally stepping back from his July announcement. 
Krajeski