This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 007421 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHSA KNNP IN UK PSI
SUBJECT: BREAKING INDIA'S PSI LOGJAM 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 6848 
 
Classified By: Charge Bob Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request for Department L/LEI.  See 
para 7. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary:  To gain GOI support for the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) we should quickly respond to GOI 
concerns about the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) Convention, while 
reiterating A/S Rademaker's argument that SUA and PSI are 
complementary in their objectives, but independent in their 
operations.  Further, we should promote support for PSI as an 
immediate opportunity for the GOI to demonstrate to Congress 
its commitment to nonproliferation and thereby help to repair 
the damages from India's unwillingness to date to support 
referral of Iran to the UNSC.  End Summary. 
 
¶3.  (C) Following the September 15 DVC between A/S Rademaker 
and his MEA counterpart Joint Secretary for Disarmament and 
International Security Hamid Ali Rao to address India's 
concerns about SUA and PSI, PolCouns met with MEA Acting 
Joint Secretary Sanjay Bhattacharya on Sept 21 to underline 
that we should not let disagreement on SUA amendments become 
an excuse for delay on PSI.  Bhattacharya said the GOI was 
pleased with the opportunity to raise its concerns about SUA 
directly with A/S Rademaker and expressed hope that the GOI 
would soon receive a formal response to their demarche on SUA 
(Retel).  He noted that A/S Rademaker seemed to reject the 
discriminatory "NPT-like" nature of SUA transport provisions, 
but added that he thought the safety clause may afford some 
flexibility.  Finally, Bhattacharya mentioned that MEA 
Additional Secretary for International Security Meera Shankar 
was currently in New York, implying that any decision on PSI 
lay with Shankar. 
 
¶4.  (C) Eager to have Indian participation in the UK-hosted 
PSI Indian Ocean exercises Nov 14-19, colleagues at the UK 
High Commission have also asked about the status of US 
dialogue with the GOI on PSI.  BHC Second Secretary told 
PolMilOff on Sept 22 that the GOI gave the BHC the same 
non-paper outlining GOI concerns about SUA, but did not link 
SUA to PSI, possibly because PSI is perceived to be a US 
initiative.  Martinek also shared UK legal experts' response 
to the GOI non-paper (e-mailed to NP and SA/RA), which would 
be given to the GOI on September 23. 
 
¶5.  (C) Meanwhile, in New Delhi's strategic circles, debate 
continues among those who believe that GOI participation in 
PSI would be good for India regardless of what the US thinks 
about it.  In his article, "Maritime Non-Proliferation 
Initiative India's Bulwarks Against Nuclear Terrorism," 
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses Research Fellow 
Cdr. Gurpreet Khurana makes a case for GOI participation in 
PSI and the Container Security Initiative (CSI) based on 
India's real and immediate security concerns.  Khurana argues 
that if the GOI continues its doctrinaire rejection of all 
global efforts linked to the NPT, it would compromise its own 
security.  Under Manmohan Singh, Khurana has detected subtle 
indicators that India's leadership may be willing to consider 
practical approaches to counter the global threat of nuclear 
terrorism such as PSI and CSI, but this would require a 
political decision to move beyond traditional objections to 
the NPT treaty and concentrate instead on practical 
nonproliferation measures. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment:  As A/S Rademaker stated during the Sept 15 
DVC, we do not believe GOI concerns about the SUA treaty have 
any practical bearing on PSI.  However, a rapid response to 
issues in the GOI non-paper with additional points discussing 
the complementary but separate operations of SUA as a treaty 
on the one hand, and PSI as an informal, ad hoc initiative on 
the other, may de-link these initiatives and break the 
logjam.  MEA's Bhattacharya offered a hopeful interpretation 
of the DVC, welcoming A/S Rademaker's answers on some of the 
GOI's practical questions about PSI implementation.  Further, 
leveraging Indian equities in the July 18 civil nuclear 
agreement, we may present PSI as an immediate -- albeit less 
high-profile -- opportunity for the GOI to demonstrate to the 
US Congress its commitment to nonproliferation in the absence 
of India's outward support for referring Iran to the UNSC. 
End Comment. 
 
¶7.  (U) Post seeks guidance on the GOI demarche (reftel) as 
soon as possible. 
 
¶8.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
BLAKE