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Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI7767, SECOND ANNUAL SOUTH ASIA POLITICAL REPORTING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NEWDELHI7767 2005-10-05 13:11 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 007767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER BD PK NP IN
SUBJECT: SECOND ANNUAL SOUTH ASIA POLITICAL REPORTING 
OFFICERS' CONFERENCE SHEDS LIGHT ON REGIONAL ISSUES 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (U) Summary: The September 29 South Asia Political 
Reporting Officers' Conference in New Delhi brought together 
almost 50 officers and FSNs from Indian consulates, South 
Asian countries, the broader region and Washington to discuss 
recent developments.  Participants discussed the July 18 
Indo-US Joint Statement and its effects, the Indo-Pak peace 
process, situations in Nepal and Bangladesh, and India's 
internal affairs.  In a presentation on the recent "India 
Today" poll of public opinion around the country, Managing 
Editor Raj Chengappa explored India's changing foreign policy 
and the public's confidence in the country's emerging status 
as a world power.  Input from representatives from as far as 
Dushanbe and Dubai was helpful in understanding how growing 
US-India ties and other regional issues are affecting the 
South Asian neighborhood and beyond.  The conference was an 
excellent opportunity to network and build linkages to help 
advance American policy.  Embassy New Delhi thanks all who 
attended for the quality and sophistication they brought to 
our annual review of reporting issues.  End Summary. 
 
US-India Relations Grow as India Seeks Superpower Status 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
2.  (U) New Delhi PolCouns opened the conference by pointing 
to the changing focus of geopolitics from Europe towards Asia 
-- a phenomenon that the Secretary and others have cited to 
explain our India initiative.  The simultaneous commitment 
from Indian and US leaderships to move the bilateral 
relationship ahead was crucial to conclude the POTUS-PM Singh 
July 18th Joint Statement and the agreement on civil nuclear 
energy.  Participants agreed that stronger US-India ties 
reflected increased people-to-people contacts, economic 
incentives and opportunities, and converging interests on 
terrorism and non-proliferation.  A recent Pew Global 
Attitudes Project survey found that 71 percent of Indians 
have a positive opinion of the US (compared with 54 percent 
three years ago).  India's economic growth has also given it 
greater confidence and resources to engage in world affairs, 
resulting in a more equal relationship with the US and 
increased scope for cooperation. 
 
3.  (C) "India Today" Managing Editor Raj Chengappa 
summarized India's evolving foreign policy and the results of 
a September 2005 CNN/India Today poll on India's emerging 
status.  Chengappa emphasized that the July 18th US-Indo 
civilian nuclear agreement and India's recent IAEA vote 
against Iran are signs that the GOI is "unveiling a new 
foreign policy world view.  India no longer wants to be "Mr. 
Third World," and instead is "aggressively and pragmatically 
pursuing its national interests in order to become a global 
player."  Another poll commissioned by Time Magazine reported 
that 75 percent of Indians think that India will become a 
superpower within 25 years.  In order to achieve this status, 
India Today found 30 percent of people think India should pay 
greater attention to international trade.  After building 
trade, infrastructure and domestic productivity, respondents 
listed closer ties with the US as the fourth most important 
method to achieving superpower status.  Chengappa warned the 
conference not to let the pace of Indo-US ties slow down.  It 
is important to "quickly cross the nuclear hurdles," he 
observed, because expectations about the benefits of the 
civil nuclear agreement are rising. 
 
South Asia Apprehensive About Rising India 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4.  (U) India's striving for a larger role in South Asia has 
created new opportunities for US-Indo cooperation but also 
led to apprehension from India's neighbors.  In a discussion 
on India's regional relationships, some of our conclusions 
were: 
 
-- Indians view their country's growing role in South Asia as 
a natural one, but some think India should "talk tough" while 
others see the benefits of engagement and economic 
integration.  It is still unclear which course India will 
take to cope with emerging challenges in Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh. 
 
-- Nepal and Afghanistan have presented new opportunities for 
US-India cooperation.  Through information sharing and policy 
coordination, both sides have taken each other's concerns 
into account to work towards common objectives. 
 
-- India's neighbors can feel the GOI spreading out its 
wings, and many are apprehensive about India's interests and 
sheer influence in the region. 
 
-- Dhaka perceives Delhi as a bully, and many Bangladeshis 
feel a "me too" jealousy about growing Indo-US relations. 
 
-- In Pakistan, leaders cast a wary eye at the US building a 
permanent partnership with Delhi and worry that, by 
comparison, the US has short-term interests in Pakistan which 
are based only on its role in the war on terror. 
 
Indo-Pak Process Still on Track 
------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Despite a sour meeting along the sidelines of UNGA, 
participants agreed that both PM Singh and President 
Musharraf are still personally committed to moving the peace 
process forward.  Other observations include: 
 
-- Indian politics towards Pakistan have fundamentally 
changed, as the public wants more cross border trade and 
people to people contacts.  Pakistan-bashing does not bring 
in the votes like it used to. 
 
-- The Pakistani economy is growing and Pakistanis are also 
pushing for more economic opportunities to take advantage of 
rising Indian prosperity.  These trends support the logic 
behind PM Singh's "soft borders" process. 
 
-- In Pakistan, the perception is that there is a window of 
opportunity before elections in 2007.  However, the Indian 
side is not able to digest a solution to Kashmir on such a 
short time frame nor do elites envision radical solutions. 
 
-- The Indian leadership realizes that the time for progress 
has come, but worries the BJP and the bureaucracy will attack 
any concessions the GOI makes to Pakistan. 
 
-- Kashmiri "fence sitters" with a vested financial interest 
in the status quo are stalling progress by remaining 
disengaged or working against the peace process. 
 
Situations Deteriorate in Nepal and Bangladesh 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
6.  (C) Despite positive Indo-US cooperation in Nepal, the 
King has refused to reach out to the political parties. 
Participants agreed that: 
 
-- It is critical that the King reach out to the parties 
before November, when the political parties may consider 
greater cooperation with the Maoists. 
-- The King believes that if the Maoists grow stronger and 
threaten the monarchy, India and the US will ultimately come 
to his rescue. 
 
-- Although US-Indo cooperation on Nepal has been a good 
experience, the GOI has also not been able to influence the 
King to move towards democracy. 
 
7. (C) Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh is raising 
concerns in India, Britain, and among the donor countries. 
Participants worried that: 
 
-- If bombings in Dhaka continue, security concerns could 
endanger the November 12-13 SAARC meeting. 
 
-- In Delhi and Calcutta, Indians are increasingly worried 
about Bangladeshi migrants and madrassas along the border. 
 
-- Many in India are urging the US to "do something" about 
Bangladesh.  Indian cooperation with the GOB is complicated 
by the perception that the GOI supports the Awami League, in 
addition to disagreements over security and border issues, 
water sharing and trade. 
 
India's Internal Affairs 
------------------------ 
 
8.  (U) Participants discussed BJP and Congress ideology, 
trends in Indian politics and the chances of the UPA 
government holding together until 2008.  Our key conclusions 
are: 
 
-- The BJP and Congress parties lack cohesive, overarching 
ideologies or programs.  This is partially explained by the 
local focus of Indian politics, the economic, ethnic and 
other disparities between states, the lack of a strong 
opposition (regardless of who is in power), and ideologies 
which are brought out to gain votes but put away to rule. 
 
-- As a result of shifting loyalties and opportunism in 
parliamentary politics, it is difficult to say with great 
certainty that the Singh government will last a full term. 
 
-- Irreversible trends including liberal economic reforms (at 
an undecided pace), democratic decentralization, social 
empowerment, and stronger US-Indo relations, will continue, 
regardless of who is in power. 
 
-- The BJP remains embroiled in its own internal debate over 
the role of Hindutva.  Even the RSS sees that Hindutva 
doesn't provide the same electoral payoffs, and the BJP needs 
to find a new issue that transcends caste and religion. 
 
-- Congress also has its factions, including a modern, 
reformist block, a populist group using patronage and 
employment guarantees to rebuild the party base, and an 
ideological clan still stuck on ideas of a socialist economy. 
 
9.  (U)  A few observations on the Left Parties and the 
Naxalites include: 
 
-- The Left in West Bengal favor economic modernization but 
are the loudest critics of Indo-US cooperation.  These 
economic views clash with Marxists in the central leadership, 
which take a stronger anti-globalization stance. 
 
-- In the Communist strongholds of Kerala and West Bengal, 
the Left parties are seen as the only non-corrupt 
alternative. 
 
-- States with the worst governance present the best 
opportunities for the Naxalites to fill the governmental 
vacuum, channel people's anger, and frame the problem in 
terms of class conflict.  This also primes the people to 
switch their allegiance from the Naxalites to the Communists 
should the insurgencies run out of steam. 
 
-- Although the number of Naxalites is low, the states have 
been unable to deal with the Naxalite problem, and are only 
now starting to call in the central government for 
assistance. 
 
10.  (U) In a presentation on human rights, participants 
pointed out that: 
 
-- Factors encouraging an improvement in human rights in 
India include the UPA government, which is more inclusive 
than the BJP, an active NGO community, sound human rights 
laws, and a free press. 
 
-- However, discrimination against women, children and low 
castes remains prevalent.  Another major challenge in India 
is GOI sensitivity to taking US funding for human rights 
activities. 
 
-- USG policy should try to empower those individuals 
fighting for improvements in human rights using the 
advantages of India's democratic system. 
 
-- Two regional human trafficking challenges in South Asia 
are cross-border trafficking of women and children and camel 
jockey trafficking. 
 
11.  (U) Comment: At the second annual South Asia Political 
Reporting Officers' Conference, a diverse group of officers 
and FSNs working all over the broader region met, analyzed 
issues, put faces to names and networked.  Most importantly, 
we forged new bonds that will help us address US policy 
challenges.  Embassy New Delhi thanks all the participants 
for their attendance and cooperation at a successful 
conference.  End Comment. 
 
12.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
Mulford