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Viewing cable 05TEGUCIGALPA1693, SEND LAWYERS, FUNDS AND GUNNY: SA/LW DESTRUCTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TEGUCIGALPA1693 2005-08-12 23:27 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tegucigalpa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 001693 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM/WRA, WHA/PPC, WHA/CEN, INL/LP, AND S/CT 
DOD FOR DTRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2015 
TAGS: MASS MARR PARM PREL PTER MOPS SNAR KLIG HO
SUBJECT: SEND LAWYERS, FUNDS AND GUNNY: SA/LW DESTRUCTION 
AND SEMINARS A POSSIBILITY IF HOAF ACTS DECISIVELY 
 
 
Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Paul Tuebner; 
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Department of State Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SA/LW) program officer (PM/WRA) and Department of 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) ordnance destruction 
team visited Honduras August 1-5 to review possible future 
technical assistance.  Team and PolMilOff met with Vice 
Minister of Defense (VMOD) Julio Edgardo Perez Matamoros, 
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs (VMFA) Juan Alberto Lara 
Bueso, Vice Chief of the Honduran Armed Forces (VCHOD) 
Brigadier General Nelson Willys Mejia Mejia, as well as 
logistical, operational, and base commanders.  Although the 
general reception of the team and its goals was positive, 
there were several notable exceptions of resistance.  Decades 
of neglect, poor physical security, and improper 
accountability and storage have all worked together to create 
a security nightmare and a criminal's one-stop shopping 
paradise.  The inspections revealed situations begging for 
U.S. support and expertise, but whether the Honduran 
Government (GOH) will take advantage of the small arms/light 
weapons destruction or the seminars on storage, maintenance, 
and security is still up in the air.  Currently, Minister of 
Defense (MOD) Federico Breve Travieso has informally 
requested the seminars and is drafting an official request. 
Post is also considering approaching the Attorney General and 
Frontier Police about destroying impounded weapons and 
ammunition.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Department of State Small Arms and Light Weapons 
(SA/LW) program officer (PM/WRA) and Department of Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) ordnance destruction team 
visited Honduras August 1-5 to review possible future 
technical assistance.  Team and PolMilOff met with Vice 
Minister of Defense (VMOD) Julio Edgardo Perez Matamoros, 
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs (VMFA) Juan Alberto Lara 
Bueso, Vice Chief of the Honduran Armed Forces (VCHOD) 
Brigadier General Nelson Willys Mejia Mejia, as well as 
logistical, operational, and base commanders.  The VMOD and 
VMFA seemed very receptive to the goals of the team and 
admitted that Honduras has problems with excess small arms 
and munitions and their storage.  When the team and PolMilOff 
spoke with VCHOD Mejia however, he stated that the Honduran 
forces had no excess weapons and that they needed all that 
they had for their reserves. 
 
3. (C) Team and PolMilOff then spoke with logistical 
commander and current demolition commander.  Both commanders 
were very interested in U.S. support for their destruction 
program and in the seminars that were offered by the DTRA 
contingent.  The demolition commander was interested in 
special courses in addition to the basic seminar offered.  He 
and one of his trainers have received explosive ordnance 
destruction (EOD) training in the U.S. and were interested in 
specialized training, above the proposed levels.  The 
Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) has already started a vigorous 
ammunition validation and destruction program but are having 
some problems with the associated costs and logistics. 
(COMMENT:  The destruction team was trained with U.S. 
funding.  The current Chief of the Honduran Armed Forces 
(CHOD), General Romeo Orlando Vasquez Velasquez, requested 
the training and started this program when he was head of the 
Army.  The team seems to be competent and has received 
compliments from the U.S. MILGP Commander.  The impetus for 
this destruction team was the explosion of a munitions bunker 
in Naco military base in the mid 1990's and U.S.-prompted 
inspections that discovered unsafe conditions and thefts. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
4. (C) Team and PolMilOff visited four different sites: two 
Air Force bases, a regional Army logistic center and base, 
and the HOAF depot facility.  DAO, JTF-B, and U.S. MILGP 
assistance facilitated excellent access to all sites.  Each 
base commander was interested in the seminars and the 
possibility of destroying excess arms and munitions.  Each 
facility visited had large numbers of weapons that would 
qualify under the program, but would require the approval of 
HOAF leadership to approve their destruction.  In addition, 
each site would benefit greatly from the seminars, 
particularly on the appropriate storage and security for 
weapons and munitions. 
 
5. (C) The weapons repair facility/depot (Cale) is currently 
undergoing a complete inventory.  The HOAF has switched to 
M-16 rifles for its armed forces, M-1 rifles for its military 
academies, and is keeping its former weapons, FALs, as a 
reserve.  Weapons are issued according to troop numbers when 
they join and they keep those weapons throughout their own 
career.  Therefore, all weapons in these facilities are above 
and beyond those in use by actual troops.  The Cale facility 
contains about 8,000-10,000 FAL rifles, hundreds of Israeli 
UZI machine guns, and approximately another 5,000 or so 
M-16s, all of which are being kept as reserves.  In addition, 
Cale has more than 1,000 older bolt action rifles held in 
reserve for the military academies.  There were stacked piles 
of rifle parts and older rifles as well as improperly stored 
rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers and ammunition.  The 
individual in charge of the facility said that due to the 
inventory, he could not yet determine what was excess or not. 
 Team members noted that there were easily over 10,000 pieces 
in the inventory that would qualify for the destruction 
program and still leave plenty as reserves.  Decades of 
neglect, poor physical security, and improper accountability 
and storage have all worked together to create a security 
nightmare and a criminal's one-stop shopping paradise. 
 
6. (C) The Naco facility had less weapons, but a greater 
security hazard and much more concern about danger from 
improper storage of ammo and weapons.  After the inspection, 
the team's consensus was that if something was not done soon, 
history would repeat itself and there would be another large 
scale accident.  The significant number of "excess arms" were 
those which are secured by the armed forces, but are under 
the control and jurisdiction of the Honduran Attorney 
General's office (Public Ministry).  Approximately 5,000 FALs 
and 500 AK-47s have been impounded and are currently in limbo 
over ownership.  The commander of the base and the HOAF 
leadership would like to have these weapons destroyed - to 
remove them from their area of responsibility and from their 
list of problems.  (COMMENT:  In 2001, there was a theft of 
more than 230 of these AK-47s from the locked warehouse.  At 
least some of these weapons were confiscated in an alleged 
drugs for arms deal earlier this year.  Bars were placed on 
the windows after the break-in, but other security procedures 
have not been improved since that time.  In addition, there 
is ongoing litigation over the ownership of these weapons and 
the responsibility for debts associated with them between the 
Honduran government and two U.S. firms with a final 
dispensation still pending.  END COMMENT.) 
 
7. (C) The two Air Force bases, in La Mesa and Toncontin, 
were in somewhat better shape - probably more due to lower 
amounts of weapons and relatively higher prestige and budget 
within the armed forces.  They did have issues with storage 
and maintenance of their munitions and their various weapons. 
 Older, excess aviation bombs were their major concern. 
PolMilOff noticed stacks of .50 caliber guns and was informed 
that they were the machine guns removed from no longer flying 
aircraft, Corsairs and F-86s.  In addition to the .50 cal 
machine guns, there were rockets that would qualify under 
this program. 
 
8. (C) Comment:  All commanders were interested in the 
seminars offered by DTRA and Redstone Arsenal.  The NCOs and 
junior officers seemed impressed with the knowledge of the 
Redstone staff sergeant and seemed much more open and 
responsive to questions and comments than their superiors. 
The GOH in general and HOAF in particular are very concerned 
about the regional aspects of small arms proliferation and 
verbally stated that they were interested in reducing excess 
weapons and munitions.  Commitment to the SA/LW destruction 
will be a harder sell.  Although the CHOD has publicly stated 
that he wants to and is destroying excess arms, his second in 
command told the team that there were no excess weapons, 
which the team then went on to observe.  The lower level 
leadership seems eager to participate in both programs. 
However, without an impetus from all levels, but especially 
senior levels, this visit and offer will have fallen upon 
deaf ears. 
 
9. (C) Comment continued: Post is hoping that a request for 
the Redstone seminars will come within the next few weeks. 
U.S. MILGP has delivered a letter to the MOD and the CHOD, 
reminding them of this opportunity and that in the next 30 
days they need to compile a comprehensive list of their 
excess munitions slated for destruction.  In addition to the 
two possible requests, three of the commanders requested 
assistance/permission in destruction of unusable equipment, 
equipment that was donated to them by the USG - as in old 
non-working vehicles that could be sold for scrap and the .50 
cal machine-guns that were removed from former U.S-provided 
aircraft.  The decisions and actions of the HOAF and the MOD 
have been somewhat mercurial, especially with the upcoming 
national elections on November 27.  Although the decision is 
in their hands, once they make their decision to take 
advantage of this opportunity, the USG needs to be willing 
and able to accept that hand-off and sprint for the finish 
line.  End Comment. 
 
10. (C) This cable was cleared by PM/WRA.  See also septels 
from DATT with additional reporting on the SA/LW visit. 
Williard