This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
FROM US REPS AT INTER-SUDANESE PEACE TALKS ON DARFUR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KAWC KCRS SU NI DARFUR
SUBJECT: ABUJA:  ROUND SIX 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The Sixth Round of the Darfur talks 
at Abuja, held from September 15 - October 20, were 
hindered by controversy within the SLM/A, poor 
planning, and a perceived lack of serious approach by 
the GOS and the JEM/SLM.  The African Union did not 
provide the stern leadership needed to keep the 
negotiations focused, especially given the enduring 
suspicion and lack of trust existing between the 
parties.  Violence continued on the ground in Darfur, 
further eroding chances for success.  Plans for the 
seventh round must focus on a disciplined, coordinated 
effort and must limit the size of delegations as well 
as restrict the increasing presence of non-participants 
or partners which interferes with the attention given 
to serious negotiation.  As the talks move toward more 
substantive issues, the AU should make a concerted 
effort to use the time between sessions to help 
representatives of the parties to prepare for the next 
round.  In the meanwhile, the United States should use 
its influence with the SLM/A to help ensure a solution 
to the movement's internal problems - which could well 
result in a more-than-two-way split or, worse, 
increased violence.  End summary. 
 
---------------- 
The Negotiations 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Neither the GOS nor the SLM/JEM showed 
enthusiasm to negotiate in good faith.  Meetings were 
scheduled, but often suspended after a short while. 
Documents were presented (often late), but delays in 
translations also led to further delays.  JEM dominated 
the newly-formed JEM/SLM group and clearly did most of 
the work.  We expect that, as the subjects become more 
substantive, the AU will have to insist on a more 
disciplined approach by all.  JEM has asked for AU 
support for a few of its members to remain for a time 
in Abuja to begin preparing papers for the next round. 
First, however, the parties must agree on the agendas 
for wealth-sharing and security commissions, an 
apparently daunting task that should, nonetheless, be 
accomplished before breaking October 20 for the end of 
Ramadan Eid.  Round 6 results although meager will be 
real with agreement on some of the more general issues 
under power sharing and, optimistically, the approved 
agendas for the other two commissions.  This would 
permit the parties to make focused preparation on the 
specific issue to be discussed during Round 7, if they 
were to use their time well during the month long 
break. 
 
------------- 
The SLM Issue 
------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Sixth round began under the shadow of 
division and controversy within the SLM/A.  Per 
agreement with SLM Chairman Abdul Wahid, the JEM and 
SLM joined forces to negotiate as one unit.  Abdul 
Wahid, however, submitted an arbitrary list of 42 
participants to the AU, thus provoking early SLM in- 
fighting.  A group of disciplined commanders from the 
field, led by Bakheit Karimo and representing five 
tribes and one Arab tribe, traveled to Abuja in an 
attempt to convince the AU and International Community 
to accept a previous list of delegates signed by 
Minawi, Abdel Wahid, and Khamis.  They were 
unsuccessful, and, increasingly frustrated by Chairman 
Wahid's inflexibility, returned to Darfur on October 
¶16. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The internal conflict within the SLM/A 
contributed to the negative climate.  Other issues, 
such as the almost-instant condemnation of the SLA in 
the killings of 6 AU and contractor personnel, also 
became a focus of attention and dissatisfaction.  The 
key issue is, however, the clash between SLM Chairman 
Abdel Wahid and Secretary General Mini Minawi.  A long 
history of personal dislike has culminated in a 
dangerous rift in the movement which could lead to 
multiple splinter groups and more violence.  Attempts 
by the commanders, the AU, and the international 
partners to reason with Abdel Wahid fell on deaf ears. 
Eventually, many of his own supporters became 
frustrated by his arrogance and lack of leadership, and 
a quiet coalition of "neutral" members is emerging. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The SLM conference planned for late October 
in Darfur is still on track.  Various versions exist of 
who, what, and when, but we have talked with those on 
the planning commission and others acknowledge that an 
attempt was made to have all groups represented in the 
planning stage.  Some, including Abdel Wahid and 
Khamis, refused to go to N'Djamena to participate. 
Minawi, on the other hand, had refused to hold the 
conference earlier in Kofra - as agreed to by the 
others.  Chadian President Deby has told Abdel Wahid 
and some members of the International Community that he 
will try to convince the three leaders to go to Chad 
for a meeting, in the interest of SLM unity.  This 
apparently would be a prelude to Deby's idea of a 
broader SLM Conference to be convened by him in Abeche 
or elsewhere in Chad.  Many members in Abuja back this 
suggestion, but warn that Mini is not on Deby's list of 
favorites right now and may not attend. 
 
----------- 
Compromise? 
----------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) An air of frustration and almost fear hangs 
now over the SLM here.  All acknowledge the need for a 
general conference soon.  Most do not believe the 
conference planned to be held within the next few days 
is a Mini affair or a Zaghawa plot - especially since 
the co-chairmen are from the Massaleit and Bergit 
tribes.  An emerging plan, which merits attention, is 
that this conference is held, Abdel Wahid attends, and 
the leadership remains intact for an interim period 
while the movement is organized.  That would remove the 
threat of removal from Wahid especially, and allow 
breathing space in which to structure the SLM, 
hopefully keep it united, and select a competent team 
of negotiators acceptable to all factions. 
 
----------- 
Round Seven 
----------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The talks are bogged down but not broken.  If 
the next round is to be successful, however, the AU 
should limit numbers from all parties and consider the 
venue.  A stream of researchers, authors, and 
representatives from NGO's and even the Holocaust 
Museum competed for time with the parties, detracting 
from the negotiations.  Current AU planning is to limit 
the delegations to 30 members each, both for financial 
and efficiency reasons.  In addition to expected 
intensive efforts to try to resolve the problem of a 
weak, divided SLM negotiating team, the AU, with help 
from international partners, also will make more 
attempts toward capacity building especially for the 
movements.  The planned Norwegian/World Bank wealth 
sharing training workshop in Nairobi the week of 
November 8, focused on specific issues and actual, 
anticipated negotiators, seems a reasonable example of 
the sorts of efforts which might help.  On a different 
tack, some expect that a GOS delegation truly 
representative of the GNU with prominent SPLM 
participation would make a difference.  The movements 
even come close at times to insisting on it as a 
condition for negotiating with the GOS, but that is not 
an issue that can be resolved in Abuja or by the AU. 
Salim plans to reconvene Round 7 on November 20, 
working to and through Christmas if necessary. 
Everyone knows that it will take that long and longer 
to get the comprehensive agreement which is needed. 
 
CAMPBELL