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Viewing cable 05DOHA1593, 9/17 MEETING WITH AL JAZEERA MANAGING DIRECTOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05DOHA1593 2005-09-18 13:08 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Doha
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DOHA 001593 
 
SIPDIS 
 
INFO NSC FOR ABRAMS, DOD/OSD FOR SCHENKER AND MATHENY, 
LONDON FOR ARAB MEDIA OFFICE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2010 
TAGS: KPAO PREL PTER QA ALJAZEERA
SUBJECT: 9/17 MEETING WITH AL JAZEERA MANAGING DIRECTOR 
 
REF: A. DOHA 1264 
     B. THORNE-EMBASSY DOHA EMAIL 9/8/05 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Scott McGehee for reasons 1.4 (b&d) 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: PAO met 9/17 with Wadah Khanfar, Managing 
Director of Al Jazeera (AJ). The following topics were 
discussed: 
 
Para 2: Khanfar's view of GWOT; 
Para 3: A new entity: "The Al Jazeera Network" 
Paras 4-7: Al Jazeera's relations with Arab governments 
(including Iraq's); 
Paras 5: USG/AJ relations; 
Paras 9-22: DIA's "unclassified snippets"; 
Para 23: AJ's Madrid correspondent, Taysir Alluni. 
 
End summary. 
 
Khanfar's view of GWOT 
---------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) A Palestinian with Jordanian citizenship, Khanfar 
has been employed by AJ for the last eight years, having 
joined it a year after its establishment and becoming 
managing director in October 2003. Khanfar gave his views on 
U.S. policy in the region and vis a vis Al Jazeera, noting 
that until 9/11 Al Jazeera was regarded by the USG and the 
western world as a great asset and symbol of progress in the 
region. Following 9/11, Khanfar said the the USG's 
distinction between a war on terror and a war on Islam has 
not filtered down to the grass roots in the Arab world. He 
said the terminology "War on Terror" is unfortunate because 
the phenomenon it is designed to describe does not match 
conventional conceptions of war - with a beginning, a 
definable period of action, and an end. Khanfar referred to 
recent comments by Deputy Secretary Zoellick in which the 
latter referred to the "Struggle Against Violent Extremism." 
This formulation better meets the reality of the situation 
and avoids the polarizing affect of a phrase like "The War on 
Terror," said Khanfar. A key post-9/11 USG mistake was to 
take a page from Osama bin Laden's book and divide the world 
into two camps - "either with us, or against us," he added. 
Al Jazeera falls in neither camp nor - as a member of the 
international Fourth Estate with analytical and critical 
responsibilities - should it, said Khanfar. 
 
New: The Al Jazeera Network 
--------------------------- 
 
3. (U) According to Khanfar, the Al Jazeera group has 
recently established the Al Jazeera Network (AJN), a legal 
entity that will oversee the growing number of Al Jazeera 
offshoots. AJN will retain the same executive leadership 
(chaired by Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer) as AJ and its role will 
be to ensure consistency of quality and message across the 
different offshoots, which now include Al Jazeera Arabic, Al 
Jazeera International (Ref A), Al Jazeera Children's Channel 
(septel reporting), Al Jazeera Sports and Al Jazeera 
Documentary, plus the AJ website, the Al Jazeera Media 
Training Center in Doha and the new Al Jazeera Center for 
Research and Studies. The latter, recently established in 
premises here in Doha, is a think-tank intended to analyze 
political, economic, social and other developments in the 
region from an "insider's viewpoint."  There are few, if any, 
credible think-tanks in the region that play this role, said 
Khanfar. The Center has recently opened under the leadership 
of Mustafa Sawaq, an Algerian professor of English literature 
who until recently was a correspondent in Al Jazeera's London 
Bureau. Regarding Al Jazeera International, Khanfar said that 
AJ and AJI are currently in talks to determine the nature and 
extent of editorial collaboration between the two. 
 
Al Jazeera's thorny relationships 
--------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) PAO asked Khanfar how he views AJ-USG relations. 
Khanfar prefaced his response by noting that tension 
characterizes AJ's relations with many governments, not just 
the USG. He listed Iraq, Iran, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan and 
Egypt as current examples. He described as an aside AJ's 
problems with Algeria, saying they began when an AJ interview 
with President Bouteflika was unexpectedly terminated because 
of breaking news, offending Bouteflika, who then cut off 
relations with AJ. AJ is in negotiations with Algeria to 
re-establish its presence in Algiers, and Khanfar implied 
that Bouteflika has made a repeat interview with him a 
condition of moving forward. Concerning Tunisia, Khanfar said 
AJ is free to visit Tunisia to report as stories develop but 
wants to establish a permanent correspondent in Tunisia. So 
far the Tunisian government has said it would grant a license 
only to a specific individual proposed by the government, an 
offer that AJ cannot accept, said Khanfar. On the other hand, 
he said, AJ has recently re-established its presence in 
Kuwait and has opened up offices for the first time in 
Bahrain and UAE. The only Gulf country where AJ is not 
present now is Saudi Arabia. 
 
 
Relations with the USG 
---------------------- 
 
5. (C) Concerning relations with the USG, Khanfar said they 
were transformed by 9/11 and the subsequent US military 
action in Iraq. Both sides have made mistakes, he said, 
noting that the past nine years have represented a learning 
process for Al Jazeera, one that remains ongoing. A turning 
point in USG/AJ relations was reached earlier this year when 
detailed, practical exchanges began to take place between the 
two sides. AJ remains open to such input and indeed welcomes 
it, said Khanfar. "We have been more able to respond since we 
have received input. It is now a practical discussion, a much 
more healthy relationship," he said. There is more optimism 
now at Al Jazeera concerning the future of USG/AJ relations, 
however, he said, one USG perception that holds things back 
is that AJ has espoused a specifically anti-American 
strategy, so that each negligent mistake or evidence of bias 
by an individual reporter or anchor is viewed through this 
optic as part of a larger editorial conspiracy. "Al Jazeera 
is not there to be anti-American," said Khanfar. "Absolutely 
not." 
 
Al Jazeera and Iraq? 
-------------------- 
 
6. (C) PAO asked for an update on AJ's status in Iraq. 
Khanfar responded that the Iraqi government had responded to 
AJ's request to return to Baghdad by setting "unacceptable 
conditions", including requiring AJ to sign on to restrictive 
guidelines governing reporting on issues relating to ethnic 
and sectarian groups. He said that in his opinion both the 
Kurdish and Sunni representation in the Iraqi government 
would be fine with AJ returning to Baghdad, but that the key 
opposition comes from Shi'a representative Abdel Aziz Al 
Hakim, of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in 
Iraq, who is in turn influenced by Tehran, said Khanfar. 
 
7. (SBU) Ironically, as well as the ire of governments, AJ 
sometimes simultaneously attracts the ire of extremists such 
as Al Qaeda's Al Zarqawi, said Khanfar, recalling that a 
recent prominent AJ news headline was "Rumsfeld and Al 
Zarqawi Attack Al Jazeera." 
 
Daily quality assurance meeting 
------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Khanfar noted that he holds a daily 1pm meeting with 
an AJ quality assurance team entrusted with implementing AJ's 
code of ethics and conduct, which views and anlayzes all Al 
Jazeera programming, looking for lapses in professionalism, 
balance and objectivity. "That meeting is very tight, tighter 
even than your list," said Khanfar. He noted that great 
progress has been achieved in many areas, particularly in 
discouraging reporters from inserting their own opinions into 
their field reports and in discouraging the use of 
value-laden language (e.g. "resistance" vs "military groups" 
or "occupation" vs "multinational force"). "Where there is a 
problem -- whether we learn about it from you, from our QA 
team, or from another source -- we fix it immediately," said 
Khanfar. Anchors and reporters are subject to a range of 
disciplinary actions for violating the AJ code of ethics and 
conduct, including being pulled from a particular program or 
beat, he said. 
 
Reaction to DIA's "unclassified snippets" on AJ reporting in 
July 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
9. (C) PAO raised DIA's most recent unclassified snippets 
(Ref B) and asked for Khanfar's comments. Due to constraints 
of time, only some items were discussed. (Note: Per Ref B 
instructions, PAO did not leave a hard copy of the points 
with Khanfar, but told him that a hard copy had been left 
with the MFA. Khanfar complained that the MFA can take "two 
or three weeks" to send things over. Post recommends that 
NEA/ARPI seek permission to leave a hard copy of these points 
with Khanfar in future. He clearly takes them seriously and 
both sides would benefit from him having time and leisure to 
study and respond to them in a timely fashion. End note.) PAO 
began the disussion by saying that although a sustained 
reduction in negative news coverage has been noted overall in 
the last several months, the USG remains concerned about AJ's 
continued broadcasting of insurgent-provided videos and 
airing of provocative interviews. 
 
Rationale for airing insurgent-provided tapes 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Khanfar said this is a thorny problem with which Al 
Jazeera continues to wrestle. As of now, the policy is as 
follows: Each insurgent-provided tape should meet specific 
standards before any portion of it is aired, he said. The 
aired portion must be newsworthy; the material should not 
speak against specific people or organizations by name; and 
the aired portion must be placed in a critical analysis 
context by the program. For example, the most recent tape of 
Al Qaeda operative Al Zawahiri (dealing with the London 
attacks) was radically cut in broadcasting. "The tape was 28 
minutes long and we aired two minutes," said Khanfar. Those 
two minutes contained practical information concerning the 
bombings, while the remainder was abstract commentary on 
Islam, the teachings of the Koran and reflections on Arab 
regimes. Also: "Airing these tapes is a way of demystifying 
the whole Al Qaeda mystique," said Khanfar. "The audience 
sees that these are issues you can criticize, and this does 
increase rationality in the audience." 
 
July 27: Interview with Ali Belhadj of FIS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
11. (U) DIA snippet: "On 27 July 2005, al-Jazeera interviewed 
Ali Belhadj, deputy chairman of the Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS) in Algeria about the recent murder of Algerian 
diplomats in Iraq by Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi,s group.  Rather 
than condemning the terrorist action, Belhadj said that, 
'there is no solution to the occupation except through jihad 
and resistance.  There is a gateway for freedom which is 
based on bloodshed... I am praying to God Almighty to help 
them conquer the occupation and the enemies...' After the 
interview, Algerian authorities arrested Belhadj for inciting 
violence." 
 
12. (C) Khanfar's response: AJ categorically opposes the 
kidnapping of civilians, whatever their nationality, and when 
AJ includes kidnappings in its news programming, attempts to 
do so in ways that will lead to a positive resolution for 
victims. In this case, said Khanfar, AJ was told by Belhadj 
that he wished to broadcast a plea to the kidnappers to 
release the Algerian diplomat. However, he did not live up to 
this agreement and instead stated his support for the 
kidnapping while on air. "When we realized he was not sending 
the message we agreed on, we cut him off," said Khanfar. 
"That was at 4pm, the program was live. We then worked 
quickly to invite people to discuss his statements, 
disagreeing with him, and that was broadcast at 9:30pm the 
same day." 
 
13. (C) Policy on kidnapping videos: Khanfar noted that AJ 
used to broadcast kidnapping videos as they were received, 
including the voices of both kidnappers and victims, but has 
now developed a specific more limited policy concerning such 
tapes. No more than 10-second segments are now broadcast, 
with no sound used from the tape - only comments by the 
anchor. "Most networks do the same, including BBC and Fox and 
sometimes our standard is even higher than theirs," said 
Khanfar. 
 
July 27: Interview with Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
14. (U) DIA snippet: "On 5 July 2005, al-Jazeera interviewed 
Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi, recently released from prison in 
Jordan, who claimed that Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi was not the 
'murderer portrayed by news agencies' but a 'brother who is 
concerned about religion and ....devoted and kind to his 
brethren.' Al-Jazeera made no mention of al-Zarqawi,s lethal 
attacks in Iraq." 
 
15. (C) Khanfar's response: "We should have been rewarded for 
interviewing Al Maqdisi!" Khanfar said Al Maqdisi was the 
spiritual leader of Al Qaeda's Al Zarqawi. During the course 
of his imprisonment in Jordan, he revised many of his 
religious beliefs and reversed his position on key Al Qaeda 
points of doctrine. After being released, he gave a full-page 
interview to Al Hayat newspaper, detailing the ways in which 
his beliefs had changed, including the fact that he no longer 
believed that Islamic teachings support the killing of 
civilians, and this encouraged AJ to showcase him. Although 
he spoke in praise of Al Zarqawi in the July 27 AJ interview, 
the praise was a preface to cataloguing his disagreement with 
Al Zarqawi's modus operandi, said Khanfar. Following the 
interview, Al Zarqawi issued a tape criticizing Al Maqdisi 
and Al Jazeera, and saying the former had been brainwashed in 
prison. "The interview created havoc in Al Qaeda circles, it 
shed light on these Islamic issues and started an important 
theological debate!" said Khanfar. 
July 13: Suicide car bomber attack kills 28 children 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
16. (U) DIA snippet: "On 13 July 2005 a suicide car bomber 
attack in Baghdad killed 28 children in a Shia neighborhood. 
Al-Jazeera reporter Walid Khalid accurately reported that the 
car 'exploded before reaching US forces.'  However, al 
-Jazeera reported that the attack killed only four civilians 
without mentioning the deaths of the children.  Al-Jazeera 
downplayed a terrorist attack that killed numerous Iraqi 
children." 
 
17. (C) Khanfar's response: "I noticed that report and I 
interfered to fix it," said Khanfar. AJ was criticized for 
the omission in that report by at least two other Arab 
newspapers, he said. He said that AJ has a policy of 
double-sourcing anything out of Iraq (since they do not have 
a bureau there) but that initial reports of that attack were 
both unclear and contradictory. Once the confusion was sorted 
out, AJ did report on the deaths of the children, said 
Khanfar. 
 
18. (C) On downplaying insurgent atrocities: Khanfar 
categorically denied that AJ has a policy of downplaying or 
under-reporting attacks on civilians, citing its promiment 
headline and reporting on the recent attack on a Shi'a mosque 
in Baghdad as just one example. 
 
July 6: Interview with Muthanna al-Dari 
--------------------------------------- 
 
19. (U) DIA snippet: "On 6 July 2005, al-Jazeera interviewed 
Dr. Muthanna al-Dari from the Association of Muslim Scholars 
(AMS), who claimed that 'occupation forces arrested people 
and tied them down to explosives and blew them up before 
turning them over to their families the next day as 
dismembered bodies.  Nobody talks about these things.' 
Al-Jazeera regularly interviews al-Dari and allows his 
extremist views to go unchallenged." 
 
20. (C) Khanfar response: "Al-Dari holds a prominent position 
and is a well-established personality in the mainstream. He 
is constantly interviewed in the Arabic press -- you can see 
him everywhere and not just on Al Jazeera." Secondly, Khanfar 
said, as soon as al-Dari made that remark on the live show, 
AJ made strenuous efforts to locate a U.S. spokesperson to 
provide an opposing viewpoint. "We tried four times," said 
Khanfar. No one at CENTCOM would go on the record to 
contradict Al Dari, he said. "This happens all the time. We 
are live, 24 hours, seven days a week, we cannot anticipate 
when someone will say something extreme like that. We have to 
be able to get comments fast. We get tired of dialing. They 
promise to get back to us and they don't." 
 
July 23: "Behind the News" - on the London bombings 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
21. (U) DIA snippet: "On al-Jazeera,s 'Behind the News' 
program broadcast on 23 July, all three guests blamed US and 
British imperialistic policies for the London bombings -- not 
the terrorists.  One guest suggested that Usama bin Ladin had 
a legitimate reason to fight 'the Western onslaught.'" 
 
22. (SBU) Khanfar's response: He could not recall the episode 
in question but promised to look into it. "I take this 
seriously because I am responsible for this program," he 
said. (Note: It appears that the program is a special project 
of his. End note.) 
 
Taysir Alluni 
------------- 
23. (SBU) PAO asked about the status of Al Jazeera 
correspondent Taysir Alluni, who was re-arrested in Madrid on 
9/16. Khanfar said that the re-arrest is normal judicial 
procedure in Spain, preceding the issuance of a verdict in 
Alluni's case, expected on 9/18. He said a team of Al Jazeera 
lawyers had traveled to Spain and were optimistic that the 
remaining charge against Alluni would be dropped and he would 
be released. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
24. (C) Khanfar came across as energetic, articulate and 
thoughtful. He is clearly committed to bringing Al Jazeera up 
to professional international standards of journalism and 
(while emphasizing that USG criticism is just one source of 
input among many) seems to be not only open to criticism but 
to welcome it. He insisted on the need for a healthy tension 
between AJ and its critics -- the tension that he said should 
naturally exist between any news-gathering source and its 
objects of focus. He seems to be a practical individual, and 
clearly much prefers dealing with criticism that details 
dates and times and specific instances of lapses in 
professionalism, rather than broader abstractions.  He 
appears very familiar with and closely involved in monitoring 
the daily content of Al Jazeera's programming. He encouraged 
PAO to meet with the head of the AJ quality assurance 
department and we will take him up on this offer in the days 
to come. 
MCGEHEE