This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 TEGUCIGALPA 001938 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/WHA, S/CT, AND WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2015 
TAGS: ASEC HO KSAC
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 162859 
 
     ¶B. 04 TEGUCIGALPA 02777 
     ¶C. TEGUCIGALPA 00557 
     ¶D. TEGUCIGALPA 767 
     ¶E. TEGUCIGALPA 1859 
     ¶F. TEGUCIGALPA 1775 
     ¶G. TEGUCIGALPA 2673 
     ¶H. TEGUCIGALPA 2491 
 
Classified By: CDA JAMES WILLIARD Reason 1.4 (C) and (D). 
 
¶1. (U) The following responses are keyed to the Security 
Environment Profile Questionnaire (ref A). 
 
--------------------------------- 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Demonstrations: 
 
(1-A.)  Yes.  Additionally, there are a number of 
organizations and groups under the loose collective 
leadership of (and affiliated with) the Bloque Popular that 
have been carrying out demonstrations against U.S. foreign 
policy, as well as demonstrations targeting local issues. 
The following organizations have been involved in 
anti-American political activities to varying degrees.  They 
are listed in alphabetical order, utilizing Spanish acronyms 
where applicable.  Post notes that the majority of those 
organizations are left-leaning NGOs or unions, many of whom 
maintain good relations with the Embassy. (List updated 
September 2005): 
 
- ARTISTAS DE LA UNAH 
 
Artists of the National Autonomous University of Honduras 
(A-UNAH) 
 
- BLOQUE POPULAR 
Popular Block 
 
- COCOH 
Farmers' Cooperatives Union 
 
- CODECOH 
Honduran Consumer Protection Committee 
 
- CODEH 
Honduran Committee for Human Rights 
 
- COFADEH 
Honduran Committee of Family Members of the Detained and 
Disappeared 
 
- COHAPAZ 
Honduran Committee for Action for Peace 
 
- COLPROSUMAH 
Honduran Professional Teachers College (a teachers' union) 
 
- COMPA-H 
People of the Americas Convergence Movement (COMPA)-Honduras 
 
- COPEMH 
Honduran Association of Secondary School Teachers 
 
- COPINH 
Civic Council of Popular Organizations and Indigenous Groups 
of Honduras (also appears as COPIN) 
 
- COPRUMH 
Honduran Professional Association Teachers' Union 
 
- CGT 
General Workers Central (the largest of Honduras' three 
national labor confederations) 
 
- CTH 
Confederation of Honduran Workers (arguably, the strongest of 
the three national labor confederations) 
 
- CUTH 
United Confederation of Honduran Workers (the most left of 
the three national labor confederations) 
 
- FPR 
Popular Revolution Forces, a shadowy alleged revolutionary 
group. 
 
- FUTH 
United Federation of Honduran Workers (the largest component 
of CUTH, above) 
- FSM 
Feminist Movement (details needed) 
- FUR 
University Revolutionary Front 
 
- GRUPO LOS NECIOS DE LA UNAH 
UNAH Fools Group - Activist group in UNAH that "cheerleads" 
and motivates demos 
 
- MEH 
Honduran Student Movement 
 
- PARTIDO DE LOS TRABAJADORES DE LA FACULTAD DE PEDAGOGIA DE 
LA UNAH 
Teaching Faculty Workers' Party of UNAH 
 
- RADIO GUALCHO 
Leftist/Activist radio station (1510Mhz) that works closely 
with Bloque Popular and is actively involved in most 
demonstrations 
 
- REPRESENTANTE DE FRENTE Y REFORMA DE LA UNAH 
Reform Front Representative of UNAH 
 
- SERUNAH 
New UNAH coalition group, like Bloque Popular (but not as 
prominent) 
 
- SITRAINFOP 
National Institute of Professional Formation Workers' Union 
 
- SITRAINA 
National Agrarian Institute Workers' Union 
 
- SITRAIHSS 
Institute of Social Security Workers' Union 
 
- SITRAUNAH 
UNAH Workers' Union 
 
- SITRAUPEN 
A Workers' Union (details needed) 
 
- STIBYS 
Beverage and Associated Industries Workers' Union (plays a 
key organizing and logistics role for many demos)- Leader of 
STIBYS is also the leader of the Popular Block. 
 
- SITRAPANI 
Child Welfare Association Workers' Union 
 
- UD 
Democratic Unification Party (remnants of the Communist Party 
of Honduras and other former Marxist parties; represented in 
the National Congress) 
 
- UNAH 
National Autonomous University of Honduras 
 
- URP 
Revolutionary People's Union 
 
NOTE: The most fervent anti-U.S. groups are: MEH, URP, UD, 
Bloque Popular, STIBYS, COPINH, and COMPA-H.  The following 
groups have committed and participated in acts of political 
vandalism (against the Honduran Government and other 
entities) that resulted in the destruction of public and 
private property: Bloque Popular, COPINH, Democratic 
Unification Party (UD), and The Revolutionary People's Union 
(URP). 
 
(1-B.) Yes.  There have been 40 demonstrations in Tegucigalpa 
since August 2004, including nine demonstrations either held 
outside or near the U.S. Embassy.  While not all 
demonstrations are directed against the U.S. Government, many 
are convoked to protest against U.S. foreign policy 
initiators, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom or the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement.  On December 13, 2004, there 
was a demonstration that resulted in local police using tear 
gas outside of the National Congress against the 
demonstrators, consisting mainly of local university students 
and administrators (reftel B).  On March 8, several groups 
protested against the CAFTA resolution which was passed by 
the Honduran Congress on March 3 (reftel C).  On April 8, the 
Honduran public sector unions protested against alleged back 
pay, and the Honduran police used water and tear gas to break 
up the crowd (reftel D).  On May 11, approximately 150 people 
from the Consejo Civico de Organizaciones Populares e 
Inigenas de Honduras (COPINH) and the Bloque Popular again 
protested against CAFTA.  And most recently, on September 7 
and 8, protesters comprised of mainly public transportation 
(taxi) drivers blocked streets in protest against an increase 
in gasoline and other basic products.  Access and egress from 
the main airport in Tegucigalpa were shut-off for 
approximately 14 hours (reftel E). 
 
(1-C.)  About half of the demonstrations noted above have 
taken place near U.S. Mission facilities. 
 
(1-D.)  The size of demonstrations at the Embassy varies from 
twenty to over three hundred participants.  The larger demos 
usually consist of supporters from six to more than twelve 
different organizations, which operate as a loosely 
structured coalition under the guidance of Bloque Popular. 
 
(1-E.)  While there are demonstrations based on local issues, 
such as civil service salaries, privatization, gasoline 
prices, and IMF requirements, the current focus has been on 
U.S. actions in Iraq, the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA), as well as previous U.S. involvement in 
Venezuela and Haiti.  The following statements, demands, and 
gestures have been made repeatedly during past demos at the 
Embassy:  No to war in Iraq, No to war, Stop Plan Colombia, 
Pro-Human rights, World Peace, Stop Central American Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA), U.S. Forces out of Honduras (Soto 
Cano AB), U.S. Military out of Cuba, U.S. destroy your WMD, 
Stop intervention in Venezuela, Stop Standard Fruit from 
exploiting the indigenous people, Opposition to CAFTA, No to 
privatization, Stop intervention in Haiti. 
 
(1-F.)  Generally peaceful, but demonstrators have burned 
U.S. flags, thrown rocks, painted slogans on Mission outer 
perimeter walls, and utilized homemade mortars to detonate 
large fireworks charges that are propelled high into the air 
before exploding. 
 
(1-G.)  N/A. 
 
(1-H.)  N/A. 
 
(1-I.)  Yes. 
 
(1-J.)  Yes.  Occasionally they will pass by the Embassy. 
 
(1-K.)  The size varies from a few hundred to approximately 
five thousand people. 
 
(1-L.)  Generally peaceful, but fences, grillwork, and 
windows have been destroyed near the National Congress, as 
well as many tires burned.  At times, suspected plain-clothes 
police have been held and beaten by hard-core protesters 
within the demonstrations. 
 
On occasions, small groups of thug-like cadre have 
initiated/instigated violence against static police guards by 
attempting to strike them in the lower leg areas, which are 
not protected by riot shields with heavy placard poles with 
large nails embedded in the ends.  Several police officials 
have been injured in unsuccessful attempts to get the police 
to use force. 
 
(1-M.)  N/A. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶2. (SBU)  Macro Conflict Conditions: 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
(2-A.)  No. 
 
(2-B.)  N/A. 
(2-C.)  N/A. 
(2-D.)  N/A. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU)  Host Country Capabilities: 
------------------------------------------- 
 
(3-A.)  No. 
 
Police are somewhat mediocre in professionalism and training; 
they are also somewhat apathetic toward post residential 
security requirements, including response to alarms and 
investigation of incidents in Mission neighborhoods; they 
have definite resource/manpower limitations that inhibit 
their deterrence or response effectiveness. 
 
The National Preventive Police and Criminal Investigations 
Directorate General (DGIC).  Both departments suffer from a 
lack of manpower, training, equipment, low pay, and 
motivation.  Honduras has the lowest per capita ratio of 
police in Latin America.  They lack the capital to purchase 
and maintain vehicles (including gas) and radio equipment. 
There is no standard service weapon.  Despite numerous 
training programs and efforts by many nations, including the 
U.S., the DGIC is lacking in morale, leadership, and 
resources.  In numerous traffic accidents involving Mission 
personnel, the response time has exceeded several hours by 
the transit police.  The courts, prosecutors, and police are 
extremely susceptible to bribery and influence, causing 
reversals in judgments against the Embassy.  In one incident 
involving a Mission employee and a Mission dependent, where 
guns were pointed into their backs and faces and they were 
significantly terrorized, the police never showed up, even 
after repeated calls.  Terminations have been numerous for 
both political as well as criminal reasons and extend beyond 
positions normally considered political appointees.  In other 
cases, certain high-ranking police cannot be terminated for 
technical reason.   Morale and integrity in the DGIC is seen 
as low.  The problem is exacerbated by continued fighting 
between the Minister of Public Security, the Attorney 
General's office, prosecutors, and judges. 
 
(3-B.)  Yes.  Training by U.S. Border Patrol Tactical 
(BorTac) teams is good, but GOH security infrastructure needs 
major improvements. 
 
(3-C.)  Yes.   Although not directly tied to a law 
enforcement agency, significant corruption was recently 
uncovered within Honduran Immigration, namely from the former 
Immigration Director Ramon Romero.  The Honduran Immigration 
scandal continues to dominate press headlines.  The Special 
Prosecutor for Organized Crime is appealing the August 18 
release of Romero, who was jailed for four months (reftel F). 
 
 
(3-D.)  No.  However, GOH intelligence units have an 
institutional awareness of and a modest capability of 
penetrating indigenous radical groups. 
 
(3-E.)  Yes. 
 
(3-F.)  No.  (They have almost no capability to detect or 
disrupt international terrorist activities). 
 
(3-G.)  Yes. 
 
(3-H.)  Poor.  There is widespread corruption within 
immigration and customs and a measurable lack of security 
coordination within the airport.  Physical security is also 
inadequate, as the perimeter lacks effective fencing, vehicle 
barriers, and lighting. 
 
(3-I.)  Ineffective.  Corrupt officials are easily bribed, 
and therefore pose a real threat to U.S security interests. 
Honduran passports, for example, have been fraudulently 
obtained through immigration and customs officials for use by 
subjects not legitimately entitled to them. 
 
(3-J.)  Average/Ineffective.  A unit within the Ministry of 
Public Security called the Frontier Police handles border 
patrol duties.  The unit is making positive steps towards 
border control, but lack of funding and manpower are limiting 
the effectiveness of the unit. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶4. (SBU) Indigenous Terrorism-Anti American Terrorist Groups: 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
(4-A.)  No. 
 
(4-B.)  N/A. 
 
(4-C.)  N/A. 
 
(4-D.)  N/A. 
 
(4-E.)  N/A. 
 
(4-F.)  N/A. 
 
(4-G.)  N/A. 
 
(4-H.)  N/A. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶5. (SBU)  Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups: 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
(5-A.)  No. 
 
(5-B.)  N/A. 
 
(5-C.)  N/A. 
 
(5-D.)  N/A. 
 
(5-E.)  N/A. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶6. (S/NF)  Transnational Terrorism-Transnational Terrorist 
Indicators: 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
(6-A.)  No.  However, there are rumors that in the past there 
have been Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), IRA, and 
Chiapas (Zapatistas) sympathizers in Honduras who could be 
involved in advising indigenous groups.  Some Hondurans are 
studying in Cuba and also conceivably could be receiving 
training in subversion and terrorism, although it is more 
likely they are being indoctrinated as agents of influence. 
As this Cuban program for Hondurans is in its infancy, there 
have been no indications that such training is taking place. 
 
Additionally, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) has a notorious presence in Honduras, especially in 
the northern coastal areas, where they routinely trade drugs 
for arms. 
 
There were two further incidents of note: 
 
Incident 1 - In November 2004, a Lebanese-flagged merchant 
vessel, Abdul Rahman, was discovered carrying large 
quantities of explosives.  The explosives had not been 
reported to port officials when the ship arrived.  The vessel 
is on watch list for possible terrorist links based on 
information indicating its owner Wael OZOR was an al-Qaida 
sympathizer and had connections to Hizballah (reftel G). 
 
Incident 2 -  On September 19,  2004, two Jordanians were 
detained in Costa Rica for using fake passports.  They were 
deported back to Amman, Jordan, and interviewed by Jordanian 
authorities. They stated that they were in Central America 
looking for work.  They did not mention receiving assistance 
from anyone or why they traveled to four Central American 
countries. RSO has been able to obtain documentation that, 
while in Honduras, the two were assisted by a third party who 
paid for their hotel, food, and a plane ticket to facilitate 
travel.  Subsequently, RSO Tegucigalpa, working with other 
sections, has found a possible link between the telephone 
number called by Abdel Rahman Nassar and the two Jordanian 
subjects with known alien smuggling groups within Central 
America and Hizbollah terror group in the Middle East (reftel 
H). 
 
(6-B.)  N/A. 
(6-C.)  N/A. 
 
(6-D.)  N/A and No. 
(6-E.)  N/A. 
(6-F.)  The only known hostile intelligence presence of note 
is Cuban.  While the Cuban mission appears to have extensive 
contacts with leftists and indigenous groups, there is no 
indication they are planning or supporting terrorism. 
Likewise, while there is concern over alleged Venezuelan 
contact with and possible funding of Leftist organizations, 
there is no indication that they are planning or supporting 
terrorism. 
 
(6-G.)  There is no shortage of weapons in Honduras.  It 
would also not be difficult for hostile terrorist elements to 
import weapons and/or explosives from neighboring countries. 
Williard