Tim W Hayes  01/23/2008 02:10:02 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

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S E C R E T        NICOSIA 01566

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 NICOSIA 001566 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/PGI (LREASOR/IWEINSTEIN), EUR/SE (KINGMANSON), EUR/ACE 
(SKUX), EUR/PPD (VWALKER), S/CT (MNORMAN) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1 AND 1.6X6 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PTER SOCI TU CY
SUBJECT: EXTREMISM IN CYPRUS: (MOSTLY) "NO PROBLEM" 
 
REF: A. STATE 144222 
     ¶B. 04 NICOSIA 1916 
     ¶C. USDAO NICOSIA IIR 6 823 0128 05 
     ¶D. USDAO NICOSIA IIR 6 823 0118 05 
     ¶E. 04 NICOSIA 1754 
 
Classified By: CDA Jane Zimmerman, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) This message is in reply to ref a tasking.  The 
31-year division of Cyprus has produced two separate, and 
quite distinct, populations and governing systems on the 
island.  While the USG and the international community 
recognize the Republic of Cyprus as the sole sovereign 
government on the island, the "Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC)" exercises de facto control over one third of 
the island's area and population, with the strong backing of 
Turkey and the 25,000-strong Turkish army stationed here. 
Due to the transfer of populations after the 1974 war, the 
vast majority of the island's Muslim population (roughly 
250,000 out of a total population of just under 1 million) 
lives in the "TRNC," although a smaller number of third 
country Muslims also resides in the south.  This cable deals 
with each side of the Green Line separately. 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶2. (S) The overwhelmingly secular Turkish Cypriot community 
in north Cyprus appears to have no sympathy for religious 
extremism, and the almost 30,000 foreign students in the 
"TRNC" appear mainly uninterested in radical Islam. 
Traditionally minded Turkish settlers make up nearly half the 
population of the north, however.  Although there is little 
evidence that Islamic radicalism has taken root in this 
community, there have been reports of extremist clerics 
visiting the north to teach and preach to the settlers. 
Discrimination against mainland Turks by Turkish Cypriots, 
the settlers' relative poverty and socio-economic 
marginalization, together with an increasing number of 
EU-bound illegal migrants from other Muslim countries, could 
serve as a catalyst for extremist sympathies.   For the 
moment, however, local extremism in the north appears to be 
limited to marginal, far-right nationalist groups with 
limited influence.  The "state's" tight control over mosques 
and religious education, bolstered by a heavy presence of 
Turkish security forces, appears to have minimized the danger 
of homegrown Islamic terrorism -- and has also helped keep 
KGK/Kongra-Gel at bay.  But there are several potentially 
tempting targets in the north, including large numbers of 
British holiday makers.  At the same time, the "TRNC's" 
vulnerability to money laundering makes it a potentially 
attractive place for terrorist financiers. 
 
¶3. (S)  Similarly, ROC authorities in the south have yet to 
come to grips with the porousness of their own borders and 
the security threat this could pose.  Large numbers of 
UK/European tourists, along with UK military personnel and 
bases, represent a potentially tempting target for foreign 
militants in the south.  While there is little evidence of 
extremists in the south, tensions between locals and 
third-country immigrants (some of whom are Muslim) bear 
watching.  Meanwhile, Greek Cypriot authorities have allowed 
KGK/Kongra-Gel some room to maneuver in the south -- a result 
of the ROC's enmity toward Turkey, as well as a desire to 
remain useful to (and therefore safe from) Kurdish terrorism. 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
 
SECULAR TURKISH CYPRIOTS: ONLY HALF THE EQUATION 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Turkish Cypriots make up a little over half of the 
north's population and their presence in Cyprus dates from 
the Ottoman conquest in 1571.  Within this population, 
however, there is significant diversity; many Turkish 
Cypriots have European Janissary, Alevi, or even Greek 
Cypriot ancestry.  It is perhaps due to this diverse and 
evolving ethnic mix that Turkish Cypriots have always 
practiced a very heterodox form of Islam. 
 
¶5. (S) Mainly Sunni in name and by tradition, Turkish 
Cypriots are nonetheless overwhelmingly secular, and proudly 
point this out to anyone who asks.  Their behavior bears out 
this assertion.  With the exception of funerals or other 
special occasions, Turkish Cypriots rarely pray or visit 
mosques.  Fasting at Ramadan is not uncommon, but restaurants 
do not close during the holiday.  In fact, bars and cafes do 
a brisk business selling alcohol year-round, often right next 
door to mosques.   Although it is impossible to rule out the 
existence of individual extremists in the community, as a 
group the Turkish Cypriots appear to offer infertile ground 
for Islamic extremism. 
 
TURKISH SETTLERS: MORE TRADITIONAL, MORE MARGINALIZED 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6. (C) In addition to the Turkish Cypriots, however, there 
are roughly 100,000 Anatolian settlers resident in the north 
(ref b), who arrived in several waves after the 1974 Turkish 
invasion.  Some are now "TRNC" citizens, but the most recent 
arrivals, are often undocumented, unskilled, economic 
migrants hailing from eastern Turkey (especially the 
southeastern province of Hatay).  A significant number speak 
Arabic as a first language, and "TRNC" officials guess that 
up to 20 percent are Kurdish. 
 
¶7. (C) Some of these immigrants have integrated with Turkish 
Cypriots through intermarriage.  Most remain outside the 
mainstream of Turkish Cypriot society, however, and mesh 
poorly with the secular and westernized local population. 
Compared to Turkish Cypriots, settlers are significantly more 
religious and traditional.  Headscarves are a common site in 
settler areas, and settlers attend prayer services more 
regularly than Turkish Cypriots. 
 
¶8. (S) Nonetheless, Turkish Cypriot officials do not believe 
that extremist Islamic ideology enjoys much support in the 
settler community at this time.  A local demographer and 
immigration expert suggested to us that ethnic and religious 
diversity among settlers (who include traditional Sunnis 
along side "very tolerant" Syrian Alewites, Turkish Alevis, 
and Sufis) have so far helped prevent the crystallization of 
Islamist political parties or radical religious groups.  This 
tracks with Post's own observations, especially of visa 
applicants.   Few applicants from any community on Cyprus 
present suspicious travel histories or other potentially 
worrying signs of religious radicalism. 
 
¶9. (S) The danger of extremism in the Turkish-origin 
population cannot be discounted entirely, however.  Recent 
changes in "TRNC" immigration law have put the squeeze on 
Turkish immigrants, particularly those poor, unskilled 
workers who are in the country without documentation.  There 
has been angry, if muted, reaction to dramatic scenes of 
deportation and the implementation of heavy fines on workers 
and their families who have overstayed in Cyprus.  This -- 
coupled with ongoing discrimination Turkish settlers 
reportedly suffer at the hands of Turkish Cypriot employers, 
officials, and police -- could lay the foundation for 
|~rentful extremism among the more marginalized elements of 
the settler community. 
 
¶10. (S) Meanwhile, there are occasional reports of extre%st 
Imams entering north Cyprus to preach or teach to the set8ier 
community unofficially.  Sometimes these are pro-Erbakan 
mainland clerQs who enter through Turkey, butpon at least 
one occasion in 2004 a group of radiQ,l clerics reportedly 
entered via the Greek Cypriot south.  There is no indication 
that such extremists stay very long or attract much 
following, but they continue to make exploratory visits to 
the north. 
 
AN UNKNOWN VARIABLE IN THE NORTH: STUDENTS AND MIGRANTS 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶11. (S) The third major group of Muslims in the north 
consists of temporary residents and transients.  Most 
significant among these are nearly 23,000 foreign university 
students.  This population which is likely to grow thanks to 
an increase in the number and capacity of the north's 
universities, and their increasing efforts to recruit foreign 
students.  While a large majority of the north's foreign 
university students are from mainland Turkey, a significant 
number are from third countries -- including Muslim countries 
such as Iran, Syria, and the Gulf states.  Turkish Cypriot 
officials admit that some of these third country nationals 
may be more inclined to religiosity than their Turkish or 
Turkish Cypriot classmates, but insist that there is no 
evidence of gy Islamist groups present at "TRNC" 
universities. 
 
¶12. (S) One lecturer at the north's largest university shares 
this view.  He contends that students from "places like Iran 
or Pakistan" who come to the "TRNC" are drawn precisely 
because of the more liberal, secular nature of the north's 
universities -- and are therefore not inclined to support 
religious radicalism.  A Turkish Cypriot demographer 
specializing in immigration told us that a "surprising 
number" of students, especially those from Iran, are in fact 
Christian.  He went onto tell us that the "Palestinian 
Student Organization" (which he characterized as the most 
active foreign student group at the north's largest school, 
Eastern Mediterranean Universivy) limits itself to discussion 
groups and occasional demonst^tions about the plight of the 
Palestinians, but strikes a decidedly secular, 
Arab-nationalist line. 
 
¶13. (S) Turkish Cypriot officials know less, however, about 
the religious inclinations of the increasing number of third 
country transient migrants in the north -- many of whom use 
the "TRNC" as a stepping stone to get to the south (i.e., 
into the EU) where they can claim political asylum.  These 
migrants come mainly from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh (ref c), sometimes arriving through legal ports of 
entry on forged documents, sometimes bribing officials to let 
them through, and sometimes arriving on the Karpass Peninsula 
by boat from Turkey, LebanoF or Syria.  They are reportedly 
housed for short periods in safe houses before trying to 
sneak south. 
 
¶14. (S) Contacts from both the Turkish Embassy and the "TRNC 
government" express doubt that these migrants present much 
threat of religious extremism.  The mayor of one Turkish 
Cypriot city with a large immigrant population explained that 
these migrants are more interested in keeping their heads 
down and slipping quickly into the EU than in causing trouble 
in the north.  Nonetheless, there are an estimated 4,000 
Qtkistanis, Afghans, and others who reside more or less 
permanently in the north -- either because they have not yet 
tried to cross south or because they prefer to remain in the 
north to study or work.  These immigrants are harder for the 
Turkish Cypriot authorities to monitor, and it is unclear to 
what extent this population sympathizes with radical IslQl. 
 
OFFICIALQISLAM IN THE NORTH 
-------------------------i 
 
¶15. (C) To the extent that radical Islam does exist in therQnorth, it i 
Tikely confined to small groups on the margins 
of society.  The "TRNC" mirrors the Turkish model of tight 
state control over an officially sanctioned system of 
mainstream Sunni mosques and religious instruction -- which 
is permitted only in "state" mosques and in elective courses 
at the public schools.  The north's mosques are run by the 
"state" office in charge of religious affairs (Diyanet, 
headed by Ahmet Yonluer), which also oversees the curriculum 
of all Muslim religious education.  Diyanet answers to the 
Evkaf organization, which oversees a large array of business 
and charity interests as well as the supervising the Diyanet. 
 Evkaf, in turn, is run by a board of directors appointed by 
and responsible to the "TRNC prime minister." 
 
¶16. (S) According to a contact at the Turkish Embassy, the 
majority of the "TRNC's" official Imams are appointed by the 
Turkish Cypriot Diyanet from among candidates approved by the 
Turkish government.  Although there is also a small handful 
of Turkish Cypriot clerics, including Yonluer, most are 
Turkish government employees seconded to the "TRNC" -- and 
consequently have been vetted for extremist tendencies by the 
GOT.  Turkish Cypriot Diyanet keeps a close eye on the 
country's spiritual leaders after they are appointed to make 
sure they do not threaten the "state" in their sermons or 
with the content of any religion courses they are authorized 
to teach. 
 
¶17. (S) The state permits, but does not actively oversee, 
several smaller non-Sunni Muslim religious groups.  These 
groups, by virtue of their tolerant (some would say 
heretical) approach to Islam, are thought to pose little 
threat of fundamentalism.  Notable among them is the "Haci 
Bektas Veli" organization of Turkish- and Kurdish-origin 
Alevis (numbering up to 5,000), who enjoy warm relations with 
the "government" and have even been given Evkaf land by the 
authorities for religious use.  Arab Alewites among the 
settler population, while theologically related to Turkish 
Alevis, do not participate in this organization, preferring 
instead a loosely arranged system of informal prayer and 
instruction centered in private homes.  Sufis and other sects 
-- such as the Nakshibendi who are led by Turkish Cypriot 
"Sheikh" Nazim -- also operate independently, but with the 
consent of the authorities. 
 
THE TURKISH ARMY: KEEPING THE LID ON 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶18. (S) Nonetheless, there are scattered rumors of more 
radical religious groups in the north.  One reliable foreign 
military officer reported to DAO there were currently four 
unofficial "madrassas" with suspected hard-line tendencies 
operating in the north (ref d).  Such privately taught 
religion classes are occasionally uncovered and closed down 
-- or taken over by officially sanctioned Imams.  In cases 
where the content of these classes is not considered 
dangerous, serious penalties for those who teach or attend 
are not common.  Sometimes the reaction is more severe, 
however.  One Turkish Cypriot official reported to us that "a 
few years ago," the Turkish military identified and 
infiltrated a settler-run "Erbakan-style" school in the 
Karpass Peninsula; the Turkish Cypriots subsequently closed 
the school and deported the teachers to Turkey 
 
¶19. (S) These stories lend credence to the general impression 
most Turkish Cypriots have (and which Post shares) that the 
Turkish army keeps a close watch on potential Islamic 
extremism in the north.  With 25,000-30,000 soldiers and 
police on the island, the ratio of security forces 4Hthe 
general population is extZordinarily high (roughly one 
solider or cop for every 10 civilians).  Furthermore, there 
are army installations at various locations throughout the 
north; few villages are very far from a Turkish base, and 
mosques all over the ountry are attended and closely watched 
by Turkish military personnel. 
 
¶20. (S) As a result, very little is believed to escape the 
scrutiny of the Turkish army.  Former leftist opposition 
activists -- now in "government" -- recount their own 
experiences being under close and effective surveillance by 
the security forces.  Other Turkish Cypriot officials 
privately confirm that the Turkish army's ivil Affairs 
Branch continues to observe "dangerous" religious and student 
groups -- working closely with the Turkish Cypriots to 
infiltrate suspect organizations and deport troublemakers. 
 
OTHER RADICALS UP NORTH: NATIONALISTS AND KONGRA-GEL 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶21. (S) It is worth noting that there are at least two other 
types of extremists who, though not motivated primarily by 
Islam, are present to some degree in the north.  The first is 
KGK/Kongra-Gel, which is rumored to enjoy significant support 
among Kurdish-origin settlers.  Turkish Cypriot officials do 
not believe there is a significant threat of KGK activity or 
attacks in the north, however, thanks largely to the heavy 
concentration of Turkish security forces who keep close tabs 
an practically every individual of Kurdish decent in the 
county.  Nonetheless, KGK/Kongra-Gel is believed to use the 
north as a transit point for smuggling fighters and 
fund-raisers into the sympathetic Greek Cypriot south. 
 
¶22. (S) In addition, there are several small, home-grown 
radical Turkish nationalist groups in the north, which 
occasionally conduct small-scale acts of violence such as the 
2004 fire-bombing of a Greek Cypriot church in Morphou (ref 
f).  The UHH (National Popular Movement), which was fingered 
EU@~PGI (LREASOR/IWEINSTEIN), EURQ (KINGMANSON), EUR/ACE 
(SKUX), EUR/PPD (VWALKER), S/CT (MNOUMAN) 
E.O. 1>58: DECL: 1.6XQAND 1.6X6 
for the Morphou attack and some other incidents, is a shadowy 
organization of Turkish Cypriot veterans and radical 
natio*hlists with close ties to the reactionary former 
"Presidew Rauf Denktash -- and allegedly to hard-line 
elements in thehurkish army and "deep state." 
¶23. (S) Theerm "Grey Wolves" -- officiallylhe name of the 
youth branch of the minuscule far-right MAP party -- is alsoQ 
commonly used to describe "th the UHH and the loose cadrQDof 
young thugs (who are often unemployed witQcriminal recordsQ 
who support the UHH and occasionally do its dirty work. 
While both groups have a track record of violence and are 
cr#3ical of the Unitmd States, neither the UHH nor te Grey 
WolQs appear to behM threat to American interests because: 
1) their anger is focused mainly on the Greek Cypriots and on 
Turkish Cypriots who support peaceful unification of the 
island; and 2) they are held largely in check by the Turkish 
military, which currently supports an Annan-Plan style vision 
for Cyprus. 
 
GREEK CYPRIOTS: RELIGIOUS... 
---------------------------- 
 
¶24. (C) Greek Cypriots who populate the south are, by and 
large, more religious than their Turkish Cypriot 
counterparts.  Mainstream religious institutions and 
religious leaders play a role in politics that has no 
parallel in the north.  Archbishop Makarios -- the original 
Ethnarch -- was both President of Cyprus and head S the 
Cypriot Orthodox Church until his death in 1977.   The focal 
point of the church's interest in politics, however, is the 
Cyprus problem itself.  Church leaders do not hesitate to 
take public positions on secular political issues.  The 
Bishop of Kyrenia, for example, infamously warned that those 
who voted "yes" to the Annan Plan in the April 2004 referenda 
would go to hell. 
 
... BUT NOT USUALLY DANGEROUS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶25. (C) While largely conservative, even reactionary at 
timps, mainstream church politics are hardly extreme and 
there is no reason to believe that there is any link to 
violence.  The EOKA militants of the 1950s ad 1960s are now 
mostly old men reminiscing about the twin struggles against 
the British and their Turkish Cypriot compatriots over a 
glass of Zivania.  The only "home-grown" extremist group in 
the south is actually a Greek Import -- Xrisi Avgi or "Golden 
Dawn."  Few in Cypr'd view either the group or its goals as 
representing a significant threat.  There was, however, one 
serious incident involving a member of Golden Dawn last July. 
 A known member of the organization, Christodoulos 
Nicolaides, attacked a Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot who 
were sitting together in a Nicosia cafe.  Nicolaides was 
arrested and charged with assault and acting with intent to 
incite hostility between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.  His 
trial is underway.  A previously unknown group, the 
"Organization of Cypriot Nationalists" claimed responsibility 
for a grenade attack on the home of opposition party leader 
Nicos Anastassiades in 2004.  Cypriot police discounted the 
credibility of the claim and the group has not been heard 
from since. 
 
THIRD-COUNTRY RESIDENTS IN THE SOUTH 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶26. (C) Third-country nationals make up perhaps 10% of the 
population in the government-controlled south, but represent 
a significantly greater share of the potential threat of 
extremist violence.  Many third-country nationals work in 
low-wage jobs in the services or construction industry. 
Reports of discrimination, harassment and exploitation are 
far from uncommon, and could serve as a catalyst for 
resentment between Cypriots and foreign workers. 
 
¶27. (S) Although most of this population hails from the 
predominantly non-Muslim Philippines, Sri Lanka, and other EU 
member states, there are Muslims among the south's foreign 
workers -- as weL as among the south's small population of 
foreign university s:Qdents.  There is one mosque hoilding 
services and catering to the local Muslim populati1 in each 
of the three major cities:  Nicosia, Limassol and Larnaca. 
Even on a Friday night, however, there are seldom more than 
200 worshipers.  None of the major mosques has any kind of 
reputation for hard-line politics or firebrand sermons, and 
contacts from British military intelligence report they know 
of no Muslims preaching extremist views in the ROC.  It is 
likely that some Muslim clerics preach outside the mosques to 
small groups of believers in private homes, and we have heard 
reports of some Imams advocating a militant line.   Tasos 
Tzionis, who in addition to being the President's Diplomatic 
Advisor is also formally the head of the Cypriot Intelligence 
Services, told us, however, that he does not view either the 
mainstream mosques or the itinerant clerics as representing 
any kind of security risk either for Cyprus or 
internationally. 
 
ROC AND KGK/KONGRA-GEL: BENIGN NEGLECT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶28. (S) The single most worrisome extremist group active on 
Cyprus is Kongra Gel.  Cyprus is primarily used for 
fund-raising and as a transit point, but there is some 
evidence that the KGK leadership is interested in using the 
Greek-Cypriot controlled part of the island as an R&R 
destination for front-line fighters the way that the PLO used 
Chile.  The Kurdish community in the south is estimated at 
about 1500, a number that is negotiated directly between 
senior GOC officials and the local Kurdish leaders. 
 
¶29. (S) The GOC puts loose boundaries on KGK activities -- 
many of which are conducted under the alleged auspices of the 
YKK Kurdish Cultural Center -- but keeps a watchful eye on 
the community's activities and takes active steps to reign in 
those it considers threatening or dangerous.  Many of the 
Kurds in the south are asylees, something that the 
authorities use to justify their relative passivity. 
 
¶30. (S) GOC attitudes towards Kongra Gel are complex.  There 
is certainly an "enemy of my enemy" mentality related to 
Kongra Gel's traditional antagonism towards Ankara.  More 
importantly, there is an overarching sense that while Kongra 
Gel may be misusing Cypriot hospitality, it is precisely the 
usefulness of Cyprus that insulates the island from any 
potential threat.  Cracking down on KGK activities would, in 
their view, only risk stirring up a hornets' nest of problems. 
 
ROC: POROUS "BORDERS" 
--------------------- 
 
¶31. (S) The sizable (by Cyprus standards) Kurdish presence 
also reflects a deeper security concern: the porous nature of 
the Green Line.  For ideological and other reasons, the GOC 
is reluctant to take steps to strengthen controls along the 
Buffer Zone that might accelerate the calcification of the 
Green Line into a "border."  But in practical terms, the 
UN-patrolled buffer zone now effectively is the EU's 
easternmost frontier.  It is relatively easy for KGK 
personnel to travel from Turkey and "jump the fence" to claim 
asylum in the south.  The number of asylum seekers in Cyprus 
has risen at a startling clip, almost certainly in response 
to Cyprus, accession to the EU.  Between 2003 and 2005, 
asylum applications in Cyprus grew by 710%.  There were 953 
asylum applications in 2002 compared to more than 4,000 in 
the period from January-June 2005.  Asylees in Cyprus are a 
relatively diverse group, but the largest number come from 
Sri Lanka, Georgia, Iran, Syria, Ukraine, Pakistan, Russia, 
Bangladesh, Gaza and China.  The large and growing asylee 
community in Cyprus represents a source of potential recruits 
for extremist groups looking to extend their reach in Europe. 
 This will bear close watching as Cypriot authorities 
struggle to come to grips with an immigration challenge -- 
and potential security headache -- they are ill-prepared to 
handle. 
 
COMMENT: TERRORISM POSSIBLE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶32. (S) Post believes there is currently very little 
religious extremism on either side of the Green Line, but we 
do not rule out the possibility of Islamic radicals seeking 
to extend their influence -- or even stage attacks -- in 
EUR/PGI (LREASOR/IWEINSTEIN), E4S/SE (KINGMANSON), EUR/ACE 
either the "TRNC" or in the ROC-controlled south.  Tensions 
between immigrants and locals, especially if egged on by 
extremists from outside, are a potential source of volatility. 
 
¶33. (S) Furthermore, Cyprus is a target-rich environment. 
The high concentration of Turkish military in the north, 
generally thought of as a deterrent to attacks in there, 
could also attract the attention of either KGK/Kongra-Gel or 
radical Islamists.  The "TRNC" is an easily accessible place 
for extremists to strike at official Turkish interests.  In 
the south, two UK mil'tary bases, as well as British and 
other allied soldiers who participate in UNFIYCP, are 
potential targets.  Possible civilian targets are also easy 
to identify.  On both sides of the island, large numbers of 
British/European holiday makers concentrate in coastal resort 
towns; a Bali-style attack is not unthinkable.  Even if it is 
difficult for terrorist groups to organize, plan, and train 
in the north, there is very little to stop outside extremists 
-- such as those responsible for the recent attacks in nearby 
coastal Turkey -- from entering through the north and 
conducting operations here, especially if they have Turkish 
citizenship. 
 
¶34. (S) Even if extremists do not opt to target Cyprus, the 
country could nonetheless figure in their plans for attacks 
elsewhere.  Weak immigration controls, especially in the 
north, make the island a potential transit point for 
terrorists.  Furthermore in the "TRNC," a lightly regulated 
banking sector and unsupervised casino industry could offer 
an attractive terrorist financing haven.  Although we do not 
have information to suggest terrorist financing activity in 
the north, we understand that criminal elements involved in 
narcotic smuggling have already discovered the "TRNC," and 
are using the financial system there to launder illicit 
proceeds.  END COMMENT. 
ZIMMERMAN