This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 009089 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015 
TAGS: KJUS PTER PREL PGOV CO ELN
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER OPPOSES DON BERNA'S EXTRADITION 
AND IS SURPRISED BY SUPPORT FOR ELN TALKS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo on September 
22 told the Ambassador that the GOC is inclined not to 
extradite Diego Murillo AKA "Don Berna" at the moment because 
it would endanger future demobilizations and Don Berna 
remains an important player in ensuring these demobilizations 
happen.  The Ambassador responded that not extraditing Don 
Berna would feed domestic and international critics of the 
peace process.  Restrepo agreed to delay any public 
announcement on Don Berna until the Ambassador has had the 
opportunity to consult with Washington and speak again to 
President Uribe.  Restrepo also updated the Ambassador on the 
public and private support the GOC has received for its 
preliminary peace talks with the National Liberation Army of 
Colombia (ELN).  He contrasted this with the unenthusiastic 
response to the GOC's decision to allow 38 jailed 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) members to 
benefit from Justice and Peace (J&P) law sentence reductions. 
 End summary. 
 
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GOC LEANING IN FAVOR OF KEEPING DON BERNA IN COLOMBIA 
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¶2.  (C) Restrepo expressed ambivalence about Don Berna's 
extradition.  On the one hand, he is aware of the political 
implications, in particular with the USG and NGOs, of 
refusing to extradite him given ongoing criticism the GOC's 
negotiations with the AUC.  Nevertheless, his primary goal is 
to demobilize the remaining paramilitary structures during 
the next three months and Don Berna remains an important 
player in ensuring this happens. 
 
¶3.  (C) Restrepo explained that if the GOC were to announce 
Don Berna's extradition now it could generate "panic," freeze 
future demobilizations, and lead those leaders imprisoned in 
Santa Fe de Ralito to try to escape.  There is already fear 
and resistance after meetings last week with AUC leaders when 
he made clear that demobilized paramilitary leaders would 
serve time in prison.  He was told that his announcement had 
angered many AUC members, especially those in the middle 
ranks, and that his statement threatened the current peace 
talks with the remaining paramilitary blocks. 
 
¶4. (C) Restrepo insisted that his hesitation to extradite Don 
Berna did not extend to the other 10 to 12 key AUC leaders. 
If Don Berna is extradited, however, Restrepo foresees a 
significant change in the atmosphere, which could affect 
ongoing peace talks and spark paramilitary violence.  He 
emphasized that the GOC would need significant USG security 
assistance if this occurred.  He drew on his experience as a 
psychologist to express particular concern for the state of 
mind of the paramilitaries, whom he described as "bandits 
willing and able to do harm."  His preference was not to 
scare them, but instead to encourage them to continue to 
"enter the corral" and participate in the process. Meanwhile, 
he said that AUC leader Salvatore Mancuso wanted to speak to 
the USG because he is willing to consider serving some time 
in the United States and could convince others to do the 
same.  Other AUC leaders have suggested that after being 
convicted in Colombia, they would like to serve their time in 
another country.  The rational for this is that they have no 
opportunities here and their lives would be in danger from 
fellow AUC and FARC members. 
 
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AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED USG POSITION ON EXTRADITION 
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¶5. (C) The Ambassador said the USG wants Don Berna's 
extradition for judicial and political reasons. Judicially, 
the USG has been able to support the Justice and Peace (J&P) 
law because the GOC promised it would not negotiate 
extradition.  The J&P law denies benefits for illegal 
activities conducted for personal gain before membership. The 
law permits the serving of sentences abroad.  Therefore, 
there should be no obstacle for Don Berna or others to be 
extradited to the United States.  Don Berna personally 
benefited from illicit activities before and during his 
membership in the AUC.  Don Berna has also been accused of 
complicity in the killing of a government official while 
negotiating, thus violating the ceasefire, and his subsequent 
denial of responsibility for this crime makes him eligible 
for trial in the regular criminal justice system. 
 
¶6. (C) From the political perspective, the Ambassador said he 
understood Uribe's concern about the political cost of 
extradition while trying to demobilize paramilitaries. 
Nevertheless, showing a firm hand with respect to the rule of 
law would help to further legitimize the process.  The 
Ambassador said that in his meetings on September 23 with 
Governor Gaviria of Antioquia, Mayor of Medellin Fajardo and 
General Carillo, both Gaviria and Carillo favored Don Berna's 
extradition, and the Mayor did not oppose the idea.  (Berna 
had an extensive network in Medellin.) 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador stressed the intense focus in the U.S. 
and elsewhere on Colombia's demobilization and reinsertion 
efforts.  An announcement like that for Salvatore Mancuso, 
that the GOC was suspending Don Berna's extradition "while he 
assisted the peace process" would undercut support for the 
demobilization process and the J&P law.  It would also 
undermine Uribe's credibility shortly after his conversations 
with members of the U.S. Congress.  The Ambassador asked that 
there be no public statement until he again discussed it with 
President Uribe. 
 
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POTENTIAL TALKS WITH ELN RECEIVE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT... 
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¶8.  (C) Restrepo said that in the past days he has received 
more local and international support on potential peace talks 
with the ELN than he has had during his three years trying to 
promote peace with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
(AUC).  Politicians, former Presidents, the Catholic Church, 
and the Swedish and Norwegian governments have expressed 
their willingness to help in the process.  With the AUC, he 
struggled to "fill a van of supporters," while with the ELN 
he has already had to "hire three large buses and turn people 
back."  He was appreciative of the reiteration of USG support 
for the process and emphasized his hope that the ELN would 
take advantage of it. 
 
¶9. (C) Restrepo speculated that the talks might succeed 
because of tensions between the ELN and the FARC.  In recent 
weeks, the FARC has intensified its threats against the ELN 
leadership and warned them to withdraw from negotiations or 
expect a war.  Restrepo said the FARC's tactic of 
discouraging the ELN from negotiating may benefit the 
government.  Specifically, he thought the threats could 
backfire by convincing the ELN to negotiate now before 
fighting with the FARC weakens them further. 
 
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...BUT SUPPORT FOR FARC'S 38 J&P PETITION IS WEAK 
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¶10. (C) Restrepo understood the political cost of allowing 
the petition of the 38 jailed FARC members to participate 
under the Justice and Peace (J&P) law, but underscored the 
overall value of this and similar future requests.  He 
explained that accepting these requests weakens FARC morale 
and helps the GOC collect intelligence against the 
guerrillas.  He hoped to put the FARC members interested in 
participating in the J&P law through a rigorous interrogation 
process, which could confirm their identification and extract 
relevant intelligence.  He added that he has a list of an 
additional 150 FARC members waiting for a response from the 
GOC regarding their petitions to participate under the J&P 
law. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶11. (C) We believe that we can persuade the Uribe 
Administration not to suspend Don Berna's extradition on an 
open-ended basis like they did for Mancuso.  But we doubt we 
can get a decision for immediate extradition by the September 
29 deadline. 
WOOD