This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 002620 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS BIC SORT
SUBJECT: BIC-IV:  (U) MEETING ON ISSUES RELATED TO 
TRANSPARENCY AND OPENNESS, OCTOBER 27, 2005 
 
REF: 04 GENEVA 1027 (BIC-I-003) 
 
Classified By:  DAS Karin L. Look, U.S. Representative 
to the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC). 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is BIC-IV-004. 
 
¶2.  (U)  Meeting Date:  October 27, 2005 
                 Time:  3:00 - 3:45 P.M. 
                Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶3.  (C) As a measure to improve transparency and 
confidence-building, Russia repackaged its proposal 
(originally made in BIC-I on April 9, 2004, REFTEL) to 
sub-aggregate strategic nuclear warhead data.  Russia 
proposed that, in addition to providing the total number of 
deployed strategic nuclear warheads that is already reported 
in each side's briefings on its strategic forces, the sides 
should also report sub-aggregated numbers of deployed 
strategic nuclear warhead data for ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy 
bombers at each base.  Alternatively, if the United States 
cannot agree to provide the positional data, then perhaps the 
sides could agree to provide the sub-aggregated numbers for 
ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.  The Russian Delegation 
stated that the focus of Russia's proposal was to obtain a 
clear picture of Moscow Treaty (MT) implementation.  The U.S. 
Delegation restated the U.S. position that providing 
additional information in the BIC was unnecessary, but said 
that it would report this proposal to Washington. 
 
¶4.  (C) In reference to the Russian Aide-Memoire on strategic 
stability of September 20, 2005, Russia stressed that the 
question of our future strategic relationship is an important 
issue and noted that the expiration of the START Treaty had 
provided the impetus behind Russia's Aide Memoire.  The sides 
need to cooperate to work through these important issues. 
There would be a new administration in 2009; therefore, it is 
important to examine these issues now.  The U.S. side noted 
that the United States was considering the Aide-Memoire, but 
added that we are still four years away from the expiration 
of START. 
 
------------------------------- 
RUSSIA OUTLINES RE-PACKAGED 
APPROACH TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING 
AND TRANSPARENCY 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Ul'yanov stated that, in the Joint Declaration of May 
24, 2002, the Presidents of Russia and the United States had 
stated that the START Treaty provides the foundation for 
providing confidence, transparency and predictability in 
further strategic offensive reductions, along with other 
supplementary measures, including transparency measures to be 
agreed.  This statement should be a direct assignment to both 
delegations of the BIC by the Presidents of the United States 
and Russia.  He said that it was unfortunate that the amount 
of data provided under the MT was much less than the amount 
of information that was provided under the START Treaty. 
Furthermore, he believed that the sides were more transparent 
at the end of the Cold War than they are now, and that this 
approach should not continue in this new era of partnership. 
 
¶6.  (C) As a way forward, Ul'yanov said that the sides should 
focus on enhancing transparency.  Thus, Russia proposed that 
the sides provide additional sub-aggregated strategic nuclear 
warhead data in the strategic forces briefings to improve 
transparency and confidence-building measures related to 
reporting numbers of such warheads under the MT.  Russia 
proposed that, in addition to providing the total number of 
deployed strategic nuclear warheads that was already reported 
in each side's briefings on its strategic forces, the sides 
should also report sub-aggregated numbers of deployed 
strategic nuclear warhead data for ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy 
bombers at each base.  Alternatively, if the United States 
cannot agree to provide the positional data, then perhaps the 
sides could agree to provide the sub-aggregated numbers for 
ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.  Ul'yanov stated that such an 
exchange of data would not include verification measures, and 
that Russia is flexible regarding the form of the agreement. 
Russia's past proposal was for an exchange of letters, 
however, now Russia believes this could be based on each 
side's mutual understanding.  He concluded that the focus of 
Russia's proposal was to obtain a clear picture of MT 
implementation. 
 
¶7.  (C) Look stated that it has been a long-standing U.S. 
position that it is unnecessary to provide additional data 
for reporting strategic nuclear warheads under the MT -- that 
position has not changed.  The U.S. focus is on cooperative, 
informal approaches that are reciprocal, but not necessarily 
symmetrical, that do not require negotiations and agreements. 
 Look also disagreed with Ul'yanov about his comparison 
between the MT and the START Treaty with the types and amount 
of data that was provided.  She said that information 
provided under the START Treaty was not provided out of 
generosity or openness.  It was required to be provided 
because of strict Treaty provisions developed because of the 
nature of our Cold War relationship.  In contrast, under the 
MT, which grew out of, and is part of a changed U.S.-Russian 
relationship, information is offered, not required, and the 
mechanism for providing information is one of briefings and 
dialogue.  Look, commenting on the Russian side's repeated 
focus on transparency for the MT, said that since we are now 
several years into implementing the MT and are closing in on 
the end date of the START Treaty (December 5, 2009), it was 
probably more important to look to the future, as Russia had 
outlined in its September 20, 2005 Aide-Memoire, rather than 
try to improve the past. 
 
--------------------------------- 
RUSSIA'S AIDE-MEMOIRE:  WHAT 
SHOULD WE DO AFTER START EXPIRES? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Ul'yanov stated that, with respect to future 
dialogue, the START Treaty currently allows each Party to 
view, with some degree of certainty, what the other side was 
doing with its strategic forces.  He asked whether the United 
States had considered how it would address openness and 
transparency after December 5, 2009.  Look said that the 
United States had not yet formally considered this issue. 
However, she noted that the United States was considering 
Russia's September 20 Aide-Memoire.  Look said that, in her 
view, Russia had asked the right question in its 
Aide-Memoire; i.e., where do the sides go from here with our 
strategic relationship?  She said that the United States is 
considering how to answer the question.  She also said that 
Russia's Aide-Memoire also indicates to her that Russia did 
not have answers to these questions at this point either. 
She said that although, in her view, we need to work to find 
those answers, there is no sense of urgency as to when the 
answers are needed. 
 
¶9.  (C) Ul'yanov said that Look was quite right in stating 
that Russia did not have answers to questions beyond 2009. 
He suggested that both the United States and Russia as 
partners should work together to seek the answers.  He said 
that it may be easier to come up with the answers to these 
questions separately at the higher levels of our governments, 
but he said he did not believe that this was the right 
approach.  He said that the right approach was one of 
cooperation among the two sides.  As to Look's point on the 
lack of urgency, Ul'yanov pointed out that there will be 
Presidential elections in both Russia and the United States 
before the end of START.  The elections would have a 
significant impact on our work, and it was important to 
address these questions now.  The new administrations would 
not be focusing on questions related to the end of the START 
Treaty, there would be bigger issues for the new 
administrations to consider.  Therefore, the sooner we began 
the dialogue on the way forward on this question, the better 
chance we have to end our dialogue in a more fruitful way. 
 
¶10.  (C) Look said she believes that a U.S.-Russia dialogue 
should not be focused on the expiration of START.  Ul'yanov 
said that the expiration of START provided the impetus for 
the Aide-Memoire, but the sides should, of course, focus on 
the broader relationship.  Russia wants a serious dialogue. 
Look thanked Ul'yanov for his explanations and indicated she 
would report them to Washington. 
 
----------------------- 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Ul'yanov said that, based on established tradition, 
the sides should discuss the date for the next BIC meeting. 
Look said that, since she did not know who would be the U.S. 
Representative for the next session of the BIC, it was unfair 
to try to set a date now.  However, in general, since the 
U.S. Report on the MT is due to the Senate on April 1st, 
perhaps sometime in the early spring could be used for 
initial planning purposes.  Ul'yanov said that two meetings a 
year, one in the spring and one in the fall, seem right to 
him.  He noted that the sides could finalize the date in 
diplomatic channels.  By way of a summary of the session, 
Ul'yanov said this had not been an easy session but the 
dialogue had been good.  However, he hoped that the sides 
could approach the next session by taking a closer look into 
finalizing the issues related to the definition and Russia's 
proposal for increased transparency.  Look agreed with 
Ul'yanov's assessment of the dialogue at this session.  She 
said that while there were some dead ends, there were also 
some possibilities for further fruitful discussions. 
 
¶12.  (U) Documents exchanged:  None. 
 
¶13.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
DAS Look 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Singer 
Col Smith 
Mr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
Russia 
 
Mr. Ul'yanov 
Gen Maj Artyukhin 
Mr. Artem'yev 
Col Fedorchenko 
Col Kamenskiy 
Amb Masterkov 
Mr. Mezhennyy 
Ms. Sorokina 
Ms. Vodopolova 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Gusev (Int) 
 
¶14.  (U) Look sends. 
Moley